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Responses

The Advent of Neo-Revisionism?

Günter Bischof

At a signal moment in the process of European unification, when ten new countries—most of them from Central and Eastern Europe—have joined the European Union (EU), it is a propitious moment to look back and ask when and how the unfortunate division of the European continent came about. As Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Hungarians, and the peoples of the Baltic states are entering “EU-Europe,” their decades of suffering under the iron boot of Communism and painful loss of sovereignty under Soviet Communism seem remote yet full of traumatic memories. In such moments it behooves historians to take a look back and revisit the tragic months and years of the early Cold War when the “Iron Curtain” came down and divided Europe between East and West.

Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe reassess the origins and impact of the Marshall Plan in June–July 1947 and conclude that the United States (and to a lesser degree Great Britain and France) were responsible for the division of the continent. They posit as their key thesis that “it was American policies as much as (and perhaps more than) Soviet actions that finally led to the division of Europe.” In their view, U.S. officials conceived of the European Recovery Program (ERP) as a tool to exclude the Soviet Union from European reconstruction and to push Moscow toward “a breakdown” in Cold War relations, thus forsaking all chances for continued cooperation. The momentous decisions of late June and early July 1947, according to Cox and Kennedy-Pipe, led to the exclusion of the East European states under Soviet tutelage from European reconstruction and thus drove them into the Soviet camp for good. They maintain that Josif Stalin did not want a division of Europe because he knew that, in economic terms, the Soviet Union could not win “an extended and costly standoff” with the West. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe claim that the antagonistic bloc system, as it developed in 1948 and beyond, was the result of Western, not Soviet, intransigence during the initial rounds of negotiations concerning the Marshall Plan. The USSR’s turn toward the Cold War, they argue, “followed rather than preceded the breakdown of negotiations in July 1947” (emphasis in original). When the United States and its principal European allies made an effort “to pull the East Europeans away...
from the USSR” with the U.S. aid offer, they should have understood that this would aggravate Soviet security concerns and thus make the situation worse. When Stalin recognized that Washington was seeking to “roll back Communism,” he would have nothing of it. A more flexible and accommodating Western approach during the crucial Paris conference, according to Cox and Kennedy-Pipe, might have forestalled the division of Europe into two hostile blocs.¹

What are we to make of this new revisionist attempt to place the blame for the post–World War II division of Europe squarely on the Americans and their chief allies, Great Britain and France? From my perspective, as a historian of the Cold War in Central Europe, Cox’s and Kennedy-Pipe’s arguments are less than persuasive. First, they entirely ignore the German question. Second, they do not present any new evidence from Soviet archives indicating that Stalin was willing to cooperate with the West. Third, they ignore disagreements among U.S. policy elites over European reconstruction and the German question and the complex framework of decision-making in Washington. Fourth, from the perspective of Cold War historiography, their article does not advance our understanding of the genesis of the Cold War division of Europe. Instead, it seems like a throwback to the arch-revisionism of the 1960s and early 1970s. Let me deal with each of these issues in turn.

### The German Question

The struggle over the future of Germany and its role in European reconstruction was the key issue fueling and defining the East-West antagonism on the continent, as Marc Trachtenberg has recently reminded us.² A German settlement held the key to a lasting security regime in Europe. In July 1945 the Allied agreement at Potsdam was designed to deliver German economic unity. But economic unity was undermined by a system of reparations “swaps” between the zones, as the British reparations expert David Waley warned at Potsdam: “[I]f a line is drawn across the middle of Europe, so that there is a frontier with Russia on one side and the Western Powers on the other, this has importance far transcending reparations.”³ In other words, long before

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the Marshall Plan was conceived, the reparations line drawn at Potsdam was already a first step toward the future partition of Germany, with vast implications for Europe.

By 1947 the Potsdam agreement had outlived its usefulness for the Western occupation powers in Germany. As early as May 1946, General Lucius D. Clay, the American deputy military governor for Germany, had stopped reparations deliveries to the Soviet zone. The acrimonious negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) deliberations in Paris frustrated Western representatives. In September 1946, amid growing East-West tensions and a lack of progress under the strict zonal regime in Germany, U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes announced the merging of the American and British zones in his famous Stuttgart speech. Most historians now agree that this decision, perhaps more than any other, precipitated the future partition of Germany. The goal was to ease the burden of making the Western zones economically viable.

In January 1947 the American and British zones began to operate as "Bizonia," which turned out to be a further step toward partition. The Anglo-American Bizone was supposed to "assist materially in reviving industry and foreign trade in both zones." A "Joint Export-Import Agency" was set up to help overcome obstacles of foreign trade. Over the next two years more and more responsibility was turned over to the West Germans. During the interminable seven-week CFM talks in Moscow in March and April 1947, no agreement was reached on German reparations, levels of industry, and the future of the Ruhr area, Germany’s industrial heartland.

Deadlock at the Moscow CFM meeting—combined with President Harry S. Truman’s enunciation of his containment doctrine—was the crucial turning point for American policy toward Germany and Europe. The new U.S. secretary of state, George C. Marshall, returned from Moscow highly frustrated with Soviet obstructionism on the German and Austrian questions, just as Byrnes had been at the Paris meetings a few months earlier. Marshall felt that Stalin was deliberately refusing to make concessions in the expectation that the West European economies would disintegrate. Time was of the essence insofar as European recovery had been much slower than expected. Marshall warned the American public in a radio address after his return to


Washington: “The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate.” Action was needed to revive the German economy and gear it for the reconstruction of Western Europe. The breakdown of any agreement on Germany drove Washington toward a European Recovery Program that included the Western occupation zones of Germany. The revival of German economic strength and of higher production levels without a reparations settlement was intolerable for Stalin.

Agreement seems to be building among historians that Stalin wanted cooperation in Germany, at least until the beginning of 1947, and that American intransigence in the economic arena as well as unilateral actions by the British and Americans in preparing for a West German state ultimately precipitated the division of Germany. The train toward the partition of Germany was gathering speed in 1947, long before the crucial weeks of Marshall's speech at Harvard and the European response. Growing disagreement over Germany widened the cracks across the East-West divide on the continent. It seems odd that Cox and Kennedy-Pipe fail to discuss how the German question not only shaped the context in which decisions about the ERP were made, but also spurred the formation of separate East-West blocs.

**Lack of New Sources**

Our two British historians wax eloquent about the new insights that the opening of archives in the former Communist countries has yielded on the genesis of the Cold War in general and the Marshall Plan in particular. Yet they fail to present any new evidence that might prove their main thesis, namely that Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov were in a cooperative and concessionary frame of mind during the Paris conference in late June 1947. In a recent study of the German Control Council, Günther Mai insists that until the beginning of 1947 Stalin was prepared to make concessions in Germany to prevent it from slipping into the American sphere of influence. Molotov's intransigent stance at the Moscow CFM, however, seems to indicate that this propitiatory mood had evaporated by the spring of 1947. During the critical weeks of May and June, when State Department officials were conceptualizing the ERP, Stalin embarked on a truculent course in Hungary by tightening Communist control, getting rid of the Smallholders Party in the governing

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7. The two most solid accounts on this are Günther Mai, *Der Alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland 1945–1948* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995); and Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*.
coalition, and forcing Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy into exile. Did the Communist takeover in Hungary via “salami tactics” (as the Hungarian Communist leader Mátyás Rákosi put it) indicate Soviet accommodation? Did it suggest that Stalin might be prepared to tolerate greater Western influence in Eastern Europe if it came with economic aid? At a press conference on the morning of 5 June, the day of Marshall’s speech, President Truman denounced the situation in Hungary as “outrageous” and drew more press coverage than Marshall’s speech did.  

Despite the selective opening of archives in Moscow, the large majority of Stalin’s personal papers concerning foreign policy, military affairs, and intelligence are still classified. Unless we can eventually gain access to diaries, letters, or memoranda that prove Stalin’s cooperative determination to tear down the Iron Curtain he himself had erected in Europe, we will have to make inferences from Molotov’s ambiguous behavior during the Paris meeting and Stalin’s refusal to allow the East European countries to participate in the Marshall Plan. At an early stage, Pravda fired a broadside against Marshall’s scheme of American “dollar imperialism,” sounding the principal theme of the vicious post-Paris propaganda war against the Marshall Plan. By the time a highly suspicious Molotov came to Paris, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai Novikov, had persuaded him that the Americans wanted to build a “Western bloc.” When Stalin prohibited the Czechoslovak government from participating in further European negotiations on the Marshall Plan, he raised the same argument, namely that “under the cover of credit assistance to Europe they were organizing something like a Western bloc against the Soviet Union.” The Soviet propaganda line of the “West-bloc” guided the New Left revisionist historians in the 1960s in their interpretation of the Marshall Plan, blaming the Americans exclusively for the division of Europe. Rehashing this charge today does not make it any more persuasive.


In Paris it was Molotov who tried to subvert the new American approach of an integrated multinational European reconstruction program that would take due account of European needs. Molotov insisted on a national approach à la the wartime Lend-Lease program of bilateral aid to individual countries, and he rejected the notion of having any “strings attached.” British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, a hardline Cold Warrior who more than anyone wanted a European reconstruction program without Soviet participation, reminded Molotov early on in Paris that debtors usually did not fix terms for creditors and that Moscow could not simply ignore the requirement to divulge its available resources and economic statistics.13

Molotov’s negotiating behavior in Paris betrayed the same truculence that had won him the well-earned sobriquet of “Mr. Nyet” during the innumerable CFM sessions.14 Initially moderate in Paris, Molotov quickly lived up to Western expectations and turned down the U.S. invitation for the Soviet Union to take part in the Plan. By implication, he also turned down the invitations for the East European countries. Moscow’s rejection of the proposal made sense politically, for, as Vladimir Pechatnov and Earl Edmondson have noted, Soviet leaders were aware that “in an open-door competition their country was no match for the American economic juggernaut.”15 After months of such truculent behavior as chief Soviet negotiator, how could anyone think that the tiger had changed his stripes?

True, the Western powers wanted to shift the burden of rejecting American aid onto the Soviet government, knowing full well that it would be hard to convince the U.S. Congress to approve a vast European aid program involving the Soviet Union at a time when the Truman administration had vigorously embarked on its containment strategy. The ERP was intended to be a departure from the piecemeal approach of doling out American aid. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe leave out a key part of the story by failing to discuss the U.S. domestic context.

U.S. officials would have been happy if the East European countries had been included in the ERP, but they did not believe there was much chance it would happen. Contrary to what Cox and Kennedy-Pipe suggest, the United States at this time had not yet embarked on a rhetoric of “liberating” Eastern Europe (it never became a realistic policy, as the American response to the cri-

ses in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956 showed\textsuperscript{16}). The United States pursued a “non-policy” toward Eastern Europe, as Geir Lundestad argued more than twenty-five years ago.\textsuperscript{17} The region was never an area of principal American interest. It was agriculturally and economically backward, and any attempt to include it in the ERP would have greatly complicated the American aid program in 1947 (in much the same way that the admission of East European countries into the EU today is making the European integration effort exceedingly difficult). Franklin Roosevelt had surrendered the region to Stalin in the infamous “percentages agreement” of 1944, and Truman was not willing to expend great effort trying to “save” the region from Soviet domination. The emerging “spheres” were part and parcel of the emerging Cold War in 1945, and by 1947 the United States and its principal Western allies, Great Britain and France, were prepared to tolerate the tightening of these spheres into “blocs.” The Soviet Union, too, as Moscow’s “salami tactics” in Hungary in 1947 abundantly demonstrated, was actively moving in that direction well before the Marshall Plan.

**Complexities of U.S. Decision-Making**

During the crucial years 1946–1947, elites in Washington often disagreed profoundly about almost every aspect of German and European reconstruction. Scholars who ignore these disagreements are bound to miss the subtlety of Marshall’s offer in June 1947. On the one side General Clay and the Office of Military Government in Berlin were heading toward the division of Germany with the unilateral May 1946 reparations stop. On the other side the brilliant economists Charles Kindleberger and Walt W. Rostow, heading the State Department’s “Division of German and Austrian Economic Affairs,” promoted “the creation of an all-European economic organization designed to accelerate lagging reconstruction and to achieve greater long-run economic unity in Europe.” But the political officers of the “European Division” in the State Department opposed such a plan. With their apocalyptic vision of the “Soviet threat” they had already embarked on policies that would lead to the partition of Germany and eventually the division of Europe. James Riddleberger of the State Department’s “Central European Division,” who


helped draft Byrnes's Stuttgart speech, noted that Soviet leaders were allowing a policy of drift in Germany to make their zone "a permanent bastion on the Elbe." Yet the economists made sure Byrnes was aware that stifling the German economy would mean handicapping "the recovery of Europe." 18

During the Moscow CFM, American advisers to Marshall clashed regularly, as Kindleberger's dense letters from Moscow to his colleagues at the State Department show. John Foster Dulles was pro-French and went along with Paris's demand for the internationalization of the Ruhr. Clay and his aides in the Office of Military Government of the United States for Germany (OMGUS) were pro-German and wanted no concessions to be made to the Soviet Union on German reparations out of current production. Kindleberger felt Clay was "violent and a little insubordinate." He and the economic advisers advocated European solutions. He preferred that "we adopt a policy of trying to unify all of Europe." 19

These policy battles were carried into the intense discussions of May 1947 during the gestation period for Marshall's speech. Will Clayton, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, returned from Europe at the end of May shocked by the breakdown of basic economic activity and advocated a rehabilitation program for Western Europe. George F. Kennan, the director of Marshall's new Policy Planning Staff in the State Department, pleaded for the United States "to play it straight" and make at least a token effort to extend it to all of Europe. From this staff work Marshall favored two points above all, namely "emphasis on opening the program to all of Europe and insistence that Europe take the initiative," as his biographer Forrest Pogue put it. In his 5 June speech at Harvard, he did not exclude any European nation but insisted that "governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom" will not be included. Everybody knew whom he meant. Even though Bevin and Bidault hoped from the outset that the Soviet Union would decline, Marshall insisted when queried that "aid was open to all countries west of Asia." 20 Kindleberger, a key

Vordenker of the European Recovery Program, makes a persuasive case that the Marshall Plan originated in the economic section of the State Department. Yet even Kindleberger, who had vigorously pushed a Europe-wide program since 1946 and along with others had managed to get it inserted into Marshall’s speech, was in the end relieved when Molotov walked out of the Paris meeting in a huff: “we envisaged that the Russian bear could choke the program to death by embracing it.”21 Bevin and Bidault fully agreed and acted accordingly. Rather than a negative conspiracy of “subversion” to pull Eastern Europe out of the Soviet sphere, as Cox and Kennedy-Pipe maintain, the American policymakers were developing a positive plan to rehabilitate Western Europe with the Western zones of Germany included. They could live with Eastern Europe languishing under the Soviet iron heel.

**Historiographic Pitfalls**

The Cox and Kennedy-Pipe article, as I have suggested above, is an exercise in neo-revisionism. It returns to the revisionism of the 1960s and early 1970s while ignoring much of the past thirty years of scholarship on the Marshall Plan. The New Left revisionists attributed historical agency almost entirely to U.S. policymakers and depicted the Soviet Union as merely reacting to the “Molotov Plan” and the Cominform. David Horowitz (who was then a radical leftist) stressed the American “counteroffensive” of the Marshall Plan. Lloyd Gardner identified Dean Acheson as the mastermind behind the Marshall Plan who desired a bipolar world. The implication was that the U.S. officials in Paris all wanted to avoid any compromise so that they could force Molotov to leave Paris and charge that “the American plan would subvert Europe’s national economies” (emphasis added). Thomas Paterson claimed that the “obvious British and French coldness toward Soviet participation” and Molotov’s fear of the “subordination of the agricultural East to the industrial West” induced the Soviet foreign minister to retreat from Paris.22 The traditionalists argued that the Cold War stemmed in part from the efforts that the Communist parties made to subvert Western Europe and seize power, whereas the revisionists turned this argument on its head in averring that the deliberately subversive design of the Marshall Plan threatened the Soviet

Union’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and spurred Stalin to establish the Cominform in order to ward off that threat. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe re-hash this argument by depicting the Molotov Plan as a defensive reaction against the Marshall Plan’s design to subvert Moscow’s position in Eastern Europe. In their account, U.S. action and Soviet reaction caused the Cold War bloc system. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe seem merely to be pouring old wine into old bottles.

Where are the advances of Marshall Plan scholarship made by Michael Hogan, Alan Milward, and Barry Eichengreen in this scheme? Where is Charles Maier’s complex model depicting the Marshall initiative as resting on three arcs of intersecting crises in 1945–1947 (namely the collapse of the British imperial role in the world balance of power, the problems of French and Italian domestic stability, and the demise of western Germany’s economy and morale)? Portrayals of Stalin as merely having reacted defensively to events after the war rather than aggressively attacking Western policies are at odds with the reality of Soviet truculence and uncompromising action in Eastern and Central Europe and elsewhere in the immediate postwar era, not to mention Molotov’s intransigence in the international negotiating arena. Cold War historians cannot entirely ignore Soviet agency in sparking the East-West conflict. The various waves of “post-revisionism” of the 1980s and 1990s did a relatively good job of insisting that both sides must share the blame for the Cold War. By singling out John Lewis Gaddis’s post–Cold War American triumphalism in We Now Know, Cox and Kennedy-Pipe are creating a straw man of “neo-traditionalism.” Too much sophisticated scholarship has appeared about the origins of the Cold War and the formation of the bloc system to merit a return to the simplifications of revisionism.

Against the backdrop of continued U.S.-European disagreements over the Bush administration’s “preemptive” war in Iraq, it is not altogether surprising that two European scholars would produce a jaundiced reassessment of the origins of the post-1945 Euro-American cooperation that originated in the Marshall Plan era. During the Vietnam War, American historians looked at the roots of U.S. interventionism and discovered that aggressive American behavior in the early Cold War was the taproot of all evil. In both instances blame is being laid exclusively on America’s doorstep. One does not need to be


a supporter of Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam policies or agree with George W. Bush’s Iraq war to note that in both instances these historical reassessments are blinkered. Nor is it triumphalist to end by citing the recent assessment by Thomas McCormick, one of the leading lights of 1960s Wisconsin revisionism: “The Marshall Plan was arguably the most innovative piece of foreign policy in American history.”