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“A Matter of Personal Pride”: How African American Football All-Stars Exposed Bigotry in New Orleans, including Didactic Considerations and Lesson Plans

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“A Matter of Personal Pride”
How African American Football All-Stars Exposed Bigotry in New Orleans, including Didactic Considerations and Lesson Plans

Diplomarbeit
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Magisters
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Innsbruck, New Orleans, April 2020
Dedications

I dedicate this work to my parents, Anna and Thomas, my step-grandmother, Siglinde, and my girlfriend, Jacqueline, who have always supported me unconditionally.
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Abstract

Throughout African American history, sport has played a major role in promoting integration and full participation in American society beyond the playing fields or courts. In the 1960s, after the first wave of African American athletes entering the white-dominated collegiate and professional sports leagues, active forms of protest against racial inequality in the US became gradually more relevant. Though in relatively small numbers, some African American athletes across various sports have used their privileged situation to voice the need for a revision of the system which has failed to represent and serve their people throughout American history.

This paper focuses on the boycott of the American Football League (AFL) All-Star Game in New Orleans after African American ball players experienced racial discrimination in the Crescent City. Their decisive action led the league officials to move the game to Houston, but, of course, also impacted New Orleans’ reputation and prestige in a rapidly changing America. Through an analysis of newspaper discourse, this diploma thesis attempts to reconstruct how public opinion about this incident was shaped. Moreover, it will be discussed how the boycott impacted race relations in New Orleans and how the protest became a part of public memory in recent years.
Introduction and Historiography

The 1960s may well be regarded as a decade of drastic transition in American history. US-foreign policy and diplomacy were dominated by the Cold War and the fight against the spread of communism, most notably in Vietnam. The world was at the brink of nuclear escalation during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The following year, America had to overcome the assassination of President John F. Kennedy while slowly adapting to the ground-breaking societal change his short tenure had wrought. This change, however, was by no means carried by the political establishment alone, it was the result of very complex and diverse bottom-up processes and movements, which reflected the Zeitgeist of the American public in the 1960s.

A “new mood”\(^1\), as Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. is quoted in Michael W. Flamm & David Steigerwald, encouraged mostly, but not exclusively, young people to voice their dissatisfaction with the prevailing social order on the streets. Activism was the dictate of the moment spanning the whole political spectrum. Arguably, the intensity and the extent of these multi-faceted movements have led to a renegotiation of American identity and culture and shaped the American public, its core beliefs and its legal and political reality to this day. Unsurprisingly, this period, which revealed such broad ideological tensions but also offered so much progression and optimism, has been subject to mystification.\(^2\)

In this sense, it may appear bold to claim that the spirit of the 1960s is encapsulated in one single event, i.e. the boycott of the 1965 American Football League (henceforth AFL) All-Star Game by African American players protesting racial discrimination in the city of New Orleans, Louisiana. The validity of this claim becomes evident, however, when one situates the importance of this incident in the context of the civil rights movement, which reached its peak during the 1960s.

This particular exhibition game arguably received more critical media attention than comparable All-Star showdowns before. Newspapers across the US covered the actions of the players and the league commissioner, who deliberately sent a strong political message to segregationists and reactionaries that they would not tolerate mistreatment based on race. The

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\(^1\) Michael W. Flamm/David Steigerwald, Debating the 1960s. Liberal, Conservative, and Radical Perspectives (Debating twentieth-century America), Lanham, Md.-Plymouth 2007, p. 3.

ways in which their boycott was then interpreted and presented to the public differed widely depending on specific characteristics of the examined newspapers. Consequently, this leads to the question of how these selected newspapers participated in the framing of the boycott. The analyses focus on the content of these sources, the type of text (informative articles vs. opinion-forming editorials or columns), and which aspects and perspectives of the boycott were predominantly presented to influence public opinion.

This paper argues that news coverage in the North was rather neutral or supportive, while southern newspapers responded very negatively to the players’ protest. To varying degrees, northern newspapers did address concerns of racial discrimination in New Orleans whereas southern journalists were more likely to attack and discredit the actions taken by the athletes and the AFL. They rather focused on the negative effects of the boycott on race relations in the ‘Big Easy’ and the backlash the players’ actions may provoke. In contrast, the boycott was identified as an important episode of the civil rights struggle by African American journalists, who applauded the emerging political power of black athletes. Through this analysis, the emotionalization of the public debate on racial injustice during this period becomes evident. It is also shown that sport was successfully used as a platform for political activism, while also revealing the deep division of the American society regarding one of the most pressing question of that time: how can racial equality be achieved?

Moreover, this thesis attempts to illustrate how the 1965 AFL All-Star Game boycott affected race relations and the legal framework of New Orleans after the initial media attention had waned. Arguably, the AFL incident left its imprint on the negotiations for a pro-football franchise in 1966, after Louisiana’s political elite helped manage to push through the merger of the AFL and National Football League (NFL) in the United States Congress. Without much notice by the media, African American civic leaders lobbied for black participation within the newly-founded New Orleans Saints, who have since become a vital part of the city’s community identity. In the latter half of the 1960s, racist incidents such as the AFL boycott would create so much negative publicity for New Orleans that the city’s image as a popular tourist destination was seriously threatened. In 1969, shortly before yet another nationally-televised sporting spectacle –Super Bowl IV– city politics eventually responded to the prevailing segregationist practices by some businesses in town and agreed upon a new public accommodation ordinance to fight racial discrimination.
Another part of this thesis will be dedicated to recent developments regarding public memory of the AFL walkout. It will be shown how the Historic New Orleans Collection, a museum and research center in the French Quarter, presented the protest in an exhibition dealing with the city’s multi-faceted sport history. The exhibit also underlined the importance of sports to challenge racism and segregation in New Orleans during the civil rights movement. Thus, they contributed to a critical reflection of the city’s historical shortcomings in that respect.

This thesis relies heavily on digitized newspapers as primary sources, which were accessible via various digital archives. These include the Times-Picayune (New Orleans, Louisiana), the Advocate (Baton Rouge, Louisiana), the Shreveport Times (Shreveport, Louisiana), and the Clarion Ledger (Jackson, Mississippi) as examples of news coverage in the American South. The New York Times (New York, New York) – one of the most prestigious national newspapers, the Pittsburgh Courier (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) and the Washington Afro-American (Washington, D.C.) are analyzed to deconstruct reportage of the incident in the North. Moreover, articles or essays from Jet, one of the most influential African American magazines, and Sports Illustrated, a leading sport magazine, are also part of this survey. In total, the analysis covers 73 articles related to the AFL incident and the subsequent developments in New Orleans’ sport and civil rights history. Other valuable sources are the NAACP New Orleans papers, stored at the Special and Louisiana Collection at the Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans, and the Jack Kemp papers, stored at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.

To gain further first-hand insights into the dynamics of the civil rights movement, oral history interviews are conducted with former New Orleans NAACP Youth Council president, Raphael Cassimere, and civil rights activist, scholar and author, Richard Lapchick. Cassimere joined the local NAACP in 1960, became the first African American professor at the University of New Orleans in the early 1970s, and is a recognized expert on New Orleans’ civil rights history. Lapchick got involved in civil rights activism through his experience as a promising basketball player and organized the boycott of the South African tennis team at the Davis Cup in Nashville, Tennessee in 1978. Shortly after his involvement in the protests against the Apartheid regime, he was physically attacked in his university office and accused of having self-inflicted the wounds by the police and media.

Within this introductory chapter, the most relevant academic contributions in the field of sport and civil rights history will also be addressed. This will help understand the historical
context of the players’ protest. The general demands and methods of the civil rights movement will be outlined, which necessarily leads to an examination of the conflict between moderate and radical forms of activism. It will also be discussed how the 1964 Civil Rights Act impacted life and race relations in New Orleans and how local and state politics approached desegregation efforts in the Deep South.

Research on this field of interest has been conducted by quite a few scholars across various scientific disciplines, including history, African American studies, sociology and political science. David Kenneth Wiggins and Patrick B. Miller compiled an extensive documentary history of the African American experience in sport, starting in the pre-Civil War era and ending at the turn of the 21st century. Their study was made as an “attempt to link the ideas of many specialists in sport studies, as well as social history and cultural commentary, to broader patterns of development in African American history, specifically the campaign by black Americans to become full participants in the social, economic, and political life of the nation.” Wiggins and Miller successfully consider the African American perspective by relying on first-hand documentations or essays by black commentators and intellectuals.

Chapter 6 deals with the ties between sport and civil rights, including an essay by former African American basketball star Chet Walker on his experiences in the Deep South and discussions about the legitimacy of the famous 1968 Olympic Games protest by Tommie Smith and John Carlos.

In a separate article, Wiggins examines “the efforts made by African Americans to compete with and against their white counterparts on an equal basis in highly organized sport in the USA”. He provides an historical overview of events and iconic figures that have paved the way for African Americans to become highly successful and widely respected athletes. Wiggins points out that sport plays a major role in African American communities, as it is perceived by many as one of only few options to escape poverty. However, full participation in America’s most popular sports has not been reached yet because of the apparent lack of representation in organizational and controlling top positions. Seen as a legacy of slavery, racism and structural differences still accompany many African American athletes throughout

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3 David Kenneth Wiggins/Patrick B. Miller (Eds.), The Unlevel Playing Field. A Documentary History of the African American Experience in Sport (Sport and society), Urbana-Great Britain 2003.
4 Ibid., p. 2.
5 Ibid., pp. 269-314.
their careers, despite their success and involvement in expanding specific sports nationally and internationally.\textsuperscript{7}

Michael E. Lomax edited a collection of articles which address the African American and Latino experience in recent sport history.\textsuperscript{8} One article, written by Maureen Smith, explicitly deals with the 1965 AFL All-Star boycott in New Orleans, focusing on the “evolving race consciousness within the context of an emerging professional football league seeking legitimacy”.\textsuperscript{9} This article thoroughly reconstructs the impact of the AFL and Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) as a talent pool for aspiring young African American athletes, the risks that the protesting players took to contribute to a broader civil rights struggle in New Orleans, and the consequences they faced. She identifies the boycott as “a precedent for hundreds of African American athletes who would make similar use of sport in the latter half of the 1960s”.\textsuperscript{10} This thesis can be understood as an extended discussion of the public reaction via the media and the long-term effects of the boycott for race relations in the city.

Lomax further analyzes the history of African Americans in professional football, with an emphasis on the post WWII era, during which the National Football League (NFL) has emerged as the most prestigious organization for professional gridiron football in the USA.\textsuperscript{11} The end of the war also marked the beginning of a slow process of reintegration of black athletes, who had formerly been excluded from participation due to racial segregation, into professional football. Lomax also highlights the efforts made by civil rights groups, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), to apply pressure to team owners who were reluctant to add African American athletes to their rosters.\textsuperscript{12} In the wake of the civil rights movement during the 1960s, athlete activists became important spokespersons against structural racism in the sport industry. The assertion that black athletes had contributed to a more just and equal society also drew interest among the scientific community during the 70s, mostly in the form of sociological inquiries of the effect

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{7} Ibid., p. 195.
\bibitem{10} Ibid., p. 4 f.
\bibitem{12} Ibid., p. 165.
\end{thebibliography}
of integration on athletes after their active careers. It was also analyzed whether external pressure by civil rights activists or economic motives (to gain competitive advantage over other professional leagues) were the main reason for desegregation.\textsuperscript{13} It is shown, however, that acts of desegregation in the sport industry have often coincided with broader public movements. Thus, athlete activism can be regarded as “both a reflection and extension”\textsuperscript{14} of such debates.

An extensive history of the American Football League – particularly focusing on the “contributions of African American players to the development of this successful league”\textsuperscript{15} was written by Charles K. Ross. He argues that the AFL, which was launched in 1959, “profoundly changed pro football”\textsuperscript{16} in that they actively recruited talented African American football players, especially from Historical Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), and gave them the opportunity to showcase their abilities. The AFL kickstarted this revolution of the game and pushed its well-established rival league, the National Football League (NFL), to acknowledge the potential of black players as well. Ross dedicates one chapter of his book to the 1965 All-Star Game boycott and emphasized that the act of protest and the subsequent relocation of the contest were the first of its kind. Yet, other vocal athletes of the 1960s have certainly attained more recognition as prime examples of civil rights activism in sport.\textsuperscript{17}

Similarly, Richard C. Crepeau authored a chronological history of the NFL.\textsuperscript{18} Roughly broken down into three large sections, Crepeau reconstructs the history of the league from its formative years to the modern era. Especially the chapters covering Pete Rozelle’s tenure as the league’s commissioner offer valuable insights into the developments during the civil rights movement and the rivalry with the AFL.

While the authors mentioned above put their works in a larger historical context, more recent studies have investigated the impacts of the so-called national anthem protest launched by currently unemployed NFL-Quarterback Colin Kaepernick in 2016. Evelyn Stratmoen, Tiffany J. Lawless and Donald A. Saucier\textsuperscript{19} focused their survey on individual perceptions of

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 166.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 173.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 75.
\textsuperscript{18} Richard C. Crepeau, NFL Football. A History of America's New National Pastime (Sport and society), Urbana 2014.
protesting pro-athletes, examining “the influence of individual differences in the propensity to make attributions to prejudice (PMAP) and adherence to masculine honor beliefs (MHBs)”\textsuperscript{20}. The results of their study show that individual reactions to player protests highly correlate with those two attributes. Accordingly, people who strongly believe in masculine honor concepts, which is described as the “man’s responsibility […] to protect himself, his reputation, family, community, and property against threat and insult, using aggression if necessary”\textsuperscript{21}, regard acts of protest (especially by members of a minority) as disrespectful and inappropriate. These beliefs are said to be more common in the American South. On the contrary, people who make attributions to prejudice, i.e. the assumption that prejudice might have an influence on the behavior of police officers towards African Americans are more likely to conclude that the protests were against racial inequality and not against patriotism.\textsuperscript{22}

These findings are useful as they contribute to the understanding of public responses to contemporary political activism by African American athletes.

In their 2017 study, Jonathan Intravia, Alex R. Piquero and Nicole Leeper Piquero examined the relations between the ethnicity of respondents and their perception of the NFL protest.\textsuperscript{23} Their findings show that African Americans participants in the survey were more likely to consider the protest legitimate. In addition, punishments against protesting players by the NFL were seen very critically by black respondents.\textsuperscript{24} Other notable contributions have been made by Dain TePoel, who addressed the role of sport journalism for raising awareness of social and racial injustice.\textsuperscript{25} TePoel examines the impact of Mary Garber, who was “the first white (and female) sports writer in her area to cover black high school and college athletes”\textsuperscript{26} and was thus a pioneer of female participation in sports journalism in the South. Tiffany Muller Myrdahl attempts to explain the logic of social spaces produced by the relations between sport, society and politics by exemplifying the on-court activism by basketball

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 204.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 205.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 205.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 1062 f.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 1599.
player Toni Smith in 2003.\textsuperscript{27} The latter two contributions are examples of the growing interest in the gender aspect in critical sport studies.

In recent years, several American universities, e.g. the University of Colorado and San José State University, have established institutes that conduct research on race and gender issues in sport. The increasing significance of the topic is also reflected in the growing involvement of independent scholarly institutions in critical sport journalism and corporate decision making. The Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sport, directed by Richard Lapchick, educates aspiring scholars to “produce gender and racial report cards on the NBA, the NFL, Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, College sport, the WNBA and the sports media”.\textsuperscript{28} These organizations build a bridge between activism, research and education.

In terms of civil rights in New Orleans, Louisiana and beyond, a number of scholarly works lay the foundation to understand the historical context of the AFL boycott. Edward Haas’ biography of Victor Schiro, who was mayor of New Orleans from 1961 to 1970, thoroughly investigates the politician’s approach to race-related issues in the city. During his time in office, New Orleans slowly transformed from a segregated into an integrated community. Schiro’s position on civil rights is portrayed in all its complexity, ranging from his resolute opposition during his first mayoral campaign to his silent acceptance of social change after the US government put pressure on the South. By the late 1960s, New Orleans had finally come into compliance with federal civil rights policies and Schiro eventually had given a stronger say to the local African American community. Haas also acknowledges that the AFL walkout and other cancellations of big events for similar reasons played a substantial role in changing the mayor’s political course.\textsuperscript{29}

Kim Rogers compiled an oral history collection of civil rights activists in New Orleans, providing an integral resource to recognize individual and collective efforts to bring about social justice.\textsuperscript{30} Adam Fairclough extends the scope in his work about the history of civil rights in Louisiana between 1915 and 1972. His book gives insights into the complexity of social activism in a particularly hostile and racist environment. Among other things, he


elaborates on the intensification of the struggle, culminating in violence and terror against activists and the black community after the passing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.\textsuperscript{31}

The American civil rights movement in general is a well-documented era. Numerous scholars have specialized in the fundamental characteristics of protests, demonstrations and other forms of social advocacy. Herbert Haines, for instance, attempts to clarify the moderate-radical continuum of the civil rights movement between 1954 and 1970. It is of particular interest how radical tendencies within the movement shaped its broader reception. Haines argues that “black radicalization had the net effect of enhancing the bargaining position of mainstream civil rights groups”\textsuperscript{32}. Thus, he contradicts the notion that radicalism had predominantly negative ramifications for the overall goals of the civil rights movement. Furthermore, he claims that his findings could also have “implications for any social movement which is composed of moderate and radical factions”\textsuperscript{33}.

\textsuperscript{32} Herbert M. Haines, Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954-1970, Knoxville 1989\textsuperscript{2}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
From Jim Crow to Integration: New Orleans and the Civil Rights Movement

This chapter will provide a concise survey of the civil rights history of New Orleans and Louisiana, with a special focus on the impact of federal civil rights legislation. A closer look will be taken at the characteristics of activism aiming at social justice reforms and how these were instrumentalized in the Crescent City. Moreover, it will be discussed how southern politics responded to the demands of civil rights organizations and the federal government.

Although New Orleans had stood out as quite an exceptional community in regard to its ethnic composition since the colonial days, the struggle for racial equality in the 1950s and 1960s proved just as intense as in the rest of the American South. The city, which had played an essential role as a hub of slave trade in the antebellum years, was home to a culturally rich Creole population both black and white, a vibrant African American community and southern whites, who had re-established political hegemony after Reconstruction in the late 19th century.34

Despite its multicultural background, New Orleans was still a segregated city under Jim Crow laws in the 1950s and early 1960s. Jim Crow legislation aimed at “disenfranchising nearly all African Americans and a good number or rural and poor whites”35 and created a single party system in the South, dominated by the “lily white southern Democratic Party”.36 Although unconstitutional in many ways, the southern political elite had been able to sustain this legal framework undermining federal laws such as the Civil War amendments. They did so by implementing legislation which limited electoral eligibility for blacks and low-income whites through imposing tax polls, literacy tests and white-only primaries. Apart from that, the most striking effect of Jim Crow was the normative separation of African Americans and whites both socially and economically.37 This system of oppression, however, faced increasing opposition as the civil rights movement gained momentum after the 1954 Supreme Court case, Brown v. Board of Education, which, de jure, put an end to segregation in the public school system.38

34 Rogers, Righteous Lives, p. 12.
36 Ibid., p. 109.
37 Ibid., p. 97.
38 Haines, Black Radicals and Mainstream, p. 25.
For decades, various activist groups and philanthropists across the United States had been working towards racial equality and integration adopting different strategies. Most of these organizations were also active in New Orleans. Among the most influential – and particularly relevant for this paper – were the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Haines describes the main differences between these two major groups by referring to the fashion of their respective protests. Whereas the NAACP “relied primarily on lawsuits and lobbying to fight discrimination and segregation”\textsuperscript{39}, CORE, which united African American and white activists, “favored direct, face-to-face confrontation”.\textsuperscript{40} It was also predominantly CORE members who participated in the famous Freedom Rides of 1961, testing whether new desegregation laws in interstate transit were actually executed or not.\textsuperscript{41} Regardless, both the NAACP and CORE were considered radical in the eyes of southern legislators, who reacted with massive resistance to the Supreme Court rulings in Washington and the increasing pressure from the streets.\textsuperscript{42}

In her oral history work, Kim Rogers relates the subjective and collective experiences of 25 civic leaders of New Orleans most of whom were members of either the NAACP and CORE. She categorizes three generations of activists in the 1950s and 1960s and reconstructs how their socioeconomic background shaped their political careers.\textsuperscript{43} Rogers also points out that factors such as social class, ethnicity and religious affiliations often reflected on the individuals’ course of action. In this respect, she identifies racial diplomats, who were often of Catholic mixed Creole descent, well-educated and felt “most comfortable when acting as negotiators with white men of power”.\textsuperscript{44} Generally speaking, members of the New Orleans NAACP branch tended to adhere to these principles.

Another important group, especially regarding the mobilization of African American communities for demonstrations and boycotts, were black ministers. On the national level, Martin Luther King of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) would, of course, fall into this category. Employing more confrontational tactics while still adhering to the principles of non-violent civil disobedience, these ministers challenged the more subtle

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{41} Sybil Haydel Morial/Andrew Young, Witness to Change. From Jim Crow to Political Empowerment, Winston-Salem North Carolina 2015, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{42} Rogers, Righteous Lives, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 15.
approach of the diplomats, successfully organizing boycotts in New Orleans, for instance in 1954 and 1955 (Mc-Donogh Day Boycotts), in 1959-1960 (Dryades Street Boycott), and in 1960-1963 (Canal Street).45

Yet the most energetic group were the student-activists – both black and white – who pushed for more determined direct action and a faster pace to overcome racial inequality in New Orleans and beyond. Many of them were members of CORE or the NAACP Youth Council. Campuses across the United States played a vital role in the protest culture of the 1960s, embodying a “youthful idealism”46 in the collective and individual effort to change the societal fundamentals of the nation. Universities provided the theoretic and ideological framework for many student-led activist groups, such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the so-called New Left, or CORE.47

In the early 1960s, a coalition of these various movements had “managed to coordinate their interests for the cause of racial justice”48, prompting the liberal administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to set the issue on their presidential agendas. On July 2nd, 1964, Johnson managed to push through the pathbreaking Civil Rights Act of 1964 despite the harsh opposition of southern legislators. Its purpose was to:

enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.49

This act certainly marked a turning point in American history. It was the most extensive civil rights legislation since Reconstruction after the Civil War and it was the long-awaited federal response to Jim Crow in the South. Not only did it change the face of public life, in that it prohibited segregation based on race, color, religion or national origin in any establishment of public accommodation50, it also initiated a transformation of America’s political landscape.

46 Flamm/Steigerwald, Debating the 1960s, p. 10.
47 For more detailed information on specific activist organizations and their ties to one another please consult Haines, Black Radicals and Mainstream. Or Flamm/Steigerwald, Debating the 1960s.
48 Flamm/Steigerwald, Debating the 1960s, p. 24.
The Republican presidential candidate for the 1964 elections, Barry Goldwater from Arizona, signalled his opposition to the Civil Rights Act in an attempt to appeal to white voters in the South.\textsuperscript{51} As mentioned above, the Democratic party had established its hegemony throughout all levels of legislatures in most southern states. In a relatively slow process, however, the Republicans started to gain ground and eventually became the driving force of conservatism in the region.\textsuperscript{52} New Orleans’ political elite had been divided over the race issue ever since the civil rights movement picked up pace. In 1962, Victor H. Schiro won the mayoral election, succeeding deLesseps Story “Chep” Morrison, who had desegregated some of the city’s public places (transportation, golf courses and libraries, for instance) during his tenure. Both understood the importance of black voters for their campaign, at the same time, they were “aware of general white opposition to desegregation throughout Louisiana”.\textsuperscript{53} Morrison unsuccessfully ran for governor in 1960, owing his defeat to his allegedly soft position on race relations. Soon thereafter, he left office to join the Kennedy administration while Schiro, fellow party member of the Crescent City Democratic Association (CCDA), took over as interim mayor. In 1961, federal courts ruled that New Orleans’ public schools be integrated, which immediately put Schiro’s leadership skills on trial. School desegregation went without any severe incidents. Schiro announced that his administration would comply with federal court orders. He relied on massive police presence to protect students, teachers and parents.\textsuperscript{54}

Race was one of the major topics during the upcoming mayoral campaign. Schiro’s opponents were more successful in winning African American voters by advertising in the most important black newspaper, the Louisiana Weekly, and seeking support of local community leaders. Schiro first tried to dodge the race issue and focused his campaign on white voters. In the second round of the election, Schiro took a more aggressive position towards the leading African American civil rights organizations for their support of his opponents, which apparently secured him the majority of white votes. After his win, however, he declared himself the mayor of all people and, despite the outrage of segregationists, cautiously continued integration efforts in the city.\textsuperscript{55

\begin{footnotes}
\item[51] Aldrich/Griffin, Why Parties Matter, p. 127.
\item[52] Ibid., p. 129.
\item[54] Ibid., p. 8.
\item[55] Ibid., p. 27.
\end{footnotes}
Schiro had to find a strategy to meet the expectations which emerged with the civil rights movement without incurring his white supporters’ anger. His middle path would often draw criticism from both sides, ranging from threats by white supremacist groups to lawsuits by the NAACP against still prevailing segregationist practices. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 came into law, many restaurants, hotels and other privately-owned businesses in New Orleans were still not open for African Americans. Many activists, among them the local NAACP president, Ernest ‘Dutch’ Morial, who would later become the first black mayor of the city, were lobbying for the creation of a bi-racial committee on human relations in the city to ease racial tensions, which Schiro refused. As indicated above, the civic leaders’ positions and approaches were heterogenous and many younger activists were voicing their protest against Schiro’s hesitance on the streets. Cases of police brutality further stressed race relations in the city.

One day after President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act on July 3rd, 1964, Louisiana’s largest daily newspaper, the Advocate, reported that African Americans “tested compliance of the new Civil Rights Act in scattered areas across Louisiana”. Mayor Schiro was quoted saying “whether we like or whether we don’t, all of us must obey the law. We can’t pick and choose the laws we like and those we don’t”. According to the article, many restaurants in New Orleans accepted African American customers without any incidents, it was also stated, however, that a cross was burned outside a black Catholic school and that other cases of arson occurred.

In an interview, Raphael Cassimere Jr., who became a member of New Orleans’ NAACP Youth Council in 1960 and served as their president from 1961 until 1966, confirmed that his organization participated in the testing of various places of public accommodation after the passing of the Civil Rights Act in the summer of 1964. He stated that “most of the hotels […], chain stores like Woolworths and Sears […] complied almost immediately”. However, smaller, more isolated businesses found their loopholes and stayed segregated for years to come. Accordingly, there remained some uncertainties which types of establishments were, in fact, covered by the Civil Rights Act. These included bars which did not serve food and were

56 Haas, Schiro, p. 140 ff.
57 Ibid., p. 151.
58 n.a., Negroes Try Rights Law in Louisiana, in: Morning Advocate, 4.7.1964, p. 1.
59 Ibid., p. 1.
60 Andreas Hofbauer, Interview with Raphael Cassimere Jr., New Orleans, 20.2.2020, transcript in the appendix.
not directly associated with interstate travel – two details that were critical to the definition of public accommodation in the legal context.\textsuperscript{61}

Cassimere remembered that initially it was not as clear as it is today that such businesses were meant to be covered and had to accept customers without regard to their ethnicity. Another way of subverting the new federal laws was to convert a formerly public establishment into a private club requiring membership.\textsuperscript{62} It took another four years until the good intentions of the federal law fully materialized in New Orleans. In late 1969, the new Public Accommodation Ordinance came into city law. This ordinance finally stripped segregationists, who had defended their resistance by referring to the vagueness of the Civil Rights Act, of their legal foundation. As will be shown later, the 1965 AFL boycott had played a substantial role in the creation of this ground-breaking ordinance.\textsuperscript{63}

New Orleans had, of course, its fair share of reactionists who lobbied relentlessly against desegregation. Yet, major riots and violence which occurred in other parts of the Deep South were avoided, perhaps as a result of the city’s multicultural background and the leaders’ willingness to negotiate. The main civil rights organizations nationally, i.e. the NAACP, the SCLC and CORE, were committed to non-violent methods. However, these principles were threatened tremendously in rural and provincial parts of Louisiana through the terror of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). Especially on the Mississippi border, where the white-supremacist terror group was extremely powerful and well-organized, the Klan made their presence felt – launching a “campaign of terror”\textsuperscript{64} against civil rights activists and the black community. In 1964, their ongoing aggression led to the formation of the armed Deacons for Defense and Justice in Jonesboro, Louisiana, whose purpose it was to protect activist rallies and black neighborhoods from Klan activities. It was a major shift in Louisiana’s civil rights history when the forceful opposition of desegregation and equality were countered by an armed,

\begin{footnotes}
\item See: The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Publ. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, n.d. [https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=97&page=transcript], accessed 1.3.2020. Title II Sec. 201(b): Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action: (2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station; and Title II Sec. 201(c) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this title if […] (2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food it serves, or gasoline or other product which it sells, has moved in commerce.
\item Andreas Hofbauer, Interview with Raphael Cassimere Jr., New Orleans, 20.2.2020, transcript in the appendix.
\item Kent B. Germany, New Orleans after the Promises. Poverty, Citizenship, and the Search for the Great Society, [Place of publication not identified] 2011, p. 195 f.
\item Fairclough, Race & Democracy, p. 341.
\end{footnotes}
militant group of activists who would resort to violence if necessary.65 Moreover, despite the establishment of a legal framework that aimed at equality for the nation’s population the struggle for justice became increasingly radical, volatile and ambiguous over the course of the second half of the 1960s. This issue will again be addressed later in this paper.

In summary, many factors played a role in transitioning New Orleans from a segregated into an integrated city. Civil rights organizations were very active in promoting equality on all levels of society through protests and demonstrations. Unlike in many other regions of the South, the struggle for civil rights remained mostly peaceful and the Civil Rights Act and other integrationist measures were accepted without much turmoil. Nonetheless, full integration – at least supported by law – was not reached until the signing of the public accommodation ordinance in 1969. New Orleans’ political elite was often reluctant and hesitant to respond to social changes imposed by the federal administration and the increasing influence of the civil rights movement. This assumption would become particularly evident in their reaction to the 1965 AFL boycott.

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65 Ibid., p. 342 f.
Media Coverage of the 1965 AFL Boycott

This chapter will elaborate on the local and national media response to the AFL All-Star Game walkout. In the first subsection, it will be shown how southern newspapers reacted to the players’ charges and how they proceeded to frame the incident detrimental to the athletes’ cause. In the second subsection, the arguments of supportive news coverage will be closely inspected. Especially African American newspapers considered the walkout as a valuable contribution to the civil rights movement.

Initial Response and Negative Framing

On January 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1965, newspapers across Louisiana advertised the last game of a long football season to be played in New Orleans’ Tulane Stadium. They referred to the American Football League’s All-Star Game, which was an annually held showdown between the best players of the Western-Conference versus their counterparts of the Eastern-Division. The AFL was a professional football league launched in 1960, threatening the monopoly of the National Football League (NFL) on pro-level football. From its beginnings, the league also created new opportunities for athletes who had been widely ignored by NFL franchises as a result of implicitly racist recruiting tactics. Players who attended Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) barely found themselves on the rosters of NFL teams despite successful college football careers. The AFL, however, entered a race for the most talented players against the well-established NFL regardless of their collegiate background, ultimately pushing their rival to do same.\textsuperscript{66}

The competition between the two leagues also opened new markets for possible expansions, New Orleans being one of them. It had been one of Mayor Schiro’s signature projects to bring a professional football franchise to New Orleans in order to lift the city’s prestige. In 1963, a sports advisory committee was formed. Local business owner and promoter, Dave Dixon, was hired as the head of said committee. The black community of the Crescent City was hoping for major improvements regarding integration since professional sport – predominantly played in the North – had endorsed this process since the end of WWII. However, the leading African American newspaper in the region, the Louisiana Weekly,

\textsuperscript{66} Ross, Mavericks, p. 7.
voiced its concerns that New Orleans, in its current state, would not be ready to host a professional franchise. When Dixon arranged a pre-season game in New Orleans between the AFL’s Boston Patriots and Houston Oilers in 1962, black players had to sleep and dine separate from their white teammates, but plans to segregate the stands at City Park Stadium failed “owing to a last-minute rush for tickets”.  

Illustration 1: Advertisement urging readers to sign a petition for a professional football team in New Orleans, The Times-Picayune, Aug. 18th, 1962.

Other big local newspapers did not raise race-related issues in their sports sections, they rather focused on less controversial stories surrounding the game. Sports columnist of the Times-Picayune, Buddy Diliberto, wrote in an open letter to the officials of the AFL that “New Orleans fans will make the turnstiles click like no other city in your league”. He referred to the remarkable crowd of 31,000 viewers who filled City Park Stadium, but when

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67 Haas, Schiro, p. 183.
he pleaded his case for a New Orleans franchise, the city’s prevailing segregation problem was not addressed.

Yet another exhibition contest, a doubleheader of four NFL teams, was held at Tulane Stadium on September 7th, 1963, in front of a desegregated crowd of more than 50,000. The Louisiana Weekly reported that the players were housed in the same hotel this time, interpreting this fact as a clear step towards integration and a possible pro franchise in the city.69 Again, the mainstream press of New Orleans and Louisiana did not specifically mention the efforts made off the field to accommodate African American players equally to their white teammates. The Times-Picayune identified the muggy weather and the thunderstorm that hit the city during the game as the biggest obstacles to pro football in New Orleans. They did acknowledge that “the stands were jammed with multicolored, shirt-sleeved thousands”, which showed that “New Orleans was ready, rains or no rains”.70

New Orleans was about to get another shot to prove whether the city was ready or not for professional football, when Dixon lobbied the AFL officials for playing their annual All-Star Game at Tulane Stadium. The game was scheduled to take place on January 16th, 1965, between the East and West All-Stars, after a week of training camps and meetings of league representatives. The City had high hopes of finally acquiring a pro-franchise.

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69 Haas, Schiro, p. 183.
On January 10th, these hopes were crushed when all 21 African American players on both teams publicly announced that they would boycott the game and leave New Orleans immediately. The local press quickly reported on the story, the Times-Picayune even put it on their front page on the next day, with the follow up on page 5 – the local news section. The paper reprinted one version of the players’ official press release71, which said:

The American Football League is progressing in great strides and the Negro football players feel they are playing a vital role in the league’s progression and have been treated fairly in all cities throughout the league. However, because of adverse conditions and discriminatory practices experienced by the Negro players while here in New Orleans the players feel they cannot perform 100 per cent as expected in the All-Star game and be treated differently outside. With the exceptions of the hotels

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71 A slightly different wording was used in Cookie Gilchrist/Chris Garbarino, The Cookie that did not Crumble, United States 2011, p. 103. Gilchrist was part of the East All-Star roster.
(Roosevelt and Fontainebleau) where the squads were quartered, recreational facilities and transportation were not available to the Negro players and service was refused.\textsuperscript{72}

Ernie Warlick, who was appointed as the spokesman of the players, was cited explaining the reasons for their protest. He told the press that when they arrived on January 9\textsuperscript{th}, “some of the players had to wait nearly an hour at the airport Saturday because cab drivers refused to take them into town. It seemed that if Negro players were with several white players they were serviced by the cab drivers. But the ones who were not with white teammates were refused.”\textsuperscript{73} Warlick also said that he was refused admittance to a nightclub on New Orleans’ famous Bourbon Street while his white teammates were let in. “Not you. You’re not allowed in here”\textsuperscript{74}, Warlick recounts the bouncers’ words. He further emphasized that most of the other black players of both rosters shared similar experiences. They were surprised that such incidents could happen since they “were led to believe that [they] could relax and enjoy [themselves] in New Orleans just like other citizens”.\textsuperscript{75} Dave Dixon is quoted that he felt “heart sick”\textsuperscript{76} and that the press could expect a formal statement on Monday, January 11\textsuperscript{th}.

Another article, located in the sports section, reported that Joe Foss, the AFL commissioner, backed the walkout by the African American players “because [they] are all members of the AFL family”.\textsuperscript{77} Accordingly, several white players felt disappointed about the cancellation, and among the negotiators with the African American athletes were “several leaders in the New Orleans Negro community [who] pleaded with the 21 players not to walk out”.\textsuperscript{78}

Diliberto, the sports reporter who covered the story for the Times-Picayune, elaborated on his accounts of Sunday’s events in his column on page 4 and 5, section 2 – the sports section. After realizing that none of the African American players were present at the first scheduled practice of both teams at Tulane Stadium, Diliberto was told by West-head coach Sid Gillman that the black players met Sunday morning after experiencing discrimination the night before and decided to leave the city. Apparently, a second meeting was taking place at that moment between some of the players and members of the organizing team and official

\textsuperscript{72} Buddy Diliberto, Protest by Negro Gridders Cancels N.O. All-Star Game. Announcement is Made by AFL Chief, in: \textit{The Times-Picayune}, 11.1.1965, pp. 1, 5.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{77} Bob Roesler, AFL Commissioner Joe Foss Backs Action of Negro Players. Says Contest is Canceled. Game Might be Played in Another City, in: \textit{The Times-Picayune}, 01/11/11, Section 2, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
representatives at the Roosevelt Hotel. The journalist then headed to the hotel and met Clem Daniels, an African American player of the West squad, in the lobby. He told Diliberto that they felt unwanted in the city and after discussing what had happened the night before, they decided to boycott the game. In response to Diliberto’s suggestion that they might find a way to renegotiate their decision, Daniels reportedly said, “What could possibly be done now that wouldn’t already have been done before we came here?”79 After walking over to the room where the meeting was taking place, Diliberto ran into Dixon in the hallway, who let him know that “several prominent people in there [are] talking to them”80 Although the meeting took place behind closed doors, Diliberto wrote that he overheard the conversation. An unnamed representative of the negotiating team is quoted in the column, “We’re asking you men to cooperate with us. This would be a deadly blow to our community and it would undo all of the good that has been done in this area. We have arranged for you men to have access to all of the better class establishments – restaurants and night clubs – in the French Quarter. Why penalize all of these people because some discriminated against you?”81 Diliberto also provided one player’s response, stating, “You’re asking us to sacrifice our principles and play when the conditions that surround us outside are deplorable. This is an unfair request.”82 Apparently, the players refused to back down since Ernie Warlick reportedly read their statement after the meeting concluded. Diliberto continued describing Dixon’s expressions when the statement was presented, looking like someone “who was watching a lifetime dream crumble before his eyes”.83

Diliberto’s and Roesler’s reporting had two important effects. On the one hand, they offered first-hand accounts of the players’ experiences with racism and discrimination by directly quoting them. Thus, the athletes were given a chance to let the readers know what happened to them and how they felt about their treatment in New Orleans. The Times-Picayune prominently placed the story on the front page and within the local news section where many readers would actually see it. On the other hand, Diliberto already established implicitly what would become the prevailing narrative of many news reports on the issue across the country. The victims of the whole incident were New Orleans and Dave Dixon, whose efforts to bring a professional football franchise to town were shattered due to the action of a few individuals.

79 Buddy Diliberto, From the Bench. The Hours of Agony, in: The Times-Picayune, 11.1.1965, Section 2, pp. 4-5.
80 Ibid., Section 2, p. 4.
81 Ibid., Section 2, p. 4.
82 Ibid., Section 2, p. 4.
83 Ibid., Section 2, p. 5.
According to Roesler, the player’s actions were not supported by local African American community leaders. The report of the white teammates who were disappointed by Foss’ decision to cancel the game added to the image that the 21 players basically stood alone in their protest.

Frank Wilson, the correspondent for the Baton Rouge-based Advocate, covered the story for Louisiana’s major newspaper. In his initial report, the players’ meeting was described as “boisterous” and Cookie Gilchrist, known for his extravagant lifestyle and decried as a troublemaker, was identified as the most vocal of the group. Wilson also mentioned that local African American civic leaders attempted to downplay the incidents as the “actions of a few” and urged the players “not to judge the entire city” based thereupon. Warlick was cited extensively, adding that some of the black players were denied entrance to small clubs on famous Bourbon Street, one player was purposefully dropped in the wrong location by a cab driver, and “in a large restaurant one lady violently objected to me hanging my coat on the same rack that contained her coat”. Warlick also stated that the protesters knew that their action might hurt the league and many others financially but for them it was “a matter of personal pride”. He also acknowledged that the vote to boycott the All-Star Game was not unanimous (eight players reportedly preferred to participate) but that they agreed to present a common front as a group and leave. However, Gilchrist wrote in his biography that the decision was unanimous and that he urged his fellows to show unity by letting them know that he “[would] kick the ass of whoever votes to stay and play”.

Seemingly only a relatively small detail, the controversy around the vote became apparent in other news publications as well. Ben Thomas, who was a sports writer for the Associated Press and whose articles about the boycott were published by various newspapers in the US beyond Louisiana, wrote that Warlick would not disclose the exact result of the vote but said that the majority ruled. The discrepancy raised questions about the level of unity within the group. Gilchrist was concerned that if he was appointed the spokesperson of the players, the media could discredit the protest by focussing on his flamboyant reputation and alleged

85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Gilchrist/Garbarino, Cookie, p. 102.
character flaws.\textsuperscript{90} As mentioned above, he could not avoid being recognized as one of the driving forces behind the players’ actions. They were aware that they had to choose an official representative carefully in order to move the media’s attention away from the individuals towards the broader issue in which their protest was rooted – racism. Gilchrist proposed Ernie Warlick, whom he described as a “respected player”\textsuperscript{91}, to take on this task. The selection seemed to fulfil its desired purpose as Times-Picayune writer Diliberto, albeit in condescending fashion, acknowledged Warlick as “an articulate Negro”.\textsuperscript{92}

There seemed to be yet another inconsistency in the early coverage of the walkout. News reports by Roesler and Diliberto of the Times-Picayune, Wilson of the Advocate, and Associated Press journalist Thomas all indicated that Dave Dixon gathered a number of African American civic leaders in a meeting with the athletes to convince them to call off the boycott. It was not further specified who those persons were nor was mentioned what they offered or proposed to persuade the players. Additionally, none of these representatives were interviewed or quoted in regard to their opinion about the allegations of racial discrimination in the city. Local TV and radio station WDSU published a statement of editorial opinion on January 11\textsuperscript{th}, in which they indirectly identify one of Dixon’s associates as Ernest Morial, then president of the local branch of the NAACP. The editors expressed their remorse about the occurrences of the previous night and bemoaned the consequences for New Orleans’ reputation in the country (“The walkout of the Negro football players will, no doubt, cause many people around the country to conclude that New Orleans is a hotbed of bigotry and intolerance”).\textsuperscript{93} They realized that New Orleans still faced “a long way to go in solving its racial problems”,\textsuperscript{94} but they also emphasized that there had been vast improvements over the previous years. The editorial then aimed at defending the city’s and civic leaders’ efforts to guarantee high standards to all players regardless of their ethnic background. The two All-Star teams were indeed accommodated in two of the most prestigious hotels in New Orleans at that time, the Fontainebleau and the Roosevelt. WSDU deemed it unfair of the players “to unleash unfavourable publicity on the entire city and state for the actions of a few cab drivers and Bourbon Street night club operators”\textsuperscript{95} and according to them, the president of the local

\textsuperscript{90} Gilchrist/Garbarino, Cookie, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., p. 103.
\textsuperscript{92} Diliberto, From the Bench. Hours of Agony, Section 2, pp. 4-5, here p. 4.
\textsuperscript{93} News Release, 12.1.1965, University of New Orleans Earl K. Long LA and Special Collection, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, New Orleans Branch, Mss 28-237.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
NAACP came to the same conclusion. Reportedly, Ernest Morial comprehended the boycott as harmful rather than helpful to New Orleans’ race relations.

WSDU’s interpretation of Morial’s role as a negotiator put the local NAACP under pressure. On January 11th, the regular monthly meeting of the New Orleans branch was held and as a reaction to the WSDU editorial, they decided to release the following resolution to the press:

The following resolution was unanimously adopted in regular monthly meeting of the New Orleans Branch NAACP on Monday, January 11, 1965.

WHEREAS, the position of the President of the New Orleans Branch NAACP has been misrepresented in the various news media; and

WHEREAS, the New Orleans Branch NAACP stands four-square behind the action taken by the players, owners, and Commissioner of the American Football League; and

WHEREAS, the New Orleans Branch of the NAACP is steadfast in its opposition to the discrimination encountered by Negro players of the American Football League; and

WHEREAS, the New Orleans Branch of the NAACP is dissatisfied with the political and other leadership of the City of New Orleans;

THEREFORE, be it resolved: That the New Orleans Branch of the NAACP calls upon the political and other leadership of the City of New Orleans to put an end NOW to discrimination and segregation in all its various forms.⁹⁶

Apparently, Morial had to balance the expectations of both the African American community and the city’s officials, who were, of course, not interested in losing the All-Star Game and thus the opportunity of a pro-football franchise in New Orleans. The NAACP, which usually preferred diplomacy over direct action to advocate for social justice and racial equality, found themselves in a very unpleasant situation. Local newspapers and the Associated Press implied that they opposed the players’ announcement of boycotting the event, hence undermining the legitimacy of the protest. Morial and the NAACP found it necessary to clarify their position that they supported the boycott despite their diplomatic efforts and that they were eager to continue their work as civil rights activists. In fact, the Times-Picayune published a summary of the resolution on page six on January 13th, although not meant to be an eye-catcher.⁹⁷

Indeed, Morial’s role in the negotiations led to some significant turmoil within the local NAACP. According to Raphael Cassimere, who was the president of the Youth Council at

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⁹⁶ Ibid.
⁹⁷ n.a., NAACP Branch Hits at City Leadership, in: The Times-Picayune, 13.1.1965, Section 1, p. 6.
the time, many members of the organization were disturbed about his initial reaction and “[waited] to excoriate him for that”\textsuperscript{98} in the upcoming monthly meeting, which happened to be on January 11\textsuperscript{th} coincidentally. Cassimere himself pointed out that he was not at all surprised about the situation in the French Quarter because he had experienced similar incidents there. “Often we would drive through the French Quarter and when the doorman or the bouncers would see us, they would close the door – make sure that we did not look in”\textsuperscript{99}, Cassimere said. Yet, the president’s involvement needed to be addressed at the meeting and was finally resolved internally. For Cassimere, Morial undoubtedly “opposed the indignities that these people suffered”\textsuperscript{100}, however, for many members of the adult branch, he failed to properly communicate his perspective to the public. The official resolution was an attempt to signify unity and support for the civil rights cause in New Orleans.

On January 12\textsuperscript{th}, the newspaper prominently issued a statement by E.M. Rowley, chairman of the Citizens Special Committee, which consisted of civic and business leaders, on the front page. Rowley pointed out that he felt devastated about the boycott since “a small number of unrelated incidents imperil[s] the good name of our city, which has made such extraordinary progress in race relations”\textsuperscript{101}. He largely stated a defense of the measures taken by the city and local businesses to abide by the Civil Rights Act. He listed, for instance, the New Orleans Hotel Association, The New Orleans Restaurant Association, and the New Orleans Motion Picture Association, which all had made strives to integrate and serve African Americans since the passing of the milestone law in 1964. In his published statement, Rowley also referred to the positive experiences made during the 1965 Sugar Bowl between the Louisiana State University (LSU) and the integrated team from Syracuse University, New York.

The Sugar Bowl, an annual college football championship game in New Orleans, has traditionally been played on New Year’s Day and attracted tens of thousands of people. The 1965 Sugar Bowl was only the second time in the classic’s history that an integrated team was invited. Nine years prior, in 1956, Bobby Grier of the University of Pittsburgh had been the first African American player to make the trip to the Deep South alongside his teammates. After that game, segregationists had been successful in promoting stricter anti-integration

\textsuperscript{98} Andreas Hofbauer, Interview with Raphael Cassimere Jr., New Orleans, 20.2.2020, transcript in the appendix.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} n.a., 21 Negroes' Act Causes Regret. Charges of Discrimination in N.O. Deplored, in: The Times-Picayune, 12.1.1965, Section 1, pp. 1, 3.
laws for sport competitions in Louisiana until the 1964 Civil Rights Act nullified such legislation.

In the reportage prior to the bowl game, Advocate sports columnist Bud Montet highlighted the presence of African American players on Syracuse’s roster by making a Civil War reference (“The Orangemen from New York are fighting the War between the States over again”102). He acknowledged that Syracuse still viewed LSU as a “segregated institution”103 in spite of previous matchups of Louisiana’s flagship university against integrated teams. After the game, Floyd Little, an African American running back for Syracuse, gave LSU credit for their sportsmanship and let the press know that “they didn’t show any prejudice at all”.104 An LSU player also expressed that playing the game helped overcome the political and social tensions prevalent in the South, stating that “playing against Negroes for the first time didn’t bother me. They were just another bunch of football players as far as I was concerned.”105

Dixon’s official statement was printed on January 12th in the Times-Picayune in the sport section. In an attempt to classify the All-Stars’ charges as isolated incidents, he also referred to the lack of any such accusations by Syracuse players. In the same article, Jim Nance, another African American star running back of Syracuse, was quoted saying that he would “tell everybody about the splendid treatment [they] received down here”.106 Dixon was very careful in his choice of words. He argued that the players’ reaction was out of proportion but he did not directly signify doubt or rebuttal of their allegations (“Neither do we question the sincerity of the feelings of the Negro players”107). In response to the AFL’s announcement to move the game to Houston, Dixon affirmed that his organizing team felt “no bitterness toward either Commissioner Foss or the owners of the League”.108 They also “hope[d] to continue these [warm and cordial] relationships in the future.”109 The statement further read as follows:

In the long discussions of Sunday, local civic leaders from both races made it clear to these players that militant action such as they were then contemplating would not only

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103 Ibid.
105 Bud Montet, Bengal Flanker Hauls in TD Pass, Gets Most Valuable Award, in: Morning Advocate, 2.1.1965, Section C, pp. 1, 5, here p. 5.
106 Bob Roesler, American Football League All-Star Game Moved to Houston. Action Told by Joe Foss, in: The Times-Picayune, 12.1.1965, Section 2, pp. 5-6, here p. 6.
107 Ibid., p. 5.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
damage this city, but would greatly retard efforts by men of good will, of both races, to achieve harmony in the most difficult problem of our times. [...] To characterize these discussions as ‘negotiations’ is wrong. No concessions were offered and none were asked. The entire discussion consisted of a description of their grievances and a long consideration of the wisdom of the “walk-out” action which they seemed prone to take. It was made eloquently clear to these players, by spokesmen of both races, including representatives of the local NAACP, that the finest food and lodging establishments of this city offered them courteous and hospitable accommodation. [...] We consider it both unfortunate and erroneous that New Orleans be judged and condemned by the actions, if these actions be substantiated by proper investigation, of a few. No negotiations were possible in the sense that perfection in race relationships is beyond the bounds of negotiations.\footnote{Ibid.}

Three major points of this statement deserve further analysis. First, it is remarkable that Dixon and his colleagues described the protest of the players as militant, which exemplified the predominant view on direct action activism at the time of the civil rights movement. The perception of militancy by the players also pushed the local NAACP to publicly defend their positions, as mentioned above. Thus, the AFL boycott and its media coverage joined the ranks of key events of the civil rights movements as it added to the public discourse about militancy, radicalism and moderate streams of activism. The walkout was clearly identified as detrimental to the longstanding, restrained approach of New Orleans’ civic leaders, again interpreting the NAACP’s evaluation of the boycott as harmful for their cause.

The second notable point regards Dixon’s view that the discussions they had with the players could not be called negotiations since no offers were laid on the table. Gilchrist, who, according to his biography, was present at the meeting between Dixon, Morial and the protesters, offered a different version of the events, claiming that “as last-ditch incentives to stay, we were offered cars, cash and just about anything else.”\footnote{Gilchrist/Garbarino, Cookie, p. 104.} Besides, Gilchrist was very critical of Morial’s role in the meeting, unflatteringly describing him as “the token Negro to support Mr. Dixon’s cause”.\footnote{Ibid.} Morial’s naivety about the chances of a professional football franchise changing people’s attitudes towards race bewildered him. After the conclusion of the meeting, a re-vote about the boycott was still in favor of leaving. Now down to 19 players – two had already left town – the vote was 16 to 3, which once more raised questions about whose accounts regarding the vote were actually true (see above).\footnote{Ibid.}
The last aspect of interest arises when analyzing Dixon’s remarks about the substance of the players’ charges. Despite expressing sympathy with the protesters earlier in his statement, Dixon implied the necessity of proper investigation into the alleged incidents of misconduct. He left no doubt, however, that the boycott would still be deemed exaggerated, thus unjustified, regardless of the results of such investigations.

Meanwhile, the AFL Commissioner and other league executives decided to move the All-Star Game to Houston, Texas. The event was scheduled to take place on January 16th at Jeppesen Stadium, the official home of the AFL’s Houston Oilers. Well aware of the financial losses the change of location would cause – Jeppesen Stadium was significantly smaller than Tulane Stadium – Foss not only accepted the players’ resolution to leave New Orleans, he also publicly announced that he fully backed their move.114 In his autobiography, he would later remark that it was simply unacceptable that the players were exposed to such treatment and that moving the All-Star Game to a different location was the only plausible response, regardless of the public backlash the league would face.115

Houston appeared to have learned from previous shortcomings in race issues. According to the Pittsburgh Courier, the local AFL team, the Oilers, were themselves confronted with a fan boycott for three years. African American fans protested segregated seating in the stadium.116 The NAACP organized a picket line in front of the stadium to make the public aware of the team’s discriminatory practices. Soon, a local African American newspaper, the Houston Informer, would join the efforts to force the Oilers to end their segregationist stadium policies. Whereas Courier journalist Bill Nunn claimed that the boycott went on for three years, other sources indicate that the Houston Oilers terminated segregated seating after the 1960 season.117

Giving in to the pressure mostly by student activists, the city of Houston made vast improvements to guarantee adequate living conditions for African Americans. Between 1960 and 1962, restaurants, hotels and entertainment establishments like movie theaters and sports stadiums were desegregated.118 However, the efforts of the Oilers to scout African Americans for their roster were not considered “overly sincere”.119

114 Roesler, American, Section 2, pp. 5-6.
116 Bill Nunn, Change of Pace, in: Pittsburgh Courier, 23.1.1965, p. 15.
117 Ross, Mavericks, p. 26 f.
118 Ibid., p. 28.
119 Nunn, Change of Pace, p. 15.
The growing scepticism of the boycott was also manifested in the first published reaction from the highest ranking political representative of the city of New Orleans, mayor Victor Schiro. The mayor, who reportedly could not meet the protesters in person due to illness, sent out harsh words in a press release, suggesting that they “should have rolled with the punch”. Accordingly, the players had primarily hurt their own people, and New Orleans – a “very cosmopolitan and tolerant city” had made “exceptionally good” experiences with integrated sports so far. However, as “educated college men”, they should have been able to realize that in a southern city like New Orleans, “human nature [could not change] overnight”. He also made sure to emphasize that other cities had similar struggles, cynically predicting that “if these men would only play football in cities where everybody loved them, they would all be out of a job today.” His statement contributed to the increasing hostility by some local media, fuelling – in modern terminology – notions of victim blaming and whataboutism. Haas, in his biography on the mayor, showed that Schiro even speculated that the African American All-Stars had been on a mission to cause troubles.

News of the boycott and the subsequent relocation of the sport event also reached Louisiana’s governor, John McKeithen, who addressed the issue during a meeting with representatives of the Chamber of Commerce at the Roosevelt Hotel. He complained about the players’ hasty decision to walk out without consulting the mayor and himself. In response to the charges that the African American players were refused admittance to Bourbon Street nightclubs, he was quoted saying that “[the club owners would not] even let our D.A. in”. With his reference to the District Attorney, McKeithen completely ignored or even ridiculed that the players were not admitted due to their racial background. Like Schiro, McKeithen chose to appease the (white) public by stating that he was satisfied with Louisiana’s performance in

121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
race relations. Both politicians, influential members of the Democratic Party in the South, saw no necessity to hold anyone accountable other than the accusers. They expressed no condemnation of the discriminatory acts, which once more underlined the reluctance and ignorance of the southern Democrats towards civil rights issues. Given these remarks by top-ranking politicians, the last two demands of the NAACP resolution, in which the activists criticized the political leadership and called for decisive action to end racial discrimination, became more relatable.

Communal and state legislatures remained integral in implementing civil rights policies even after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was introduced. In regard to the AFL controversy, the question whether the cab operators were, indeed, legally bound to serve African American customers was central. Title II of the Civil Rights Act protected all people from discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin in places of public accommodation. The law mentioned, among others, hotels, motels, inns, restaurants and other places that primarily sell food, gas stations, cinemas, concert halls, and sport stadiums. Since taxi transportation was not listed explicitly, it was unclear whether cab services constituted public accommodation or not. As a prerequisite for any such business to be regulated by Title II, the operation of the establishment had to affect commerce, which was defined as “travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States”. 129

As a matter of fact, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 particularly focussed on getting rid of any obstructions to interstate commerce, and congressional hearings showed that economic considerations influenced the discussion significantly. 130 Keeping in mind that this legislation had faced severe opposition, especially in the South and by private business owners, Congress might have chosen this rather vague formulation in order to leave the interpretation of its content and range to the courts. 131 In the case of the African American football players, who were refused service by cab drivers, it could thus be argued that they were, of course, interstate travellers, but that the cab drivers were not necessarily obstructing interstate commerce, in the sense that they primarily operated within the city limits of New Orleans. Furthermore, New Orleans still had taxi service regulations in effect which distinguished between permits for the transportation of white and colored passengers. Referring to Section

131 Ibid., p. 963 f.
12-91 (d) and Section 12-129 of the city code, Nicholas Tedesco, the city taxi cab bureau director, explained in the Times-Picayune that operators were allowed to serve customers of the respective other ‘passenger class’, but were not required to do so. He further said that the city did not encourage the drivers to carry passengers for whom they have no permit issued. This recommendation was made in order to avoid conflict between black and white cab operators. He argued that if African American customers “patronized cabs in large numbers which have permits to carry white passengers, […] it would injure the business of the Negro taxi cab operators.”

He added that these passages of the city had not been contested in court, as far as he knew.

This argument was often used to counter desegregation efforts, including in the sports world. For instance, the reintegration of African Americans into major league baseball – Jackie Robinson famously broke the color line when he was signed by the Brooklyn Dodgers on October 23rd, 1945 – led to the demise of the so-called Negro League, which consequently hurt African American team owners and other associated businesses. For some black enterprises, to put an end to the *separate but equal* doctrine of the time meant to gauge moral convictions and business considerations. Besides, the economic argument also served as a convenient excuse for people who opposed equal participation and desegregation. However, there might have been African American business owner who feared a monopolization by whites should the *separate but equal* doctrine be overturned.

In contrast to the director of the city taxi cab bureau, a high representative of the Aviation Board emphasized that if the players’ complaints about harassment at the airport proved to be true and if any misconduct by airport personnel could be attested, he would propose to the board to take appropriate steps to “correct the situation”. He realized that “the airport [was] certainly engaged in interstate commerce and [was] subject to laws prohibiting discrimination at such facilities.” In fact, after a meeting on Wednesday, January 13th, the Aviation Board announced that “no cab driver who racially discriminates will be allowed to enter the airport for the purpose of doing business.” They viewed their motion as a reaffirmation of an

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132 n.a., 21 Negroes' Act, Section I, pp. 1, 3, here p. 3.
133 Wiggins/Miller (Eds.), Unlevel Playing Field, p. 205 f.
134 Andreas Hofbauer, Interview with Raphael Cassimere Jr., New Orleans, 2022, transcript in the appendix.
135 n.a., 21 Negroes' Act, Section I, p. 3.
136 Ibid.
137 Id., Aviation Board Has Taxi Ruling. Drivers Prohibited from Refusing Negroes, in: The Times-Picayune, 14.1.1965, Section 1, p. 5.
existing policy that dated back to 1957, which already entailed that refusing taxi service to people of color was prohibited.\textsuperscript{138} On the one hand, their statement meant a small victory for the protesting athletes, who forced the Aviation Board to address potential discriminatory treatment of African American travelers at New Orleans’ airport. On the other hand, however, the airport officials pointed out that their motion did not imply that taxi drivers had been violating this policy in the past.\textsuperscript{139} Basically, they avoided commenting on the truthfulness of the players’ allegation and provided no concrete measures how their anti-discrimination rules would be enforced in the future.

In the interest of fairness, the Times-Picayune also gave Morial a chance to share his experience of the meeting in their January 12\textsuperscript{th} -edition. He stated that he had not arranged the meeting himself but was called in on short notice. However, he did not disclose who had sought his expertise to the public.\textsuperscript{140} Morial’s strategy was to buy some time so that he could get the players in touch with city officials to find a solution. His concern was that their actions would be deemed impetuous if they insisted on leaving town without further negotiations, but he ensured them that the NAACP would continue their efforts to tackle discrimination in New Orleans.\textsuperscript{141} Arguably, Morial’s presence in the meeting did not show much results. He was brought in by one of Dixon’s associates without any time for preparation due to the urgency of the situation. Consequently, he could not offer much other than delaying the protesters’ decision. However, the players were not willing to wait, they wanted to act immediately. Morial had to accept that despite the NAACP’s efforts in the past and present to improve race relations in New Orleans, the 21 African American players still experienced enough mistreatment in one night to boycott the game and risk potentially harmful ramifications for their careers. He was also confronted with the fact that he was later instrumentalized by critics of the boycott to delegitimize the players and the league. This led to the resolution by the NAACP which did not garner the same media attention as the misleading reports about Morial’s disapproval of the boycott.

News about the boycott and the subsequent relocation of the game to Houston spread across the nation fairly quickly after January 11\textsuperscript{th}. The New York Times, arguably one of the most important and renowned newspapers of the United States, dedicated a long article written by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Haas identified David Kleck, a PR consultant working for Dixon, as the man who brought in Morial and other civic leaders, see: Haas, Schiro, p. 184.
\item \textsuperscript{141} n.a., 21 Negroes’ Act, Section 1, p. 3.
\end{itemize}
sports reporter William N. Wallace, placing the first part on the front page on January 12th. Wallace, who called the incident “a boycott without precedent in professional sports”142, reported that he reached the players’ spokesman, Ernie Warlick, by telephone after he had already arrived in his hometown Buffalo. In this interview, Warlick once again pointed out that they were very satisfied with the team hotels and their staff. According to Wallace, Warlick also said, “[b]asically we all wanted to play the game. We’re not part of any civil rights movement, or anything like that. The conditions we encountered do not necessarily represent all the people in New Orleans.”143 Apparently, he did not want their protest to be put in the larger context of the civil rights movement, possibly to avoid being considered militant. The article, which widely provided the same information as the Times-Picayune reportage, shared two more aspects which did not help the boycotters plead their case. For one thing, it was revealed that two of the night clubs which refused admittance to the African American players were strip clubs. Many critics would later use this knowledge to discredit the players’ professionalism and the sincerity of the charges. For another thing, an undisclosed white team member was quoted that they felt left out on the decision and that they objected the method of protest despite their sympathy with their African American teammates.144

From today’s perspective, the relationship between black and white athletes during this period of reintegration is difficult to track. For instance, Jack Kemp, who was the starting quarterback for the East in the AFL All-Star Game and Gilchrist’s teammate and evidently good friend145 in Buffalo, was a volunteer on Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign.146 Thus, he supported a candidate that endorsed segregation. Kemp would later launch a successful political career with the Republicans himself. He became a member of Congress in 1970, climbed the ladder within the G.O.P. and was even considered a potential nominee for vice president under Ronald Reagan in 1980. Despite his close relationship with his African American colleagues, his correspondence with a former teammate with the San Diego Chargers revealed the tensions that came with integration for less open-minded athletes. In

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143 Ibid., p. 19.
144 Ibid.
145 Not only does Gilchrist often mention his friendship with Kemp in his biography, it is also evident in their correspondence, see: Correspondence Gilchrist, Charlton Chester, Library of Congress Manuscript Division Washington, Jack Kemp Papers, Box 239, Folder 3.
his letter to Kemp, football pro Charlie Flowers not only called their former head coach Sid Gilman, who was Jewish, “the big Christ killer”\textsuperscript{147}, he also complained about how every “liberal Yankee do gooder [sic!], political S.O.B [son of a bitch]”\textsuperscript{148} unjustly imposed a liberal agenda on his home, the South. He further bemoaned that “the Kennedy adm., under the guise of Uncle Tomism is attempting in the form of Civil Rights reforms to place this country at his feet.”\textsuperscript{149} Flower’s racist and obviously antisemitic views were symptomatic for white Southerners. His letter also showed that such attitudes also existed in an integrated locker room.

Sports columnists and editors of peripheral news stations in the Deep South often had a very negative opinion towards the walkout and the AFL officials. Whereas the Times-Picayune at least gathered perspectives from different angles, and the New York Times included Warlick’s extended explanation of the protesters’ motives, smaller southern newspapers used their coverage to consolidate racial bias among their readership. In his sports column, Bill McIntyre of The Times (Shreveport, Louisiana), for instance, denounced Commissioner Foss and his colleagues as lacking authority and maturity. He further ranted about the players’ “mutiny”\textsuperscript{150} and questioned their professionalism in regard to their leisure time activities. Not only did he echo Mayor Schiro’s opinion that the players should have expected and thus condoned hostility and discrimination in a Deep South city, he also implicitly deprived African American athletes of the right to complain about such mistreatment. He wrote:

Our national magazines of late have been saturated with articles by outstanding Negro athletes – people like Jimmy Brown, Cookie Gilchrist and Cassius Clay – lamenting their status as “second class citizens” and claiming to strike a blow against segregation. Yet these same people refuse to recognize that they are still able to go far on their own abilities in the world of athletics. […] The AFL’s decision to take dictation from the 20 Negro players – and we will not dignify them by naming them here – reduces both the players and the league to just one word apropos to sports: ‘Bush’.\textsuperscript{151}

Three days later, McIntyre added affirmative letters from the paper’s readership to his column. One Shreveport citizen wrote that according to many locals, “Negroes have to be a

\textsuperscript{147} Charlie Flowers to Jack Kemp, 3.10.1963, Library of Congress Manuscript Division Washington, Jack Kemp Papers, Box 1, Folder 2. 
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{150} Bill McIntyre, Authority Is Absent In AFL. Keep'em in Knickers 'cause they haven't grown up, in: The Times (Shreveport, La.), 12.1.1965, p. 17. 
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
cut above in order to play professional sports […] and are not destined to be some sort of freelance racists.”

Hence, this reader equated protest against racial discrimination with racism. Another local man, identified as Sam Schweiger, Director of Advertising and Public Relations of Southwestern Electric Power Co., was “baffled [why] the League should capitulate to the wishes of a half dozen disgruntled and unreasonable Negro players.” He also called for a fan boycott of the relocated game and the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), which upheld its contract to televise the game.

The Times also published excerpts from a letter by John B. McKinley, chairman of the pro-segregation ‘Louisiana State Sovereignty Commission’, which was sent to Joe Foss. In this letter, McKinley doubted the truthfulness of the allegations. He also shifted the attention to race relations in other cities where the AFL hosted games, which again mirrored Mayor Schiro’s line of argument.

An editorial in the Advocate pronounced that New Orleans had no reason to apologize for the incident. They claimed that only “three or four African American players actually were involved in the unpleasant situation about which they protested.” Moreover, Joe Foss was criticized for “quailing as people in the athletic and entertainment worlds generally do when the cry of discrimination is raised.” The protesters were called “hotheads,” who would have faced the same problems in any other major city “bumming around the dives”.

It did not take long until new headlines ignited even more criticism of the walkout. Newspapers across the nation revealed that due to the relocation to the much smaller Jeppesen Stadium in Houston (35,000 seats compared to 60,000 seats), profits from ticket sales would plummet, which would hurt the league’s pension fund. Although ABC confirmed that their contract to televise the game was still in effect, the agreed revenue of 75,000 USD would have been not enough to cover all the costs of the relocation and create a surplus for the pension fund.

Sports editor, Wayne Thompson, from the Mississippi-based Clarion Ledger accused the boycotting athletes of “[ignoring] their obligation not just to the city of New Orleans and the AFL but also to the rest of the players in the league – including, one

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152 Id., Out of the Mail Bag. …And We Get Letters, in: The Times (Shreveport, La.), 15.1.1965, p. 23.
153 Ibid.
154 n.a., Foss Sent Written Protest By State Sovereignty Head, in: The Times (Shreveport, La.), 13.1.1965, p. 16.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
might surmise, a number of others who might be black-balled in any attempt to join the KKK."\(^{160}\) He further downplayed the charges of discrimination and the indignity experienced by the African American athletes as hurt feelings and implied that ABC should have cancelled their broadcasting of the All-Star Game in Houston.\(^{161}\)

In contrast to the previously mentioned examples, the Times-Picayune, whose initial coverage of the AFL incident was rather balanced and fair, published a respectfully phrased – albeit critical – editorial. George W. Healy Jr, the editor, wrote that there “was no lack of official hospitality”\(^{162}\) but acknowledged that the incidents were “no doubt irksome to the players”\(^{163}\) and regrettable. Accordingly, the players should have expected that the realization of the new public accommodation laws of the Civil Rights Act needed time in a southern city.

In a letter to the editor on the same page, one citizen of New Orleans stated her disagreement with the boycott, arguing that the walkout humiliated many people who were, in fact, advocating racial equality. She admitted that the current situation for African Americans in New Orleans “is not perfect, but New Orleans is far more tolerant and friendly […] than other places in the South.”\(^{164}\) “The greatest help that any Negro player could give to his cause or his principles would be to live here and help to change the attitudes he disagrees with”\(^{165}\), the reader went on. In the following days, the newspaper’s editors opted to print significantly more aggressive and reactionist letters. One reader was of the same opinion as the mayor, claiming that the protesting athletes had done “a disservice to their employers, their race and to the sport that permits them to earn salaries”.\(^{166}\) He continued that the players came to New Orleans as “paid performers”\(^{167}\) and since they were not offering their services for free, they were not “entitled to be treated as benefactors and honored guests”.\(^{168}\) In conclusion, this reader basically deprived any professional performer of the right to challenge mistreatment or discrimination. On January 16th, the façade of impartiality on the matter finally crumbled when the paper published a deeply racist letter by a reader who generally accused African Americans.


\(^{161}\) Ibid.


\(^{163}\) Ibid.


\(^{165}\) Ibid.


\(^{167}\) Ibid.

\(^{168}\) Ibid.
Americans of an “instability of character”\textsuperscript{169} and “immaturity”\textsuperscript{170} for expecting “wholesale acceptance because of a legal enactment [the Civil Rights Act, note by the author]”.\textsuperscript{171}

Whereas the Times-Picayune first endeavored to depict New Orleans as a progressive town whose officials and citizens were preponderantly striving for racial equality, their deliberate publication of such reactionist letters revealed prevailing resentments. Those letters to the editor were all printed after the game was already moved to Houston. The definite decision by Foss and the AFL to relocate the event changed the strategy of some local media. The general goal was to further deny any responsibility as a community for the incidents, find arguments to delegitimize the athletes’ protest and curtail their freedom of speech.

\begin{footnotesize}
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The Boycott as a Positive Example of Athlete Activism

Supportive reporting about the protest was mainly found in African American newspapers, as was pointed out in Smith.172 Regarding their influence on the public discourse, it was problematic that the examined newspapers were published on a weekly basis rather than a daily basis. Therefore, favorable coverage of the boycott appeared considerably late, as the following examples will show. Consequently, southern dailies had already framed the boycott negatively and were able to establish a narrative that put the blame on the boycotters.

Columnist Wendell Smith of the Pittsburgh Courier wrote that “[Joe Foss] had to find another city in which to play the game after learning that New Orleans is a bush league town, not worthy of big league considerations.”173 Smith lauded Commissioner Foss’ reaction to move the game and not attempting “smooth things”174 or blame the players’ sensitivity. He predicted that New Orleans’ efforts to attract a pro-franchise in any of America’s big leagues would be fruitless for a long time since he assumed that “no sports promoter in his right mind [would] go there”.175

This prediction proved to be wrong fairly soon. In 1966, NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle awarded New Orleans with a team after Hale Boggs, the Majority Whip in the House of Representatives in Washington D.C., and Russell B. Long, assistant Majority Leader in the Senate, helped secure congressional approval of the merger of the AFL and NFL. Boggs and Long were both from Louisiana and very influential Democrats from the South.176 By calling New Orleans a ‘bush league town’, Smith reversed McIntyre’s judgement of the incident, clearly shifting the responsibility for the boycott to New Orleans’ backwardness and bigotry regarding desegregation and civil rights. McIntyre, as mentioned above, had deemed the behavior of the players as ‘bush’.

Ernest Curry, another writer for the Pittsburgh Courier, figured that city officials were to be blamed for not “properly [orienting] local businesses – entertainment places, transportation firms, etc. – on what was to be expected from them”.177 Less confrontational than his colleague Smith’s reporting, Curry wrote that the “few unfortunate incidents […] did not

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172 Smith, All-Star Game Boycott, pp. 3–22.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 Ross, Mavericks, p. 96.
speak for the general citizenry of the town”\textsuperscript{178}, but that due to the lack of addressing and fighting racism and bigotry in advance of the event, “one must pay the prize for a mistake”\textsuperscript{179}. Curry meant well with David Dixon, whom he thought had done a magnificent job promoting integration in sports in New Orleans. After all, he concluded that New Orleans will “recover [from the boycott] as the forces of good have gradually overtaken that of evilness and racial hate”\textsuperscript{180}, a very optimistic view on the situation. At the same time, it became evident through Curry’s words that the players’ protest had the potential to change the face of a whole city and beyond. Once New Orleans was ready to overcome the initial shock of losing perhaps the most promising opportunity to land a franchise, he assumed, those who strive to put an end to racial discrimination in the city would “[gain] allies”\textsuperscript{181}.

The majority of the examined newspapers either refrained from naming any of the players involved in the boycott or highlighted certain individuals to denounce them as troublemakers, most prominently, Cookie Gilchrist. The Pittsburgh Courier, however, portrayed him and Ernie Warlick as the leaders of the group, praising his longstanding “firm stand against racial injustice”\textsuperscript{182}. Sports editor Bill Nunn pointed out that Gilchrist had often been demonized by the mainstream media for his flamboyance and arrogance, but what they failed to acknowledge was his advocacy for civil rights. There were numerous other politically and socially-involved African American athletes at that time who shared a similar experience, for instance, boxing legend Muhammad Ali or NFL star Jim Brown. Their behavior was not in compliance with the expectations of a still white and conservative sport establishment, which propagated humility rather than self-assurance, especially among black sport stars. Ali might be the most prominent example of an African American athlete who exposed America’s polarization concerning the race issue. While praised as perhaps the most influential ambassador for black liberation and culture by many African Americans and liberals, his lifestyle also embodied everything the conservative political spectrum condemned\textsuperscript{183}. Yet, Gilchrist – as with Ali – was assured the support of progressive African American journalists.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{182} Nunn, Change of Pace, p. 15.
like Nunn, who admired them as role models for self-emancipation and spokespersons for a greater cause.

Another important African American newspaper, the Afro-American, also reported extensively on the walkout. Sam Lacy, the paper’s leading columnist for sports, used his weekly commentary to deconstruct the most common arguments against the boycott. He heavily criticized Dixon for calling the players’ decision ‘preemptory’ since – according to his knowledge – AFL officials had been informed of a potential non-participation of African American players should they encounter discrimination in such an exhibition game. Lacy concluded that Dixon simply did not believe the players and the league would be committed to do so. However, Lacy did not provide any evidence that Dixon knew about this resolution before it became reality. He also disapproved of Dixon’s statement that the players’ alleged militancy would harm the cause they were fighting for. Thus, he commented on the prevailing cultural conflict within the broader civil rights movement, the conflict between negotiation and direct action, clearly favoring the latter. He wrote:

Men of good will have been making such efforts for lo too many years…with their hats in their hands…Warlick and his contemporaries – like the sit-inners, the Freedom Riders and the Washington Marchers – are simply wearing their hats. They did not stretch themselves in front of the cabs or knock down the doors of the jim-crow eating places…They just packed up and said: “Go on, have your football game; we’d rather not play.”

Lacy questioned Dixon’s use of the term militant since the players did not engage in any sort of violent protest. Although the broader civil rights movement faced severe challenges from more radical sources including riots on the streets of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Rochester, Paterson-Elizabeth, New Jersey and Jersey-City in 1964, the boycott – though completely non-violent – was still classified in the same category. Moreover, Dixon’s reaction mirrored the fear of many people in New Orleans that the players’ action could provoke similar eruptions of violence as the aforementioned northern cities experienced the previous summer. With the rise of radicalism in northern ghettos, the general consent of non-violence propagated by all major civil rights organizations was under attack. In the South,

185 Haines, Black Radicals and Mainstream, p. 51.
many activists saw it as a necessity to be armed for self-defense against forceful retaliations by segregationists – most notably members of the KKK. 186

Although New Orleans’ CORE chapter and other major activist groups still followed the non-violence doctrine, the generational discrepancy over how the common goal of equality was to be achieved became more and more evident. The local CORE branch, for instance, had expelled white members in 1962 following a huge increase in white, mostly male, members who were students from Tulane University and LSU New Orleans (University of New Orleans today) after the Freedom Rides. Veteran black leaders of the organization reacted to the growing influence of white participants who were eager to take over leadership roles within CORE or used the chapter as a platform for interracial dating. 187 This decision certainly strengthened young black leadership, but hardly contributed to eased racial tensions. Established leaders of the NAACP were more concerned with moderation and the prevention of radicalization, but were still aware of the necessity of direct action when negotiations failed to materialize. 188 Yet, as Lacy’s comment indicated, the players’ walkout revealed the differences between the two major streams of activism and the expectations related to them.

Without mentioning him by name, Lacy’s argument implicitly attacked Morial’s attempt to buy time and find a less controversial solution. For the journalist, the time of holding “their hats in their hands”, which presumably referred to the approach of the NAACP, was apparently over. Lacy did not discuss the official resolution made by the local NAACP, in which they backed the actions taken by the players, indicative of the organization’s struggle to clarify its position in the issue. African American activism was at an ideological crossroads in the mid-1960s and the AFL boycott showed that the longstanding moderate approach of negotiation proved rather toothless. Younger generations of activists and, of course, the AFL All-stars were no longer willing to wait for social change to arrive at its own pace. At the same time, the direct action of the players created a white backlash, leading local newspapers to unite with reactionists and the mayor of New Orleans to humiliate a significant portion of the city’s citizen.

Hence, it is not surprising that mayor Schiro’s statement was perceived as an insult by Lacy. He asked in response to the mayor’s claim that the players would soon be unemployed if they expected to be loved in every city they play. “Since when do you have to ‘love’ a man to

186 Ibid., p. 53 f.
188 Ibid., p. 61.
extend to him the same rights you enjoy?” As a politician, Schiro should have realized the irrationality of such an assumption. Accordingly, his suggestion to “[roll] with the punch” was seen as the very reason why inequality was still prevailing in the US. Why are African Americans “destined to be the only ones in this country showing the Christian attitude of turning the other cheek?” Lacy wondered. He concluded that colored people could only expect to be treated as first-class citizens in America when the government needed recruits for a war and when “income tax time” was due, hence the title of his column.

The following week, Lacy published parts of an anonymous letter from New Orleans, addressing his thoughts from the previous column. The writer of said letter had interpreted Lacy’s comment on Christian attitudes as a direct accusation against white people in New Orleans. Besides, the enraged author made use of brute racial slurs and claimed that the people of New Orleans did not ask for a football game or the accommodation of African American athletes. Furthermore, the city should have “the right to run its business to satisfy the people who live there”. Lacy soberly countered:

The writer is absolutely correct, however…New Orleans and its people have a right to run their affairs as they see fit…That is why, in this time of change, the city is rapidly deteriorating as a first-class community… In 1963, New Orleans lost the American Legion convention and an estimated 9 million dollars in revenue … Before that, it had lost the American Medical Association convention and was bypassed for a National Football League franchise […] the New Orleans Pelicans had to move to Little Rock (of all places) because the team could neither use colored players nor sell seats in the stands to colored patrons.

Lacy’s references to past incidences in which New Orleans’ inglorious tradition of segregation led to a boycott of the city underlined the notion that the AFL walkout could not be viewed as an isolated event. The American Legion, a non-profit organization focusing on the wellbeing of veterans and servicemembers, moved their 1963 convention to Miami because hotels and other establishments had refused their service to African American members. Consequently, the city lost a significant amount of money, ranging between 9-10 million USD. The New Orleans Hotel Association, led by the director of the Roosevelt Hotel,

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189 Lacy, Only in Times of War, p. 13.
190 n.a., Schiro Attacks AFL, Section 3–C, p. 1.
191 Lacy, Only in Times of War, p. 13.
192 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
stated that they acted on the authority of state laws but they also expressed that these laws spurred many conventions to avoid the city and go elsewhere in the South. Later that year a court decision ruled it unlawful to exclude African American patrons from hotels etc., contradicting Louisiana state law. Lacy also pointed out that New Orleans had been unsuccessful to convince the NFL to grant the city a professional franchise despite the aforementioned exhibition games held in the past. Finally, the New Orleans Pelicans, a professional baseball team playing in the Southern Association, were indeed sold to Little Rock, Arkansas. However, the Southern Association was a segregated league with the exception of one African American player, Nat Peeples, who had a short stint with the Atlanta Crackers in 1954. So, Little Rock did not change the fact that no black player was on the team’s roster. Yet, the Pelicans were boycotted by some African Americans after the Louisiana Weekly mobilized the black community to demonstrate against the segregated seating in the stadium. The league would soon fold due to a decline in fan interest, low attendance and the emergence of live, televised baseball.

After dismantling the angry letter, Lacy disseminated an editorial by WWL-TV, a news station run by New Orleans’ Loyola University. They shared a view of the boycott which was very different from comparably influential news outlets in New Orleans and beyond. Lacy reprinted the transcript:

Right now, it is popular to blame the loss of the nationally televised game on the 21 (colored players) who walked out … So far, nobody has mentioned that perhaps New Orleans is to blame, also … just as it was when the American Legion cancelled out … If any good can come of this, perhaps it will be that this city must at last face to face with facts … Either we are going to compete in this world of ours – as other cities are competing oh, so successfully … Or we close ourselves off from the rest of America and remain the petty, provincial capital of limited opportunity and dubious culture which some seem to enjoy … But of course, physically and economically, the latter choice is impossible … And the sooner all of New Orleans realizes this the better off we will all be.

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195 Haas, Schiro, p. 147 f.
This editorial pretty much unfolded the common strategy of both the majority of local newspapers and city officials to shift the guilt upon the players rather than reflecting New Orleans’ past shortcomings regarding antidiscrimination. None of the high-circulation southern papers analyzed here made a reference to the American Legion convention two years prior to the AFL walkout. No other commentator, columnist or editor scrutinized the reasons why the city still had not landed a pro-football franchise. It was, indeed, easier to claim that the players’ adamant reaction obstructed progress in race relations, instead of realizing that individuals, enterprises and city regulations which continued to adhere to segregation kept New Orleans on the sideline.

One editor from the Courier-Journal out of Louisville, Kentucky came to a similar conclusion when he wrote that “if pro football is to come to the Deep South, which has the stadiums and the climate to attract franchises, the South is going to have to improve its manners, traditionally a regional source of pride.”

Well after the game was held in Houston on January 16th, Jet Magazine, a weekly covering African American culture and politics, featured the AFL-boycott in a long article, introducing new perspectives and statements by the pro-players, the student-athletes from Syracuse and a CORE-representative. Bobbie Barbee, responsible for the report, first summarized the allegations, counting at least eight incidences of verbal abuse, beside the taxi-cab and Bourbon Street issues. He added that the players’ decision to leave New Orleans was widely celebrated among African Americans, but he also underlined Mr. Morial’s initial attempt to convince the players to call off the boycott. The following resolution by the NAACP showing support of the walkout and urging the city officials to take decisive action against racial discrimination was mentioned, but Morial’s ambiguous role apparently drew more attention. Abner Haynes, running back from the Kansas City Chiefs, voiced his discontent with Morial, accusing him of having used more energy to sway them than to fight discrimination in his hometown credibly. Haynes argued that it was not their concern to solve the problem of racism and segregation in New Orleans, so they saw no need to stay and help with whatever solution there might have been.

202 Ibid., p. 53 f.
For Morial and the local NAACP, the whole incident turned out to be a PR-disaster: on the one hand, their role in the longstanding efforts to overcome Jim Crow in the South was widely ignored by the conservative “white” press. Other groups and committees, mostly representing business associations, publicly claimed credit for the progress being made in the past. In addition, newspapers instrumentalized him to further discredit the boycott, which urged the civil rights organization to release the official resolution without much publicity. On the other hand, the players really doubted Morial’s and the NAACP’s achievements and sincerity, and so did influential African American commentators Sam Lacy in the Washington Afro-American and Bobbie Barbee in this article. The image was created that Morial was not willing to side with the boycotters but readily served the interests of the economic and political establishment of New Orleans. It is, thus, indicative that Barbee cited a statement by Richard Haley, the director of the Southern Regional Office of CORE:

> These men were treated as the South has habitually treated Negroes – with condescension, scorn and insult. The players followed the only course open: they resisted directly and in the best tradition of non-violence.203

Yet the most significant contribution of Barbee’s story was that some of the African American athletes of Syracuse University, who played in the Sugar Bowl on New Year’s Day of 1965, came forward and made allegations of racially-motivated abuse during their stay in New Orleans. Billy Hunter, a senior, reported that they had a similar experience with cab-drivers refusing to serve the black athletes in front of the Sheraton-Charles hotel. They were verbally attacked with racial slurs time and again and were also refused entrance to some not further specified establishments.204 These accounts clearly contradicted the common argument by local newspapers that the first integrated Sugar Bowl in almost 10 years went off without any relatable incidents of discrimination. The players, including the team’s two biggest stars Jim Nance and Floyd Little, had not raised these issues right after the game while being interviewed by the media. It is unclear whether they kept it to themselves in order to avoid negative headlines and possible repercussions for their collegiate careers or had different reasons. For student athletes, who were often highly dependent on athletic scholarships, and for young professionals who had not yet established themselves in a pro-league, getting involved in any controversies definitely posed a threat to their futures. In this

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203 Ibid., p. 56.
204 Ibid., p. 55.
regard, it was not surprising that the votes against the boycott reportedly came from rookies – players who were still in their first year in the league.\textsuperscript{205}

Barbee further wrote that the AFL All-stars were warmly welcomed in Houston and that “18 of the 37 white players indicated that although many didn’t wholly agree with their Negro teammates they would have backed them in their refusal to play in New Orleans.”\textsuperscript{206} The journalist added some closing remarks by the players who were ready to leave the incident and New Orleans behind. Larry Garron from the Boston Patriots said, “The false sense of full integration is what disturbed us the most.”\textsuperscript{207} A Patriots teammate of Garron, Houston Antwine, added that he had played an exhibition game in the Crescent City in 1963. He claimed that the only difference to the pre-Civil Rights Act era was that they were allowed to stay in the same hotel as their white teammates this time. On the streets, they still ran into the same struggles caused by racism. Gilchrist summarized his view on the matter: “The city rolled out the red carpet and jerked it from beneath us. Then it got mad when we didn’t fall.”\textsuperscript{208}

These examples of positive media coverage indicate how much admiration the players’ courage aroused among the African American community. Leaders of the group like Gilchrist and Warlick were able to establish their motives in black publications and receive acclaim as civil rights activists – although Warlick highlighted that they had not intended to be associated with activism. Commentators and writers such as Smith, Lacy and Barbee hailed the collective action of the players and the commitment by the AFL to take the athletes’ accusations seriously. From their perspective, the All-Star Game incident was not another episode of a failed attempt to land a pro-franchise in New Orleans but an unprecedented chapter of political activism in the sports realm.

Not many newspapers apart from African American papers and magazines echoed their appreciation of the boycott. Outside the South, the boycott was rarely featured in editorials or covered by on-site correspondents. The Argus-Leader from Sioux Falls, South Dakota, was an exception though. South Dakota was the home state of AFL commissioner Joe Foss. He even served as governor before his tenure as commissioner, which apparently guaranteed him support by the newspaper’s editors. In an editorial titled ‘Old Joe’ Comes Through, Foss was

\textsuperscript{205} Gilchrist/Garbarino, Cookie, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{206} Barbee, Throw Bias For a Loss, pp. 52–57., here p. 56.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., p. 57.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
portrayed as a person who did not run away from problems. The writer respected Foss’ achievement of handling the relocation and pointed out the he was applauded nationwide “for doing the right thing and doing it promptly”.209

Another startling contribution to the ensuing public discourse came from a white All-Star on the West-squad, Ron Mix. In an essay published on January 18th in Sports Illustrated, the major sports magazine in the United States, Mix described his involvement in the boycott. “Was this their Freedom Ride?”210 Mix asked in the title of the essay, alluding to the actions of CORE members who famously put anti-segregation laws in public transit to the test. Recalling a vacation in Germany during the 1964 offseason, Mix mentioned an incident where he “could not relax and enjoy [him]self”211 despite sitting in a bar in Hamburg having drinks with a lady friend. In the club, he spotted a black man who was dancing with a white woman, seemingly having a great time. Mix, however, was disgruntled, full of resentment and felt jealous of the man’s sense of freedom. The reason for his feelings was that Mix was Jewish, and consequently, he could not easily ignore what had happened to the Jews in this very country during the 1930s and 1940s. He admitted that he had not granted the black man a kind of liberty he could not enjoy himself and thus, stared him down until the man felt harassed and left. When he joined the discussion at the Roosevelt Hotel after learning about the planned walkout, he was again reminded of this irritating incident, now even more ashamed of his reaction.

Yet his experience of not belonging helped Mix understand the African American players’ discomfort in this climate of racial inequality and hate in New Orleans. Still, he tried to persuade them to stay as he “felt something was wrong about what the Negro ballplayers were doing. Not wrong to protest, but wrong in method. An action such as this must lead to a favorable result.”212 He proposed to stay and get the local and nation media on their side to report about the injustice African Americans were exposed to in this city. They rejected his idea for a simple reason: Prior to the 1964 season, some of the players present already ran into a very similar racial incident in another southern metropolis, Atlanta. The AFL’s San Diego Chargers were in town to play the New York Jets in a preseason-exhibition game. The Chargers were staying in the Atlanta Hilton Inn, which was ironically co-owned by their team

211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
owner, Barron Hilton. When some of the African American players on the team tried to enter the pool room of the hotel, they were denied entrance. Head Coach Sid Gilman, who was also coaching the West All-Stars in New Orleans five months later, convinced the players to withdraw. The game was played without any visible reaction by the players, which was why the incident did not draw the same media attention as the All-Star game walkout. During their meeting with Mix, the boycotters used this experience to underline the necessity of their move.²¹³

Soon Mix realized that his African American teammates were not necessarily thrilled to hear another “‘Mister Charlie’s promise of a distant something’”²¹⁴. Unsuccessful in changing his teammates’ resolution, Mix tried to see the incident from their perspective. He wondered whether some of them chose to participate in the boycott out of a bad conscience over “having escaped the suffering of their southern brother, their ghettoed brother”.²¹⁵ Although he still disapproved of boycotting the whole city in principle, Mix wrote that he felt the responsibility to show solidarity with his black teammates. He decided not to play should the game be held as planned in New Orleans. According to him it was “important for at least one white player […] to join the Negroes, to say we’re with you”.²¹⁶

Mix’ essay was distributed among journalists before it was published in Sports Illustrated. The Shreveport Times highlighted his effort to sway his fellow teammates.²¹⁷ Sam Lacy of the Washington Afro-American, however, attacked Mix for suggesting to wait and protest in another fashion. He thought that Mix “should have known better his argument was pathetic”²¹⁸, before wondering “how naïve an educated white boy [can] get”.²¹⁹ Lacy argued that national newspapers had been filled with stories about police brutality, campus riots and other civil rights protests in the South for years, yet “Dixiecrat elements”²²⁰ were still pretty much accepted and widespread. Accordingly, a hundred years of waiting for equality – in reference to the abolition of slavery amidst the Civil War – had not brought the “favorable

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 25.
²¹⁶ Ibid.
²¹⁷ n.a., Vain Attempt Was Made by Ron Mix, in: The Times (Shreveport, La.), 14.1.1965, Section D, p. 2.
²¹⁸ Ibid., Only in Times of War, p. 13.
²¹⁹ Ibid.
²²⁰ Ibid. The term “Dixiecrat” referred to a secessionist group of Southern Democrats protesting civil rights proposals made during the 1948 national convention of the Democratic Party. Some members formed the “States’ Right Democratic Party”, which was also known as the Dixiecrat Party. Dixie stands for the former Confederate States. The party was dissolved the same year, see: Aldrich/Griffin, Why Parties Matter, p. 108.
Mix was hoping to achieve in the week leading up to the game. Lacy further questioned Mix’ expression of sympathy and understanding, thus rejecting the notion of solidarity between a Jewish ballplayer and his African American teammates. He pointed out that Mix did not experience any form of discrimination in New Orleans based on his religious affiliation. In the end, Lacy at least acknowledged that Mix “meant well”, but the discussion revealed the deep division within the American society concerning the civil rights movement. The most pressing question in this discourse was: Who was in a position to judge what type of reaction by the players and the league was appropriate and legitimate?

Lacy’s criticism aside, Mix received credit for going public and backing his African American teammates. He was the only white player from either squad to address the issue without asking to stay anonymous. On Thursday, January 14th, Mix was elected vice president of the AFL Players Association, which also released a statement that day, sharing their official view on the boycott. Their resolution came after discussing the incident in New Orleans with at least one African American player of each team in the AFL. The Players Association concluded that they unanimously supported their colleagues’ walkout. “We came to a new understanding concerning the relations of man”, the statement was cited via the Associated Press. They added that they had stood behind the African American players from the beginning, “but through lack of communications [they were] unable to assemble enough information to take a stand”. As a result of their inquiry, the association prompted league officials to investigate “future sites for pre-season games, all-star and other games sponsored by the league […] for discriminatory practices before the game sites are chosen”.

On January 16th, the All-Star Game was finally played in Houston, witnessed by a mere 15,446 people at Jeppesen Stadium. The West All-Stars dominated the game and finished the season with a 38:14 victory over their opponents from the East.

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221 Mix, Was This Their Freedom Ride, p. 24.
222 Lacy, Only in Times of War, p. 13.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
The on-the-field action was after all secondary, the off-the-field action, however, was a milestone for activism in American sports history. New York Times sports reporter, William Wallace, realized that the AFL-boycott was unprecedented, but naturally, national newspapers such as the New York Times prioritized other developing stories, which were often impactful on a global stage. In terms of agenda setting, when the news about the walkout broke on January 11th, front pages of national and local newspapers alike highlighted a massive – nationwide – strike by longshoremen, which significantly threatened the economy. However, for New Orleans’ main newspaper, the Times-Picayune, the boycott became the dominating story for the week leading up to the game, thus assuring that their readers stayed informed about the latest developments and public reactions. As a daily newspaper with on-site correspondents, the Times-Picayune was able to frame the story, determining what was important to know and whose voice and perspective was featured. In this case, it was peculiar that the paper’s editorial policy seemed to change over the course of the following days. Their initial coverage was, in fact, objective and offered statements from different standpoints.

The newspaper started to frame the boycott in a way that made the protesting players the aggressors and provocateurs. They went about this by foregrounding opinions by groups and individuals that supported that narrative. The city, its citizens, Dave Dixon and his organizing committee were the victims of the players’ and the league’s allegedly preemptory action. The focus was laid on unfavorable consequences for New Orleans’ reputation in the nation and their endeavors to attain a professional football franchise. Furthermore, the reports emphasized financial deficits for the Police Foundation and the players’ pension fund as a result of the walkout and subsequent relocation of the event. The causes for the players’ protest, the discriminatory and racist actions of numerous individuals in town, were more and more pushed in the background. Tendentially supportive statements, such as the resolution by the local NAACP, were published, but did not receive the same prominence as contributions which opposed the boycott. In contrast, letters to the editors – ranging from being critical of the players’ protest to overtly racist and hostile towards civil rights activism in general – were recognizably placed in the editorial section. From today’s perspective, it can only be speculated whether the paper deliberately withheld any supportive responses from their readers or they did not receive any.

In their respective coverage of the issue, newspapers from two other urban centers in Louisiana, the Advocate from Baton Rouge and the Times from Shreveport, reflected popular
resentments against the societal and political movements that kicked off a new era in American history. Columnists, editorials and readers echoed the indignation expressed by Mayor Schiro or Governor McKeithen. They generally refused to acknowledge any connections between the charges by the players and the underlying racism behind the reluctance to accept racial equality in the Deep South. Moreover, the legitimacy of a boycott based on racially motivated but non-violent abuse was widely contested. Southern newspapers shared and spread the assumption that such methods of direct action were detrimental to social harmony and the cause of African American self-emancipation. Instead they proposed that the players should simply have suffered the indignity and “rolled with the punch”, as Mayor Schiro put it. Through blaming the victim, southern news reporters not only made a mockery of the boycott but also discredited the civil rights movement in general.

At the same time, the decision not to stay and play was backed by league officials, especially Joe Foss, who was well aware of the financial and potentially defamatory ramifications of the walkout. The league’s firm stance against bigotry was probably the most significant victory for the protesting players and perhaps all other minority athletes in the US. The successful protest showed that African American football players, who had been excluded from competing on a level playing field for decades, now possessed the power to force a nationally televised event to be moved for the sake of justice. Although local newspapers tended to report negatively, Warlick and others were allowed a platform to share their experiences in a city still hostile towards African Americans. Their commitment to principles aroused admiration among black journalists, who embraced the league’s move to shun New Orleans, thus prioritizing their employees’ well-being over money. In fact, the AFL sacrificed a lucrative market for expansion, which was eventually conquered by their rivals, the NFL. The players also received support from their peers when the AFL Players Association issued their statement to the press. African American newspapers and magazines reported extensively after some delay, which was the result of their weekly distribution. Although early news reports told a different story, the New Orleans NAACP, led by Ernest Morial, was also looking to underline their allegiance with the players, thus building a bridge between the athletes and the official civil rights movement. Perhaps to avoid the stigmatization as troublemakers – a label which was often given to athletes like Ali or Gilchrist who were vocal about social justice – some of the players told the press that they did not see themselves as activists. The reactions they caused in the newsrooms and the public, however, were very

\(^{227}\) n.a., Schiro Attacks AFL, Section 3–C, p. 1.
much in the tradition of other chapters of civil rights activism. The AFL All-Stars showed with their boycott that the civil rights movement also touched the purportedly meritocratic world of sports, and that the media was reflective of a divided nation on race issues.

Of course, much has changed in New Orleans’ sports history since the 1965 All-Star game boycott. The following chapter discusses the aftermaths of the incident. It will be shown how the city finally landed their pro-football franchise, and how individuals and institutions have since attempted to commemorate the boycott. It will also be addressed what the critical public can learn from the boycott in regard to contemporary discourses concerning socially and politically involved athletes.
The Aftermath

The subsequent chapter will outline the political and societal ties of professional football in New Orleans. It will be shown how political leaders of Louisiana utilized their influence in Congress to pave the way for a professional football franchise in New Orleans and how the 1965 AFL boycott influenced negotiations and city policy making in the following years.

The AFL-NFL Merger and the Birth of the New Orleans Saints

The relocated game in Houston on January 16th marked the end of a long 1964-1965 football season. As a consequence, reporting about the boycott ended abruptly and moved on to other news, scores and updates in the sports sections of American newspapers. Behind the scenes, however, the protest refueled the call for political action against racism and discrimination. For instance, the boycott induced the Community Relations Council of Greater New Orleans, a “non-political association of concerned citizens composed of business, professional and laboring people of various religious [sic!] and races”\(^{228}\), to address the City Council of New Orleans to create an official Human Relations Commission. The purpose thereof was “to represent all racial, religious, civic, business and political groups”\(^{229}\) in order to “[eliminate] the misunderstanding and recrimination rampant among our citizens […] by a constructive community force”.\(^{230}\) The group stated that the recent boycott as well as the loss of the American Legion convention seriously threatened New Orleans’ reputation in the world as a tourist attraction, but especially the latest incident revealed that New Orleans’ politicians and officials needed to take measures to counteract bigotry and racism. In order to avoid yet more repercussions during the upcoming Mardi Gras season and the world-famous Jazz-Festival, the association called for immediate action. They offered to provide experts and professionals to the City Council.

In terms of forming an official Human Relations Commission or Committee, which would have sent a strong signal to the black community of New Orleans, Mayor Schiro, remained hesitant and his position ambiguous. 1965 was virtually an election year for the mayor when

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\(^{228}\) Statement Delivered to the City Council on New Orleans, January 14, 1965, University of New Orleans Earl K. Long LA and Special Collection, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, New Orleans Branch, Mss 28-195.

\(^{229}\) Ibid.

\(^{230}\) Ibid.
he faced his challenger James Fitzmorris in the Democratic primary, in which the party’s candidate for the general election in 1966 would be determined. Since usually no Republican contestant entered the race for mayor in this Democratic stronghold, the winner of the primary would be New Orleans’ mayor for the next four years. A few days before the election, Schiro announced that he was planning to build a domed stadium for an estimated 24 million dollars. However, there was still no pro-franchise in sight, as a skeptical Times-Picayune editorial pointed out. The paper warned their readers that the reigning mayor had made such promises about big infrastructure projects in the past without much effect. They further accused him of addressing the issue only because of the upcoming primary, which was one of the reasons why the paper officially endorsed Fitzmorris. Dave Dixon was also involved in the new plans which were apparently adopted after the AFL fiasco. He stated that the new stadium would “put New Orleans in a commanding position for the 16th National Football League franchise”. The AFL All-Star Game boycott was neither mentioned by Schiro and Dixon nor by the Times-Picayune editors, which was indicative for their joint efforts to gloss over any bad publicity caused by the city’s shortcomings in race relations. The newspaper quoted Marvin Kratter, an investor who donated land for the venture, that Schiro had “been bugging [him] about this project for six months”. This statement implied that the stadium plans had not been high on the agenda before the AFL boycott set back New Orleans’ endeavors to attract a pro football team. The wealthy donor even anticipated that the new sports arena would one day host the Olympic Games.

In this sense, the short-term effect of the AFL walkout was that Schiro and Dixon adjusted their strategy to attract a football franchise in two ways. On the one hand, a state-of-the-art, domed 60,000 seat stadium would guarantee weatherproof playing conditions year-round – a lesson learned from the 1963 NFL-doubleheader. On the other hand, New Orleans preferably targeted an NFL franchise rather than an AFL affiliation. Yet, Dixon stayed in contact with AFL officials and expressed via the news that the “walkout is a closed issue. […] Everyone

231 n.a., Wonderful - If!, in: The Times-Picayune, 6.11.1965, p. 10.
232 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
involved regrets what happened and we all agreed months ago that this is a closed mater [sic!] which will not recur.”236

For Roesler, the issue did not seem closed at all. His columns remained hostile whenever he found an occasion to address the AFL or the 1965 All-Star Game boycott. Shortly after Dixon’s announcement to reenter negotiations with the league, the journalist wrote an aggressive column attacking the players and the “tons of unfavorable comment [sic!] from uninformed newsmen”237 stemming from their protest. He reiterated to his readers that the AFL “sanctioned a humiliating slap to New Orleans’ face”238 and shrugged off the indignities that the players had endured in the city. “Okay, there was discrimination here. I’ll take you to any town in the nation and I’ll bet you a beer you’ll find some of the same practices”, Roesler argued in attempt to defend New Orleans. The journalist appeared to be intimidated by outspoken African American athletes in general. For instance, he expressed his dislike for boxing heavyweight-champion Muhammad Ali, whom he referred to as “Ali Babble”239 in the very same text. In another column, which dealt with Ali’s refusal to be drafted by the army for combat in Vietnam in 1966, Roesler called for a fan and media boycott of his fights. He suggested to invest the money in the USO (United Service Organizations) instead of giving it to “that creep who wears the heavyweight title, who is lending comfort to those who are killing Americans.”240

Realizing that there was not much movement from the NFL regarding an expansion to the Crescent City, Dixon became aware of the leverage the AFL still possessed. In 1966, when the dome discussion became more concrete and reached the next political level – Governor McKeithen had gotten involved in talks with NFL commissioner Pete Rozelle – Dixon figured that it was useful to keep open-minded towards an AFL franchise. Buddy Diliberto, one of the Times-Picayune correspondents of the walkout, agreed with Dixon “that an open mind on the subject would give the city a stronger bargaining hand”.241 Diliberto acknowledged that “the AFL walkout here over a year ago left a bad taste,”242 but that this

238 Ibid.
239 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
was not reason enough to “burn down the bridges”.

His colleague Bob Roesler, however, continued to choose a less pragmatic approach in his conclusions. He made sure to sustain the narrative that New Orleans was the victim of an unjust campaign by the AFL and the protesting athletes. In August of 1966, the issue of a pro-franchise for New Orleans was still not resolved and Roesler feared that the AFL could be given another shot eventually. Reminiscent of the “[...] scars left by the AFL walkout in January, 1965,” Roesler expressed that he would “hate to campaign for the stadium knowing the tenants would be the AFL. Whoever would own the franchise here would probably tap out before they could reap benefits of playing in the league.” His comment showed the lack of self-reflection that had accompanied the local news coverage since the players and the league announced their boycott. It was thus no surprise that the NFL was the columnist’s preferred option.

Throughout its history, the National Football League had not shown much eagerness to embrace progressive measures. For instance, the Washington Redskins were not sanctioned by the league for refusing to desegregate their team up until the 1961 season. The team, led by owner George Preston Marshall, only integrated after the Kennedy administration threatened to ban the franchise from their home stadium which was situated on land regulated by the Interior Department. Thus, Marshall was forced to adhere to anti-discrimination regulations and stop segregationist hiring tactics. Although the league saw a significant increase in the number of black players on team rosters during the 1960s (from 16.5 percent of all players employed in the league in 1961 to 28 percent in 1968), discrimination based on skin color was widespread and accepted among the NFL establishment. Certain positions, such as the quarterback and the center on offense or the middle linebacker on defense, were exclusively reserved for whites. These positions required a high level of mental capacity along with athleticism, and because of prevailing racist biases, coaches and executives did not attribute this skillset to African American ball players.

In 1965, the NFL was, of course, an integrated league, yet civil rights were not a great concern for the white elite in the front offices. Commissioner Pete Rozelle was more worried

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243 Ibid.
244 Bob Roesler, Behind the Sports Scene. AFL Has First Call on N.O., Says Ford, in: The Times-Picayune, 8.8.1966, Section 2, p. 10.
245 Ibid.
247 Crepeau, NFL, p. 82.
248 Ibid.
about the longstanding rivalry with the AFL, especially in regard to drafting the best players out of college, striking television deals and filling the stadiums. Expansion had also not been on their agenda. In 1964, however, Rozelle acknowledged that New Orleans and Atlanta would have been their most-promising prospects for a new franchise if they had intended to change their plans.\textsuperscript{249} As mentioned above, Atlanta already had a racist incident involving pro-athletes from the AFL, which was addressed in the same issue of Sports Illustrated. Their second favorite for an expansion, New Orleans, ironically drew level with Atlanta when the All-Stars walked out.

Besides Schiro’s and Dixon’s dome plans, Louisiana’s political elite came up with another idea to plead their case for a pro-team in New Orleans. As previously mentioned, the struggle between the NFL and the AFL to draft and sign the best players out of colleges was a big financial concern for both leagues. The New York Jets, for instance, signed rookie Alabama Quarterback Joe Namath to a record-breaking 400,000 $ contract to secure his services. Namath, who would become one of the most iconic figures of professional football due to his “playboy persona”\textsuperscript{250}, rebellious attire and style, embodied a new type of athlete, challenging the traditional ideals of sportsmanship. Broadway Joe, as he was also called, represented the spirit of youth, as did the whole AFL in comparison to the NFL. Nevertheless, the prevailing conflict between the leagues needed to be resolved without threatening the financial stability of the respective teams, which had started to offer astronomical sums to get the best talents. A merger between the NFL and AFL became the most agreeable option, but needed congressional approval due to national anti-trust laws. Dixon helped Commissioner Rozelle to get in contact with Hale Boggs, House Majority Whip from Louisiana, to push forward favorable legislation allowing the NFL and AFL to merge. In return, Boggs was crystal-clear that the NFL had to finally award New Orleans and the state of Louisiana a pro-franchise.\textsuperscript{251}

On October 13\textsuperscript{th}, 1966, Hale Boggs presented the respective bill H.R. 17791 before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives. The bill’s aim was “to authorize the merger of two or more professional football leagues, and to protect football contest [sic!] between secondary schools from professional football

\textsuperscript{250} Crepeau, NFL, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{251} Ross, Mavericks, p. 96.
Boggs further specified that he represented a community, i.e. Louisiana, which felt discriminated against because it had not been granted a professional franchise yet. He prepared the following statement:

[...] Mr. Chairman, New Orleans is the prime candidate for a franchise in the merger plans.

The New Orleans area is ready for a professional football team. It is what New Orleans and Louisiana wants. It is what the South wants. We have a growing industrial area, one of the fastest growing in the United States. We are building from Houston to Atlanta one of the great industrial complexes of this country. Professional sports are an integral part of growth patterns. We have come of age and we deserve a team.

The residents of my great area have proven they will support a team. We have success upon success in staging professional football pre-season games and double headers in our great Sugar Bowl. We have the market for a team and we want the football team to share in our prosperity.

We have the enthusiasm. We have the interest.

Now the legal minds of the professional teams believe it is necessary to have an exemption from the anti-trust law to protect them. I believe they have a sound legal basis for doing so. I have sought help from attorneys to substantiate this contention. I am making it part of the record.

I believe we must also recognize the great mandate from the people who overwhelmingly approve of the merger and an [sic!] rapid end to the war now going on between the two football leagues.

We are seeking peace with this merger and I believe we should do all we can to accommodate that peace.

We must also consider the other cities that will get teams in the expansion plans. We must spread this game to as many of our citizens as we can.

The second part of my bill would prohibit telecasts of pro games in areas where high schools and colleges are playing. We should do all in our power to help our youngsters maintain the widespread support they no receive. There is enough time in the weekend for all levels of the game and we should work towards an orderly schedule that hurts none of the parties.

I urge you to report this bill favorably.  

Boggs’ accounts indirectly revealed the quid-pro-quo arrangement between him and NFL commissioner Rozelle. The reason for his effort to reach an exemption of the anti-trust law

for the merger of the two leagues was to secure New Orleans a franchise. His plea aimed at endorsing New Orleans, Louisiana and the South in general as a great market for a team. He underlined the success of past events, like the pre-season games, which showed how enthusiastic the football fanbase could be. Once more, the importance of professional sports as a catalyst for economic growth became evident through Boggs’ words. However, he made no mention of New Orleans’ latest failed attempt to persuade a pro-league to expand to the Crescent City. Boggs deliberately neglected the impact of sports on social issues, thus contributing to the adopted political strategy to dismiss the All-Star incident completely. Mentioning the boycott and potential lessons learned from it would have been interpreted as an admission of guilt, which was clearly not in the interest of New Orleans’ and Louisiana’s political elite. In fact, he reversed the notion of discrimination in his introductory speech, claiming that the citizens in the South felt unjustly treated for not qualifying for a pro-franchise. In retrospect, these allegations seem extremely cynical, yet they followed a common tactic to delegitimize imposed social and ethnical reforms.

The second part of Boggs’ proposal aimed at facilitating the congressional passing of bill H.R. 17791 in that it combined the merger with an important, yet uncontroversial proposition. Introducing a coordinated schedule for events on all levels of football avoided conflicts of interest between professional, college and high school programs. Eventually, this section of the bill led to the well-established format of having high school football on Fridays, college football on Saturdays and NFL-football on Sundays.²⁵⁴

Commissioner Pete Rozelle was also summoned to the congressional hearing to present the leagues’ arguments for a merger. Expansion plans to areas which had no franchise yet were an essential strategy to woo representatives of the respective regions. He posed the following aspects of the preliminary agreements of the two leagues:

1. Every franchise of both leagues will remain in its present location.
2. Two new franchises will be added by the 1968 season, making a total of 26 teams.
3. Studies will then be made of the feasibility of adding two more franchises.
4. A world championship game between the champions of the two present leagues will be established beginning in January 1967.

²⁵⁴ In 1970, Monday Night Football was introduced in an 8.6 Mio. $ contract with ABC, see: Crepeau, NFL, p. 96. In the 2000s, Thursday Night Football was established and they even tried Saturday Night Football, albeit briefly, see: Thursday Night Football, in: Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia, last edited on 2.2.2020, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thursday_Night_Football], accessed on 10.2.2020.
5. Following this championship game, a player selection system will be instituted by the combined league with priority of selection determined by the won-loss record of each team during the 1966 season.

[…]

7. By 1970, there will be full integration of the combined league schedule […]

8. […] Beginning in 1970, there will be an equal division of television income among all clubs of the combined league. 255

Point 2 referred to the planned expansion franchises in New Orleans (the Saints) and Cincinnati (the Bengals). Point 3 opened opportunities for other markets, most notably for the cities of Memphis, Tennessee; Tampa, Florida; Seattle, Washington; and Phoenix, Arizona. 256 Another major issue for the two leagues was the draft, as outlined in point 5: A combined selection of the most promising talents from college would prevent young, unproven players from being drafted by two teams at the same time, which had led to immense expansion of rookie contracts in the past. Many veteran players had voiced their dissatisfaction with the prevailing situation that rookie players were able to land more lucrative deals than some of the games’ most respected stars. Additionally, the leagues’ plan to link a team’s draft position to its performance in the previous season made sure that worse teams had a chance to close the gap to opponents with a better record. In essence, the worst team of one season got to choose first in the following draft.

The congressional hearings also featured reactions from players and newspapers, which were clearly in favor of a merger between the NFL and AFL. 257 Unsurprisingly, the hopes were particularly high in New Orleans. On October 18th, the Times-Picayune announced on their front page that the involved committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate passed the anti-trust exemption for the merger. Due to the successful lobbying of Rep. Hale Boggs and Sen. Russell B. Long from Louisiana, who served as assistant Majority Leader in the Senate, the door for the merger was pushed wide open. Consequently, New Orleans was in pole-position to benefit from the planned league expansion. For Boggs and Long, their success cemented their powerful stance within both Houses, which became evident in a

256 Crepeau, NFL, p. 115.
statement by Washington experts quoted in the Times-Picayune. Accordingly, the legislation only passed due to:

[…], the immense prestige and influence of the two men from Louisiana – one chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and assistant majority leader, and the other, acting majority leader and permanent whip of the House and high-ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee. Few states wield such immense power and influence through their representatives.258

It cannot be underestimated how significant this merger was for their political careers. On the one hand, they were able to overpower intra-party opposition in the person of Emanuel Celler, Representative from New York and chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.259 For Boggs and Long, the merger was thus a victory for the South in the longstanding conflict within the Democratic party during the 1960s. Indirectly, it was a defeat for the boycotters of the AFL All-Star Game and those progressive forces that were hoping for social improvements to be pivotal for an expansion franchise in New Orleans. In the end, adept networking by politicians who had represented the southern opposition to civil rights and racial justice in the past 260 guaranteed Louisiana a pro-football franchise.

On the other hand, the passing of their bills meant excellent publicity for the upcoming elections for the 90th United States Congress on November 8th. Boggs sought re-election as congressman and being the ‘father’ of a New Orleans pro-grid team would definitely secure him popularity in his congressional district. Sports columnist Bob Roesler lauded Long and Boggs for “[pulling] off a magnificent end run to elude Rep. Emanuel Celler (D.N.Y) […] and [scoring] a mighty big touchdown for professional football”261, elaborating on football jargon to describe the politicians’ accomplishments. But first, commissioner Rozelle had to deliver on his promise to bring NFL football to the city permanently.

On November 1st, Pete Rozelle officially announced the awarding of an NFL franchise to New Orleans. The 24 team owners of both the NFL and AFL voted unanimously for the expansion. According to Roesler, Rozelle’s “voice was drowned in the sea of applause from

259 Ibid., p. 1.
civic, business and political leaders who were present at the press conference.”\textsuperscript{262} The economic impact of a new football team dominated the headlines in New Orleans’ major newspaper. Drawing on the experience of other cities with pro-franchises, like Houston, Atlanta, or Miami, the paper predicted a substantial financial boost for restaurants, hotels, taxi companies, the infrastructure industry and retailers. Mayor Schiro emphasized the much-needed additional tax dollar for the realization of municipal projects.\textsuperscript{263} Civil rights issues, however, were again dodged, whereas business interests were clearly highlighted by the local news.

The next step for New Orleans was to build an adequate home stadium for the new team, which was another politically relevant enterprise. On November 8\textsuperscript{th}, eligible voters not only decided on their representation in the House and the Senate, they also voted on a number of state-constitutional amendments. These were of particular interest for Governor McKeithen, being the highest ranked politician of the state. Constitutional Amendment No. 1, for instance, regulated the succession of governor. Yet, in several caricatures and articles published in the days between Rozelle’s announcement and the election, Constitutional Amendment No.10 was identified as the most essential reform: Amendment No. 10 proposed the financing of a domed multi-purpose stadium by means of a sales tax increase on hotel and motel rooms in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes.\textsuperscript{264} The costs for the stadium, which reportedly already bore the name ‘Superdome’, were estimated at $30-Million.\textsuperscript{265}

\textsuperscript{263} n.a., Pro Team Big Economic Gain. Visitor Increase Means Millions of Dollars, in: \textit{The Times-Picayune}, 2.11.1965, pp. 1–8, here p. 1.
\textsuperscript{264} Ed Staton, Vote for the Stadium, in: \textit{The Times-Picayune}, 4.11.1966, p. 58.
Rozelle and New Orleans’ and Louisiana’s political elite made sure that the influential Times-Picayune heavily endorsed the amendment. In the aforementioned press conference, Rozelle stressed the importance of a new facility, arguing that playing games in Tulane Stadium, which the university kindly offered, could only be an interim solution. In his speech, Rozelle cleverly highlighted the newspaper’s contribution to bringing an NFL to town. He said, “I don’t like to differentiate among news media people, but we are delighted, and would like to mention just one name if I may, Mr. (John F.) Tims (President and publisher of The Times-Picayune Publishing Corp.).”

He further acknowledged that their favorable reporting “was another factor in encouraging us to come here”. Indeed, it was crucial for the whole endeavor to reach popular approval for Amendment No. 10 and Rozelle, Boggs and co. were well-advised to get the Times-Picayune on board. Mayor Schiro, absent from the press conference, released a statement which also emphasized the necessary next step of getting the stadium built.


266 Roesler, Big Time Football Comes To N.O., pp. 1, 8, here p. 8.
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid.
Their strategy apparently paid off. The Times-Picayune made the dome-amendment a top-priority in their coverage of the upcoming elections. Roesler, in his sports column, quoted Gov. McKeithen’s plea to the media:

I’d like to ask the members of the news media to help those of us who got Amendment No. 10 started. The amendment, when properly explained, is acceptable to most everyone. That is all we need do: explain it. [...] The taxes collected on those millions will go to Louisiana [...], so actually in the long run it (the stadium) will cost us nothing. [...] No policeman, no teacher, no highway, no road or institution is going to lose a dollar because of the dome.  

A publicly funded multi-million Dollar project, such as the Superdome, needed to be promoted properly to tax payers. In the days leading to the deciding November 8th elections, the Times-Picayune ran a campaign to convince their readers to vote ‘yes’ on Amendment No.10. A fact-based front page article on November 6th backed the project’s feasibility with findings of a study by the Gulf South Research Institute (GSRI). Accordingly, the costs would amount to $30-Million for a suburban location, and $35-Million for a downtown location, respectively. The study also explained that the funding for the Superdome would be sufficient through the tax increase on hotels and motels and the operating surplus of the dome itself. The study also stressed the employment opportunities that come with a new facility. Not only would New Orleans’s construction companies be able to earn substantial contracts, the operation of the dome would create hundreds of full-time and part-time jobs. Furthermore, various football events held in the stadium (both professional and college bowl games), would attract an estimated 1.27 million paying visitors, who would consequently spark up business for other enterprises and industries in the city.  

Reaching out to sports fans, essayist Ed Staton was less subtle in his promotion for the amendment. He urged his readers to acknowledge the necessity of a domed, air-conditioned home stadium in order to assure New Orleans’ “position of prominence as one of the major league sports cities in the nation”. Moreover, he underlined how versatile the Superdome would be, not just for sports but also for other events such as conventions, concerts or fairs. He mentioned plans of Tulane University to tear down their stadium in the near future to provide space for new buildings on their campus. He ironically remarked that a domed

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271 Staton, Vote, p. 58.
stadium would make them “more progressive than Muleshoe, Tex”\textsuperscript{272}, a little town in Texas which was ‘famous’ for a statue of a mule.

On November 7th, the Times-Picayune editorial identified Amendment No.10 as one of seven reforms that were essential to the area. The editors wrote that “the proper response to the excellent set-up [the new NFL team], we believe, should be overwhelming ratification of Amendment 10 which will authorize the financing.”\textsuperscript{273} They dismissed the concerns of critics who claimed that public funds would be necessary to assist financing, again referring to the findings of the GSRI study. The issue was also highlighted on the front page on the day of the election, Tuesday, November 8th. Furthermore, page 19 featured a paid advertisement for Representative Hale Boggs, featuring the official declarations of endorsement by notable politicians and officials, including Mayor Schiro.\textsuperscript{274}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\caption{Illustration 4: Caricature supporting the Times-Picayune editorial about amendments vital to the area, The Times-Picayune, November 7th, 1966.}
\end{figure}

The next day, the Times-Picayune reported that the preliminary count of the votes favored Amendment No.10 by a wide margin.\textsuperscript{275} The stage was set, the Saints, as New Orleans’ NFL team was named shortly thereafter, were ready to finally march in.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{272} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{273} n.a., Seven Proposals Vital to Area, in: The Times-Picayune, p. 14.
\item \textsuperscript{274} Boggs for Congress Campaign Committee, These Elected Officials of The Second Congressional District Urge You to Re-Elect Your Congressman, Hale Boggs 1966.
\item \textsuperscript{275} C. M. Hargroder, Amendments 10, 1 Seen Passing, in: The Times-Picayune, 9.11.1966, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
Despite the significance of Boggs’ and Long’s congressional campaign to facilitate the merger, one civic man had also played a vital role in the birth of the Saints, Dave Dixon. His commitment was applauded by Rozelle during his press conference, and Mayor Schiro also recognized his efforts in his press release.\textsuperscript{276} It was thus no surprise that Dixon was rewarded for his determination. On November 10\textsuperscript{th}, Schiro appointed him as one of the five members of the Superdome Commission.\textsuperscript{277} Dixon even drew admiration from the New York Times. In contrast to the local Times-Picayune, the New York Times explicitly reminded their readers of the AFL-boycott, writing that Dixon “[…] survived the walkout of the American Football League’s Negro players […], a harmful incident from which New Orleans managed to recover neatly and nicely.”\textsuperscript{278} Roesler added to the optimism that came with the launching of the pro-franchise in his city, which seemed to have overcome “some of the darkest days in New Orleans sports history”.\textsuperscript{279} He did not, however, mention the walkout by name nor did he make any references to improvements in race relations. He remarked that “in most of those dark sports years we made substantial progress in bringing industrial plants, new business, more port activity and our economic horizons kept stretching further and further.”\textsuperscript{280} Yet, Roesler criticized New Orleans and its citizens, who allegedly “kept getting duller and duller”\textsuperscript{281} during those years. This statement possibly referred to some people’s reluctance to embrace social change, but it rather aimed at discussions about the principle necessity of a pro-sports club and an expensive new arena. The latter interpretation became more reliable as Roesler continued to argue for the construction of the Superdome. He also listed again how profitable a pro-football team would be for New Orleans’ prestige in the nation, for the economy and for the citizens’ self-esteem. “Isn’t good to think [sic!] of ourselves as major league?”\textsuperscript{282}, he wondered. Through his coverage of this beginning of a new era in local sports history, the excitement about the new franchise becomes evident. The question remained, however, what lessons New Orleans had learned from its past deficiencies which were exposed by the protest of the AFL All-Stars in 1965.

\textsuperscript{276} Roesler, Big Time Football Comes To N.O., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{278} Wallace, New Orleans is Awarded Franchise, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{280} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid.
The Boycott’s Lasting Effect: The Public Accommodation Ordinance of 1969

It is not particularly easy to link cause and effect of isolated actions such as the AFL walkout, especially in the light of the volatile era of the civil rights movement. As was shown in the newspaper analysis, the immediate response – at least on the local level – was rather negative and symptomatic of the so-called white backlash, which often followed direct action protests. Notwithstanding, there was evidence that the athletes’ boycott entailed positive ramifications for the city’s African American population and their representation on the political level. The All-Stars certainly managed to ignite a nation-wide discussion about race relations in a city which had not been as much on the media radar as other bigot hotspots in the South. Still, the progress in regard to the integration of New Orleans was mainly the result of the perseverance of established civil rights activists and groups. The AFL All-Star Game incident was significant but just another episode of a much broader struggle.

As mentioned earlier, 1965 was an election year for reigning mayor Schiro. He faced his rival Fitzmorris in the primaries for the nomination as the Democratic candidate for the 1966 mayoralty election. Despite his condescending and cynical reaction to the AFL-boycott (“[roll] with the punch”283), Schiro had worked on his relationship with local African American leaders after heavily relying on the white votership in his 1962 campaign. However, for the better part of his tenure, he chose to overlook the African American community, especially concerning the appointment of representatives in official committees. As of 1963, not a single African American got a chance to represent the more than 200,000 black residents of New Orleans in any city commission or committee.284

The AFL-incident certainly put the topic back on the agenda. Apart from civic organizations like the Community Relations Council of Greater New Orleans, Schiro was also confronted with concerns about the city’s dealings of racial discrimination by the Southern Historical Association. They had a convention in New Orleans scheduled for 1968, but started to worry about the feasibility of this event after learning about the AFL boycott. One representative wrote to Schiro that they would not hold their convention in his city if African American members of their society had to anticipate the same humiliating treatment. The risk of losing prestige as a tourist and convention destination prompted Schiro to react. He quickly reiterated that official New Orleans could not be held accountable for the behavior of

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283 n.a., Schiro Attacks AFL, Section 3–C, p. 1.
284 Haas, Schiro, p. 150.
individual citizens. He also pointed his finger to other cities and areas in the South which experienced the same or far worse issues.\footnote{Ibid., p. 201.}

These remarks were again evidence for the mayors’ reluctance to realize that social progress depended on a pro-active political commitment to the cause. Disclaiming any responsibility regarding the continuing mistreatment of African Americans in the city did not satisfy the demands of a growing political force. Criticism about Schiro’s and the local press’ apologetic reaction to the boycott also came from a prominent African American civil rights attorney, Nils R. Douglas, who condemned their attempt to depict New Orleans as a city that fully embraced integration. Schiro also received letters from a few white residents who felt sympathetic with the protesting players. One woman also objected to the mayor’s and the press’ interpretation that the 1965 Sugar Bowl, which featured an integrated squad from Syracuse, went without any incidents, claiming that she heard racial slurs in the stands by LSU fans.\footnote{J. Mark Souther, Into the Big League. Conventions, Football, and the Color Line in New Orleans, in: \textit{Journal of Urban History} 29 (2003), No. 6, pp. 694–725, here p. 714.}

Contrary to the dominating narrative that the incidents preceding the AFL walkout were untypical for New Orleans, cases of racial discrimination by the city’s tourism industry still occurred regularly. Reportedly, African American guests and locals continued to experience indignities at some French Quarter restaurants or clubs. There were documented incidents in which black patrons were refused taxi cab service, including at the airport. These episodes added to the already tarnished reputation of New Orleans as a tourist destination.\footnote{Ibid., p. 715.}

Nonetheless, 1965 marked a momentous year for race relations in New Orleans, especially in regard to the upcoming mayoralty primary in November. These developments, however, were triggered elsewhere.

On March 7\textsuperscript{th}, 1965, 600 demonstrators took to the streets of Selma, Alabama, intending to march 50 miles to the State Capitol in Montgomery. Montgomery was already a symbol for the civil rights movement. It was the place where Rosa Parks famously started the movement by rejecting to offer her seat on a bus to a white patron.\footnote{Maurice Isserman/Michael Kazin, America Divided. The Civil War of the 1960s, New York-Oxford 2000\textsuperscript{2}, p. 142.} Led by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the marchers protested against the ongoing violence and resistance that surrounded their voter
registration efforts. The demonstrators were met with brutal police force, which caused nationwide consternation, including the president, Lyndon B. Johnson. Two days later, SCLC leader Martin Luther King joined the demonstrators and directed another march to Montgomery. Again, the demonstrators faced violent interference, and one participant, a white minister from Boston, was beaten to death by white locals. President Johnson addressed Alabama’s ultraconservative governor, George Wallace, to protect the constitutional rights of the marchers and to guarantee them protection from his rampaging police force.\(^{289}\)

In a nationally-televised speech, President Johnson responded to the attacks on the civil rights activists, making a new voting rights bill his top-priority. His announcement was viewed by an estimated 70 Million people\(^ {290}\) and paved the way for “the most effective civil rights statute ever enacted in the United States”\(^ {291}\), the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

Johnson, who could rely on a large Democrat majority in Congress, signed the Voting Rights Act into law on August 6\(^ {th}\), 1965. The new bill prohibited literacy tests, which used to be a prerequisite for voting registration in the South, and introduced federal mechanisms to ensure that eligible voters, regardless of their ethnicity, had equal opportunities to be registered. It aimed at removing all preexisting obstacles which had prevented African American citizens from participating in elections, especially in the Deep South. These included massive fines and potential imprisonment for violators. The Voting Rights Act attracted much support, both in Congress and among the people.\(^ {292}\) Even some southern Democrats, who had opposed Johnson’s progressive civil rights politics in the past, seemed to relent and follow their president’s lead. For instance, Hale Boggs, who had not backed Johnson’s Civil Rights Act in 1964, passionately voiced his support for the Voting Rights Act in a speech before the House, which reportedly “drew a standing ovation from his colleagues”\(^ {293}\) and earned him “praise and favorable coverage from the press”.\(^ {294}\) Whether these politicians changed their former convictions based on moral considerations or due to opportunistic thinking, cannot always be ascertained. In Hale Boggs’ case, his critics assumed that he altered his position to ascend the

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\(^{289}\) Ibid., p. 141.

\(^{290}\) Ibid.


\(^{293}\) Ferrell/Haydel, Hale and Lindy Boggs, 389–402., here p. 396.

\(^{294}\) Ibid.
political hierarchy within the Democratic party, realizing that Johnson’s political course was more popular. Ferrell and Haydel added that the increase in African American voters in his congressional district might have played a role in his decision. 295

Former New Orleans NAACP Youth Council president, Raphael Cassimere, came to a similar conclusion in regard to Mayor Schiro’s efforts to appeal to black voters in the 1965 Democratic primary. For him, Schiro was the “quintessential politician” 296 and could no longer ignore the fact that black voters became a deciding factor in the elections. In 1961, he had expressed “hardcore racist views” 297 to appeal to white voters, who still made up a sizable majority. After he won, he backed down from his anti-integration campaign and sought to comply with court rulings and federal legislations that dictated desegregation. His main incentive was to avoid negative headlines that could further damage New Orleans’ national and international reputation.

According to Cassimere, Schiro was about winning elections and did not seem to have “any hard and fast principles on anything”. 298 This observation might explain why Schiro actively tried to persuade some African American community leaders to support him in the race against Fitzmorris in 1965. As a result of the Voting Rights Act and the long-lasting commitment by various civil rights groups to get people registered, the number of eligible African American voters had increased significantly and amounted to around 45,000 in 1965. 299 The registration drives in the summer of 1965, however, faced obstacles when the city’s bureaucracy proved incapable of handling thousands of new registration applications within a short time. Some activists, including the new president of the local NAACP, Horace Bynum 300, grew frustrated over the delays and conjectured deliberate inactivity among the registrars, who rejected all accusations. 301 Nonetheless, the registration efforts had a huge impact on the respective campaigns. Both candidates sought to canvass the African American community. Schiro received support from the only three African Americans who ran for various municipal offices, Avery Alexander, Earl J. Amedee and Wellington Arnaud. For many African American backers of Schiro, it was particularly important that the reigning

295 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
298 Ibid.
299 Ibid.
300 Haas, Schiro, p. 255.
301 Ernest Morial was appointed as U.S. Attorney in May 1965, the first African American from Louisiana to hold that position, see: Rogers, Righteous Lives, p. 57.
302 Haas, Schiro, p. 250 f.
mayor had remained loyal to President Johnson and his progressive agenda, whereas some other southern Democrats had switched sides and endorsed Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential election. They argued that the reigning mayor had also handled school integration properly. Influential minister, A.L. Davis, who had been heavily involved in the voter registration, also stated his approval despite the unharmonious relationship between Schiro and many leading civil rights groups and activists during his first tenure.302

Schiro eventually won the primary by a narrow majority (50.12 percent), and although he lost the African American vote to Fitzmorris, he made significant gains among the black community, receiving around 40 percent of their share.303

In November 1966, of course, the NFL awarded New Orleans with a pro-football franchise. As already mentioned, the local news mainly focused on the involvement of the city’s and Louisiana’s political elite and ignored any implications which the new team could have on race relations. Yet, behind the scenes, black participation was a major factor. Cassimere remembered that there were several discussions about how the local African American community could be integrated in the franchise, which promised so much opportunities for business in the city. Accordingly, it was important for the officials to show the league “there had, in fact, been changes made”304 and that there were African Americans involved in the plans for the project. Vice versa, the black community knew that the city was dependent on their support. In that sense, the AFL boycott had strengthened their position tremendously. They could now argue that New Orleans apparently still lagged behind other major cities in regard to desegregation. Moreover, the AFL All-Stars displayed a level of self-emancipation that was evidence of their powerful position within America’s favorite pastime. People had to acknowledge that they would no longer accept being treated as second-class citizens. By moving the game, the AFL had also made clear that they were not willing to trade their stars’ comfort for financial profit in a city that was unfit to host a franchise at the time. Cassimere argued that their walkout was so momentous since it was eye opening for a lot of people who were confused and thought that New Orleans was different from most southern cities, that it was more open and did not have the hard racists that you had in other cities. This was, of course, not true. So, that was one of the bargain points that we had, because when the leaders like Dave Dixon or Vic Schiro […] pushed for

302 Ibid., p. 257 f.
303 Ibid., p. 264.
the first NFL franchise, they knew that they would not get it if they did not have the help from the black leadership.\footnote{Ibid.}

Consequently, the boycott helped local civil rights advocates to push for progress and more commitment from business leaders to come into compliance with federal laws. The economic argument for desegregation seemed to be more fruitful than moral considerations. The AFL incident had led to severe financial losses in the city, not limited to organizations that were directly involved or were supposed to benefit from ticket sales, such as the Police Fund. The same could be said about the cancelled American Legion Convention in 1963 or when activist groups boycotted businesses that refused to serve or hire African Americans in the early 1960s.\footnote{Raphael Cassimere Jr. was heavily involved in protests on Canal Street, one of the most frequented shopping streets in New Orleans. The sit-ins and picketing started in 1960 and were mostly organized by CORE and NAACP Youth Council members. One of their goals was to force merchants to hire African Americans for jobs above the menial level. The protests lasted for more than two years until the merchants finally capitulated, see: Mark Cave, Interview with Raphael Cassimere, Jr., 09.08.2017, in: The Historic New Orleans Collection (ed.), NOLA Resistance Project MSS 936.2.2., n.d., [http://hnoc.minisisinc.com/THNOC/SCRIPTS/MWIMAIN.DLL/125215032/M2A/REFD/MSS~20936.2.2?JUMP], accessed 27.2.2020.}

Cassimere highlighted that African American community leaders lobbied for participation on all levels of the new franchise. This included, for instance, to have black doctors at the games, black operators of concession-stands in the stadium, or black bands for half-time entertainment.\footnote{Andreas Hofbauer, Interview with Raphael Cassimere Jr., New Orleans, 20.2.2020, transcript in the appendix.} The “concerns that had been expressed by the black players […] had to be resolved and they were”\footnote{Ibid.} Cassimere stated, who thus attested the boycott a very positive impact.

The newly founded New Orleans Saints even had two African American minority owners. Norman Francis, longtime president of Xavier University in New Orleans – a historical black college – and C.C. Dejoie, a publisher and co-founder of the Louisiana Weekly, shared 2 percent of the franchise. In 1974, Francis was featured in an African American business magazine and explained that “the owner’s plans for integrating the operation was a major concern for him”.\footnote{n.a., The Business of Sports, in: Black Enterprise 5 (1974), No. 5, pp. 42–48, here p. 44, [https://books.google.com/books?id=1GO_dDo1oH4C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false], accessed 27.2.2020.} Participation was more important than financial profits. Their share did
not give them any decision-making power, but according to Francis “[their] presence [was] reflected in the number of black ticket takers, blacks on the publicity staff, and the representation of blacks in the overall operation of the franchise.”310 Progress was also made in New Orleans’ politics. After years of disregarding the call for an official human relations office, Schiro eventually approved of it in 1967.311

These remarkable developments went unnoticed by the local white press. When the Saints began playing their first season in 1967, the focus was laid on their success (or lack thereof) on the football field. The Times-Picayune rarely addressed the positive impacts of the football franchise on integration. However, the AFL-boycott was occasionally rehashed in the newspaper. In 1969, the NFL and AFL were about to form a unified league and finalize the merger. There were, of course, discussions about the format, i.e. whether the teams should be split in two conferences reflecting the former two leagues. The NFL had more teams than the AFL, so Rozelle had to find a solution which franchises should be moved to the conference that consisted of the former AFL. The New Orleans Saints were one of the potential candidates, which caused a stir for Times Picayune sports journalist, Bob Roesler. In one of his columns, he assumed that “it would be near-suicide for the Saints to accept a move to the other league”312 because of the “unpleasant memories of the AFL walkout some years back”.313 His opinion seemed to attract readers’ reaction. The following two weeks, his column consisted of readers’ letters and his response to their thoughts. Some of the feedback was clearly following Roesler’s train of thought, others were explicitly critical of his ongoing hostility against the AFL and the boycotting athletes. One reader wrote concerning the walkout:

As far as the unpleasant memories left by the AFL walkout, the city and business community brought this upon New Orleans. The city wanted to go big time and still hang on to its archaic customs, which I am sure need not be spelled out.314

Roesler’s reply was somewhat uncharacteristic, as he acknowledged that the “All-Star walkout was a valuable lesson to everyone”315 and that “the job [of solving its problems]
certainly isn’t over”\textsuperscript{316} for the city. One week later, another reader voiced his discontent with Roesler’s reluctance to come to terms with the 1965 walkout. He stated that “the city of New Orleans several years ago was in part responsible for the walkout of the AFL. Sure, it was a bad deal, but it is remembered more vehemently by the press than anyone else.”\textsuperscript{317} He further criticized that the columnist “painted [the city’s] responsibility with a very wide, white brush”.\textsuperscript{318} This letter was a direct attack on Roesler’s framing of the boycott. The reader implicitly accused the journalist of being racially insensitive and incapable of putting the issue to rest.

These published correspondences were peculiar for two reasons. First, the AFL walkout still sparked a controversial debate four years after the All-Star Game was moved. Second, it was one of the rare cases that the Times-Picayune printed and spread views that favored the players’ decision and questioned the official reaction by the city and its most influential newspaper.

The former of the two points became even more evident when New Orleans won the bid for hosting the fourth and last Super Bowl\textsuperscript{319} that was played under the old two-league format in January 1970. However, several cases of racial discrimination had since emerged which continued to harm the city’s standing as a modern tourist destination. These events eventually spurred municipal legislators to come forward with a new public accommodation ordinance. This legislation aimed at ending discriminatory practices in establishments that were not fully covered by the 1964 Civil Rights Act or still resisted to comply. The Super Bowl turned out to be leverage for civil rights activists who could use America’s major sporting event to push for progressive measures in the city. In the summer of 1969, African American delegates of a large convention had again run into similar problems as the All-Stars had in 1965. Not only did they confront the city officials with a potential boycott of New Orleans in the future, they also connected with other conventions to reconsider their choice of holding their events there. One such organization, the Head Start and Child Development Conference in New Orleans,

\textsuperscript{316} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{318} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{319} Super Bowl IV was the fourth championship game between the champions of the 1969 AFL and NFL seasons (Kansas City Chiefs vs. Minnesota Vikings). When the two leagues finally merged after the 1969 season, the AFL was transformed into the AFC (American Football Conference), and all but three teams from the NFL performed in the NFC (National Football Conference). The two conferences constituted the new NFL with 26 franchises and Pete Rozelle as the commissioner. The champions of the respective conferences have since met in the Super Bowl. This format exists until today, however, new franchises have joined the league, which has now 32 teams.
made it clear that they would approach the NFL and tell them about the continuing race-related discrimination provided the city did not adopt a new public accommodation ordinance. A number of other organizations supported their demands, including the Human Relations Council, which underlined the necessity of new laws with the Super Bowl in view.\footnote{Souther, Into the Big League, p. 716 f.}

Illustration 5: Caricature stressing the importance of a public accommodations reform in regard to sporting events and conventions, The Times-Picayune, December 18\textsuperscript{th}, 1969.

The lobbying for new city laws by a broad coalition of civic groups seemed to materialize when New Orleans Councilman-at-large Maurice ‘Moon’ Landrieu and Councilman Henry B. Curtis introduced a bill for a new ordinance in December, 1969. Mayor Schiro announced his support for new legislation if the City Council reached a majority on the issue.\footnote{n.a., Schiro Backing Access Proposal, in: The Times-Picayune, 19.12.1969, p. 1.} With the
upcoming Super Bowl at stake, observers considered it a “foregone conclusion that it was going to pass”.322 Even the Times-Picayune seemed to endorse Landrieu’s proposal, when they published an editorial on December 22nd, one day before the final vote in the City Council:

When the ordinance is presented for passage tomorrow, it is expected councilmen will agree that the time has come for an enlightened New Orleans to remove those outworn racial prohibitions – injustices – which are irritants and which handicap this tourist and convention city in its attraction of visors. […] It is the fair, just and moral thing to do.323

Of course, economic considerations gained the upper hand. The cancellation of prestigious and profitable events, such as the 1965 All-Star Game, or numerous conventions, amounted to a significant financial loss for a broad variety of businesses in New Orleans. Nevertheless, there was also opposition, and Landrieu and Curtis had to overcome reluctance among their fellow councilmen.324 Cassimere, who was present at the hearings at city hall, remembered that his main concern was whether the bill passed unanimously. For African American residents, it was essential to know that this ordinance had a strong and reliable support in the City Council and that they could hold them accountable in the future. Although the tourist industry was clearly the catalyst of the progressive turn in New Orleans’ politics, the new legislation would also guarantee access to previously segregated places for the local African American community.325

When the Council eventually passed the proposal unanimously (7:0), without adding any amendments which could have allowed for loopholes, their decision was applauded by the broad coalition of supporters, including the Times-Picayune editors. More than 50 civic organizations had come forward to back Landrieu’s and Curtis’ plans.326 Landrieu, who would soon thereafter succeed Schiro as mayor, stated that “seven men representing seven districts of this city have joined together in an effort toward progress”.327 The editors added

324 Souther, Into the Big League, p. 718.
327 Ibid.
that “[in] doing what is right morally, the council also did what is right for the city in a financial sense”.328

The public accommodation ordinance can be understood as the final step towards the legal end of segregation in New Orleans. Scheduled to come into law on January 1st, 1970, just in time for the Sugar Bowl and Super Bowl, the ordinance was widely accepted although opponents sought to delay its implementation through lawsuits.329

The 1965 All-Star Game boycott proved vital for the civil rights advocates in the city. When the hearings for the public accommodation law took place, “a lot [about] what had happened to those players – the indignities and insults that they had suffered”330 was rehashed and contributed to the overwhelming evidence that made new reforms necessary. The Super Bowl was also significant since the city could not risk to be embarrassed on a nationwide stage again. In this sense, it can be argued that sports in general, and the protesting AFL All-Stars in particular, played a significant role in the integration of New Orleans. While the 1965 boycott and its inherent implications for race relations in the city were not publicly recognized as a decisive factor in the acquisition of a pro-football franchise, the protest had its impact on the city’s sport and civil rights history.

328 Ibid.
Public Memory of the AFL All-Star Game Boycott

For decades, the AFL All-Star Game incident in New Orleans has neither attracted much scholarly nor public interest. This chapter will reconstruct the efforts made by various individuals and organizations to assure that the boycott was not forgotten.

In 1998, Cookie Gilchrist attempted to capitalize on his involvement in the walkout, and even registered a trademark for the name. In a press release, issued by the Cookie™ Gilchrist Consultants International, Inc., he offered “exclusive opportunities […] for interviews” to share his story with a broader public. To attain more publicity Gilchrist had reached out to his friend and former teammate, Jack Kemp, for support. Kemp, who had started an impressive political career after playing professional football, was well-connected in the American elite. Gilchrist had previously tried to get involved in politics when Kemp was still a top Republican leader. He even offered himself as a campaign consultant to mobilize the African American community in case Kemp became vice president under Ronald Reagan in 1980. In a letter, he wrote to Kemp:

Looking back to the beginning of our relationship, we came together as a part of God’s devine [sic!] plan in Buffalo and accomplished positive and progressive feats. We made history together on and off the playing field. On January 9, 1965, Ernie Warlick, Art Powell and ourselves helped to integrate a segregated State, without any fanfare or violence on either side […]  

For Gilchrist, his involvement in civil rights was evidently important. In the press release, he emphasized that of the 21 players who stood together in the protest most “remain unrecognized, unrewarded and unsung heroes of the now forgotten Boycott of 65”. Moreover, he listed a few prominent supporters of his mission, including Jack Kemp, who had apparently agreed to help his former teammate, Muhammad Ali, and NFL Hall of Famer Jim Brown. However, Gilchrist’s project did not seem to have much impact as there are no further traces of this project.

331 The Boycott of 65, Library of Congress Manuscript Division Washington, Jack Kemp Papers, Box 239, Folder 3.
333 The Boycott of 65, Library of Congress Manuscript Division Washington, Jack Kemp Papers, Box 239, Folder 3.
Smith points out that an exhibit at the Pro Football Hall of Fame in Canton, Ohio, featured the AFL boycott in a short video clip, but criticizes the NFL’s self-depiction as “an agent of change in the Civil Rights Movement”. She concluded that “this is an especially important manipulation of the events in part because the NFL makes no effort to distinguish between the leagues. […] The NFL sets up an image of the league as being an institution that actively promoted racial equality rather than maintaining the divide.”

Since Smith’s article was published, the AFL All-Star Game boycott has, in fact, received significantly more public attention. For instance, NFL films addressed the incident in a documentary about the history of the AFL, which was released in 2009 on Showtime and can be streamed on YouTube. Participants such as Ernie Warlick, Earl Faison and Abner Haynes were interviewed and recounted their experiences in New Orleans. It is particularly interesting that – in spite of the official support by AFL commissioner Joe Foss – at least two of the protesting athletes, Haynes and Gilchrist, took a hard hit on their careers due to their actions in New Orleans. Both were traded to the AFL’s worst team at the time, the Denver Broncos, within days of the All-Star contest. Haynes remembered that his General Manager at Kansas City wrote him a letter, implying that “a football player’s role is not to help these people; all he’s supposed to do is play football and keep his mouth shut.” The short video is a late but significant recognition of the players’ contribution to the public memory of the incident. This holds especially true because it is accessible free of charge via YouTube.

Between November 22nd, 2019 and March 8th, 2020, the Historic New Orleans Collection, a museum, research center and publisher located on the famous Royal Street in the French Quarter, dedicated one segment of their Crescent City Sport exhibition to the 1965 AFL incident. The exhibition covered 150 years of sport in New Orleans, especially highlighting the impact of sport on “broader social, economic and cultural change”. Curated by Mark Cave, the purpose of the exhibition was to raise awareness of sport as an “important instrument for challenging the city’s resistance to gender equality and racial integration for

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334 Smith, All-Star Game Boycott, p. 16.
335 Ibid., p. 16 f.
337 Gilchrist/Garbarino, Cookie, p. 112.
much of [the post-Civil War] era.” 340 The Historic New Orleans Collection further stressed that the city “might not have its beloved Saints today if, in the 1950s and ‘60s, African American collegiate and pro football players hadn’t forced [New Orleans] to confront its Jim Crow laws and retrograde attitudes.” 341 The AFL All-Star Game boycott was presented as an example in the line of this assumption. Another segment dealt with the integration of the Sugar Bowl, telling the story of Bobby Grier, who was the first African American to play in that college football series in 1956. 342 The exhibition also featured other histories in which the strong ties between sport and the African American community in New Orleans were reflected. These included, for instance, a significant number of African American baseball teams that competed in various leagues during the era of segregation. 343

The exhibition made an essential contribution to a critical accounting of New Orleans’ and Louisiana’s past. Not only did it provide a space for historians to show their findings in a growing field of scholarly interest, i.e. sports history, it also challenged the notion that sport is an apolitical space. Human rights activist, Richard Lapchick, also emphasized the necessity to “keep a recording so that future generations know the price that athletes paid for their standing up for social justice. That it was not without cost.” 344

In addition, the Historic New Orleans Collection offers most of their publications, like The Historic New Orleans Collection Quarterly journal, on their website free of charge. 345 The Crescent City Sport exhibit had free admission as well. This approach may boost scholars’ and educators’ efforts to make a critical local history more accessible to the public. Below is some of the material that was used in the exhibition to tell the story of the protesting AFL All-Stars in 1965.

340 Ibid.
341 Ibid.
342 Ibid., p. 5.
343 Ibid., p. 4.
344 Andreas Hofbauer, Interview with Richard Lapchick, New Orleans, 6.3.2020, transcript in the appendix.
Illustration 6: Ticket for the AFL All-Star League Game, courtesy of The Historic New Orleans Collection.

Illustration 7: The New Orleans Sports and Cultural Activities Foundation, Inc. provides information on ticket refunds after the cancellation. Customers still had the chance to donate the ticket price to the Police Foundation, courtesy of The Historic New Orleans Collection.
Illustration 8: An editorial on July 4th, 1964, by WDSU-TV expressed high hopes for the AFL All-Star Game, courtesy of The Historic New Orleans Collection.
These examples of public memory reflect the growing interest in sport history. They contribute to an emerging understanding that sport is an essential part of culture, society and politics. It is also shown that the social implications of sport cannot be reduced to a small number of incidents that had entered public recognition in the past. Especially on the local level, many relevant stories concerning the impact of sport on communities remain untold. It can thus be claimed that this field of research is far from exhausted.
Conclusion

This thesis attempted to prove the following arguments: Contrary to northern and/or African American newspapers, local and southern journalists reported predominantly negatively about the 21 AFL All-Stars whose protest against racial discrimination led to the relocation of the 1965 AFL All-Star Game from New Orleans to Houston. Through editorials and columns – two of the most frequent journalistic text types to spread a newspaper’s point of view on specific events or developments – the boycott was portrayed as a pre-emptive and ultimately unjust reaction to isolated incidents. Local papers did not primarily blame those who continued to adhere to racial segregation according to the athletes’ charges. They rather downplayed the allegations and focused on the detrimental financial ramifications of the All-Star Game relocation. Thus, their news coverage cannot be seen as a critical (self)reflection on an unresolved issue, i.e. the yet insufficient compliance with federal laws that guaranteed full access to public accommodations regardless of race, color, religion or national origin.

In contrast, African American newspapers and – to some extent – the New York Times perceived the players’ and the AFL’s decision to boycott New Orleans as a substantial episode of civil rights activism. They urged the necessity to raise awareness of prevailing discriminatory treatment of African Americans despite the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Consequently, they accused official New Orleans of not doing enough to bring about social justice and full participation for African Americans.

The second large section of this thesis was based upon the argument that the AFL All-Star Game boycott and football were integral factors in forcing New Orleans to fill loopholes in its public accommodation laws.

Finally, more recent accounts of public memory have contributed to a critical reflection of the incident. For instance, the Crescent City Sport exhibition, curated and displayed at the Historic New Orleans Collection, featured the boycott to illustrate the importance of sport as a platform for broader social issues in the city.

Before the civil rights movement started to change the social and legal reality of the United States, New Orleans was a typical southern city under so-called Jim Crow laws. Schools, universities, buses, parks, hotels, restaurants and most other public spaces were strictly segregated, which kept the legacy of the confederacy alive. After the Civil War, the southern Democrats had established a white hegemony in the South, which deprived African Americans of their civil rights.
Americans of full access to civil rights and basically degraded them to second-class citizens. WWII and the allied fight against fascism and national socialism in Europe gave new incentives to debate and revise social injustices in America. In the mid-1950s, federal courts started to rule in favor of desegregation after civil rights organizations, such as the NAACP, contested Jim Crow laws juridically. African Americans used the momentum and engaged collectively in non-violent protests and demonstrations across the nation. Reactions to these efforts varied and ranged from solidary to violent resistance.

Perhaps due to its multicultural and multi-ethnic background, New Orleans had not experienced major outbreaks of violence against the civil rights movement. However, numerous activist groups, including the NAACP Youth Council and CORE, relied on direct action methods to pursue the end of Jim Crow in the city. In the early 1960s, stores and businesses in the city were picketed and boycotted by African Americans to push them towards desegregation. In 1961, after federal courts ruled school segregation illegal, New Orleans’ public schools allowed black students to enrol in formerly whites-only schools and city officials managed to keep the situation under control.

On the federal level, the Johnson administration continued John F. Kennedy’s progressive course and pushed through the Civil Rights Act in 1964. New Orleans, led by mayor Victor Schiro, widely accepted the new federal legislation, and the majority of public accommodations started to service African American patrons. However, some businesses and establishments apparently held on to segregationist ideologies and policies and exploited loopholes in the Civil Rights Act.

In January 1965, these grievances became publicly known when local and national newspapers reported the walkout of 21 African American football players from the annual AFL All-Star Game, scheduled on January 16th in New Orleans. In a press conference on January 10th, the players announced their departure from the city due to racial discrimination experienced in restaurants, night clubs and taxi service throughout famous French Quarter. The two most influential local newspapers, the Times-Picayune and the Advocate, initially reported objectively, providing a space for the players to voice their disappointment about the prevailing social injustice they had to endure. After the game was officially moved to Houston, however, the tone and intensity of the controversy started to change and southern papers increasingly framed the boycott as an illegitimate offence against the city. This claim is evident in the high amount of opinion-forming publications, which portrayed the players’
and league’s decision as peremptory, immature, irresponsible and exaggerated. One Advocate editorial, for instance, concluded that New Orleans had no reason to apologize, another sports editor of the Times in Shreveport in Louisiana ranted against the allegedly privileged star athletes for being oversensitive. Letters from readers were frequently published, mirroring the newspapers’ arguments. City officials, especially mayor Victor Schiro, were given a platform to defend the assumed progressiveness of New Orleans. It was emphasized that the charges made by the All-Stars were merely isolated incidents, neglecting previous cancellations of big events due to discriminatory practices. The 1965 Sugar Bowl, which was played on January 1st, and featured an integrated college team from Syracuse, New York, was instrumentalized to underline that black athletes had been treated well in the city, which was later rebutted by an African American magazine. Moreover, the financial loss for the AFL pension fund and the New Orleans Police Foundation were disproportionally highlighted.

Positive and supportive news coverage of the AFL All-Star Game boycott was mainly found in African American newspapers and magazines, albeit with some delay due to their weekly distribution. They highlighted that the walkout by the players and the AFL was a valuable contribution to the larger civil rights struggle, and stressed the importance of direct action methods to protest against bigotry. Players like Ernie Warlick and Cookie Gilchrist were praised for their leadership and commitment to principles. The blame was put on New Orleans’ reluctance to fight racial discrimination. The argument that the players’ charges were rather an exception than a common problem in the Crescent City was firmly rejected. Through their articles and columns, the importance of this incident for civil rights activism in sport became clear. The New York Times also realized the historic meaning of the boycott by calling it unprecedented. Another noteworthy commentary on the walkout was found in the highly popular Sports Illustrated. The essay was written by Ron Mix, one of the white teammates of the protesting All-Stars. He intended to show his support for the motives of the boycott although he opposed the means.

The 1965 AFL All-Star Game boycott certainly retarded New Orleans’ efforts to lure in a professional football franchise, which would have a great boost for the region’s economy. Since race relations remained a critical factor in one of the most prestigious tourist destinations of the South, city and state politics found another way to become more attractive. Victor Schiro presented plans to build a new domed stadium shortly before he faced a highly competitive primary to assure his reelection. Meanwhile, Louisiana’s senator Russel B. Long and Representative Hale Boggs used their influence in the Democratic Party to push through
the merger of the NFL and AFL in the U.S. Congress. As part of a quid-pro-quo deal, NFL commissioner Pete Rozelle awarded New Orleans with a franchise – the New Orleans Saints – in 1966. The announcement was celebrated in the local news and boosted the politicians’ popularity. Race-related issues were dodged once again in the media. However, former NAACP Youth Council president, Raphael Cassimere, pointed out that black participation in all levels of the new football team was played an essential role in the negotiations. The New Orleans Saints featured two African American minority owners, Norman Francis and C.C. Dejoie, who viewed their presence as a very positive symbol for social change in the city.

Notwithstanding, racial discrimination remained a big problem in the South and African American visitors and locals continued to be confronted with segregationist business owners in New Orleans. Subsequently, gig conferences by national organizations and nationally-recognized sporting events turned out to be driving forces behind progressive reforms in the city. While preparing to host Super Bowl IV, numerous racial incidents similar to the events that led to the relocation of the AFL All-Star Game had eventually forced city council to react. To avoid further exposure as a deeply racist city, New Orleans adopted a new public accommodation ordinance which went beyond federal legislation. According to Cassimere, the AFL boycott was addressed as an example of the negative repercussions of discriminatory practices during the debate in city hall. The city council ultimately agreed upon a new public accommodation ordinance aiming at full accessibility and integration of all people regardless of race or origin. Thus, New Orleans’ legal foundation finally moved on from the heritage of the Jim Crow era. The AFL All-Stars, who deliberately chose to prioritize principle over financial gains, were vital contributors to social justice in the “Big Easy”.

It took some time until this episode of civil rights activism attracted scholarly and public attention. Many other athletes and activists have since joined forces in the fight against racism and other social issues, and widely caused controversial reactions. Although the AFL All-Star boycott was perhaps the first successful protest on such a big stage in the U.S., other instances of athlete activism have certainly overshadowed the event. Images like the black power salute by Tommy Smith and John Carlos during the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City, or Muhammad Ali’s refusal to join the Army and his long-standing advocacy for African American pride and equality have become part of America’s public memory. The history of the 21 black ball players who took a stance against racism in New Orleans and exposed the city’s bigot image to America is fairly unknown. In recent years, however, various platforms have acknowledged the boycott as an outstanding example of athlete
activism in the context of the civil rights movement. Not only did scholars raise interest about the incident in the scientific community, other projects also aimed at making the players’ action accessible to a broader public. For instance, NFL Films featured some of the involved All-Stars in a documentary about the history of the AFL. The Historic New Orleans Collection dedicated one part of their Crescent City Sport exhibition to the boycott, thus providing a critical perspective on the role of sport as a catalyst for social justice in New Orleans.

Throughout history, sport has always been a political issue in spite of its inherent meritocratic ideals. In reality, however, the world of sport is a mirror of its social and political context. Success is not merely the result of talent and hard work, it is also dependent on equal chances, representation and public recognition. For most parts of American sport history, African Americans were denied equal participation in almost all sports. This unbalance became even more apparent when black athletes used the sport platform to address political and social issues. For decades, the media has reinforced sentiments against vocal sport stars and although this paradigm has started to change in recent years, athlete activism remains a controversial topic. This thesis may contribute to a better understanding of contemporary discourses about the legitimacy of protest in sports.
Didactic Considerations

This chapter provides concrete ideas and methods about how the overall topic of this thesis can be integrated in the Austrian school context. More specifically, it attempts to illustrate how sports and civil right activism can be dealt with in the subject *History, Social Studies and Political Education* as part of Austria’s upper-secondary high school system. As a first step, it is imperative to explore the Austrian curriculum for this particular subject in order to legitimize the prioritization of this topic in the given context. Moreover, this chapter will also feature a discussion about didactic principles in history classes, including methodological approaches to the use of historic newspapers as primary sources. Finally, commented lesson plans will be presented to show the feasibility of this topic in Austria’s school context. Arguably, it is challenging to directly translate most of the specific terminology that constitutes the academic and political discourse in Austria’s education system. In some cases, the original German terminology is retained.

Sports, Civil Rights and the Austrian Curriculum for History

In this subsection, the focus lies on the most recent version of the curriculum for History, Social Studies and Political Education, which was implemented in 2016.\(^{346}\) Legislators made sure to incorporate latest findings in the field of didactics to allow for a competency-oriented education on the upper-secondary level of Academic High Schools (5\(^{th}\)-8\(^{th}\) form).

This has, of course, affected the curriculum for history as well. The curriculum distinguishes between four subject-specific historical competencies and four political competencies which constitute the overall educational goal of teaching students how to process history and politics. These particular competencies will be covered in the next subsection.

By including contemporary didactic fundamentals in the curriculum, the Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Research (*Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung*, henceforth BMBWF) has made its educational expectations more comprehensible, comparable and concrete. While there are guidelines on subject areas that

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have to be covered as part of certain thematic modules, Austrian educators have a lot of leeway when it comes to the details or individual foci within these boundaries. In that sense, the curriculum for the 7th and 8th form of Austrian Academic High Schools (age level 16-18) might offer the most applicable subject areas for covering sports history and its ties to the American civil rights history.

For instance, competency module 6, which is featured in the 7th form, requires the coverage of “political, economic, cultural and social developments from WWI to the present”\(^347\), further specifying “societal changes after 1945 and their impact on everyday life”\(^348\). Since the curriculum does not limit these subject areas to a particular geographic region, it might well be argued that the American civil rights movement and its relations to sports as part of American culture fits perfectly into this category. Similarly, module 7, which is part of the curriculum for the 8th form, opens opportunities for covering the topic of this thesis in that it comprises “essential transformative processes in the 20th and 21st centuries and fundamental insights into political issues”\(^349\). This module explicitly highlights “emancipatory, social movements and counter-movements after 1945 in Austria, Europe and the world”\(^350\).

Not only do both respective modules imply a historical perspective on events and developments that shaped western culture, they also foster the apprehension of sociopolitical fundamentals. It is exactly this nexus which underlies the basic argument of this thesis, i.e. the correlation between history, society and politics and the (mediated) interpretation of this interaction. Furthermore, the curriculum requires teachers to consider seven didactic principles which reflect this holistic approach. These include:

- a science-based approach (*Wissenschaftsorientierung*)
- target-group orientation (*Subjektorientierung*)
- relevance in regard to students’ everyday life (*Lebensweltbezug*)
- enabling practical application of acquired skills and knowledge (*Handlungsorientierung*)
- problem-oriented approach (*Problemorientierung*)
- multi-perspectivity (*Multiperspektivität*)

\(^{347}\) Ibid., p. 58, translation by the author.
\(^{348}\) Ibid., translation by the author.
\(^{349}\) Ibid., p. 59, translation by the author.
\(^{350}\) Ibid., translation by the author.
focus on controversies (Kontroversitätsprinzip)351

Hellmuth and Kühberger elaborated on some of these principles in their commentary of the adapted curriculum for the lower-secondary level, which widely mirrored the upper-secondary version in regard to the underlying fundamentals. Accordingly, some of the mentioned points correlate to a certain degree. The science-based approach, thus, is based on the principle of multi-perspectivity because scientific standards implicate a high level of objectivity. Target-group orientation and the requirement of establishing relevance of a topic to the students’ experience of the world are closely related as well. These two principles attempt to raise students’ awareness of the interdependency between their individual or shared experience and the historic context. Consequently, it is also necessary to foster skills that enable students to apply their knowledge and allow the transfer to the cognitive and reflective level. Finally, the problem-oriented approach and the focus on controversies imply that history confronts the students with reoccurring, fairly durable key-problems which need to be addressed in order to comprehend the present and the past.352

With this in mind, it can be argued that the 1965 AFL All-Star Game boycott and the ensuing discourse via local and national newspapers offer enough links to the Austrian upper-secondary curriculum for History, Social Studies and Political Education. Through the thorough analysis of both favorable and negative responses to the players’ actions and the multi-faceted impacts of their walkout on New Orleans’ politics and society, the principles of science-orientation and multi-perspectivity are clearly covered. Sports, race and political activism have also remained critically debated issues beyond the United States and seem to transcend temporal limitations. Hence, this case study also revealed a conflict that may well be interpreted as one of these timeless key-problems which Hellmuth and Kühberger mentioned. Owing to the demographic change, which is partly a result of migration, classrooms in Austria have become increasingly diverse and integration has turned out to be a critical factor in Austrian politics and society. Although embedded in a completely different historical context, sport continues to be a driving force of integration, participation and social mobility. Therefore, the case study can be seen as relevant and target-group oriented.

351 Ibid., p. 54.
352 Thomas Hellmuth/Christoph Kühberger, Kommentar zum Lehplan der Neuen Mittelschule und der AHS-Unterstufe "Geschichte und Sozialkunde/Politische Bildung", 2016, [https://www.politiklernen.at/site/shop/shop.item/106400.html], accessed 3.3.2020.
It further contributes to interdisciplinary goals of historical and political education that are featured in the Austrian curriculum. Three of the so-called Bildungsbereiche, i.e. fields of education, are most applicable: Language and communication; humanity and society; and health and sports. By developing methods and skills that help students interpret historical newspaper articles and critically reflect mass media, the field of language and communication is adequately dealt with.\textsuperscript{353} One of the subsections of the field of humanity and society mentions “concepts of legitimization of and protest against power and authority”\textsuperscript{354}. These are reflected in the struggle for civil rights and the AFL All-Star Game boycott. Finally, the field of health and sports suggests to engage with the “societal and political function and instrumentalization of sport in different cultures”.\textsuperscript{355} It is perhaps this point which is most prominently featured throughout this thesis.


\textsuperscript{354} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{355} Ibid.
Historical and Political Competencies

Arguably, the purpose of the 2016 curriculum reform was to acknowledge and integrate the contemporary scientific discourse in the field of didactics. Modern history and political education are based on the insights of this discourse, which highlights the importance and necessity of historical and political competencies rather than the stubborn acquisition and reproduction of historical events or dates. This chapter provides a concise review of both historical and political competencies and attempts to illustrate how they could be fostered in regard to sport, protest and civil rights in the classroom.

Historical competency is defined as the ability, skill and willingness ("Fähigkeit, Fertigkeit und Bereitschaft") of historical thinking or contemplation. This model aims at teaching the subject in a fashion that allows students to perceive history as a concept that concerns their everyday life. Focusing on such competencies supposedly enables students to comprehend and interpret their surroundings autonomously and might also help them use their acquired knowledge and skills outside of the classroom. It is thus closely related to the narrativist theory of history, which defines the “principles and operations of historical thinking and historiography as an elaborate form of the lifeworld dealing with the past". It basically attempts to fulfill the fundamental human need to find orientation in time and understand reality and life. History is seen as a narration, narrative or construct of the past which dynamically operates on two basic concepts: reconstruction (of autonomous narrations of the past) and deconstruction (of existing narrations of the past). The potential of the competency model for history education lies in its intention to develop a reflected and self-reflective historical awareness, i.e. "Geschichtsbewusstsein".

As practical guidelines for the process of historical thinking, didactic scholars identified four interdependent historical competencies that are prerequisites for orientation and the development of historical awareness: These include the historical:

- competency of realizing and raising questions (Fragekompetenz)
- competency of orientation (Orientierungskompetenz)
- methodological competency (Methodenkompetenz)

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357 Ibid., p. 15.
358 Ibid., p. 17.
359 Ibid., p. 16.
Since this thesis mainly relied on newspapers (and to some extent on oral histories) as primary sources, it is perhaps most applicable to focus on the methodological competency. Methodological competency is fundamentally important to find answers to historical questions. As already indicated, history or historical narrations are seen as a construct. Thus, reconstruction and deconstruction of such narratives are identified as core-competences of the methodological competency. Reconstruction comprises the interpretation of specific phenomena of the past based on sources, which are heuristically and critically analyzed. Not only does reconstruction aim at the understanding of isolated particles of the past, it also implies the construction of links, relationships and correlations between various particles within a certain historical context. It is hence not merely an attempt to explain the past, but also a vehicle of comprehending the present and possible future scenarios. \(^{361}\)

\(^{360}\) Ibid., p. 19 f.  
\(^{361}\) Ibid., p. 23 f.
In contrast, deconstruction is a purely analytical act. Existing historical narrations are examined in all their structural layers in order expose the underlying intentions of said narrations.\footnote{Ibid., p. 24.}

Illustration 11: Deconstruction and reconstruction as core-competences of the Historische Methodenkompetenz, in: Schreiber, Historisches Denken, p. 32.

These two fundamental processes can be exercised by elaborating on primary sources such as newspaper articles, caricatures, photographs, or interviews with contemporary witnesses. Historical presentations (historische Darstellungen), such as documentaries, paintings, or literature should always be thoroughly analyzed and deconstructed to reveal their subliminal meaning. Scholars of didactics have developed analytical systems which attempt to facilitate these processes. Accordingly, educators should guide students to autonomous thinking by using so-called Operatoren, or prompts for their tasks, which also aim at structuring the analytical process. There are three general areas featuring several prompts that vary in complexity and lay the ground for competency-oriented education. The first area mainly comprises the reproduction and description of subject-specific contents. The second step
fosters autonomous explaining, adapting and sorting, which leads to reorganization and transfer to a more profound cognitive level. The third area, arguably the most sophisticated, prompts the students to reflect upon the issues that were raised in the previous steps, the methods that they used and the arguments, interpretations or judgements they consequently formed. This last step mainly requires self-reflective efforts and problem-solving.\textsuperscript{363}

In the modern school context, educators are encouraged to base their tasks on these three cognitive levels, which can be used in almost any school subject. Subsequently, political competencies are also trained by relying on this \textit{Operatorensystem}.

Political competencies are similarly structured. The goal of political education is to enable students to develop political:

- methodological competency (\textit{Politische Methodenkompetenz})
- professional competency (\textit{Politische Sachkompetenz})
- competency of action-taking (\textit{Politische Handlungskompetenz})
- competency of judgement-making (\textit{Politische Urteilskompetenz})\textsuperscript{364}

Any democracy depends on a politically mature and responsible population, which includes, of course, young people as well. Political competencies are a prerequisite for orientation and involvement in the political discourse. While covering key moments and developments of the civil rights movement and emphasizing the role of sports for integration and social justice, students might understand the potential of active participation in political processes.

Furthermore, they have the opportunity to find similarities and differences between historical and contemporary protest movements, such as Black Lives Matter in the United States or the globally impactful Fridays for Future.

The Austrian curriculum suggests a focus on the political competencies of action-taking and judgement-making when discussing political, economic, cultural and social developments in contemporary history. Action-taking competency includes the application and conceptualization of democratic means of communicating personal and collective demands, for instance, demonstrations, petitions, or pamphlets. The curriculum also highlights the use of media to distribute political opinions. Judgement-making stresses the importance of scrutinizing existing dominant viewpoints in regard to fundamental human rights and their

\textsuperscript{363} Heinrich Ammerer/Elfriede Windischbauer (Eds.), Kompetenzorientierter Unterricht in Geschichte und politischer Bildung. Diagnoseaufgaben mit Bildern, Wien 2011, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{364} Ibid., p. 7.
impact on society and politics. Presenting the 1965 AFL All-Star Game boycott as an episode of a much broader struggle for justice and emphasizing the attempts of newspapers to frame the incident according to their respective worldviews, might well contribute to a better comprehension of the complex correlations between politics and society.

Basic Concepts of Learning History

Hellmuth and Kühberger introduced conceptual learning as another vital part of didactics. Accordingly, everybody has an individual conception of the world, including politics and history, which depends on experience(s), education and socialization. It is imperative for teachers to incorporate these conceptions, which are embedded in recurring basic concepts (Basiskonzepte). These concepts help educators to structure their instruction, in that case studies and newly-acquired elements can be added to more general fundamental concepts. Students, subsequently, benefit from an emerging network of related particles of the past which helps them organize their knowledge and skills. In the context of Austrian history and political education, three levels of basic concepts were developed, i.e. historical, epistemic and societal.

It is worthwhile to take these structural aids into account when teaching the essential role of sport in America’s civil rights history and its continuing impact on American society.

Historical basic concepts are mainly concerned with the perception of time as a fundamental historical category. Kühberger identifies three key subcategories that are critical to the understanding of time. These include points in time, course or processes of time, and the division or categorization of time. Furthermore, epistemic basic concepts embrace processes of cognition that allow the realization of problems, challenges and peculiarities between the poles of history and the past. As a result, they are imperative for the core competence of deconstruction as they also facilitate the analysis of existing narratives of the past. Kühberger lists the concepts of perspective, constructivity, selection and verifiability as the fundamental properties of epistemic basic concepts. Finally, societal basic concepts encompass key

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366 Thomas Hellmuth/Christoph Kühberger, Historisches und politisches Lernen mit Konzepten, in: Historische Sozialkunde 46 (2016), No. 1, pp. 2–8, here p. 3 f.
notions such as diversity, communication, agency, norms and power to structurize and explain human coexistence and civilization.\textsuperscript{367}

Although Kühberger points out that it is not the primary goal to prioritize these basic concepts for teaching history and political education, they might still play a vital role in organizing and structuring knowledge and skills.\textsuperscript{368} Moreover, educators can utilize these ideas to be more flexible in their selection of topics or case studies, for instance, when contrasting the concept of diversity in different historical eras or geographical regions. In that sense, the AFL All-Star Game boycott could well be integrated in a contrastive analysis of various forms of protest (societal concept of agency). Alternatively, the focus could be laid on the local and national media coverage to elaborate on the epistemic concepts of selection or perspective.

Working with Historical Newspapers in the Classroom

While newspapers were considered main protagonists of public discourses and controversies in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, recent developments rather indicate a decreasing importance of this traditional medium. Media in general have experienced an immense transformation in the age of digitalization. Consequently, students might no longer be familiar with newspapers in their original printed format. Nonetheless, Kuchler and Städter emphasize the potential of the utilization of this allegedly dying medium. They draw on the alterity of historical newspapers in contrast to contemporary news consumption via the internet. Accordingly, historical newspapers can foster students’ understanding of mentalities, media-cultures and societies in the past. In addition, a focus on historical newspapers may contribute to the training of media-competency, from which the students benefit beyond the school context as well.\textsuperscript{369}

\textsuperscript{367} Christoph Kühberger, Kompetenzorientiertes historisches und politisches Lernen. Methodische und didaktische Annäherungen für Geschichte, Sozialkunde und Politische Bildung (Österreichische Beiträge zur Geschichtsdidaktik 2), Innsbruck 2015\textsuperscript{3}, p. 102 ff.
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid., p. 108.
Bösch underlines the social meaning of newspapers as a medium, thus, justifying their utilization as a historical source in the classroom.\textsuperscript{370} In regard to the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, newspapers were in the midst of the struggle between democracy and authoritarian systems of government. Bösch argues that their importance for mobilization and propaganda should not be underestimated, especially in the context of National Socialism and the emerging conflict between the western world and communist regimes after WWII. Journalists had to respond to these vast transformations, they were often instrumentalized to distribute a political agenda and formed coalitions with certain political movements.\textsuperscript{371} Whereas Bösch writes about the state of journalism in Germany, this thesis led to similar conclusions in the context of the civil rights movement and the Deep South. The local news coverage of the AFL incident revealed the close ties between newspapers and politics, in that they prominently joined forces and formed the (white) opposition against the boycott. Vice versa, African American newspapers and some progressive papers in the North sympathized with the protesting players and helped them spread their negative experiences in New Orleans. Without newspapers, hardly anybody would have heard about these events and historians would not have been able to do research on this topic.

In recent years, historians and history educators benefited immensely from the progressing digitalization of historical newspapers. This is especially true for resources that were published and stored in foreign countries. Geiss emphasizes that such digitalization projects also give students an opportunity to conduct autonomous research without being dependent on travelling to distant libraries and archives. Thus, digitized newspapers can be a valuable tool in the classroom, particularly for the elaboration of contents in a foreign language.\textsuperscript{372} In Austria, for instance, the platform Anno provides a significant volume of newspapers that comprises almost 1.5 million editions between 1689 and 1947.\textsuperscript{373}

However, many digitized projects are only available in certain countries or regions or via special subscriptions. Geiss further stresses the importance of a didactic guiding by the

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\textsuperscript{371} Ibid., p. 26 ff.
\textsuperscript{373} ANNO Historische Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, n.d., [http://anno.onb.ac.at/suchhilfe.htm#chap1.1], accessed 8.3.2020.
\end{flushright}
teacher to facilitate the research process for the students. Accordingly, it is necessary to acquire a certain degree of proficiency and expertise on the subject-matter before newspapers can be exploited for immersion. In this case, teachers have to consider the language level of the students as well as how much they already know about the civil rights movement and American society. If the incident surrounding the AFL All-Star Game was covered in the classroom as an example of civic activism and protest during the civil rights movement, students must be aware of the historical context, the problem of segregation and the methods people used to overcome this injustice. The provided lesson plan follows the assumption that the principles of the civil rights movement, including timeline, goals, involved organizations (supporters and opponents), and methods of protest have already been addressed.

The lessons would be held as part of module 7 of the curriculum of the 8th form in an Academic High School (AHS). As mentioned above, this module targets “emancipatory, social movements and counter-movements after 1945 in Austria, Europe and the world”. To guarantee authenticity, all resources, including newspaper articles, comments and graphic inputs are retained in their original (English) version. All instructions and discussions are also held in English. The lessons are thus following the principle of Content and Language Integrated Learning (CLIL). Students in the 8th form are approaching a B2 level of English proficiency which theoretically allows them to immerse themselves in an academic discourse sufficiently on all levels of language reception and production. Furthermore, it is critical that the teacher raises the students’ awareness of the differing norms of language use in the 1960s in regard to terms that are inappropriate today.

Two sessions of 50 minutes each will be dedicated to the AFL All-Star Game boycott and its media coverage. The basic methodological approach will be carousel learning, i.e. different stations in the classroom will focus on certain aspects of the topic, for instance, supportive or opposing news coverage, excerpts of interviews, official statements, letters to the editors or caricatures. For most parts, students will be working in pairs so that they can help one another overcome the challenges of foreign language input.

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Lesson Plans and Materials

Session 1 (8th form AHS, 50 min)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>min</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Hist. &amp; Polit. competencies</th>
<th>Content/Topic</th>
<th>Social form</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Activity of the students</th>
<th>Activity of the teacher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 min</td>
<td>Introduction, raising interest, motivation, problematization</td>
<td>Hist. method. competency</td>
<td>2 All-Star Games, of the same league, in two different cities at the same time?</td>
<td>Think-Pair-Share</td>
<td>Two ads endorsing AFL All-Star Game in New Orleans and Houston</td>
<td>Handing out two images of ads, projecting guiding prompts for 3-step analysis, collecting results</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-step image analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sharing results of individual and partner work in plenary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 min-35 min</td>
<td>Realizing of the complexity of civil rights activism and media responses</td>
<td>Hist. method. competency</td>
<td>Newspaper responses to the AFL All-Star Game Boycott</td>
<td>Partners, carousel learning</td>
<td>Newspaper reports, comments, caricatures, interview excerpts; Worksheet</td>
<td>Read and work with material of the stations, fill in worksheet</td>
<td>Control and provide help if needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Polit. method. competency</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Competency of making polit. judgements</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 min</td>
<td>Preliminary consolidation of newly acquired insights</td>
<td>Hist. competency of orientation</td>
<td>Summary and reflection of first results and findings</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>Sharing of experience with primary sources</td>
<td>Leading the discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Session 2 (8th form AHS, 50min)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>min</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Hist. &amp; Polit. competencies</th>
<th>Content/Topic</th>
<th>Social form</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Activity of the students</th>
<th>Activity of the teacher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 min-30 min</td>
<td>Realizing of the complexity of civil rights activism and media responses</td>
<td>Hist. method. competency Polit. method. competency Competency of making polit. judgements</td>
<td>Continuation Newspaper Responses to the AFL All-Star Game Boycott</td>
<td>Partners, carousel learning</td>
<td>Newspaper reports, comments, caricatures, interview excerpts; Worksheet</td>
<td>Read and work with material of the stations, fill in and finish worksheet</td>
<td>Control and provide help if needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 min</td>
<td>Consolidation of contents, participating in discussion about controversial topic</td>
<td>Competency of making polit. judgements</td>
<td>Discussion of Results</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>Worksheets</td>
<td>Share results, opinions, possible links to the present</td>
<td>Leading the discussion, provide background knowledge and input if needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 min-10 min</td>
<td>Individual consolidation and reflection</td>
<td>Hist. competency of orientation Competency of making polit. judgements</td>
<td>What do I make of all this? What questions do I have about this event?</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Workbook</td>
<td>Self-reflective writing, form can be chosen individually (letter to a person involved, for instance)</td>
<td>Control and guidance if needed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Advertisements for the AFL All-Star Game (3-step image analysis)


Advertisement for the American Football League All-Star Game in Houston, undated (after January 11th, 1965), courtesy of Historic New Orleans Collection.
3- Step Image Analysis (for both illustrations)

**Observing, describing:**
- Describe what you can see in the two images.
- Summarize the information provided by the images and the captions and clarify which image was created first.
- Identify the text type of the images.

**Analysis:**
- Match the two images with a historical period and a geographic region.
- Explain the main aspects of this historical period and how these could be connected with the two images.

**Interpretation:**
- Reconstruct possible reasons why this event was relocated.
- Interpret the relocation of the event in regard to the civil rights movement.

**Considerations:**
The 3-step image analysis mirrors the three levels of an autonomous analytical process which were discussed above. The prompts become more complex and require more cognitive effort the further the analysis proceeds. In the first step, the students are expected to describe everything they can see in the images and summarize the information they can deduce from them. They will perhaps realize that those images are advertisements for one and the same American Football game, which is scheduled to take place on January 16th at 1pm. However, if they look closely, the students will probably see that one advertisement clearly provides more information and identifies Tulane Stadium as the location of the game, and the New Orleans Sports and Cultural Foundation Inc. involved in the organization of the event. When reading the captions, they will find evidence that points toward New Orleans as well. Moreover, it becomes clear that the New Orleans-ad was published first. The second advertisement states that the game was scheduled to be played at Jeppesen Stadium in Houston, Texas.

The second step of the analysis prompts the students to match their observations from the first steps with previous knowledge. Since this lesson will not be the first of the module covering emancipatory movements, the students should identify the mid-1960s as the heyday of the civil rights movement and New Orleans and Houston as cities located in the American South. Perhaps the teacher could project a map of the United States on the wall to facilitate
the analysis. The second bullet point asks the students to explain the main aspects of the civil rights movement and speculate how this period of protest, civil disobedience and violence could be connected with the AFL All-Star Game. Possibly, students might conclude that the game had to be relocated because of something that had happened in New Orleans. The third step of the analysis hints at this possibility and students get a chance to reconstruct what could have led to a relocation.

Arguably, this analysis is pretty challenging, however, the main goal is not necessarily to find out what had really transpired in New Orleans. Its purpose is to raise interest, and to raise an issue which allows students to formulate their individual questions on the past. It is a worthwhile attempt to encourage students to solve the mystery on their own.

**Learning Carousel**

There will be four different stations presenting various types of primary sources which will help students reconstruct and deconstruct the AFL All-Star Game boycott and the ensuing media reaction. Each primary source will feature concrete tasks that guide the students through the analysis. Expected answers are signaled green. To avoid copyright violations, the newspaper articles or columns from the New York Times, Pittsburgh Courier and Shreveport Times will not be displayed in this section.

**Station 1**


**Tasks:**

- Read the text from the New York Times.
- Note when it was published and where the newspaper is located.
  12.1.1965, New York, New York, USA
- What type of text is it? Is it rather informative (objective) or opinion-forming (subjective)?
  Report, informative
- Reconstruct in a few words what had led to the boycott.
African American football players faced racial discrimination by taxi drivers and night-club owners in New Orleans, decided not to play in the All-Star Game and leave, AFL commissioner moved the game to Houston

- Whose reactions (after the announcement boycott) were quoted, and were they positive or negative?

Dave Dixon, promoter: negative
Mayor Victor Schiro: negative
Nicholas A. Tedesco, taxicab bureau director: defending cab operators, no violation of the law
Citizens Special Committee of N.O.: regret their decision
Unidentified white teammates: sympathetic but opposing their actions
Governor John J. McKeithen: negative, downplayed the severity

Station 2

Source: Nunn, Bill Jr., Change of Pace, in: The Pittsburgh Courier, 23.1.1965, p. 15.

Tasks:

- Read the text from the African American weekly newspaper, The Pittsburgh Courier.
- Note when it was published and where the newspaper is located. 23.1.1965, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
- What type of text is it? Is it rather informative (objective) or opinion-forming (subjective)? Column or comment, opinion-forming
- Does the author support or oppose the players’ and the league’s decision to boycott New Orleans? Back up your judgement with examples from the text.
Supportive (speaks of courage, universal admiration for the players, highlights the roles of their leaders Gilchrist and Warlick etc.)
- Why does Nunn find it “ironic” that the game was moved to Houston, and how is Houston different from New Orleans?
Houston had faced its own fan boycott by African American fans because of segregated seating. Yet, the city had made changes and improved in race relations tremendously.

Station 3

Source: McIntyre, Bill, Authority is Absent in AFL, in: Shreveport Times, 12.1.1965, p. 17.

Tasks:

- Read the text from the Shreveport Times.
- Note when it was published and where the newspaper is located. 12.1.1965, Shreveport, Louisiana, USA
- What type of text is it? Is it rather informative (objective) or opinion-forming (subjective)? Column, comment, opinion-forming
- Does the author support or oppose the players’ and the league’s decision to boycott New Orleans? Back up your judgement with examples from the text.
  Opposes their decision, says they had no right to do so and should be sued for breaking contract, African American players should have expected hostility in the South, and should have not immersed in night life in the first place.
- What does the author think of protesting athletes? According to him, they should be happy with their privileged situation, seems fed up with the increased media attention of Cassius Clay, Jimmie Brown or Cookie Gilchrist.

Station 4

Sources:


Andreas Hofbauer, Interview with Richard Lapchick, New Orleans, 6.3.2020, audio recording and transcript in possession of the author.
Tasks:

- **Read the two interview excerpts with civil rights activists Raphael Cassimere Jr., and Richard Lapchick**
  
- **How do they think about the role of the media in regard to the 1965 AFL All-Star Game boycott and contemporary protests respectively?**

Raphael Cassimere says that the local press was the voice of white opposition. Richard Lapchick states that positive media coverage of protesting athletes is a very new development.

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“I followed the news. In fact, I knew what the news was because it was an immediate response locally. And, of course, there was much more support of the players outside of the city than it was here. Much of the opposition came from the local white press. You know there were people who couldn’t understand, well, they came here to play football, why would you want to be down in the French Quarter anyway. A lot of these guys didn’t know anything about the French Quarter. In fact, there were a lot of people who were confused and thought that New Orleans was different from most southern cities, that it was more open and didn’t have the hard racists that you had in other cities. This was, of course, not true.” — Raphael Cassimere, former president of the NAACP Youth Council in New Orleans.

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“Particularly after the death of Muhammad Ali, people recounted everything he did to bring about social justice in his lifetime [inaudible] after he died. And athletes began to see that this guy is probably the most revered person in America in spite of being such a campaigner for social justice, that it is ok for an athlete to do that. And then the four NBA players who went on the ESPYs to talk about police brutality, WNBA taking the protest to the games. And then, of course, Colin Kaepernick, and the result after President Trump made his statements the night before – the season after Kaepernick’s first knee – galvanizing more than 200 players and coaches to take a knee that next day. I think we now have positive press coverage of athlete activism today, but it is the first time in my lifetime that it has been so positive as it is today” — Richard Lapchick, human rights
activist, author and director of the Institute of Sport and Social Justice and other activist platforms.
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Appendix

Interview Transcript I

Date of Recording: 20.02.2020
Place of Recording: The Ethel & Herman L. Midlo Center, University of New Orleans, Louisiana, USA
Interviewer: Andreas Hofbauer (AH)
Interviewee: Raphael Cassimere, Jr. Seraphia D. Leyda Emeritus-Professor of History, UNO (RCJR)
Length: 20:05 min.
Type of file: M4A

AH: Ok, well, welcome Dr. Cassimere. Would you be so kind and tell me about your affiliation with the NAACP Youth Council here in New Orleans?

RCJR: I was a member of the NAACP Youth Council from 1960 until 1966. I was president for six of those years, before that I was vice president.

AH: Alright, thank you. Could you, can you tell me about the relationship between the NAACP Youth Council and the adult branch? Were there differences in methods, were there conflicts or generational differences?

RCJR: Well, until 1962 the Youth Council was actually an auxiliary to the adult branch and the adult branch had pretty much full control over the activities of the Youth Council. They could discipline, could reward or sometimes could punish them. But then in 1961 at the NAACP National Convention, the Youth Councils were made equal to the branches. Now, that did not work out quite that way. In fact, in most cities, the Youth Councils remained subordinate to the adults because they were dependent on them financially. Because we raised our own money and we had a lot of college-aged students as opposed to just high school and elementary school students, we actually acted much more independent then. But we cooperated most of the time. That was sometimes over strategies, and as I’ve gotten older, I realized that there was a different perspective from the adults, who had different experiences than we had. Young people tend to be a little bit more impulsive. Adults, of
course, who had earlier experiences, some of them negative, and because they had seen some of the consequences of impulsive actions, usually were more reflexive. But basically, we shared the same goal and over the years I certainly gained much more respect for some of the people who had some small differences in the past.

AH: Ok. Thank you. You know my main topic – the 1965 boycott – took place, of course, after the passing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. So, I was wondering. What was actually, you know, the living situation after the passing of the Civil Rights Act? Did you experience any massive change or was it more or less still the same?

RCJR: Well, there was change in the use of public accommodation. The Civil Rights Act passed in July, July 2nd 1964. So we had half a year from the passing of the Civil Rights Act and the incident involving the AFL players in January of 1965. Most major places of public accommodations obeyed the law. I mean there were people that held out – small places that were more isolated – I’d say five or six years later, maybe even longer than that. But most of the hotels [inaudible], chain stores like Woolworths and Sears, they complied almost immediately. They may not have welcomed us with open arms, but they did, in fact, comply. So, I’d say we spent most that first half year after the passing of the Civil Rights Act testing places, make sure that they were in compliance. The incident involving the AFL hit us unexpectedly. Because they went into the French Quarter and the French Quarter does, in fact, have a lot of restaurants that were fully covered. There was always a question about bars that did not serve food – were they fully covered? And it was probably not as clear then as it is today. When I first heard about it, I was not surprised because often we would drive through the French Quarter and when the doorman or the bouncers would see us, they’d close the door. Make sure that we didn’t look in. Lot of them, of course, had women who were half-naked. So, I was not surprised of that. What did surprise me was the initial response of the branch president, Dutch Morial. He said that the players should not have left, they should have mediated this or should have actually rolled with the punch. And, of course, there was a lot of internal opposition to that. I mean a lot of the adult members were upset about that. And coincidentally we had a meeting, I think, within the next couple of days and there were a lot of people, who were there, waiting to excoriate him for that. Well he kind of walked back that he didn’t mean that, that when they contacted him, he wasn’t aware of the extent of it. But a lot of good came out of that because at that particular time, local officials were trying to get an AFL franchise because they had a franchise in Houston and then, Dallas, of course, already had an NFL franchise. We thought, they probably thought it’d be easier to get an
AFL franchise because it was a new league. And then they had not yet gotten this NFL franchise, and, of course, that really hurt. When the city did apply for a franchise in 1966, they made sure they had black participation. Blacks who in fact would serve on the team and encourage the league to award a franchise and assure the league that there had, in fact, been changes made. And the league did, in fact, agree that they would give them a franchise and they would be eligible to bid for the Super Bowl. But they had to be sure to pass a local ordinance to cover places that were not covered by the national civil rights law. So, all the local places that were not immediately affected, they would have to come into compliance. And I remember I was in graduate school, I had left and was working on my doctorate. And I came home in 1969 – I was in my second year at Lehigh – and so I was at city hall where the debate took place, and, of course, a lot of rehashing came up what had happened to those players – the indignities and insults that they had suffered. And we wanted to make sure that that didn’t happen again. And I think it was kind of a foregone conclusion that it was going to pass, but was it going to pass unanimously? And it did pass unanimously, and I felt very, very good because that was five years after the Civil Rights Act had passed. And, of course, New Orleans did host the first Super Bowl in 1970 between the Vikings and the Kansas City Chiefs. And there may have been incidents but I don’t know of any major incidents after that time. So, that went a long way because it wasn’t just helpful to tourists, but it opened up places for locals that continued to be closed even after the Civil Rights Act had passed.

AH: Wow, thank you very much because many of the questions I had you already answered, which is very interesting because you mentioned Dutch Morial. I found out in the NAACP papers that the NAACP released this press statement shortly after this incident trying to, you know, say that Morial was misinterpreted by the media. Because the media would say that civic leaders would argue against a walkout and so, in fact, I was wondering if Morial had any opposition within the NAACP?

RCJR: No, in fact. But he did leave within months because he was appointed to Assistant United States attorney. So, if I remember, he stepped down in May of 1965. But there was opposition, in that people were out for bear so to speak. But he clarified what he said, what he meant. Of course, he was opposed to the indignities that these people had suffered but he wished that they had contacted him before they had left.

AH: What I also found out is that the taxi ordinance of the city was still segregated after 1964. How long did it take to change that…
RCJR: Uhh I don’t remember the laws after that because by law blacks and whites could not pick up passengers from, of the same race unless they… I think the exception was they could take them from the airport to a destination within the city. I think that was because the FAA, the Federal Aviation Administration required non-discrimination in services at the airport. But I don’t remember when it changed, but I know it existed for some years after that.

AH: Oh yeah, it’s interesting, I think, they argued they don’t want to change it because they don’t want to hurt the business of colored companies...

RCJR: There were a few black cab drivers who supported that notion that, you know, if they integrated these services that the blacks would be the losers and whites would monopolize everything. But I don’t think it was too much longer. In fact, I know when the Super Bowl came in 1970, it was understood that there cannot be any problems that they had in 1965. That they were, in fact, going to have to accept black and whites without regards to where you were going, if you were coming to the city or you were leaving the city. But I know it was not immediately.

AH: Alright. Well, let me just take a look. Oh yeah. You know, as I am analyzing the press coverage, did you actually follow the news, were you involved in, you know, finding out what public opinion about this incident was?

RCJR: I followed the news. In fact, I knew what the news was because it was an immediate response locally. And, of course, there was much more support of the players outside of the city than it was here. Much of the opposition came from the local white press. You know there were people who couldn’t understand, well, they came here to play football, why would you want to be down in the French Quarter anyway. A lot of these guys didn’t know anything about the French Quarter. In fact, there were a lot of people who were confused and thought that New Orleans was different from most southern cities, that it was more open and didn’t have the hard racists that you had in other cities. This was, of course, not true. So, that was one of bargain points that we had because when the leaders like Dave Dixon or Vic Schiro [inaudible] when they pushed for the first NFL franchise, they knew that would not get it if they didn’t have the help from the black leadership. And then, many of the businesses who had been silent on desegregation before, were forced to come along. Because they understood, this was going to drive business in the city. And of the things I found out, I didn’t realize it at the time, Norman Francis, who was the president of Xavier University for almost fifty years, is a minority owner of the Saints. He owns two percent of the Saints, which is
now much more than what he paid for it. So, he is sitting on 20, 25 million Dollars. I assume that he kept his stock. I didn’t realize. I knew that they had talked about black ownership but I didn’t know who had gotten it. And I know the agreement was when we began playing it would be fully integrated. There would be blacks throughout. There would be blacks…Somebody said, “what about [inaudible] and supplies?” – “Well, there are some black businesses who can [inaudible] these, we can look for them”. “What about black doctors at the game?” – “Well, we are going to have black doctors at the game just as we have white doctors.” “We are going to have black hostesses, we are going to have white hostesses. We are going to use black bands, we were going to use white bands.” So, it was much more significant later on than it seemed to have been at that particular time that the indignities and insults that the AFL players suffered were offset by the fact that the two leagues merged the next year. And a lot of the concerns that had been expressed by the black players that there still were hotels that did not admit black players – all of them had to be resolved and they were.

AH: That’s fascinating. I was wondering about that. In the news you read a lot about Hale Boggs’ influence, or Senator Long, who...

RCJR: They were influential.

AH: Of course, passed the merger in Congress. But you don’t read anything, especially in the big, like the Times-Picayune, you don’t read anything about any progress in race relations. I had the feeling that they wanted to dodge the whole issue, as if it never happened.

RCJR: Well, if you look at the debate in December 69, leading up to the public accommodation ordinance, there is a lot of that being rehashed. Why we need to do it. In fact, it is almost like trying to [inaudible]. Doesn’t matter, no matter what your personal feelings are, if we are going to be a modern, progressive city, we are going to have to realize that we are going to have to accommodate everybody. This is good business. So, a lot of people reluctantly came on, “Ok, well, will there be any exemptions, for example, for barbershops, will there be exemptions for local bars”. Because a lot of the, well, not a lot, some of the restaurants – after the Civil Rights Act had passed – had become private clubs. You had to have a membership and all that to come in.

AH: So, they stayed segregated?
RCJR: So, the local public accommodation act went farther than the national Civil Rights Act. And the way to gain support was: this is just good business. And a lot of the people who in the past had been silent, if they didn’t come up publicly, at least they didn’t publicly oppose it.

AH: Maybe one more question about New Orleans politics. So, Mayor Schiro, basically when he ran for the first time, in his first campaign he was more or less the candidate of the segregationists, wasn’t he?

RCJR: Absolute, hardcore racist.

AH: And, well there is evidence, or at least it’s reported that this somehow changed in his second tenure, when he was running against Fitzmorris in 65.

RCJR: Well the Voting Rights Act of 65 had passed.

AH: That’s what I wanted to go after…

RCJR: …and the voter registration had increased very significantly. So, neither candidate could ignore us. Fitzmorris could not ignore it, Schiro could not ignore it. Schiro was the quintessential politician, I don’t think he had any hard and fast principles on anything. He was a politician, he was about win[d]s. So, he changed with the wind. He was the mayor when, well, let’s say like this. Schools were first desegregated in 1960, he became mayor in 61. In the first year, there were a lot of problems. He became mayor in 61: “We are not going to have any problems. You want to protests, protest. But you can’t congregate outside of schools.” So, a lot of the problems they had had, they had given the city a bad eye nationally and internationally in 1960. He made sure we avoided that. So, once he became mayor, a lot of the hardcore racist views that he expressed, those were not important to him – he had won. When he ran for re-election, he made sure he got some prominent blacks who supported him. And he was far less antagonistic than he had run for in 1961.

AH: Ok. So, I was wondering when I did my research whether he changed some of his positions or that he maybe got more progressive because of this AFL boycott and the loss of prestige for the city. But I didn’t find any evidence actually.

RCJR: I think he changed because politics changed. Because the black registration was close to I say 40 percent by the time he left office. When he first became officer, black voter registration might have been 20 percent, so it was significant but it really could not make the
difference. You could not ignore 40 percent of the voters. In fact, Moon Landrieu won the election in 1969 because he got 95 percent of the black vote, even though he lost the majority of the white vote. So that was a reality that most politicians began to realize. You can’t ignore this vote. You can’t run for the things you stood for in the past. You might believe them, but you can’t run and expect to be successful.

AH: So, this change of heart was often tactical reasoning?

RCJR: I think, strictly tactical.

AH: Ok, well, let me just take a look. Well if we talk about the New Orleans Saints, you said there was some black participation on the field and off the field. Do you think they had a huge impact on the community, on the unity in New Orleans? Or don’t you…

RCJR: It’s strange because you see the strong interaction between the races at these sporting events, yet, many people go back into their separate communities and express their different views in the elections. The fact that the city which was a majority… overwhelmingly, the state was overwhelmingly Democratic until what? The 1990s? And now there has been a reversal: the old Democrats who used to vote to support Dixiecrats, they all have become Republicans, except for in New Orleans. New Orleans is overwhelmingly Democratic, much more liberal. That’s because it is predominantly black, but even the majority of whites who live here have much more progressive views than much of the state has. But yeah, sports is different. In fact, I was watching the support for LSU. Baton Rouge is a, LSU, lots of the people there are conservative, but they interact for athletic events. It’s contradictory, but again that’s what human beings are.

AH: Well, amazing, thank you. I guess that should do it.

RCJR: Ok, if you have questions send them to me by email.
AH: Well, Dr. Lapchick, could you tell me a little bit about your academic focus right now and in the past?

RL: Well, it’s very wide ranging. It all generally involves issues of social justice. I’ve written two books about women, and the rest of the books are, many of them are about racism. Quite a few recently are about people who have done great things to bring about positive social changes in the sports platform. I think that’s the last five books I’ve written. I’ve written a total of 17 books. As you might know, I do racial and gender report cards with the Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sport, where we have a team of graduate assistance that I work with to produce gender and racial report cards on the NBA, the NFL, Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, College sport, the WNBA and the sports media. We do studies on graduation rates of the bowl-bound football teams, and the college Division I tournament basketball teams.

AH: Wow, that’s a lot, that’s a broad field. So, can you tell me a little bit about your career as an activist, when it started and what motivated you?

RL: Yes, so literally when I was five years old, I looked outside my bedroom window in Yonkers, New York where I was raised and saw my father in [inaudible] a tree with people under the tree picketing. And for several years, after that, I would pick up the extension cord in our house, my dad not knowing that I was listening to calls that were directed at him. And it was racial epithet after racial epithet being called at my father. I didn’t know what any of it meant except that a lot of people didn’t like this person who was my best friend. And I would later find out, I discovered that it was because as the coach of the New York Knicks he would sign the first African American player in the history of the NBA, Nathanial “Sweetwater”
Clifton, and there were a lot of people in the 1950s that were not happy that he had done that. So, I had the desire to be a great basketball player, my dad is a [inaudible] inductee to the Basketball Hall of Fame, and everybody assumed that I would follow in his footsteps, he was the first big man in the game, I was 6ft tall and one of the tallest players in New York City in the 8th grade, everybody assumed that would be 6’9 or 6’10. You can’t see me, but I’m not 6’9 or 6’10. The gene pool got significantly shuffled at that point. So, I bet at age 15, I was definitely thinking out to play in the NBA and I was recruited by a high school basketball coach. He was the coach of one of the most powerful basketball schools in the country. And I decided not to go there, but I became friends with the coach and the next summer I went to his basketball camp, where I was with five other white guys and one black guy. And one of the whites, who has been a D-1 basketball coach for the last 35 years, was dropping the N-word on the black guy for the first three days until I finally challenged him. He literally knocked me out cold. Well, the black guy who was then known as Lew Alcindor became Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and a life-long friendship began with Kareem at that moment that is so profound that Kareem invited me to be with his family when Barrack Obama gave him the presidential medal of freedom several years ago, at the end of the Obama era. I was asked to speak at the unveiling of his statue at the Staples Center, he flew to Orlando when I was scheduled to have surgery, but as a 15-year-old white kid from Yonkers, NY, an almost all-white community, I had suddenly a young urban African American lens with which to look at the world and what racism was doing to that world. And that made me want to do something about being involved in civil rights. I didn’t know what that meant at the time as a 15-year-old. But I knew that I was going to do something and that something eventually led me to get a PhD in international race relations and I was doing my doctoral dissertation on the racial factor in American foreign policy. I met at a cocktail party the South African poet who would also start the non-racial sports movement in South Africa. And I went home that weekend after spending five hours with, deciding that I was trying to write a new dissertation about how South Africa is using sport as a part of its foreign policy and the international response compared to how the Nazis have done that in the 1930s. That’s what I, in fact, did and it later was published as a book in 1975. I ended up founding the sports boycott of South Africa in the United States. It was very active in Europe, New Zealand and Australia, where sport competition with South Africa was very open. And as those countries started to boycott South Africa, I knew that they would come to the United States. And sure enough in 1978, they were sending a Davis Cup team to compete in the North American zone of the Davis Cup in Nashville, Tennessee. So my job was that the coalition was to get those matches cancelled. I
went down to Nashville, where the matches were supposed to take place and tried to call a protest and by the time I left it appeared that the matches were going to be cancelled. One of the things I was asked to do by the African governments was to announce that they would boycott the Los Angeles Olympic Games if this team was allowed to come to the United States. I said that at a press conference, and that’s when we heard that the financial backers of the Davis Cup might drop out, so I flew home to Virginia that night. I thought maybe for the first time in my life I have done something worthwhile. The next night I was working late in my college office, the office was in the school’s library. The library closed at 10:30, at 10:45 there was a knock on the door. I assumed it was campus security, so I didn’t hesitate to open the door. But instead on the other side it was two men wearing stocking masks, the [inaudible] caused liver damage, kidney damage, a concussion, they carved the N-word in my stomach with a pair of office scissors. I knew at that point that I was going to spend the rest of my life using the sport platform to address social justice issues, and I decided that because I realized that people would go to this length to try stop my dad 28 years earlier and me all these years later that night. That there must be something what I was doing had a positive effect on the fight against racism. So, I knew that I had to stay in that fight, and use the sports platform which I was convinced had the ability to bring about change. And the rest is what they say history. That’s what I’ve done for the next 52 years.

AH: That is so amazing actually. You know, my focus lies on the 60s, especially on New Orleans in the 1960s, when sports became integrated, of course, after the Civil Rights Act passed. But still segregation or racism prevailed. And I was analyzing the news media, newspaper, local newspapers, especially, how they responded to the AFL boycott in 1965. And what I found out was that the media kind of played the role of opposition, they tried to discredit the players, they tried to frame the whole incident in a way that it fits their ideology. So, I was wondering, in the 70s, when the boycott of this Davis took place, did you already see change in the tone of the discussion, in the discourse, despite the fact that you were attacked. Was a broader platform for social justice emerging through sports?

RL: Well, I think it was still a very narrow window. If an athlete did something to speak out against social injustice, they frequently lost whatever it was that they had. When you think of Tommy Smith and John Carlos after Mexico City, Muhammad Ali, Curt Flood, who was a great baseball player. His career ended when he fought for free agency in Major League Baseball. Really the only athlete who kind of escaped and was able to keep competing was Bill Russell after he wrote *Go Up for Glory* about racism in the United States. And it was
only because he was the dominant basketball player of his era that he was able to continue to play. The Celtics couldn’t afford not to keep him. But everybody else lost their position and it was a very difficult time to say the least. So, I don’t think that it changed that dramatically, and you saw the media coverage around me being attacked picked up on the police allegations that I self-inflicted the wounds. The media would pick up on that story and it ended up being a much bigger nightmare for me than the actual attack itself. So, I think right now, in the modern era, in the last four or five years, the media has been finally… Particularly after the death of Muhammad Ali, people recounted everything he did to bring about social justice in his lifetime [inaudible] after he died. And athletes began to see that this guy is probable the most revered person in America in spite of being such a campaigner for social justice, that it is ok for an athlete to do that. And then the four NBA players who went on the ESPYs to talk about police brutality, WNBA taking the protest to the games. And then, of course, Colin Kaepernick, and the result after President Trump made his statements the night before – the season after Kaepernick’s first knee – galvanizing more than 200 players and coaches to take a knee that next day. I think we now have positive press coverage of athlete activism today, but it is the first time in my lifetime that it has been so positive as it is today.

AH: Oh yeah, originally, I was planning to write about Colin Kaepernick and the anthem protest, but then I decided to a little further back in time to make sure that I kind of avoid this controversial contemporary topic. But still plays a role of course. So, you already mentioned the Institute for Sport and Social Justice that you founded. So I was wondering what could historian’s contribution be to raise public awareness of protesting players and how important sport still is as a vehicle for integration and social mobility.

RL: I think the role you could play is to keep a recording so that future generations know the price that athletes paid for their standing up for social justice. That it was not without cost. And that even in the modern era, when the media is reporting more positively about it, Colin Kaepernick still is without a professional football career as a result of what he said.

AH: Ok. Well, I think you gave perfect answers to almost all of my questions. Thank you very much.
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