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The Southern Debate over the Passage of the Marshall Plan in Congress, 1947-1948

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The Southern Debate over the Passage of the Marshall Plan in Congress, 1947-1948

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
University of New Orleans
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
History

by

Traci Donellan Howerton

B.A. Nicholls State University, 2001

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Abstract

On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall spoke at Harvard University and unveiled his plan for a comprehensive recovery program for Europe after the destruction of World War II. The European Recovery Program, also known as the "Marshall Plan," was designed to alleviate the economic and political crisis taking place in Europe. It was also marketed as a weapon in the fight against the spread of communism. Because the Marshall Plan was received at home with mixed reviews, the job of the State Department was to sell the Marshall Plan, not only to Congress, but to the American people across the country. The focus of this paper is the regional debate in the South as to whether or not the Marshall Plan should be enacted.

Introduction

“We won the war for them twice –
and now they are asking us for more help.”
- *New York Times*, October 31, 1947

This paper focuses on the regional debate over the European Recovery Program (ERP), also known as the “Marshall Plan” in the deep, agricultural South. While the South tended to go along with the rest of the country in their opinions of foreign policy, the South was never so favorable to the Marshall Plan as the roll-call votes of their representatives in Washington would suggest. Southern public opinion may not have been as different from Northern thinking on these matters as the large differences in voting behavior of their Congressmen would lead one to believe, but what was different was the strong rhetoric coming out of the South during the debate over the passage of the Marshall Plan.¹ An analysis of the correspondence written to Senator Allen J. Ellender (D-LA) reveals that people in Louisiana had a wide range of reasons for supporting or opposing the Marshall Plan. While business owners were not entirely convinced they should support the Marshall Plan, they were still interested about profits to be made from participating in the foreign aid program if it were to be enacted. Women’s organizations were prone to support the plan based on humanitarian reasons, if nothing else. Many people in the South were concerned about the price tag that accompanied the Marshall Plan and felt that the money could be better spent in the poor South. Also, the fear of communism played a role in the South as well as in the rest of the country. Why was the South hesitant on passing the Marshall Plan? What, for example, were Senator Allen J. Ellender’s (D-LA), reservations ERP? Also, why was Congressman John E. Rankin (D-MS), so adamantly against the Marshall Plan? These are just a few of the questions I hope to answer.² In the end, the South would not pose a threat to the passage of the Marshall Plan. However, by the early 1960’s the South would come to

question the foreign aid policies of the United States and would turn out to be the most critical region of American economic programs abroad.

As with the rest of the country, public opinion played a major part in the South's debate on whether or not to pass the Marshall Plan. Propaganda was used throughout the country to gather support for the Marshall Plan. Business owners, women's groups, religious organizations, and the common people all seemed to have an opinion on the proposed ERP. What is of particular importance is the level of awareness and information available regarding the Marshall Plan. Many southerners, for various reasons, were uninformed on issues involving foreign affairs. One unskilled worker, when asked about foreign policy replied to an interviewer, "Foreign affairs! That's for people who don't have to work for a living."³ Those who were familiar with the plan often did not have enough information to make clear decisions. Apathy also played a major role in American public opinion during the debate over massive aid programs to Europe.

The following is an exploration into the debate over the Marshall Plan in the deep, agricultural South, and how it compared with the rest of the country's position on the issue of foreign aid. The key areas I will examine will be public opinion in the South, the use of the media, the fear of Communism, and the congressional debates. The debate over the Marshall Plan is one of the few times in history that there was bipartisan cooperation on the issue. This paper aims at giving a clear insight into the debate of the Marshall Plan in the deep, agricultural South and what led to the 20 to 3 vote in the Senate and 82 to 7 in the House, in favor of passing the plan.⁴ Such regional studies on public opinion on the Marshall Plan are hitherto rare in the scholarship on the Marshall Plan. Southern public opinion was in line with the rest of the

country. What did set the South apart, however, was the strong rhetoric coming out of the South regarding the ERP.

The United States emerged from World War II as the richest country on the globe and as possibly the greatest power the world had ever seen; at the same time, the nation found itself in a struggle for power with the Soviet Union. For the United States the objective of that struggle in Europe was the restoration of the balance of power, to be achieved by making Western European Nations strong enough to withstand internal communist subversion and external Soviet aggression. The United States used foreign aid to achieve this objective.⁵ “The escalating economic and political crisis in spring 1947 was the immediate cause for the decision to launch a comprehensive recovery program for Europe.”⁶ On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall spoke at Harvard University and gave his ideas for a widespread recovery program for Europe. Still devastated by World War II, Europe had just faced one of the worst winters on record. Marshall knew something had to be done to save Europe, both for humanitarian reasons and also to stop the spread of communism.⁷ In his address, Marshall stated that “Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.”⁸

The Marshall Plan was initially received at home with mixed reviews. Under the Marshall Plan, the United States offered up to 20 billion dollars for European aid, but only if the European nations involved could get together and draw up a joint plan on how they would use the aid.⁹ The objectives of the Marshall Plan were:

1. To halt the spread of communism in Europe;
2. To restore normal trade and commerce throughout the world;

3. To maintain true freedom of the individual;
4. To establish a durable peace.¹⁰

People all over the United States were concerned with the plan and the amount of money involved. The recent 3.75 billion dollar British Loan seemed to be a disaster and Congress was hesitant to put more money into another aid plan.¹¹ Proponents of the ERP tried to “sell” the Marshall Plan as a means of preventing the spread of communism. They also saw it as a vital economic measure which would help to maintain the conditions of national prosperity in the United States, while continuing America’s booming export trade. Some viewed the Marshall Plan as a chance to give aid to others in the tradition of American charity and generosity.

Opponents denounced the plan for several reasons, including its long term cost. Many felt that the money should be spent at home. Opponents on the right argued that the ERP would be ineffective in the battle against communism, criticized the massive export program it called for, and saw it as another example of a failure-ridden Truman administration foreign policy. Opponents on the left also objected to it as American economic and political imperialism. Committees were formed on both sides of the debate. Questions of national interest, government spending abroad, and the time frame of the Marshall Plan all made for heated debates.¹²

The Role of American Public Opinion

Americans have often viewed foreign policy matters as distant and confusing, and both policy-makers and the general public have responded to them, for the most part, with indifference. Americans have often tended to view foreign affairs as just that - “foreign.” If it does not hit close to home, then it is not important. This apathy has given way to involvement in the world occasionally, in moments of crisis, such as war or threats to national security. When

an international issue is considered to take on crisis proportions, it stimulates wide media coverage and is filled with elements of human drama and conflict and this, in turn, draws public attention. "Crises are generally brief and bounded, and the public tends to be highly attentive throughout." By contrast, noncrisis situations do not generally gain the public's attention immediately. Even if a noncrisis does gain awareness, the public normally do not stay interested for very long.¹³ One reason may be that noncrisis situations seem to last for long periods of time and not have definitive conclusions. Some issues are too complex for the broad public: "Issues such as nuclear arms control, international trade and monetary policy, environmental protection, and foreign aid have been on the political agenda for decades and will likely remain there for the foreseeable future."¹⁴ Also, these noncrisis situations often involve issues that seem distant to most Americans, and while media coverage may spark public attention for a brief amount of time, most people are quick to return their attention to domestic matters. Finally, the problem with foreign affairs issues are that they seem complex and remote to the general American population and if the problem does not directly involve them, it is unlikely that they will seek a better understanding of how the issue at hand may ultimately affect them.¹⁵ Overall, most Americans tend to be absorbed almost completely with private matters and their immediate economics interests.¹⁶

Lack of public interest in foreign affairs prompted a massive campaign to make Americans aware of the Marshall Plan. Committees were set up specifically for the purpose of educating both Congress and the public on the ERP. One such organization, the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery (CMP), became the principal instrument through which the State Department persuaded Congress and the people to go along with the Marshall Plan. Although the CMP passed itself off as a citizens' organization, it was not independent of

State Department influence and was said to be an external propaganda organization acting on behalf of the ERP.¹⁷

The information the CMP members provided to encourage public and congressional support for the ERP was in line with Marshall's speech at Harvard University. The committee's publications contained mainly generalities and failed to take precise stands on specific issues such as United States-Soviet relations, ERP administration, as well as likely negative implications for the United States' economy. The CMP members were also careful not to add openly to anti-communist feelings. By refusing to take sides on issues such as these, the CMP added to its bipartisan appeal and was successful in gaining support from citizens and national organizations from across the political spectrum.¹⁸

CMP members were in constant contact with congressmen and senators and often held public appearances to show their support for the ERP. The CMP eventually convinced Congress that they fully supported the Department of State and its plans for the ERP:

In close cooperation with the State Department and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the CMP provided and briefed witnesses for congressional hearings, thus demonstrating well the paternalism of prominent internationalists in their efforts to "educate the public" when they held the support of public opinion to be necessary. To do this, CMP members employed tested techniques that seemed to reveal a strong public consent by the American people for the Marshall Plan - a consensus did not necessarily exist, except among the ERP promoters. The efforts of CMP members illustrate the importance of public opinion in foreign policy but also show very clearly how government and private interest groups could manipulate this "opinion" for their own purposes.¹⁹

An example of this manipulated opinion is evident in the fact that although the CMP's original objective was to educate the public, its main influence was to persuade opinion leaders:

The committee's members paid attention to public opinion polls, but their definition of "public opinion" was rather selective. As with so many internationalists, they regarded as important only the opinions of those who could exert influence and vocal support on a

local or national level. Benjamin V. Cohen, longtime State Department advisor, stated succinctly the determining force behind the CMP's efforts: "Our foreign policy should represent not the polling of an uninformed public opinion, but the best thought that an informed public opinion will accept." Most CMP publications were therefore distributed to the foreign policy groups and reached those citizens already interested in foreign affairs. These people, in turn, armed with information, arguments, and data provided by the CMP, wrote letters to their senators and congressmen and helped the CMP to create the impression that the grass roots backed the ERP.²⁰

These efforts by the CMP covered up the fact that many did not jump on the bandwagon to support the ERP. "Any estimate of public opinion and especially rural opinion which was based solely or even mainly upon the public expressions of politicians, bankers, leading farmers and the like almost certainly would underestimate the degree of passive or active opposition to any multi-billion-dollar European aid."²¹

While groups such as the CMP did their best to educate the public on a crucial foreign policy matter, or at least to "seem" more aware of foreign policy on issues such as the Marshall Plan, a large number of Americans still did not know or care about foreign affairs.

Table 1: State of Public Information on Three Foreign Policy Issues 1946-1948²²			
Percentages per 100%			
<i>Issue</i>	<i>Uninformed</i>		<i>Informed</i>
	<i>Unaware</i>	<i>Aware</i>	
The British Loan Proposal	15%	60%	25%
The Greek-Turkish Aid	16%	47%	37%
The Marshall Plan Proposal	16%	70%	14%*

*As the Marshall Plan Discussion proceeded, the number of those informed was increasing, but at no time did it reach a figure that could be called encouraging.²³

Table 1 statistics indicate that when a particular issue of foreign policy is the big news of the moment, the number of people who are totally unaware is likely to drop, while the number of aware but uninformed and the number of informed, will increase. However, even when an issue has received a large amount of publicity, a large proportion of the population is still unaware and less than half are still found to be informed.²⁴

Throughout the fall of 1947, several articles ran in the *New York Times* regarding the South's view of the Marshall Plan. A story from Biloxi, Mississippi, stated "the Marshall Plan of rehabilitation of European countries appears to have generated little interest in the South at this time. . . Perhaps the best example of the southern attitude was expressed by a Tennessee housewife who declared: 'I saved the newspaper that gave most of the background when the Marshall Plan was announced and then I threw it away; I wish the newspapers would run it again.'"²⁵ This clearly illustrates that some people in the South were open to learning more information about the ERP. There were several indications that southerners would be open to an organization of facts and pertinent illustrations to convince them that they should support the proposed ERP. As of fall 1947, the newspapers in the South had been giving the Marshall Plan headline emphasis but the articles were lacking on details and information on why the plan came about. "The man-in-the-street knows definite action on such a plan is nearing and feels that the \$19,300,000,000 requested is an astronomical figure, but in most conversations he expresses a desire to be re-informed as to the reasons why he should endorse the Marshall Plan."²⁶

Being aware of a specific event does not necessarily mean that one is informed. Awareness only requires exposure through media outlets such as newspaper, radio, etc. Being informed means actually taking an active interest. If we examine the levels at which the public was informed versus aware/uninformed about the Marshall Plan we can break down who was

informed based on the following categories: sex, income, education, rural-urban, and region.

Table 2 illustrates these categories and the levels of knowledge with regards to the Marshall Plan. We are also able to see how the South compares to the rest of the country.

Table 2: Levels of Information on the Marshall Plan ²⁷				
Percentages per 100%		(Based on a Gallup Poll, February 1948)		
<i>Categories</i>	<i>Informed</i>	<i>Uninformed</i>		
	(Gave reasonably accurate statement of purposes of Plan)	<i>Aware</i>	<i>Didn't Know</i>	<i>Unaware</i>
		Thought it meant "Just help Europe"	its purpose	Had never heard or read anything about the Marshall Plan
Sex				
Men	16%	60%	11%	13%
Women	12%	49%	20%	19%
Income				
Wealthy	18%	72%	7%	3%
Average	15%	64%	12%	9%
Poor	12%	44%	21%	23%
Education				
College	20%	69%	8%	3%
High School	17%	53%	16%	14%
Grammar School or less	10%	41%	20%	29%
Rural-Urban				
Farm & Rural	13%	54%	15%	18%
Town & Sm. City	14%	53%	16%	17%
Metro. City	18%	54%	14%	14%
Region				
New England	16%	59%	10%	15%
Mid-Atlantic	17%	53%	15%	15%
Central	13%	52%	17%	18%
South & Southwest	12%	52%	16%	20%
Mountain & Pacific	17%	55%	14%	14%

Based on Table 2, we can see that while the South's numbers were not that different from the rest of the country, the South *was* the least informed on the Marshall Plan and had the highest percentage of people who had never heard of the ERP at all.

Of those in the South who were aware and even slightly informed, a mood of weariness with all European problems was widely apparent. Expressions of “. . . great reluctance to take up the obligations that are to be assumed to be coming inevitably under the Marshall Plan is running rather strongly through much of the south.”²⁸ There seems to have been no question that the South as a whole would support the Marshall Plan in Congress, however the degree of “. . . incipient hostility to it [was] so great that some Democratic administration politicians [were] conducting one of the most extraordinary non-domestic and off-year campaigns in the recent history of the south.”²⁹ These politicians often gave speeches on local problems in the South and incorporated in those speeches great stress upon the necessity for the restoration of the European economy as essential to continued success for the two great southern crops dependent on exports, tobacco and cotton.³⁰ By doing this, they created the notion that the Marshall Plan was vital to the economic success of the South. Even if the average farmer did not understand all the details of the ERP, he understood what it would mean to not have his crop exported. Of those who were informed of the ERP and what it entailed, many had strong opinions on both sides of the debate. Senator John J. Sparkman (D-AL), for example, was concerned about the kind of effect the Marshall Plan would have on the cotton market. He entered into the *Congressional Record* an editorial by the National Cotton Council of America in the February 6, 1948, issue of its publication *Cotton's Week*. The editorial stated that “apathy toward the plan and uncertainty about its fate have aroused concern on the part of some Southern Congressmen. They are pointing out that demand in this country, Europe, and China for United States cotton is strong and apparently will continue so for several years. [The] question is whether Europe and China also can raise dollars to buy cotton...If [the] Marshall Plan fails, surpluses are pretty certain to begin piling up within a couple of years. This would bring back problems with which [the] belt

is all too familiar: price supports, production controls, and like.”³¹ It was evident that the decision regarding passage of the Marshall Plan, would not be an easy one for Congress or the general population.

The Debate over the Marshall Plan in Congress & Public Opinion in the South

“Although the Administration had laid intricate groundwork for the Marshall Plan in the preceding six months, there was no certainty that Congress would approve when it began consideration early in 1948.”³² Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had his own concerns about the Marshall Plan; however, he knew the foreign aid program was something that could not be avoided. This was evident when he wrote to his wife that “I am reserving some doubts myself regarding some phases of [the Marshall Plan] – but in the main, I do not see how we can avoid the necessity of keeping ourselves insulated against world-wide Communism by maintaining these sixteen nations of the Western Union, and helping them to rebuild an anticommunist, self-supporting society.”³³ Vandenberg was also troubled by impressions he received during the debate over interim aid preceding the Marshall Plan bill. In another letter to his wife in December, 1947, Vandenberg expressed that “. . . if the resistance which is showing up to the little short-range European relief bill . . . is any criterion, our friend Marshall is going to have a helluva time down there when he gets to his long-range plan [sic].”³⁴ One of the many obstacles the Marshall Plan would have to face was the fact that it was up against a Republican Congress that insisted on reducing taxes and slashing government spending. There was also the concern in Congress as well as across America that the Marshall Plan would result in already scarce American goods being taken off the American market in order to facilitate foreign consumption. Additional concern dealt with

the question of whether success of the European Recovery Program would serve only to increase competition for American business.³⁵ The topic of the Marshall Plan made for many heated debates and long speeches throughout both houses of the 80th Congress. Representatives from the South had very strong opinions on the pending bill. Senator Harry F. Byrd (D-VA) and Congressman John E. Rankin (D-MS), strongly opposed the ERP, while Senator Allen J. Ellender (D-LA), voted in favor of the bill, but not without reservations about the high costs.³⁶

Vandenberg knew that the State Department "...must get the confidence of the American people or the plan would be sunk without a trace."³⁷ He stated in a letter to Clark M Eichelberger, Director of the American Association for the United Nations, Inc., that "I have no illusions about this so-called 'Marshall Plan.' ...furthermore, I certainly do not take for granted that American public opinion is ready for any such burdens as would be involved unless and until it is far more effectively demonstrated to the American people that this (1) is within the latitudes of their own available resources and (2) serves their own intelligent self-interest."³⁸

Of extreme importance, in gaining support in Congress for the Marshall Plan, were the many committees that had studied the conditions in Europe firsthand. "Many of these legislators, originally skeptical or hostile, returned from abroad converted to active support or at least passive acceptance of aid to Europe. While impressed with the suffering of people in need of food and shelter, most congressmen, reinforced by the nature of the Administration argument, supported European assistance, not as a humanitarian gesture, but as a Cold War measure."³⁹ In the spring of 1947, former President Herbert Hoover made a fact-finding mission to Austria and West Germany and the trip left no doubt in his mind that the economic assistance of the Marshall Plan was desperately needed. The tremendous food shortages required immediate help from America. Hoover argued "It may come as a great shock to American taxpayers that, having won

the war over Germany, we are now faced for some years with large expenditures for relief for these people. Indeed, it is something new in human history for the conqueror to undertake.”⁴⁰

While sympathy played a slight role in swaying some votes into favor for the ERP, others were not so easily convinced.

Senator Byrd firmly opposed the Marshall Plan, citing economic and military issues. Byrd was convinced that to take on the long-term commitment of restoring prosperity to western Europe, at any price, and to maintain the many other foreign-aid programs throughout the world, and back them up with the greatest peacetime military establishment ever in our history, would require a return to a wartime economy during a time of peace. Byrd was firm in his belief that the American democratic system, based on free enterprise, simply cannot survive under continuous wartime conditions in peacetime. He stressed that the financial stability of the United States is far more crucial for freedom in the world than any program of international subsidies which would severely strain our economy. Financial instability at home would serve our enemies and our financial soundness is the only hope for those countries seeking our help. Byrd was adamant in his statement that “if the fiscal stability of America weakens, the whole civilized world will fall.”⁴¹

Senator Byrd also referred to the money the United States had already loaned to our allies and what became of those loans. “Before we embark upon a long-range program of economic aid to Europe, it is certainly the better part of wisdom to review the results from the expenditures we have already made. Since the end of [World War II], independent of all military costs, the United States has contributed to foreign aid nearly \$18,000,000,000, yet the conditions in the countries receiving this aid appear today to be worse than when the expenditures began. And let

us recognize this fact: These expenditures may be camouflaged by calling them loans instead of grants, but not one single dollar is likely to be repaid.”⁴²

Byrd and Ellender, as well as several others in Congress, were weary of the ERP because of the money the United States had recently loaned Britain in 1946. The loan was not spent wisely on Britain’s part and, as a result, the economy was still in shambles. This experience made some in Congress hesitant to pour good money after bad into another foreign aid venture. Skeptics of the Marshall Plan often referred to it as “Operation Rathole” and pointed out the almost 15 billion dollars that has been spent in Europe for relief and reconstruction since 1945, yet by the end of 1947, Europe was in the same boat it was in at the end of World War II. The argument was that “...if these vast expenditures and appropriations have brought us today to a point where Europe is on the verge of collapse, how can we hope to save Europe by appropriations of money which, under any plan proposed, will probably be less on an annual basis than what we have been spending over the past two years?”⁴³

Senator Byrd also pointed out the failed attempts to help other countries through foreign aid. For example, in Greece one billion dollars was spent in a nation of seven million people, yet conditions in Greece did not improve. Since the end of World War II, the United States had given Turkey 150 million dollars, most of it for military purposes. On March 8, 1948, Turkey was preparing to ask for additional economic aid. Since the end of the war the United States provided more than 4.2 billion dollars in aid to France and Italy and they were seeking more assistance. “How long can this go on?” asked Senator Byrd and added: “Where is there reason to believe that new money under the recovery plan will produce more order out of the European chaos than did previous financial shots in the arm?”⁴⁴

Byrd stated that the way in which the ERP was being proposed was not on an incentive basis for the recipient countries to improve their own economies. By saying that the United States would pay the difference between their exports and imports, Americans were basically saying to them to make as little as they want and spend as much as they please and the United States would foot the bill. Senator Otto E. Passman (D-LA), was also a challenger of the proposed ERP. He stated that the United States had already spent approximately 16 billion dollars in foreign aid and with the ERP, we would be obligating ourselves to 16 billion dollars more in “. . .the vain oft-disproven theory that the recipients of this largesse will love us and fight for us. But why kid ourselves...you cannot disprove history nor the old adage, ‘You can’t keep a friend by loaning him money’.”⁴⁵

Mississippi Congressman Rankin’s position was that Washington should take care of its own people at home and not try to use communism as an excuse to send more aid to Europe. He felt that organized pressure was “being brought to bear continuously through the press and over the radio on Members of Congress to swallow the so-called Marshall Plan, without investigation or reservation.”⁴⁶ Rankin stated that there was not a country in Europe that was as deeply in debt as the United States. He also asked how Washington could possibly consider giving all this aid to Europe, yet “when asked for a small amount to begin the construction of one of the greatest inland waterway projects in America, that would not amount to a drop in the bucket compared to the amount they are asking us to put into Europe and Asia, we are told that we do not have the money.”⁴⁷ Rankin also felt that there was “practically no assurance that what we ship to Europe or to Asia will not ultimately fall into the hands of the Communists.” Rankin said that when he was asked at home in Mississippi how he stood on the Marshall Plan he replied that he first wanted to try out the “Rankin Plan.” His plan was “for those lazy people in Europe to sober up,

get out and go to work; then if they needed more money we should let them extend their own credits, and not ask us to add further to the load of the overburdened taxpayers of America.”⁴⁸

Rankin could not stand by and watch the taxpayers of America put their hard-earned dollars in the “sinkhole of Europe.” He said the “time has come for Americans, for their Congressmen, to respond to the call of duty and pass laws to protect America, and [get] the world to understand that we are going to look after our own country and our own people first.”⁴⁹ He could not see how the “staggering burden” this program would impose upon the American people could possibly benefit them in any way. Some of the statistics regarding the Marshall Plan that Congressman Rankin entered into the Congressional Record are listed in Table 3:

Table 3: The Marshall Plan means FREE to Europe the following:⁵⁰
13,200 trainloads of coal
11,300 trainloads of grain
10,200 trainloads of meat
4,900 trainloads of steel in the equivalent of steel ingots
4,100 trainloads of fats and oils
3,700 trainloads of sugar
1,500 trainloads of cotton
152,000 trucks, 26,000 freight cars and 200 more merchant ships in addition to the 800 we have already given away
\$500,000,000 electrical equipment
\$500,000,000 in new American oil refineries and pipelines
\$400,000,000 worth of American steel plants
\$2,200,000,000 in oil, gasoline and grease
\$1,200,000,000 in iron and steel

Rankin believed the items listed in Table 3 were needed at home and that the American people were not in the position-nor did they want to foot the bill for the Marshall Plan. The

bottom line was that “the Marshall Plan means \$7,000,000,000 of taxes in 1948 from all of us beyond what we would normally pay.”⁵¹ Rankin warned that “if we embark upon this kind of program, we will be turning the ship of state adrift upon an uncharted sea of unpredictable adventure that may end in national disaster.”⁵²

Louisiana Senator Ellender voted for the bill, but with some reservations. When Senator Ellender was first presented with the proposed Marshall Plan, he stated that he would not support the program unless there was included definite assurances that the countries involved would take the necessary steps to stabilize their currencies, balance their budgets, stop issuing currencies to help pay the operation of their respective governments, and remove the barriers which have prevented the normal flow of trade. He also urged that the Administration realize that the salvation of Western Europe lies in the extent to which the citizens of the 16 nations involved take the necessary measures to help themselves. “Those peoples must work; they must make sacrifices, and they must be made to realize that future help from our country will be dependent upon the extent to which they help themselves.”⁵³ Ellender stated that he was not oblivious of the serious effects which this program may have upon the United States’ economy and the dangers which may arise. However, he stated that these are risks that must be taken and that the ERP was the best possible solution under the current conditions. In several of his replies to letters from his constituents, Ellender admitted that he was not sure if he was making the right decision, he could only hope it was the best course of action. He also admitted his fear that there was no alternative to the ERP.⁵⁴

Citizens throughout Louisiana wrote to Senator Ellender to voice their concerns about the Marshall Plan. Julie Benjamin, of the New Orleans Section of the National Council of Jewish Women, wrote to Senator Ellender that “while our members of Congress are enjoying the luxury

of extended debate, the people of Europe are cold and hungry. Immediate and uncut appropriations are essential to the health and well-being of Europe's millions. . . ." C. J. Tricou, proprietor of Louisiana Hatcheries, stated "It appears to me that the entire program is being turned into a ponderous and complicated matter, when it is only necessary to apply simple reasoning to reach a conclusion. Assuming the tremendous importance of providing help [through the ERP] for France, Italy and Austria, we cannot send them more than we have It seems only a very simple matter to me that the answer is to send them what we can and let this go as far as it can to avoid upsetting our entire economic system" Ernie Simonds of Simonds' Radio Store wrote "Foreign markets are important to our economy BUT to get new business or to preserve existing business, businessmen have always had to limit on expenditure to accomplish such [sic]. This has always seemed the sensible way of operating a business. We think our government should operate on those proven rules insofar as foreign aid is concerned. As a citizen of our great free America, I for one don't want to see any European or Asiatic starve. Let's help them to help themselves and stop right there. In helping Europe, let's be careful not to hazard our own economy." David Markstein of Markstein and Associates was not as understanding as his fellow neighbors when he wrote to Senator Ellender "To my knowledge, there have been no public opinion polls on the subject of pouring good grain and money down the European drain – but if there were, I'll bet they'd show a majority in favor of letting Europe starve. As I am in favor of it. Why run up our cost of living here and eventually drag the U.S. down to the level of Europe?"⁵⁵

The Chairman of The Woman's Society of Christian Service of the First Methodist Church of Monroe, Louisiana, wrote to Senator Ellender that her group had just completed a class on the United Nations, focusing on aspects of economic world peace and they were writing

to express their support for the Marshall Plan. "The United States can ill afford in the name of a Christian nation to deviate from the principle of world collaboration which incorporates primarily a responsibility for fellowmen suffering from want and deprivation. To minister unto these millions of hungry peoples of Europe is an imperative necessity."⁵⁶

The outcome of the Marshall Plan bill would have an affect on businesses in the South in particular. One constituent from Shreveport, Louisiana, wrote to Senator Ellender regarding his feeling towards the proposed ERP:

From all indications it seems that the so called Marshall Plan is to receive primary consideration and while I am strongly opposed to any more loans or gifts to Europe, am very much afraid it will go over. It seems that the present administration is adopting the old New Deal tactics of raising a tremendous emergency just about election time so that ample funds will be available to vote it back into power. . . . If Truman gets the 4 ½ billion scheduled under the Marshall Plan, I believe it is safe to assume that the south may anticipate receiving little or nothing from it. You will no doubt recall that this was exactly the policy in the fall of 1940 when it was impossible for a manufacturer south of the Ohio River to get a defense contract of any kind – regardless of the price he may have quoted. The money all went into doubtful states. On the schedule of purchases to be made under the Marshall Plan I note that 10 million dollars worth of sawmill equipment will be bought in 1948, with an additional 32 million procured in the four succeeding years. While as stated above, I am entirely against the whole scheme, nevertheless it must be paid for with our tax money and if so, we would like to participate in the purchase of any sawmill and logging equipment which may be bought.⁵⁷

It seems that this constituent was hedging his bets – he was opposed to the Marshall Plan but still wanted his company to profit if the Marshall Plan bill was passed. It is evident that businessmen in the South just wanted their fair share of the Marshall Plan revenues. Who could blame them? Why should the rest of the country benefit from the ERP and not the South? Its tax dollars would be collected just like the rest of the country's would.

Senator Ellender's replies to the previous letters can best be summarized in a letter he wrote on December 15, 1947:

[. . .]Yes, I opposed the British loan, and subsequent events, I believe, have fully vindicated my position in the matter. Now we are being called upon to extend aid to other countries, and I hardly know what course to pursue.

I reluctantly voted for the interim aid bill which passed the Congress last week. I fear that the countries of Western Europe will take it for granted that the Congress will enact the Marshall Plan, since we are following the President as to a portion of his recommendations to the Congress regarding assistance to Europe.

The Marshall Plan contemplates an expenditure by our government of from sixteen to twenty-two billion dollars in the next five years. Our people will be further affected by having to pay billions of dollars more for their food and clothing for the reason that by dividing our own food supplies with our friends across the seas scarcities will be created here, causing prices to rise.

Ellender went on to say that he was spending a lot of time studying the various aspects of the program so that he would be prepared when Congress meet in its regular session the next year. He also expressed that he was open to suggestions and that he really need guidance like never before. In regards to the issue of Communism Ellender had this to say:

I am beginning to feel that many of the countries of Europe are using the bugaboo of Communism as a goad in seeking assistance from us. I find it hard to believe that the freedom-loving people of France would resort to Communism, or those of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Switzerland. I fear that with our enormous debt and will all we are called upon to do to assist our own people, we might be placing ourselves on the same level as the people we are trying to assist abroad, and if that should occur, then God pity the world.

Ellender felt that one of the main difficulties in Europe was that their currencies were not stable. Ellender stressed that progress could not take place until currency stabilization could be achieved in Europe and this was a measure that he would insist take place.⁵⁸

It is evident that Senator Ellender, like several senators in Congress at the time, was very uncertain of what action to take with regards to the Marshall Plan. Ellender opposed the British loan and thought it was a good decision. What was it about the Marshall Plan that changed his stance on foreign aid? Was it the fear of communism? Was it the humanitarian duty of the

United States to take care of their friends in trouble? It seems from the previous letters that his constituents were divided on the matter of the ERP as well. It is also interesting to consider gender when examining who was for and who was against the Marshall Plan. It seems that most urban, educated women were for the passage of the Marshall Plan, while men writing letters to Ellender tended to be weary of it.

The Louisiana Division of the American Association of University Women voiced their support of the Marshall Plan in the New Orleans *Times Picayune*. The association's committee on international relations considered the ERP to be of crucial importance to world peace. The association rated the ERP as having top priority from a domestic standpoint.⁵⁹ Women's groups regularly gathered to discuss the Marshall Plan and how it would affect Americans at home. Dr. Vernon X. Miller, dean of law at Loyola University, expressed his opinions of the ERP when he addressed the Louisiana Federation of Women's Clubs and the New Orleans Council of the Woman's Action Committee for Lasting Peace. Miller stressed the idea that Americans must realize how important the success of European recovery was here at home.⁶⁰ It was not uncommon for groups such as this to gather and debate the Marshall Plan and the aspects which they felt to be the most vital in affecting their organization or lives. Business owners wanted to profit from the Marshall Plan. The women's groups felt it was the United States' humanitarian duty to help those European countries who could not help themselves. Concern was also expressed over the resources in the United States and how helping Europe would affect the home front. While each individual or group had their own reasons for being for or against the Marshall Plan, one thing was certain: the fear of a brewing conflict with the Soviet Union played a large part in America's debate over the Marshall Plan.

The Role of Communism

“Though its wisest sponsors did not intend it, the ERP has been presented as a mixture of relief and anti-communism.”⁶¹ The debate within the community was evident every day when one opened the newspaper. Walter Lippmann’s *Washington Post* columns for days and even weeks at a time were devoted to the ERP. Lippmann, one of the most powerful opinion leaders of the time, viewed the Marshall Plan as the preface to a reunited Europe purged of the cold war and of foreign occupation armies. He was also aware of the fact that the administration was willing to use the fear of communism as a tool to pass the Marshall Plan through Congress. Lippmann wrote of the “notion held by some in Washington that the only way to win support of Congress for the Marshall Plan is to frighten it.”⁶² President Truman used such a strategy to gain support in Congress for his Truman Doctrine, and he would use the same approach again with the ERP.

Walter Lippmann analyzed the Marshall Plan from both sides of the debate. In his column, published in the *Times Picayune* on June 20, 1947, Lippmann went into detail on the debate over the ERP and some arguments both sides were discussing. He stated that if the subject of United States aid to Europe was debated in generalities, one would arrive at a series of unpromising contradictions. He pointed out that it is argued in one breath that we cannot afford to assist in effective rehabilitation of Europe. However, in the next breath, we denounce the spread of communism and declare our determination to stop the expansion of Russia. But, if the United States cannot afford to rehabilitate Europe, which may wind up costing six or seven billion dollars a year, then how can the United States talk as if they might resist Russia by war, when that would easily cost six billion dollars a month. Lippmann made it known that if

America cannot afford the cost of rehabilitation of our allies, then it makes no sense for us to talk as if we could go to war to defend them and ourselves.⁶³

The threat of communism became more of a reality when in February 1948, Communists seized the government of Czechoslovakia – the last outpost of democracy in Eastern Europe. The Prague coup sent a war scare through Washington and prompted Truman to demand “. . . quick action on the Marshall Plan as a weapon in the war against communism.”⁶⁴ Truman went on to compare Stalin to Hitler and said the “tragic death” of the Czechoslovakia Republic was just the latest example of communist hostility. He called upon the American people to “. . . accept their mission as defenders of democracy everywhere, and urged them to make the sacrifices that such a mission required, including the sacrifice of time and money for a larger military establishment. Specifically, Truman demanded the immediate passage of the Marshall Plan. . . .”⁶⁵

Lippmann’s initial reaction to the Prague coup was panic and fear. However, after reflecting on the situation for a few weeks, Lippmann decided that the Russians were not looking to start a conflict. Six months later, Lippmann admitted to his readers that he overreacted and that the Prague coup was not a preparation for war. He felt that the coup hardly demonstrated that the Russians were planning to march on Western Europe. He said that the administration had earlier written off Czechoslovakia as little more than a Russian satellite. However, “. . . the administration desperately needed a crisis to sell the Marshall Plan and the rearmament program the Pentagon had long been pushing. The Prague coup was a gift from Providence. . . .”⁶⁶

Shortly after the hysteria over the coup, Congress quickly came up with the down payment on the Marshall Plan, restored the draft, and doubled the Air Force budget.⁶⁷

When confronted with the threat of communism, southern dedication to internationalism and faith in the United Nations (UN) as a peacekeeping organization faded quickly and the South's rigid anticommunism came to the front. In August 1946, seventy-four percent of southerners predicted another world war within twenty-five years. In 1947, seventy-eight percent of southerners predicted war within ten years. "Consistent with this pessimistic outlook concerning world peace and a determination to confront Communists threats, southerners emphasized a strong defense and the direct response to perceived Soviet threats rather than participation in the UN. Nationalism and unilateral action took precedence over international cooperation."⁶⁸

A strong advocate of the ERP and a firm believer in the Communist threat was Senator Pete Jarman (D-AL). Senator Jarman stressed the need to act before World War III approaches. He entered into the *Congressional Record* an editorial that he felt best summed up his position on the ERP. It stated that as far as the United States was concerned there must be prompt, favorable action on the Marshall Plan. Without this prompt action the countries of Europe would not be able to save themselves from Russian control. If Russian domination took place in Europe then Americans would have to fear for their long-term future, not to mention the happiness and peace of the entire world. The threat of communism was incorporated into the Marshall Plan debate and described as the reason for the plan to be swiftly voted on. Proponents made it sound as if the future of the world hung solely on the fate of the Marshall Plan. Senator Hale Boggs (D-LA), believed in the Communist threat and the importance of the Marshall Plan in the fight against communism. Boggs stated "we have faced the fact that unless there is unified action on the continent of Europe by free peoples and free nations of Europe, that one by one they will be overwhelmed by communism, and one by one they will be plucked off." He stressed

that the “very essence of this legislation is to stop Russian aggression and Russian encroachment throughout the free nations of Europe.”⁶⁹

Perhaps the strongest supporter of the Marshall Plan in Congress was Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI), the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He used the Russian threat as the basis for most of his discussions regarding the Marshall Plan.

Most at the time would agree that Senator Vandenberg’s warnings were real. A March

Washington Evening Star editorial stated:

Senator Vandenberg has not strayed into a land of hobgoblin make-believe in appealing to Congress for swift adoption of the Marshall Plan to help stop World War III before it starts. The dark realities of the hour fully justify the note of alarm and urgency in his eloquence. A ruthless and vaulting ambitious tyranny – the tyranny of Red totalitarianism – is on the march. If it is allowed to keep marching, then the chances are that on some tomorrow, not many years from now, there will be a titanic death struggle between it and what is left of the earth’s free nations, meaning chiefly our own.⁷⁰

This threat of communism was enough to scare some into going along with Marshall Plan, no matter what the cost. Others were not so convinced. One of Ellender’s constituents wrote to him that he did not care if Europe was starving and being threatened by communism. “. . . As to the old business about combating communism with food, I believe that if Europe is going communist, then let the Europeans be hungry communists.”⁷¹

The Marshall Plan seemed to gain its greatest strength, not from any feelings of duty or humanitarian obligation that other people should be helped for their own sake, but only as a demonstration against the spread of communism. The administration was fully aware that there was a considerable minority in the United States, however politically unsophisticated otherwise, that fully understood from their recent war service the military implications of the spread of communism.⁷² In March 1948, *Cosmopolitan Magazine* ran an article examining the threat of communism as a reason to pass the Marshall Plan and whether or not this was a valid argument

for the foreign aid bill. The article stated that if the threat of communism to Western Europe was indeed a valid argument then "Britain's 32 percent share in the funds must be automatically excluded from this claim. No one has even suggested that the British people are on the verge of voting Communist under any circumstances." The article also argued that this was equally true for nine more of the other 15 countries involved: Ireland, Iceland, Denmark, Portugal, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. These countries combined represented 5,000,000,000 of the total amount of aid for Europe requested. For countries in which the communist threat was real, the article concluded:

The Communist problem in two other countries involved, Austria and Greece, is commonly conceded to be military, not economic. This means that anti-communism appeal for us to buy the plan is largely confined to France and Italy, where communism has been consistently losing ground in the grass roots for over 2 years; and western Germany where the last Communist vote was 7 percent, Turkey, 4 percent. Once revealed on a country-by-country basis the anti-communism angle in the overall, all-or-nothing seventeen-billion-dollar presentation takes on a different aspect. And, in any case, few military men would care to argue that dollars alone would be effective if the Red Army marched.⁷³

Whether this threat of a Russian takeover of Europe was real or not, one thing is certain: overall, as the most persuasive propaganda tool, the fear of communism played the most significant role in gaining favorable support for the ERP.

Cartoon 1⁷⁴



Cartoon 1 demonstrates the small price of 19 billion dollars for peace with the Marshall Plan versus the chaos and mess, not to mention the 331 billion dollar cost of war. Senator Vandenberg said it best when he stated “peace is cheaper than war.”⁷⁵ The cartoon depicts the opinion that if the Marshall Plan was not passed, the world may face World War III.

Conclusion: The Marshall Plan and the South

The European Recovery Program was presented to the American public as a vital measure of economic and political stabilization which would prevent Communist infiltration of Western Europe. The Marshall Plan was sold as contributing to peace and as a step which might, in a period of a few years, make further American aid unnecessary. “It is now evident that something less than optimum achievement under the Marshall Plan will be forthcoming and that demands on American financial resources will continue long after the end of the four year period.”⁷⁶ The reservations throughout the South regarding the Marshall Plan did not prevent its passage, or even create great opposition to the ERP from southern congressional leaders. However, by the late 1950’s, the South’s increasing refusal to support internationalist projects

was apparent in the region's growing opposition to foreign aid. Although the South had provided strong support for the early containment policies, they had always questioned the foreign aid components. This ambivalence soon turned to solid and often aggressive opposition during the later Truman years. "By 1962 the South had become the region most critical of U.S. foreign aid policies."⁷⁷ In 1952, Ellender wrote, "Frankly, my feeling is that we should cut out all economic aid to Western Europe, except possibly for Austria and Western Germany."⁷⁸

Looking back on the perceived threat of communism, Senator Ellender, in 1953, suggested that ". . . much of the fear of Communism resulted from 'outsiders who stir up trouble, especially the English and French who spread propaganda in the hope of scaring Congress into giving more economic aid'."⁷⁹ Senator Passman was not as polite as Senator Ellender on the matter. In 1958, Passman told a representative of the State Department, "Son, I don't smoke and I don't drink. My only pleasure in life is kicking the shit out of the foreign aid program of the United States of America [sic]."⁸⁰

The Marshall Plan was popularized in much of the southern press as a measure designed to combat communism. One may conclude from the tendency more widespread in the archconservative South than in other regions during the Cold War to perceive world affairs as primarily a struggle with the Soviets, feeling strongly that the United States' opposition to communism was mandatory, southerners in favor of the ERP were more inclined to mention to survey interviewers stopping the communist threat in Europe as the major objective of the Marshall Plan.⁸¹

The question of why the South ultimately supported the ERP, despite its reservations with the plan, has several answers. First, arguments for southern support and opposition were not dissimilar to those from other regions of the United States. As elsewhere in America, opposition

to the Marshall Plan was often concentrated among those people who knew little or nothing about the ERP, or cared little about world affairs in general for that matter. This group of people consisted of the typically poorly educated and otherwise underprivileged. Since the South contained disproportionately large numbers of these uneducated people, better educated southerners were usually more inclined to support the Marshall Plan than those with roughly the same educational background in the north.⁸²

Another factor which encouraged southern approval of the Marshall Plan dealt with the economically developed, modern nature of these countries which had been devastated by World War II. The South knew that eventually these European countries would again be good customers of southern agricultural exports, such as cotton. It was assumed that as soon as Europe was back on its feet, business as usual would resume.

Communism, national interests and humanitarian obligation are just a few of the factors that eased the South into reluctantly accepting the passage of the Marshall Plan. While underlying reservations over the ERP never faded, the ultimate outcome was that the Marshall Plan worked.

Judgments of the Marshall Plan have varied dramatically. Some scholars have celebrated it as a unique act of international idealism that rescued a politically and economically beleaguered Europe. Others have perceived it as Cold War diplomacy intended to bolster a U.S. economy dependent on exports, contain the Soviet Union economically, and promote U.S. geostrategic supremacy. Still others have seen it as part of a U.S. long-term liberal corporatist effort to reshape Western Europe in America's image. Regardless of view, historians have judged that the Marshall Plan was far more constructive than the Truman Doctrine and that ERP became a cornerstone of a half century of Western European democratic stability and increasing political and economic cooperation, if not integration. The Marshall Plan has also endured, if only symbolically, as a prototype for galvanizing underdeveloped, or newly liberated, economies around the globe.⁸³

Almost sixty years have passed since the European Recovery Program was debated in Congress and across America. Today the ERP is revered as one of the greatest foreign aid

programs in history. The Marshall Plan has since set the precedent for all aid programs throughout the world. Without the Marshall Plan, Western Europe would not be where it is today economically, politically or socially. The South made its contribution to this happy outcome in spite of the deep division in the region about passing this massive foreign aid program.

Notes

¹ Alfred O. Hero, Jr., *The Southerner and World Affairs* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 197.

² I faced many difficulties researching my topic due to post-Hurricane Katrina conditions in New Orleans, Louisiana. While I had hoped to view the papers of Congressman Hale Boggs, I was unfortunately unable to research his papers because of damage to Tulane University's Special Collections due to Hurricane Katrina. I had also anticipated viewing Mississippi Congressman John E. Rankin's papers; however, they are currently closed to the public.

³ Martin Kriesberg, "Dark Areas of Ignorance," in: Lester Markel, ed., *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 54.

⁴ Joseph A. Fry, *Dixie Looks Abroad: The South and U.S. Foreign Relations 1789-1973* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002), 230.

⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1950), 122.

⁶ Guenter Bischof, "Der Marshall-Plan in Oesterreich/The Marshall Plan in Austria," in: Technisches Museum Wien, ed., *Oesterreich Baut Auf/Rebuilding Austria* (Vienna: Technisches Museum 2005), 25.

⁷ U.S. Department of State, "Cold War Issues: The Marshall Plan (1947)," <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/57.htm> (accessed April 24, 2005).

⁸ "The Marshall Plan Speech, 5 June 1947," in: Jussi M. Hanhimaki and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 122.

⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Cold War Issues: The Marshall Plan (1947)," <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/57.htm> (accessed April 24, 2005).

¹⁰ *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 94, Part 12, June, 1948, Appendix, A4440.

¹¹ Southern congressmen had reservations about the 1946 British loan. There was much debate within Congress. Most southern papers and key representatives endorsed the loan. Proponents emphasized that Great Britain was among the South's foremost export customers and that the British would help the United States promote its free-trade agenda. The influence of wartime cooperation and Anglophile tendencies reinforced this economic motivation. Opponents stated that they were "tired of the idea of being a Santa Claus to the British." Some congressmen objected to foreign aid in general and worried about its effect on the federal budget. Richard Russell (D-GA), voiced the South's nationalist and unilateralist inclinations. Russell argued that the United States should retain key military bases and he refused to vote for the British loan without territorial compensation from Great Britain. Seven of seventeen southern senators and thirteen of eighty-six southern representatives voted against the British loan, see Fry, *Dixie Looks Abroad*, 226-227.

¹² Harold L. Hitchens, "Influences on the Congressional Decision to Pass the Marshall Plan," *The Western Political Quarterly* 21 (March 1968): 51.

¹³ T. Knecht, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (September 2006): 709.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 710.

¹⁶ James Christoph, "American Public Opinion and Europe in the Marshall Era," *The American Review* 2 (March 1963): 12.

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- ¹⁷ Michael Wala, "Selling the Marshall Plan at Home: The Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery," *Diplomatic History* 10 (Summer 1986): 247-48.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 262.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 248.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 263-264.
- ²¹ "Many Over Nation Oppose Foreign Aid," *New York Times*, October 31, 1947, 4.
- ²² Kriesberg in *Public Opinion*, 52.
- ²³ *Ibid.*
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵ John N. Popham, Special to the *New York Times*, *New York Times*, September 28, 1947, E6.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*
- ²⁷ Based on a Gallup Poll, February 1948 cited in: Kriesberg in *Public Opinion*, 55.
- ²⁸ "Southerners Balk on Helping Europe," *New York Times*, October 20, 1947, 4.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*
- ³¹ *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 94, Part 9, January 6-March 5, 1948, Appendix, A829.
- ³² Susan Hartmann, *Truman and the 80th Congress* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 159.
- ³³ Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 378-79.
- ³⁴ Hartmann, *80th Congress*, 159.
- ³⁵ Vandenberg, *Senator Vandenberg*, 375.
- ³⁶ *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 94, Part 2, February 20-March 15, 1948, 2742; Thomas A. Becnel, *Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana: A Biography* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 143.
- ³⁷ Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Statesman* (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1987), 239.
- ³⁸ Vandenberg, *Senator Vandenberg*, 381.
- ³⁹ Hartmann, *80th Congress*, 120.
- ⁴⁰ Hans-Jurgen Schroder, "Marshall Plan Propaganda in Austria and West Germany," in: Guenter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Dieter Stiefel, eds., *The Marshall Plan in Austria* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 215.
- ⁴¹ *Congressional Record*, 2742.

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- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Allen W. Dulles, *The Marshall Plan*, Michael Wala, ed. (Providence: Berg Publishers, Inc., 1993), 96.
- ⁴⁴ *Congressional Record*, 2743.
- ⁴⁵ *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 94, Part 9, January 6–March 5, 1948, Appendix, A544.
- ⁴⁶ *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 94, Part 1, January 6–February 19, 1948, 437.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ⁴⁸ *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 94, Part 3, March 16–April 8, 1948, 3634–3635.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., 3635.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., 3636
- ⁵¹ Ibid., 3638.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 94, Part 2, February 20–March 15, 1948, 2747.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵⁵ Letter from Julie Benjamin, December 18, 1947; C.J. Tricou, November 20, 1947; Ernie Simonds, December 6, 1947; David Markstein, November 15, 1947 all in Allen J. Ellender Papers, Box 593, Folder 20. Allen J. Ellender Archives, Ellender Memorial Library, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana.
- ⁵⁶ E.P. Cudd to Ellender, December 15, 1947, Box 593, Folder 20, Ellender Papers
- ⁵⁷ C.S. Finegan to Ellender, November 4, 1947, Box 593, Folder 20, Ellender Papers
- ⁵⁸ Ellender to John T. Mendes, December 15, 1947, Box 593, Folder 20, Ellender Papers
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- ⁶⁰ “Marshall Plan Study is Urged,” *The Times Picayune*, February 20, 1948, 36.
- ⁶¹ Walter Lippmann, “Falling into the Doldrums,” *The Times Picayune*, February 11, 1948, 10.
- ⁶² Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 448, 451–452.
- ⁶³ Walter Lippmann, “Generalities About U.S. Aid,” *The Times Picayune*, June 20, 1947, 10.
- ⁶⁴ Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945–1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 94–95.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid., 146.
- ⁶⁶ Steel, *Walter Lippmann*, 452.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Fry, *Dixie Looks Abroad*, 226.

⁶⁹ *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 94, Part 3, March 16-April 8, 1948, 3645.

⁷⁰ *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 94, Part 9, January 6–March 5, 1948, Appendix, A1373.

⁷¹ Markstein to Ellender, November 15, 1947. Box 593, Folder 20, Ellender Papers

⁷² “Marshall Plan Faces Under-Cover Opposition,” *New York Times*, November 2, 1947, E3.

⁷³ *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 94, Part 3, March 16-April 8, 1948, 3638.

⁷⁴ “Marshall Plan Faces Under-Cover Opposition,” *New York Times*, November 2, 1947, E3.

⁷⁵ Vandenberg, *Senator Vandenberg*, 387.

⁷⁶ Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), 21.

⁷⁷ Fry, *Dixie Looks Abroad*, 251.

⁷⁸ Becnel, *Senator Allen Ellender*, 188.

⁷⁹ Fry, *Dixie Looks Abroad*, 252.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Hero, *The Southerner*, 201.

⁸² Ibid., 199.

⁸³ Arnold A. Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 185-186.

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Vita

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