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Egyptian-British-American Triangular Relations in the 1920s: Egypt's Efforts to Break Free of Colonial Tutelage

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Egyptian-British-American Triangular Relations in the 1920s:
Egypt's Efforts to Break Free of Colonial Tutelage

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
University of New Orleans
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
History

by

Scott Manguno

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Abstract

The triangular relationship amongst Egypt, Great Britain, and the United States serves as a microcosm for the larger international context of the 1920s. Importantly, the relationship reveals much about Egypt's decolonization and national development strategies in the 1920s. The increasing internationalism of the 1920s offered new avenues to pursue national interests. Because of a changing a status quo, Egypt had an opportunity to reform old institutions and choose new paths of national development. Despite the colonial baggage carried by Egypt, national strategies near the end of the 1920s placed the country in a position to exert leverage on the international community not possible even in the aftermath of World War I within the international context of the British Empire.

Introduction

Historians have not spilled much ink writing about the role of the United States in British-Egyptian relations in the 1920s. While well documented tensions existed between the United States and Great Britain in the 1920s over the gold standard, trade (*e.g.* the Rubber War), oil (*e.g.* San Remo 1920), and international prestige (*e.g.* naval superiority and the Washington Conference), these issues are not extended to other regions of the international arena such as Egypt. Like the Anglo-American rivalry, histories of the British in Egypt during the 1920s are also bilateral in nature, either justifying or criticizing British imperial policy. A few works have included the United States in the political equation, notably for the influence of missionaries, archaeologists, and recently the “disillusionment of the Wilsonian moment.” Erez Manela, the latest scholar to address this topic, rightly considered the rosy coverage of the Americans and U.S. policy in Egypt as an insufficient historical explanation.¹ His work built upon the works of others whose coverage of the United States in Egypt in the 1920s perpetuated the misconception that the United States subordinated its policy objective for the Middle East and Africa to Great Britain. Manela revealed a pattern of negative American influence in Egypt, which severely undercut the notion that the United States was on the sidelines during the 1920s.

Most history books address the importance of Egypt in terms of its ancient legacy, the British occupation and protectorate, and its strategic importance during the Cold War. The most discussed topic, the Suez Canal, was already a geo-political asset for Britain in the late 19th century, especially after the 1882 occupation. While the need for control of the Suez Canal was a constant from the 19th century until its nationalization during the Cold War, other issues were also important. In the 1920s legal, economic, and political issues in Egypt are salient to understanding the fluid international system as a whole. The decade after World War I was both

a decade of western collusion against Egyptian sovereignty and a decade of challenge to the British colonization of Egypt. The 1924 Egyptian Parliamentary agenda was the manifestation of a strategy to challenge the remaining obstructions to national sovereignty found in the reservation clauses of the 1922 British declaration of Egyptian independence and foreign intrusion.

While the “Wilsonian Moment,” (1918-1919) is crucial to understanding the events to follow, the Egyptian strategies of 1924-1930 were not limited or contained solely by this one paradigm. The explanation of events is even more complex, simultaneously going back further in history and also more deeply immersed in the contemporary historical context. A centuries old practice known as Capitulations and an Egyptian Capitulation reform strategy known as the Mixed Courts of Egypt placed heavy burdens on Egypt in the 1920s. United States’ national policy created tension with Britain, but also participated in the Capitulations systems. Since the United States opted not to participate directly in the new versions of colonialism following World War I, namely establishing League of Nations mandates, it was important to maintain mechanisms of influence in foreign nations. Just as the United States needed the “open door” to prevent fighting over extra-territorial rights in China, the United States needed to keep the “door open” in Egypt. However, because of the colonial presence of Great Britain, the only mechanism available to the United States was a reliance on extra-territorial rights. Because of the developments of the 1920s, this reliance shrank as a result of Egypt’s strategy evolved into a national development campaign which depended on the eradication of the Capitulations. In order to accomplish their national objectives, Egyptian political figures sought to align Egypt with international developments as they occurred in the 1920s in order to weaken the foreign control of their government. Despite the United States being a participant in the Capitulations

practice, Egypt saw opportunity in a new partnership with the United States. Egypt used bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements with the United States to weaken the colonial hold of Great Britain and at the same time exerted leverage on the international situation by being a part of the new world order envisioned by the United States near the end of the decade.

A new contextual understanding of the 1920s should stress the United States', Great Britain's and Egypt's national strategies not solely in bi-lateral terms, but would allow for a larger triangular perspective. This triangular relationship *amongst* the three nations has several implications. First, the triangular perspective elevates Egyptian 'nationalism' to the status of political and economic development to which the United States and Great Britain also focused their attention. Second, it reveals how the Egyptian strategy to incorporate itself into the new international framework was a successful step in trying to shed the burdens of the Capitulations and the remaining British colonial presence. Third, the triangular relationship is crucial to understanding the ambivalent views that the United States had toward the Capitulations and toward Egypt as a whole. Fourth, it is necessary to understand the relationship of the three nations because their policies are all nationalistic in the self serving sense, yet a kind of high stakes negotiation took place bi-laterally between the three nations, in which collusion was commonplace. Finally, this constructed relationship intertwines the major events of the decade and the events local to Egypt and paints a more comprehensive image of 1920s diplomacy.

The Impact of Woodrow Wilson on the Political Relations of Great Britain and Egypt

The Egyptians and many other colonized peoples were well aware of the promise that Wilson's conception of a new world order offered to nations in similar situations.² As Manela argued, the failure of Wilson and the United States to deliver on the political promises of "self-governance" and "consent of the governed" disillusioned the Egyptians such as Sa'd Zaghlul, the

leader of the nationalist *Wafd* party. Zaghlul possessed only a copy of Wilson's fourteen points when arrested by the British authorities for trying to take his grievances to the leaders of the world during the Paris Peace talks of 1919.³ The Egyptians, aspiring for independence from the British, refused to reconcile the hypocrisy of the basis of the new world order based on the consent of the governed.⁴ Zaghlul felt that the allowance of the British Protectorate to continue "violated the spirit of the age."⁵ As a result of the compounding infractions against Egypt, the Egyptian political leaders demonstrated a decreased willingness to seek a negotiated, gradual resolution with Britain within the context of Capitulations throughout the decade. Britain failed to appease the Egyptians despite the recommendations of the Milner Report of 1919 that Britain find a way to reconcile the aims of the Protectorate and the agenda of the *Wafd*.

In terms of American reaction to the developments in Egypt after the Wilsonian moment, U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Allen Dulles of the State Department's Near Eastern Division recommended that the U.S. ignore any petition or letter sent from the Egyptian nationalists, especially when violence was involved in their tactics.⁶ Yet the United States attempted to mitigate the political damage to America's reputation by attaching wording to their consent of the British Protectorate government over Egypt in 1919. The unfulfilling attempt read: "The President and the American people have every sympathy with the legitimate aspiration of the Egyptian people for a further measure of self-government but they view with regret any effort to obtain the realization thereof by a resort to violence."⁷ The political explanation for this statement is that Great Britain had urged the United States to support its endeavor and curb their inflammatory rhetoric of independence because it risked spreading fanaticism including the possibility of a "holy war against the infidels" according to a confidential memo sent by Arthur Balfour in April 1919 to the British Government.⁸ The fear of

extremism around the world (including the spread of Bolshevism) shaped a great deal of U.S. policy in the 1920s⁹.

Egypt faced many obstacles to national development long before the Wilsonian moment. The interference of foreign Powers in Egypt dated back centuries. Just a year prior to the “universal” call for self-determination, an American representative in Egypt noted that in Egypt is “anything of political interest is...of a purely domestic character.”¹⁰ Hampson Gary, the American Diplomatic Agent and Consul General in Cairo, reported that in the spring of 1918, “the abolition of the Capitulations is the chief subject of political interest in Egypt.”¹¹ Even Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes wrote in 1922 that official U.S. recognition of the British unilateral declaration of independence for Egypt was dependent on “the maintenance of the rights of the United States of America, as they hitherto existed.” He continued that his intention was “to leave no room for doubt of the maintenance of capitulatory and commercial rights and most favored nation treatment for the United States.”¹² In this intersection of domestic reform of centuries old agreements in an international system that prevented unilateral self remedy, the diplomatic episodes of the 1920s Egypt take on an even more complex meaning. Egypt framed their political arguments within a much larger discourse that included, but was not limited to, the disillusionment with Wilson and the West’s hypocrisy. In fact, as the 1920s progressed, discussion of Wilson disappeared and Egypt focused on other reform issues.

Manela’s recent scholarship addressed an earlier Egyptian nationalism, but described it as a proto-nationalism at most.¹³ Manela focuses on the terminology of “the nation” as a post World War I phenomenon for much of the colonized world. However, the Egyptian strategies first and foremost were anti-colonial going back to the 19th century. For instance, Husayn al-Marsafi’s (1881) *The Essay on Eight Words*, discusses the concept of “*umma*” i.e. community or

nation as his first of eight concepts. Al- Marsafi's work was one of many political writings of the 1860s and 1870s that "introduced new themes such as nationalism."¹⁴ As a result, the strategies of the 1920s fit within a larger post- colonial context that dates back at least until 1869 (Nubar Pasha's Mixed Courts) and not just the political developments of the "Wilsonian moment" and the attempted resolution of the First World War.

The Capitulations and the First Egyptian Reform Strategy: The Mixed Courts

The origins and opinions of the Capitulations are varied depending on the author's perception of the nature of empire and whether the Capitulations are considered rights versus privileges.¹⁵ Because of the traditionally large numbers of Europeans living in Egypt since the sixteenth century, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire made certain treaty agreements with individual European nations to insure a European standard of legal, economic, and political expectations for visitors. These extra-territorial privileges were called the "Capitulations." The agreements were not "imposed by superior force; they were privileges granted as a result of treaties freely negotiated between equals."¹⁶ A slightly different interpretation illustrated how much controversy would arise over the nature of these agreements. Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer) cited Van Dyck's work *Ottoman Capitulations*, which stated that Capitulations were "letters of privilege" or "sworn diplomas" and this semantic difference was important since the Ottomans seemingly would not have altruistically concluded treaties providing enumerable rights with European. The agreements were enticements, privileges, to encourage potential foreign property holders.¹⁷ The American Diplomatic Agent and Consul- General in Cairo in 1918, himself cited Lord Cromer, which is indicative of the largely paternalistic and self interested agendas of the foreign powers who benefited from the Capitulations. Cromer argued that the Egyptians had enough independence from the Ottoman Empire to arrange their own agreements

with the foreign Powers and thus modify those agreements. As a result, these agreements were not detrimental to Egypt in Cromer's opinion.¹⁸ Yet by the 1920s, the Egyptians had lost the ability to modify these diplomatic agreements unilaterally.

The original recipients of the special agreements were the merchants of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa.¹⁹ Later other European countries sought such treaty agreements in order "to confer upon European Christian communities such immunities from the *Shari a* Law, and autonomy in matters of personal status, as to enable them to live with reasonable freedom and convenience in the Ottoman dominions."²⁰ The Ottoman Empire benefited as well, for the Capitulations "encouraged westerners to invest in and do business in Ottoman territories."²¹ Over the centuries and into the nineteenth century, the Capitulations "began to take the form of a compulsory limitation on the legislative and executive powers of a state."²² The focus of the tension shifted from religious and cooperative functionality to commercial and property interest. In order to protect national business and proprietary interests in Egypt, "diplomatic pressure settled a case more often than the actual merits."²³ In 1869, Egyptian political leader Nubar Pasha, a minister in Sultan Ismail's Egyptian government, argued for a solution to this international problem.²⁴ His solution was the Mixed Courts of Egypt. The same year that Nubar argued for this new avenue of justice, the Suez Canal opened. The global importance of Suez, especially to Britain, added yet another layer to Egypt's problems.

Great Britain, Austria – Hungary, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and the United States attended a conference in 1869 in order to address the already existing concerns over the protection and enforcement of the Capitulatory rights and Nubar's concerns.²⁵ This court system would hypothetically remove the problems regarding foreigners, and by 1875 "onward, any European who had a claim either against an Egyptian or against the Egyptian Government, had

no longer been under the necessity of seeking diplomatic support.”²⁶ Nubar had two main reasons for desiring this institution. The first one had a direct connection to the then-held political belief justifying the presence of the Capitulations. Nubar saw in the Courts the possibility to show that “justice, especially economic justice was possible in Egypt.” If economic justice was possible in Egypt, then business and foreign investors would be safe, complacent, and productive. The second desire was to erect a “legal barrier between the population of Egypt and the capricious despotism of the Khedive.”²⁷ Most in Egypt viewed the Khedive as a puppet of the British not a servant of the Egyptians. This perception only exacerbated the underlying foundation of the economic and political battle in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The Egyptian nationalists of the post World-War I era would eventually find fault with the Mixed Court as a perpetuation of the Capitulations system of international relations. The Mixed Courts were viewed by many, before Egyptian objections arose, as a win for both Egypt and the rest of the world.²⁸

In the original composition of the Mixed Courts, three Courts of First Instance were situated at the locations of Cairo, Alexandria, and Mansourah. The Court of Appeal was located in Alexandria. Even during the initial stages, the composition of the court was a contested issue. The original agreement found that while Egyptian judges had to serve on all benches, “the real work was done by Europeans.”²⁹ Judges were important because it was not until 1889 that Egyptian parliament would create laws. The Mixed Courts, composed of a number of judges from fourteen Capitulatory countries, made the law in Egypt with no existing mechanism to override a ruling.³⁰ The Mixed Courts mainly ruled on civil and commercial matters. Despite Nubar Pasha’s original intention for the Courts to include criminal matters, criminal cases were decided in the consular courts of the defendants’ home country.

In 1873, the five-year trial period for the Mixed Courts, agreed to by all except France, did not bring about all of its intended consequences.³¹ The Mixed Courts actually “had provided a convenient channel” for diplomatic pressure instead of relieving it. Even in cases within the legal scope of the Court, political issues still arose. In fact, Khedive Ismail was overthrown in 1881 as part of the Colonel Arabi *coup d'état* and in part because Europe took him to the Mixed Courts over his outstanding debts.³² The verdict ordered him to pay, which caused domestic turmoil.³³ For Egypt, the Mixed Courts was an attempt to protect Egyptian national interests in the international arena, but the solution created a plague for Egyptian domestic politics.

Egypt: Pawn and Backdrop for International Relations

The use of the Mixed Courts had both immediate and long term implications for both Egypt and the international relations system. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Great Britain was the junior partner of France in dealing with Egypt.³⁴ Great Britain had little interest in anything besides an independent Egypt within the context of the Capitulations.³⁵ The contentious political problem was the enormous debt that the Egyptian Government owed to Britain as well as other countries. In 1876, Great Britain sent Stephen Cave to audit the Egyptian credit situation. Cave attempted to alleviate concerns, yet the rest of Europe did not sit quietly as they saw Great Britain slowly assuming control of Egyptian finances.³⁶ For instance, Germany had threatened first to use the Mixed Courts in order to regain the money owed to it. If the courts did not advance German economic interests, other more drastic measures might follow.³⁷

Britain tried to convince France to leave Egypt once Ismail was no longer in power, but the French did not agree.³⁸ Following another commission to readjust Egypt's payment of credit, the tension with Egypt continued.³⁹ The British and French debated their course of action. Anglo - French Dual Control, without an actual occupation, was still the preferred policy of

choice in 1881. Neither country sought Dual Occupation as a policy at this time. Some form of “an accommodation with one of the Egyptian nationalist groups... seemed the most immediately promising.”⁴⁰

The conflicting perspectives of the British and French foreign secretaries brought even more tension to the equation during the fall of 1881. The French Foreign Minister Leon M. Gambetta and Britain’s Foreign Secretary Lord Granville had opposite positions on how to handle the Egyptian situation. Gambetta wanted to scare the Egyptian army and nobles into shape; whereas, Granville felt that they should “let things dawdle.” Gambetta’s plan had “destroyed any possibility of co – operation with moderate Egyptian nationalism.”⁴¹ Instead of uniting the army and nobles with Great Britain and France, as Gambetta had hoped, the two Egyptian groups joined ranks with the growing religious extremist movements of the day. The new coalition opposed any sort of European intervention, no matter what the intention.⁴²

The extent of the new situation in Egypt was not merely a financial credit adjustment. The political crisis had developed in a way that now “jeopardiz[ed] the lives of Europeans residents” in Egypt. Accordingly, the British and French sought a solution that “extricated themselves from the situation in which M. Gambetta’s precipitancy had placed them.”⁴³ The Dual Control of France and Great Britain ended when France’s domestic politics moved them closer to Lord Granville’s previous position. Contrary to the French move and Lord Granville’s position, the British assumed a much more aggressive role. The British involved themselves directly in Egyptian domestic politics by overthrowing the nationalistic government in 1882 run by Colonel Ahmed Pasha Arabi and trying to replace the Khedive, the ruler they had supported before Arabi’s seizure of power. Following the British military occupation of Egypt in 1882 and the *Entente Cordiale* with France in 1904, Britain assumed sole control of Egypt.⁴⁴

This new situation still posed foreign policy problems for Great Britain because its main focus was still “maintaining the balance of power in Europe.” Great Britain viewed their Egyptian entanglement as a “nuisance” and a “distraction from European affairs on which her traditional foreign policy was based.”⁴⁵ Nevertheless, Britain rejected a French proposal to restore Dual Control. In retaliation, France announced defiantly that she would “resume its liberty of action in Egypt.” This defiance “amounted to an unrelenting and unreasoning hostility to Great Britain in Egypt which was persisted in every method short of war for a period of twenty years.”⁴⁶ Following the *Entente Cordiale*, the Capitulations dominated foreign policy decisions concerning Egypt for both Egypt and the rest of the Powers. This was the last open door for the Great Powers besides Britain to operate in Egypt.⁴⁷ Great Britain’s policy evolved into its second phase when Great Britain declared Egypt a Protectorate, claiming to have special ties to Egypt.

The British Protectorate of Egypt began in 1914. The relationship was symbiotic in the eyes of the British economic interests which sought to protect Egypt’s cotton markets and the Suez from Turkish threats.⁴⁸ While the Egyptian constitutionalist party was against the Khedive, they felt that it would be detrimental to force or ask the British to leave because of the looming Turkish threat, which materialized on November 6, 1914, when Turkey and Great Britain declared war on each other. As World War I increased the usual importance of the Suez Canal, the “imperial lifeline to India,”⁴⁹ Great Britain “would take upon herself the whole burden of the defense of Egypt.”⁵⁰ Because of the “self imposed mission” to protect Egyptian and therefore British interests, total independence was not an option that Britain could offer Egypt.⁵¹

In 1917, as Ahmed Fuad had begun his rule as Sultan, the British domestic political situation was tenuous. Britain considered tightening their control of Egypt; however, they could

not do it because of resulting outcry from the nationalists.⁵² The tension existed not only in Great Britain, but also the rest of Europe, which reacted negatively to a British commission calling for judicial and capitulation reform.⁵³ This tension was notable also in Egypt, where, in March of 1917, the Egyptian Council of Ministers appointed a Capitulations Commission to consider reforming the system.

The effect of the “Wilsonian moment” on Egypt’s political situation resulted in much more than disillusionment. It also created a chasm in Egyptian politics from the British and American perspective. Isolated as the “extremist nationalists” Zaghlul and the *Wafd*, the political party arising out of his attempted delegation to the Paris Peace talks, received no respect from the West. This split created a new bargaining partner for the British. Egyptian political figures such as the newly elected post war Prime Minister Mohamed Said Pasha were not associated with the “extremism” of Zaghlul. They were viewed as being more “moderate” and as possessing a sense of “tact and moral courage.” The more conservative Egyptians,

while desiring an *Egypt for Egyptians* as sincerely as their more radical compatriots, realized that such a thing is impossible at this time, and so they have simply held out for an elective Parliament and a responsible Ministry, and for the proposition that a larger number of higher government posts be given to Egyptians [italics mine for emphasis].⁵⁴

In light of the Milner Report, it was with this part of the Egyptian political elite that Great Britain sought to minimize the costs of maintaining a minimal yet effective hold on Egypt.

The culmination of this appeasement strategy was the 1922 unilateral declaration of Egyptian independence. Great Britain retained four important reservations that hindered actual Egypt sovereignty. The reservations concerned British control of the Suez Canal, Egyptian defense and foreign policy, the Sudan, and the continuance of the Capitulations. Egyptian Parliament drafted a constitution in 1923 to begin their quest for self governance, yet the

government dissolved often. Tensions between Britain and Egypt reached a boiling point after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack in 1924. In this context, Egypt initiated a new strategy to address the obstacles to independence.⁵⁵

The 1924 Reform Strategy of the Egyptian Parliament⁵⁶

In 1924, in the first session of Egypt's Parliament outlined its agenda for reforming and improving Egypt.⁵⁷ The most pertinent features on the agenda were the general revision of law and policy governing Parliament, enabling it to act more effectively, the "overhauling of the fiscal system" to ensure a more equitable tax system, Egypt's entry into the League of Nations, and complete independence for Egypt and the Sudan.⁵⁸ By the end of July, the attempt to raise import duty 15% and improve the fiscal system had failed.⁵⁹ The international Capitulatory cartel stood in the way of Egypt altering their own tax system. The Egyptians had made some bold political moves in the session. Parliament decided that it would no longer pay for the British military presence, which indicated that acceptance of the British military was over. If Great Britain had to pay for its presence, then it no longer could use the claim that Egypt welcomed the British military establishment. Another decision with implications for British policy was the Egyptian Parliament's decision not to pay the interest on the loans incurred during the period of Ottoman rule. It decided that instead the money was to be "deposited in the national bank of Egypt until the question is settled by negotiation."⁶⁰ The notion that Egypt in the post-Ottoman, post Dual-Occupation, and post- British Protectorate, period was responsible for the loans was rejected. Also, the contested interest payments would accumulate interest for Egypt rather than Britain.

In January 1924, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes revealed the strain as well as the potential of American foreign policy concerning Egypt. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Hughes noted

The new spirit of the Near East must be met sympathetically, not by arms, not by attempts at dictatorship or by meddlesome intervention, but by candor, directness, and just appreciation of nationalistic aims and by a firm but friendly insistence upon the discharge of those international obligations, the recognition of which affords the only satisfactory basis for the intercourse of nations. In this way the Orient and the Occident may find ground for cooperation and the maintenance of peace sustained by the reciprocal advantages of cultural relations.⁶¹

In other words, Hughes' foreign policy objectives both challenged Great Britain's traditional foreign policy and yet simultaneously sought the assurances of Capitulations to protect and enhance U.S. interests in the region through reciprocal agreements. Until the potential onset of these new reciprocal relationships, international relations was still dependent on the currency of extra-territorial rights, especially for the United States which had a less formal experience with colonialism in the Near East. At the same time that his policy was grounded in the traditional Western Orientalism, the possibility for a new *modus operandi* in international relations seemed very real because of the concept of reciprocal treatment and the international reputation of the Secretary. Hughes had gained political clout following his impressive showing at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 in which he proposed a new agreement concerning naval arms limitations that would balance the naval conflict between the Powers and recognize the rising influence of the United States in the international system.⁶²

Economic Strategies for Capitulation Reform

In the late summer and fall of 1924, one of the economic concerns Egypt faced was the international consensus regarding Egypt's responsibility to repay three loans taken during the Ottoman era of Egypt in 1855, 1891, and 1894. These loans were assumed by the British

following the outbreak of World War I; however, it is important to note that the British had occupied Egypt since 1882.⁶³ The British Foreign Office viewed it as just another ploy by the nationalists to evade paying legal obligations. The United States used similar rhetoric as the British in terms of labeling Egyptians that felt it necessary to repay the loans as “responsible” or “moderate” as opposed to the “extremists” of the *Wafd* party, which often demanded complete and immediate independence and rejection of the loans.⁶⁴ The United States’ counselor in the London embassy, F.A. Sterling, agreed that “all three loans represent[ed] simply a small part of the Ottoman Debt which was taken over by Egypt and for which Egypt is both morally and legally responsible.” Sterling cited as evidence the fact that “responsible” Egyptian businessmen think the loans should be repaid in order to avoid having future financial credit problems.⁶⁵

Unlike the Capitulatory powers, Zaghlul Pasha questioned Egypt’s liability for these loans.⁶⁶ Zaghlul argued that “when Egypt went to war against Turkey [in World War I], the tribute ceased and with it the power of delegation and the debt itself.” He continued that Egypt had not defaulted because “Egypt had given neither promise nor guarantee to the bondholders” and had paid “with regularity the interest on all debts she had acknowledged.” Howell interpreted the implications of Zaghlul’s remarks to mean that “if there are any guarantors of the bonds, [they] are the British and French Governments and not the Egyptian Government.”⁶⁷

As a result of the Parliamentary suspension of payments already discussed, bondholders sued Egypt and took the case to the Mixed Courts.⁶⁸ British policy had not changed since July 1924 when it had rejected the claim that Egypt was not responsible for the loans. The United States response was dismissive in nature and the U.S. diplomatic correspondence described the Egyptian Parliament as being “confused,” in order to discredit their motives and abilities. This analysis strikingly applies to Timothy Mitchell’s concept of colonization which applied

Foucault's concepts of power through control of space and order. In Mitchell's work and in the 1924 correspondence, the perceived 'dis'order of the Orient was contrasted with the order of the West.⁶⁹

If there was any doubt about the possibility of justice for Egypt in the Mixed Courts, the Court's decision to side with the bondholders' claims eliminated it.⁷⁰ Already in 1924 the Mixed Courts came under fire from the Egyptians. The Egyptian legation situated in London demanded that the issue should be resolved at the International Court at The Hague.⁷¹ This was a maneuver by the Egyptians to create a new venue of justice. The current venue, the Mixed Courts, was the favored old colonial venue for the British to discuss this matter. The Court no longer provided Egyptians with any assurances of a fair hearing. How could a court maintained and infiltrated by capitulatory abuses provide the setting for a hearing on the illegality of loans incurred under colonial rule and the threats of debt offered by the Capitulatory Powers? The Egyptians for this reason needed to find recourse outside the Mixed Courts of Egypt. This change of venue had implications for United States–Egyptian relations later in the decade as well.

Egyptian political leaders had many financial strategies to improve their political situation and lurking in the background of every idea and plan for advancement was the baggage of the Capitulations. One such political figure is Sidky Pasha, former minister of finance and twice elected Minister of the Interior. He argued in March 1926 before the Mixed Courts Bar in Cairo that despite the budget surplus, which was viewed in favorable terms by foreign governments and investors, Egypt, in fact, needed to secure more funding. The time had come for Egyptians to build a better infrastructure for themselves, including irrigation projects, health care, communications, and transportation. Sidky foresaw economic decline, if the necessary measures were not taken. According to J. Morton Howell, the Envoy Extraordinary Minister

Plenipotenary to Egypt, “his speech is significant as to what is desired along these lines indicated by all, or nearly all of Egypt’s leading politicians.”⁷² The majority of the tax revenue came from land, building, cotton export taxes, and customs. However, for the most part, local taxes accounted for much of the national revenue, which accounted for the shortfall in Sidky’s opinion. One of the reasons explaining the shortfall was that the commercial class was often not taxed. Many foreigners in Egypt belonged to this economic class.⁷³

Sidky framed the needed increase in tax revenue debate within the Capitulations discourse. Instead of focusing on how Capitulations were the root of the future Egyptian financial crisis, he used the concept of the Capitulations, which were so often invoked by foreign Powers, to Egypt’s advantage. He argued that the burden of the taxation should fall not just on the poor agricultural classes, but “should rest equally on foreigners and Egyptians alike.” This was the original purpose for the Capitulations, to protect against unfair and unequal treatment of foreigners living in Egypt (e.g. poll taxes for people not permanently residing in Egypt), so Sidky argued the principal should work in reverse as well. He even went as far as to say that just as the foreign Powers had agreed in the Declaration of London March 17, 1880 amongst themselves to ensure “equity of their nationals in Egypt,” this same equity should have applied to a “manifestly unfair” tax system that hindered the growing needs of Egypt.

In addition to framing the debate in terms of the Capitulations, Sidky took the issue a step farther. He viewed Capitulations as instances when former Egyptian governments placated foreigners “instead of standing on matters of principle” and an incompatible burden on Egypt’s political progress. Sidky based his strongest argument for the abolition of Capitulations not only on a sense of injustice, but also in the contemporaneous international situation.⁷⁴ The Treaty of Lausanne of 1922-23 both revised the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and ended the practice of the

Capitulations in Turkey. He felt the abolishment of the practice in Turkey should also apply to Egypt.

Later in 1926, Allan Dulles of the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs Division wrote a memo detailing a conversation with Egyptian Foreign Minister Samy Pasha. Samy's strategy was similar to Sidky's because he also felt that after the abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey, the same should happen in Egypt. However, Samy added another layer to his strategy. He appealed to the United States arguing that because of rampant tax evasion and the lack of income taxes a new system was needed. The new system had to be based on the abolition of *extraterritorial rights* and the creation of a new more equitable system. Samy Pasha appealed to the United States to be a leader and be the first to renounce the capitulations system which in Samy's opinion, would have forced the other nations to do the same. This appeal to the U.S. to be a leader in the international system was difficult. While Dulles discussed the possibility of modification of the broken tax system, the opinions of the other Powers would have to be considered before the U.S. acted.⁷⁵ The United States would not be a leader in a cause to renounce the only measures that maintain its access to Egypt for the sake of the Egyptian cause. While the state of international relations was in flux in the 1920s, the United States was fighting to maintain its open door policy in the face of exclusionary European politics. Yet it was unwilling to challenge the foundation of the old colonial system that handicapped the national development strategies of not only Egypt but the United States as well.

As a result of the failed attempts at rejecting the Ottoman loans and not completely successful attempt at raising revenue through other tax plans, the Egyptian government rejected the advice of the foreign financial advisors in the Egyptian Ministry of Finance to push the publication of the budget back until June 1, 1927. The Egyptian government set the date for the

first of May. While this might seem a ‘tit for tat’ strategy, the political move is more relevant when placed in its proper context as:

*An indication of the determined and steady trend of Egyptian politics toward freedom from foreign influences. This tendency is shown in the disregard of advice and warnings given by foreign advisors and foreign government employees who are subjected to sarcastic and at times, disrespectful treatment [Italics mine for emphasis].*⁷⁶

The likelihood political compromise had diminished as “the agitation for the complete abolition of the capitulations was on in campaign form.” Most likely the proposed policy of closing national consular courts in favor of a shift to the Mixed Courts was no longer acceptable to the Egyptians. The political perception relayed to Washington from Cairo was that “privileges [capitulations] and immunities are withheld more readily than extended.”⁷⁷

Another Egyptian fiscal reform maneuver that alarmed foreign nations involved collecting taxes from foreigners. In a move that characterizes much of the American diplomacy of the 1920s, Secretary of State Henry Stimson contacted his American representatives in Egypt in 1929 to inform them the U.S. would agree to pay the *Ghaffir* tax when other countries agreed to do so.⁷⁸ The tax issue, previously raised in 1923, was an Egyptian attempt to reform their tax laws and secure funding for public works by extending the mandatory requirements for paying the *Ghaffir* tax to foreigners living in Egypt. In essence, it was a public safety tax. The funds would pay for an Egyptian security force. The foreign nations had always counted on free riding the British military occupation of Egypt as their source of safety. Now Egypt sought the ability to offer security to individuals and businesses with proper funding. U.S. Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes in addition to citing international laws and protocols from the thirteenth century also cited the Real Estate Protocol of 1874 between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire. Hughes claimed that this agreement did in fact allow for the collection of a property tax from

American citizens, but the proposed extension of the tax was actually an extra tax on tenants and dwellers, exceeding the usual domain of property owners in Egypt. In addition to challenging the legal principles of the tax, Hughes also challenged the collection and distribution methods of the tax.⁷⁹

Unlike the Vacuum Oil company, which often appealed to the State Department to protect its interests, utilizing capitulatory objections to paying the tax all together, J. Morton Howell shared a different view of American responsibilities in paying the tax.⁸⁰ While Howell did not necessarily think that it was the Americans “moral duty” to pay the tax as the Egyptian prime minister did, Howell advised Americans in Egypt to pay the tax if at all possible. If they felt the need to pay it under protest or with the caveat that if the Mixed Courts returned a verdict prohibiting the collection of the tax, the American payers would be justly compensated.⁸¹

Eventually, Vacuum Oil communicated their views to the U.S. Government as having

No objection, in principle, to paying at a *reasonable rate* for actual service rendered. In the case of the Ghaffir tax, we feel there is *no assurance* whatsoever of service adequate to justify the payment of the tax, on any basis, and we should in all probability be forced to maintain, as at present, *our own force of guardians*. However, assuming the situation so develops that payment of this tax becomes obligatory; it would appear that the present basis proposed for assessment is not *immoderate* [Italics mine for emphasis].⁸²

This assessment by the only American oil company operating in Egypt at the time revealed the essence of the strange post-colonial issues that faced Egypt in the 1920s. Once again, the labels of “reasonable” and “moderate” play an important rhetorical role in identifying how the failures of the United States to support the nationalism of Egypt went far beyond that of the “Wilsonian Moment.” As the United States government participated in the rhetoric of Orientalism, so did its national economic interests. The key element of the passage is the concept of “assurance.” At its core meaning, this is the root of the Capitulations and all the baggage that came afterwards.

The foreign powers needed a mechanism to protect their own foreign policy in the fluid nature of the international framework in the 1920s. This search for a mechanism to protect national interests is the same goal of the strategies of Egypt, Britain, and the United States.

However, the Egyptian economic reforms had not completely isolated the United States. In 1926 after the Parliamentary agenda was in full swing, the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce and King Fuad signed into law a reduction in the cotton tax enacted in 1920 under the control of British imperial trade policy. The cotton tax was reduced to twenty piastres from twenty-five in 1922 and thirty-five in 1920. This political-economic, diplomatic move fit rather nicely into the new economic order sought by Herbert Hoover, serving as Secretary of Commerce from 1921-27. International trade was the foundation of Hoover's new world order and government controls on foreign raw materials raised flags at Hoover's department. While the United States pursued the "Open Door" in terms of oil, archaeology, and politics, the traditional economic interests are also important for the triangular relationship of the three countries. While, Herbert Hoover and his assistant Julius Klein, created information agencies around the globe to facilitate better trade relationships and business opportunities, the United States also won the battle that began at the Genoa Conference in 1922 about what the new gold standard would be. The British lost their position as the leading world's creditor in mid-decade, as most of the world switched to the system backed by the United States. It was no coincidence that the new economic order that challenged the more nationalistic trade barriers before 1919 took effect simultaneously with the Egyptian strategy.⁸³

Legal Reform Strategies

The proposed revision of the Mixed Courts was in and of itself already a strategy to reform an institution which main purpose was to reform the Capitulations agreements, relics

from the days that the Ottoman Empire ruled Egypt. The matters of concern pertained to the sale of narcotics, white slave trade, trade fraud, the number of judges on the courts, the possibility for Egyptians to become the President and Vice President of Mixed Courts, and the possibility for Egypt to give awards to judges on the Mixed Courts for their service.⁸⁴ The reasons for the change in the number and nationality of judges is better understood after reviewing the triangular diplomatic dance of the United States, Great Britain, and Egypt involving the Mixed Courts in the 1920s.

Reforming the Mixed Courts was not solely in the interests of the Egyptians. Already in February of 1921, Great Britain wrote to the United States that the British were seeking to modify the privileges to “protect the country” in hopes of appeasing the Egyptian nationalists.⁸⁵ While the memo referred to protecting the country of Egypt, if the reference is put into a historical and diplomatic context, “protecting the country” also meant protecting Great Britain. The framework of the proposed arrangement created the context within which foreign nations sought justice in Egypt.

The specifics were that Great Britain, still then the protectorate power, wanted every nation to close its consular courts. The controversy between the United States and Great Britain was the foundation of diplomatic maneuverings to come. Without damaging national interests, Great Britain could only soothe the Egyptian nationals’ complaints after other countries in Egypt closed their consular courts, in order to maintain their self appointed special relationship with Egypt.⁸⁶ If the United States closed its courts, then at least Britain would not have to worry about being the only nation to lose power due to the nationalist movement in Egypt. Along with these closures, the British initially sought to “reorganize and extend the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals and the application to all foreigners in Egypt of the legislation enacted by the Egyptian

legislature.”⁸⁷ The British promised both no discriminatory policies *vis-à-vis* the United States and the transfer of authority to the Egyptians with the *quid pro quo* of the closure of all foreign consular courts.⁸⁸ The United States responded in July 1921, to a telegram from 1920, about this issue.⁸⁹ The United States did not wish to possess privileges that were detrimental to Egypt. This self-denying statement had a caveat attached to it, on the British proposal to end the consular courts. The Americans had concerns about the British selecting the consular courts as the mechanism to achieve their goals. The Americans sought some sort of assurance concerning the type of government and the type of justice that would exist in Egypt once the American consular courts ceased to function. The U.S. Secretary of State’s Charles Evans Hughes response was legal in nature and sought to frame the discussion in terms of American justice.

Citing an Act of Congress from 1874, the United States could and would close their consular courts when American justice was available in a venue that could protect American interests.⁹⁰ Charles Hughes also wrote that his country possessed treaties with both the Ottomans and Egypt and only bilateral negotiations with Egypt could have affected them in any way. One of the most important points on the British proposal was that “any renunciation of rights and privileges... would in effect be made in favor of Egypt,” not Great Britain.⁹¹ The United States was not going to negotiate through Great Britain about American rights and privileges. The U.S. sought to deal directly with Egypt. In 1921, the United States demanded “most favorable nation status” for trade and diplomatic standing.⁹² This demand carried the potential to diminish Britain’s status, for the British had already promised the Americans equal treatment to Great Britain. Yet Great Britain, while Britain could offer a similar status and treatment, it could in fact not agree to the status of America as a most favored nation because that status would undermine the vision that Britain had of itself as a protectorate power.⁹³

While the Americans maintained objections, they stated that shifting to the Mixed Courts away from the consular courts as a *modus operandi* “would probably not be objectionable.”⁹⁴ Great Britain and the United States also demonstrated an ability to agree on other international issues such as American schools in Egypt. While the United States had softened its position on the abolition of the consular courts, it demanded more information about this new system that Britain wanted to establish in Egypt, and it wanted the information shared with other countries to prevent misunderstandings.⁹⁵ While seemingly an innocent request, this sort of sharing of information and decision making influence could discretely steal power away from Great Britain.

Within this larger context of international support for the Mixed Courts amidst diplomatic maneuvering over legal and political overtures, a smaller battle took place in 1921. That battle involved the replacement of retired Judge Somerville Tuck. The United States was reminded that it could nominate a successor to the retired American judge. Two nominees were put forth, yet both were rejected for seemingly unknown reasons. Pierre Crabitès and Ellery Stowell both possessed the necessary skills. Crabitès was then serving on the District Court in Cairo and Stowell was well trained according to Hughes. Hughes wrote to the British Ambassador in a tone conveying disbelief. His agitation was evident in his finding that earlier, in 1919, the British had approved a man named Philip Marshall Brown to be a possible successor to Judge Tuck. Mr. Brown had no legal training and possessed none of the desirable attributes of the rejected judges.⁹⁶ The eventual acceptance of another nominee for the Court of Appeals, Jasper Yeats Brinton, allowed the U.S. to agree to a continuation of the Mixed Courts with American representation protected.⁹⁷

The restoration of the number of American judges was an important diplomatic episode. It allowed the United States to agree to the continuation of the Courts, but also because in 1921,

Great Britain had added two more British judges to the Court of Appeals and one to the District Court. The country with the closest number of judges was Italy with five, two less than Britain's seven. France, Belgium, the United States, and Greece all had four positions.⁹⁸ In the larger context, the political elements of this particular drama are representative of the tension between Britain and the United States in the 1920s concerning the gold standard, rubber, and naval arms. Contrary to Jasper Y. Brinton's claims about the non-political motives amongst the nations concerning the promotion of judges, the denial of Crabitès as worthy and capable of a promotion to the Court of Appeals appeared to be nothing but political.⁹⁹ In March 1921, Crabitès had already earned a reputation as the American judge who had ruled in favor of expanding the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to include cases of public domain. His public domain ruling allowed the opening the tomb of King *Tutankhamen* in the interest of "science and civilization" over any claims of national rights of the Egyptians. The Egyptians later blamed an accident that caused Crabitès to have one of his legs amputated on the curse of King Tut.¹⁰⁰ This animosity over the ruling could have easily contributed to the unwillingness to promote him to the Court of Appeals, especially in the context of the British appeasement of Egyptian nationalism.

As was the case with the Ghaffir tax, the Egyptian Government began to flex its muscles in other areas of international interest. Another pressing issue for the U.S. State Department was the Metropolitan Museum of Art's claim to the promised fifty percent of the artifacts recovered from all excavations, a custom since the 1912 Egyptian law that granted the rights to the American archaeologists. The archaeologists petitioned the State Department for assistance, because without the guaranteed returns from the digs, they would no longer be able to excavate the sites.¹⁰¹ Hughes instructed Howell to gauge what Britain's, France's, and Italy's opinions were on the expiration of the 1912 law that affected them as well. Strangely enough, Howell

was not instructed to speak with the Egyptian authorities on the matter. His instructions were to build a coalition, and if the coalition was not possible or if the other powers had already independently sought remedies, Howell was to contact Hughes before making another move. Hughes wanted to be forceful with the Egyptians in the negotiations.¹⁰² He felt that the Egyptians should take the assistance of the needed foreign archaeologists, on the archaeologists' terms, or lose them all together. British high society and diplomats were already underway in their opposition to any changes in the status quo. Both the United States and Great Britain opposed the idea of granting Egypt ownership and distribution rights of all unearthed materials.¹⁰³ The opposition led to a one-year continuance of the 1912 law because a long-term agreement was then impossible.

Nearing the completion of this moratorium, the talks resumed. The discussion among the American diplomats focused primarily on the timing of the talks in conjunction with an appeal in the Mixed Courts involving King Tut archaeologist Howard Carter. The issue was the legality of Crabitès' public domain ruling that led to the unearthing of King Tut's Tomb.¹⁰⁴ The Metropolitan Museum conducted the substantive diplomacy with Egyptian authorities. The bottom line of their argument was that in order to finance not only the excavating trips, but also the exhibits back home, certain assurances were needed to make their excavations profitable.¹⁰⁵ Egypt did not want to be restricted legally with a fifty percent guarantee. The Egyptians wanted to have first choice in any objects found in order to complete collections and to have the primary collection in their own country. Only after their own needs were met would Egypt distribute the artifacts.¹⁰⁶ The British and American shared interests in protecting the foreign archaeologists forged a temporary alliance against the actions of a determined Egyptian nationalist movement.¹⁰⁷ Business interests and institutional involvement initiated both the British and

American presence in Egypt and likewise, the corresponding diplomatic pressure to protect those interests. The US seemed content as long as its interests were protected, whether through diplomatic channels or the mixed court.

As the new regulations concerning archaeological excavations went into effect under protest in the Mixed Courts, the conflict between the foreign archaeologists and the Egyptians continued into 1926.¹⁰⁸ The new Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, communicated the proposed plan of action to Howell in Egypt. Howell was to discuss confidentially the matter with the British and French Foreign Offices. Kellogg had composed a proposal for the Egyptians to consider. The proposal was a fine example of salesmanship. The mechanism that Kellogg suggested was that the Egyptians complete their own collections first and then offer equivalent pieces to participating American excavators. Kellogg focused on trying to convince the Egyptian officials that most of the archaeological contributions in the past twenty-five years have been made possible through the assistance of American institutions. He continued that the relationship was beneficial to both countries. American universities and museums were enriched both culturally and financially. These exhibits also led to an increase in tourism for Egypt. Kellogg explained that what made foreign excavators and institutions nervous was that the assurances of receiving compensation for their work disappeared with the enforcement of the 1912 law. The United States understood the need to lower the percentage, but some sort of objective assurance was needed.¹⁰⁹

The British would not support Kellogg's proposal until Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, was convinced by the French who were also worried about their investments in Egypt and the rise of the United States.¹¹⁰ Eventually various American institutions, as the diplomatic ordeal continued, reached an agreement with the Egyptian government. The

American legation of experts and archaeologists in Egypt had reached verbal agreements with the Egyptian government, but the American institutions, including museums, called for the U.S. to intervene to assure that their goals would be met.¹¹¹ The American Minister in Egypt attempted to get the Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister to insert legal language that would insure that the American archaeologists and institutions would profit from their work. Despite the Egyptian Minister's deletion of most of the assurances sought by the Americans, within two months the American legation informed the Secretary of State that the legation had decided to "accept the Egyptian Government's assurances of liberal intentions," even without the legal guarantees.¹¹² Following the Mixed Courts' ruling that Egypt had the right to determine their own laws regarding antiquities, the "liberal" offer was the best offer available. A much different ruling was possible if Judge Crabitès had been promoted to the same Court and heard the appeals case stemming from his ruling.

The distribution formula of archaeological finds was not the only issue resolved in 1926. A source of contention between the United States and Great Britain since 1920 was the conviction of a British citizen by an American Consul at Alexandria. Great Britain's objection from 1920 remained the same in 1926. The British contention was that the United States had no authority to try any British national in an American consular court. The Americans argued case precedent, which established a long standing tradition of treating foreign nationals who willingly sought refuge aboard an American ship as part of the crew. As a result, these foreign nationals were also subject to the laws that govern that ship. The British viewed this American international jurisprudence as "unjustifiable," an "error on the part of local United States Authorities." Most importantly, that it was imperative to "prevent reoccurrence."¹¹³ The magnitude of this diplomatic encounter would not register on most scales, if not for the six years

of legal arguments between the United States and Great Britain since the British sailor's prison term was only fourteen days.¹¹⁴

The entirety of the diplomatic spat entailed the unacceptability of the method of justice by the United States to Great Britain. The consular courts traditionally tried cases involving only the same nationality, yet the United States argued that the sailor was part of the crew of an American flagged vessel and under U.S. law. If this premise was accepted, then the American consul was allowed to handle criminal cases with penalties less than a hundred dollars and less than sixty-day jail terms.¹¹⁵ According to American law, the verdict was final in these circumstances. In 1860, Congress passed a law stating that United States consuls were to be regarded and held to the standards of a judicial officer. Britain, as with every other country, followed its own guidelines for conducting consular courts. A network of local and provincial British courts was under a supreme consular court that empanelled a six-person jury.

While the objection to the conviction of the sailor was but a microcosm of the larger debate about the role of the judicial system and foreign political influence in Egypt, this relatively larger debate between Great Britain and the United States about justice and political influence revealed their political motives about Egypt. Though independent, the only function Egypt served in the whole exchange was serving as a host site for the consular courts. The United States' Secretary of State argued that the imprisoned sailor "owe[d] for that time to the country to which the ship on which he is serving belongs, a temporary allegiance, and must be held to all its responsibilities."¹¹⁶ Britain's objections, placed in a larger context, revealed that it sought to maximize its political position in Egypt by utilizing this particular case as a basis for demanding the closure of all American consular courts that could jeopardize British foreign policy objectives. Not surprisingly, neither country drew the rather ironic parallel between the

sailor's "temporary allegiance" and the disregard for Egyptian sovereignty that both the United States and Great Britain exercised in conducting their consular justice and demand for the Capitulations on Egyptian soil.

From 1926, through the beginning of 1927, the United States and Egypt bantered back and forth about reform of the Mixed Courts and proportional American representation in the Courts. The Egyptians maintained that they had always reserved the right to choose their own judges.¹¹⁷ The United States grew more demanding in their need to be recognized as the world power they had become.¹¹⁸ Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, steered the U.S.'s diplomacy down a historical path that was similar to that of the British. Kellogg argued about proportional representation and refused to consent immediately to Egyptian proposals to strengthen or merely to relocate their own institutions. He and American businesses in Egypt directly challenged Egyptian civil authorities. The United States and American companies argued that Egypt had a double standard for petroleum storage by allowing Greek companies to use illegal and unsafe storage barges. The main motivation for involvement of the United States' government was that American companies were paying extra fees for the stipulations laid out by the Egyptian Parliament.¹¹⁹ The objection was that special privileges given to Greek companies could not be tolerated.¹²⁰ The irony of the parallels to the Capitulations was seemingly lost on the Americans arguing the case.

The proposed changes to the Mixed Courts drew many international responses. Lord George Lloyd, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, refused to acknowledge any aspects of the proposal until the anti-British public relations campaign stopped in the newspapers. Lloyd felt that instead of airing their grievances in public, the reforms should be circulated in private among the Powers.¹²¹ Regarding the particulars of the Egyptian proposal, extending the

jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to include criminal matters concerned Lloyd. Britain saw no reason why the President or Vice President could not be Egyptian; however, the position did not have to be necessarily Egyptian. Also, Great Britain demanded one of the foreign seats if the number of judges was reduced or a new chamber created.¹²² Much in the same manner as Britain, Italy and France had serious concerns about the reforms, and unless they were rewarded with the potentially scarce judicial seats, they refused to reduce the number of judges. As North Winship of the State Department's Division of Near Eastern Affairs noted in his memo, if Italy and France were to get seats in a general reduction of total judgeships, that would inevitably lead to strife amongst the Powers about the proportionality of representation and capitulatory rights.¹²³

The response of the United States to the Egyptian proposal was similar to that of Great Britain. Franklin Mott Gunther, the American minister to Cairo, informed the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hafez Afifi Bey, that as long as the extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts was applicable to U.S. law and previous agreements between the two nations, that the proposal was acceptable. The United States positioned its support of the creation of a new chamber as *quid pro quo* for one of those seats going to an American judge. The foundation of the United States argument was that the positions on a proposed new chamber should be decided on a "principle of equality." It is of interest that this concept of 'equality' was the foundation of both the arguments for the continuation of the Capitulations by the foreign powers and by the Egyptians calling for an end to the extra-territorial privileges. While the Egyptians had proposed the creation of a new chamber of judges, both the United States and Great Britain increased the acceptable minimum number of judges to five in their respective correspondence with Egypt in order to increase their odds against Egyptian nationalism.¹²⁴

Along with the “principle of equality”, the United States had another issue with the selection of judges that had pestered the United States the entire previous decade. Gunther notified the State Department that he had deleted the last line of text from the message for the Egyptian Minister. The deleted line read: “It is felt that outstanding judicial ability should be the sole criterion upon which election to these offices should be based.” He responded to Washington that judicial ability “does not represent the principle traditionally followed by the Mixed Court judiciary in the conduct of elections” and for this reason, the line that he omitted was “unrealistic.” Traditionally seniority played a much larger role in the election and promotion of judges on those Courts.¹²⁵ This was the very same issue that plagued the United States during the Judge Pierre Crabitès’ controversy earlier in the decade. The United States wanted to keep pace with the other Powers and definitely resorted to playing the Capitulations card when needed. However, if the United States could have had judges serving on the Mixed Courts based on judicial ability as opposed to qualifications based on the Capitulations, national interests on many different levels would have been served.

A New World Order for International Relations a Decade after Wilson

The newly elected government of Prime Minister Sarwat Pasha called for a Capitulations conference for 1928 to address ridding Egypt of the onerous Capitulations. The Egyptian strategy involved having the Capitulations “replaced by an institution more in harmony with modern times.” Despite praising Sarwat’s realism, North Winship, of the State Department Near Eastern Division, also portrayed Sarwat Pasha in the same manner as Great Britain. The United States and Britain defined “moderate” Egyptian political figures as being less demanding than the more “extremist” group the *Wafd*.¹²⁶ Egypt’s dilemma was the same in 1927 as it was in 1919, wanting Wilson’s words of national self-determination to apply to them, yet they were

still confronting the centuries old practice of the Capitulations that fostered both Orientalist and colonial foreign policy in Egypt. The Egyptian strategy also enlarged to attack the nature of the 1922 reservations claimed by Britain just as the Treaty of Lausanne presented the Egyptians with material to fuel their argument for the abolition of the Capitulations.¹²⁷ After learning of the results from Lausanne, Egyptians wanted the Capitulations abolished in Egypt especially if Europe had agreed to abolish the Capitulations in Turkey, the former seat of government for the Ottoman Empire. The maintenance of the Capitulations was also one of the four reservations Britain placed on the independence of Egypt in 1922. A strategy to abolish the Capitulations was both a challenge to British colonialism and the international system that perpetuated the Capitulatory abuses in Egypt. Within an international system in flux, the Egyptians utilized the opportunities presented through the diplomatic events of the 1920s to weaken the colonial ties to Britain and their former occupier the Ottomans.

In the opinion of Lord Lloyd, if the powers were interested in maintaining the Capitulations, they needed to address the concerns of the Egyptians and not ignore them.¹²⁸ After a decade of diplomatic wrangling over and among both Foreign and Egyptian governments, the British Foreign Ministry issued a text to the Egyptian Government that revealed the “extreme limit to which British Government would go” to meet the demands of the more moderate nationalists.¹²⁹ Much like the Egyptian strategy, Great Britain felt that a new mechanism was needed to ensure the legitimate interests of foreigners in Egypt. In sum, Great Britain sought to establish an alliance with Egypt. This goal contradicted the rhetoric used during the Protectorate Phase and throughout the 1920s about Britain’s special relationship with Egypt. The creation of a new alliance implied that the previous one was false and imposed upon Egypt. The new relationship would be more reciprocal and required ambassadors and outlined

policies in the case of third party (nation) disputes.¹³⁰ A policy for both bilateral and multilateral relations was a significant change from the days of the High Commissioner and of preventing the Egyptians from making bilateral agreements with any other party. Disputes would be settled peacefully fitting within the general political will of the time epitomized by the Kellogg-Briand Pact and through the diplomatic channels provided by Egypt's entrance into the League of Nations.¹³¹

Great Britain was ready to make both the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt the responsibility of the Egyptian Government; however, the issue of the Capitulations blocked change. This British acknowledgement that the Capitulations were no longer consistent with the modern world was the only concession to Egypt included in the communication.¹³² The same strategy that had existed since 1920 would still govern policy liberalization. Britain would relinquish its Capitulatory rights once other countries abandoned the use of consular courts in Egypt as opposed to the Mixed Courts.¹³³ This focus on changing *the venue of justice* played a major role in the British proposal.

Several areas of negotiation still favored Britain. One such issue was the Suez Canal. No matter what the British relinquished in their proposal, Suez was not on the British negotiating table. Much like in the 1922 reservations on complete independence, the British still reserved a place for themselves in the chance that Egypt would seek foreign advice both political and military. The most likely reason being to prevent the Egyptians from seeking assistance from the United States or the Soviet Union. These particular clauses reveal the distrust of the Egyptians.¹³⁴ Despite the British proposal to create a new two-way alliance, Great Britain still needed a mechanism to prevent Egypt from seeking actual independence. The British election of 1929 provided no such mechanism. Despite the British Liberal Party's victory, which opposed

Lord Lloyd's heavy handed policies in Egypt, the Egyptian Liberal Party of Sarwat Pasha, nonetheless rejected the British overtures as insufficient.¹³⁵

Three very important international treaties shaped the United States policy at the close of the decade. Separate treaties of arbitration and conciliation between the United States and Egypt along with the International Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War (also known as the Kellogg- Briand Peace Pact) were among the major forces reshaping the international system. This third treaty known for its outlawing of war as an instrument of national policy shared legacy with the other lofty peace plans of Paris in 1919.¹³⁶ For some in Egypt, however, the pact offered possibility in the political struggle against the remaining hold Great Britain held on the country as a result of the reservations of the February 28, 1922 unilateral declaration. In addition to the maintenance of the Capitulations, Great Britain also reserved the right to keep a military presence in Egypt. Some Egyptian political figures, including the *Wafd*, reasoned that if Egypt signed the Kellogg- Briand treaty, the British reservation to complete independence concerning military affairs would be nullified.¹³⁷ In other words, if war was no longer a viable national strategy, then Great Britain could no longer justify a military threat against Egypt and the Sudan. Of course, this could have affected the progress of the agenda for national development outlined in the 1924 Parliamentary assembly, as Mahmoud Passiouni (Vice President and President *ad interim* of the Egyptian Senate) and the President of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies indicated by attaching their names to separate, yet nearly identical political addresses.¹³⁸

The United States accomplished a major interwar policy objective spanning several administrations by creating a change in venue for international justice. The new venues provided options for the United States to avoid institutions that had not developed in conjunction with the rise in stature of the United States following World War I. The Treaty of Arbitration between

the U.S. and Egypt advocated the new system of settling conflicts without using war as an instrument of national policy. The Permanent Court of Arbitration established at the Hague by the convention of October 18, 1907 was the preferred venue for settling disputes through arbitration and not war.¹³⁹ While “other competent tribunals” were an option, the League of Nations was not an available venue. Shifting authority to the League would enhance Britain’s strategy and weaken the national policy objectives of the United States. While, the appeal of signing bilateral treaties enhanced Egyptian strategy, the focus of this treaty revealed that the United States was not conducting altruistic foreign policy. The new system for justice would not apply to American domestic issues or third parties and the Monroe Doctrine would reign supreme over any attempt by a nation to use the treaties to infiltrate the American sphere of influence. The American treaties sought to bypass the possibility of forfeiting sovereignty as the Capitulations had done to Egypt.

The Treaty of Conciliation established the newly created permanent Internal Commission for Arbitration as the new venue for disputes not solved by diplomacy or other competent tribunals. An entirely different method of selecting judges was established, thereby eliminating the problems that the United States had with the Mixed Courts. Egypt and the United States had different motivations, but found common ground in this new judicial venue, namely challenging the British vision for international relations. The arbitration commission had five members: one from each country involved in the dispute, two judges from different countries selected by the suing countries, and the final seat would be a mutually decided choice from a neutral nation. The treaty established that “mutual agreement” was the cornerstone for most policies surrounding the Commission.¹⁴⁰ This “mutual agreement” without the inclusion of Great Britain satisfied both the United States’ and Egyptian development strategies during the 1920s.

In the diplomatic correspondence that led to the agreements between the United States and Egypt, one of the issues raised was the final ratification of Kellogg- Briand. The Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg informed his minister in Cairo Gunther: “There is no need to await ratification by the Powers which signed the Treaty on August 27. The deposit of Acts of Adherence with the government of the United States prior thereto will automatically make adhering Powers party to the treaty at the instant the treaty becomes effective.”¹⁴¹ In the context of the diplomatic episodes of the 1920s involving archaeology, taxes, and justice in which the essence of the arguments can be reduced to the issue of “assurances,” it is significant that the acts of deposit with the United States would reflect the legal basis of the new international system. Much like the gold standard debate that fueled much tension between the United States and Britain – paired with the insistence of the American and British museums that they deposit archaeological finds in their home museums - possession seemed to indicate power. Possession of treaties shaping the new world order put the United States in a strong position at the end of the decade.¹⁴² Likewise, Egypt was empowered by the implementation of its own development strategy. It is important to realize that Egypt’s small victory was another step and not a solution to the autonomy issue.

The strategies of searching for new avenues to protect national interests in a changing international system were evident in the international nature of the triangular microcosm of British-Egyptian-American relations. While the Capitulations would exist until an agreement at the Montreaux Convention of 1936 to end the practice of the extra-territorial rights in Egypt and to eventually phase out the Mixed Courts in 1949, Egyptian strategies had found some success regarding their political ability to reform their domestic and foreign affairs.¹⁴³ This was a realization of the goal of the 1924 Parliament. As the historical record indicates, Egypt had

made significant strides between the years 1924-1930. Because of the *leverage* that Egypt possessed in the international market for the prized commodity of Egyptian cotton Egypt not only had the political will but also had seemingly developed the bargaining capacity to bring the Powers to the negotiating table.¹⁴⁴ In late 1929, Egypt sought to revise its Customs Regulations (import and export duty schedules February 1931) by threatening at first the possibility of double tariff rates for those countries not agreeing to most-favored-nation trading status with Egypt. The Egyptians then threatened that those not willing to reach an accord would face double tariff rates. Diplomatic extensions were available for those nations who demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with Egypt.¹⁴⁵

The United States viewed the strategy of “increasing the revenues of the Egyptian Treasury and at the same time placing on the Foreign Powers this burden of negotiating with it Customs treaties” as “hasty, even if technically correct” in the legal sense.¹⁴⁶ The United States and Great Britain both eventually agreed, just before the February deadline, to the new tariffs pending objections over the Capitulatory “rights.” What was missing from the diplomatic correspondence was the usual discussion of how and which venue the Powers would pursue their Capitulatory rights.¹⁴⁷ This absence of venue coupled with the agreements under protest of Britain and the United States indicated the effectiveness of the timing of the strategy to revise import and export tariff levels. The United States’ only bargaining chip was to tie support of the Egyptian proposal to the acceptance of unconditional most favored nation trade agreement as a temporary fix, a mere eleven days before the new tariffs would take place.¹⁴⁸ This would serve as a stop gap measure until the treaty could be completed.¹⁴⁹ However, the Egyptian Ministry of Finance objected because in its opinion the only possible need for such an agreement was if the United States planned to tax Egyptian exports into the United States at a higher rate than other

countries.¹⁵⁰ This implied that the American proposal sought a legal assurance while the Egyptian Ministry replied that Egyptian customs regulations would be a reflection of how other countries treated Egyptian products in their markets.

The attempt of Egypt to open economic ties with the Soviet Union in 1930 was part of the debate over Egypt's economic development plan and shaped the context in which the United States and Great Britain made their decisions. One plan called for the disposal of internationally desired Egyptian cotton in markets wherever possible and the other demanded industrial development at home. The Egyptian Undersecretary of Finance Ahmed Hamdi Seif el Nasr Bey supported the higher price (higher than the United States' prices) for Egyptian cotton because he believed it ensured quality, except when the local merchants removed the cotton from the domestic market to get a higher guaranteed price from their government.¹⁵¹ These are issues that both the United States and Great Britain faced in their status as 'power' nations in the context of the early years of the world economic depression.¹⁵² These strategies revealed that Egypt was placing its own domestic politics within the larger international situation in order to better Egypt. The fluid nature of the international system that had been altered so much by the diplomacy of the 1920s created the possibility for several intentions in the Egyptian reform strategy of 1924 to be realized. Egypt began to strategically place itself in the new international system as opposed to being controlled by anachronistic agreements that reflected 19th century imperialism.

Conclusion

Following World War I, Britain faced challenges to its international strategy from both the United States and Egypt. Within the context of the more widely studied tensions between Britain and the United States, the inclusion of the Egyptian strategy offers valuable insight that leads to more complete understanding of 1920s diplomacy. In the tradition as Husayn al-

Marsafi's *The Essay on Eight Words* in 1881, several key concepts are important to this study. Words such as *reasonable*, *equitable*, and *moderate* are incorporated into the strategies of the United States and Britain to protect their national interests in Egypt as if it was a zero-sum game. In instances when Egyptian political leaders demanded the application of these concepts to their own agenda, the implications assumed different meanings and posed further obstacles for the Egyptian goal of independence. The physical act of '*depositing*' revealed a sense of power that Foucault would realize and appreciate. Possession of mummified kings, treasure, new treaties, and gold indicated power in the 1920s much as they had in earlier decades. Negotiations took place throughout the decade concerning the legal validity and political viability of pursuing these objects as 'rights.' The episodes revealed that at the core of every diplomatic drama was insecurity with the existing system of *assurances* of good faith dealing, namely aside from collusion for self-gain, a lack of trust existed. Perhaps the most revealing evidence for the insecurity with the old world in the 1920s was the fact that at the end of the decade, political maneuvers that matching the vision of the League of Nations and the Wilsonian Moment were still being devised and implemented.

While Egyptian nationalism had used political, legal, and economic reform strategies before and during the 1920s, the Egyptian strategies of 1924-1930 attacked the root of their problems, namely Capitulations. Internationalism in and of itself was not the answer to the sovereignty crisis of Egypt. The Capitulations, the Mixed Courts, the various legal, political, and economic reform strategies, and physical revolt against colonial occupation all were inherently international and very problematic. The Egyptian political maneuvers at the end of the decade had more potential than the previous reform strategies that failed. Egypt created leverage on Great Britain by finding new avenues for their legal, economic, and political platforms through

bilateral and multilateral treaties with the United States. While Nubar Pasha argued for the creation of the Mixed Courts of Egypt in 1869 to remove the political dimensions of diplomacy from the corrupt Capitulations system, Egyptian strategies of 1924-1930 used both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic approaches to begin the process of excavating the relics of Ottoman, British, and International tutelage from Egyptian soil. Events in Egypt in the 1920s demonstrate that European ascendancy was beginning to ebb in the colonial arena.¹⁵³ British hegemonic influence in Egypt was waning due to the leverage that Egypt and the United States exerted on the new system of international relations following World War I. These economic, political, and legal battles fought in Egypt are the beginning of the British slow retreat from 'East of Suez', which was completed in the 1960s.

Notes

¹ Erez Manela, “The Wilson Moment and the Rise of Anticolonial Nationalism: The Case of Egypt,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 12, no. 4 (Dec. 2001): 99-102. p. 99. www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~manela/

² Manela, “The Case of Egypt,” p. 103.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 112, 108.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.99, 109.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁹ 883.00Bolshevism- 883.002/90 B, Roll 7, M571, Record Group 59, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland [hereinafter cited as RG 59 NARA]. Frank Costigliola, “U.S. Cultural Expansion in an Era of Systemic Upheaval” in Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: Volume II: Since 1914*. 6th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), pp. 96-104.

¹⁰ 1918 First Quarter Report on Diplomatic and Political Events in Egypt by Hampson Gary, American Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, Egypt, 883.00/181-340, Roll 3, M571, RG 59, NARA, [Hereafter cited as *Gary Report March 31, 1918*].

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Charles Hughes to J. Morten Howell, May 25, 1922, in: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922*, vol. 2: (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 105. [Hereinafter cited as *FRUS* with appropriate volume number]. U.S. President Warren G. Harding welcomed Egyptian King Fuad into the “family of free nations” and noted that he looked forward to “a new era of happiness and prosperity.” See Harding to Fuad, May 26, 1922, in: *FRUS 1922*, II, 106

¹³ *Ibid.*, 101.

¹⁴ Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 131, 154.

¹⁵ Great Britain received Capitulatory privileges with the Ottoman Empire as far back as 1583; whereas the U.S. started in 1830. L.H. Woosley, “The Unilateral Termination of Treaties,” *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Apr. 1926), 346-353. (here 347). <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9300%28192604%2920%3A2%3C346%3ATUTOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U>

¹⁶ Evelyn Cromer, *Modern Egypt* (New York: MacMillan Co, 1908), p. 426.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Gary Report March 31, 1918*. This appearance of independence continued under the British Protectorate System. Most of the important policies were decided by the British Government and were channeled through the British High Commissioner into the Egyptian Government. Gary reported that Egyptian independence was a “legal fiction” and that “Egypt had been administered and its policies entirely shaped by Great Britain since the latter’s occupation of the country of 1882.”

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰ John Marlowe, *Anglo – Egyptian Relations: 1800- 1956*, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1965), p. 85. *Shari a* is the Islamic legal system based on the Qu’ran.

²¹ Selma Botman, *Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919 – 1952* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 161.

²² Marlowe, *Anglo - Egyptian Relations*, p. 86.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶ Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 317.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 316. The *Khedive* was the title of the non-elected, monarchal ruler of Egypt. The title changed to ‘King’ following the 1922 Declaration.

²⁸ Nathan J. Brown, “The Precarious Life and Slow Death of the Mixed Courts of Egypt,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 25, (1993) 33- 52. <http://links.jstor.org/sici=0020-7438%28199302%2925%3A1%3C33%ATPLASD%3E2.o.CO%3B2-A> [Brown views the courts in a less glamorous light, portraying the existence of the courts as precarious in nature].

²⁹ Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 318.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 318, 319.

³¹ Marlowe, *Anglo – Egyptian Relations*, pp. 88, 89.

³² *Gary Report March 31, 1918*. It is important to note that the American diplomat’s language used to describe Ismail’s debt is that of “excessive extravagance” and that he “brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy.” However later in the 1920s, some Egyptians would argue that debt incurred during the Ottoman reign was not their debt and therefore should not have to be responsible.

³³ Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, pp. 317, 318.

³⁴ Marlowe, *Anglo – Egyptian Relations*, p. 95. Just as the relationship of power shifted to Great Britain from France, the 1920s marked a decade of growing influence of the United States over Britain in Egypt and the international political system. Traditionally, historians neglect to incorporate the tension between the United States and Britain into their works on Egypt. Traditionally British primacy in Egypt is taken for granted. See Phillip Baram, *The Department of State in the Middle East 1919 – 1945* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), pp. 29, 30. However, in 1957, under the Eisenhower Doctrine, it is the United States that becomes the “senior member of the Anglo-American partnership in the Middle East.” See Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), p. 119. The Suez Crisis was not the beginning of this shift in power. One must understand the development strategies within the triangular relationship of the three countries in the 1920s. I use the term “development strategies” throughout the course of this thesis with a deliberate intent. I am attempting to elevate the Egyptian policies within the Western discourse by not referring to them as mere nationalism. However, I do not wish to discredit any positive aspects of nationalism or the Egyptians’ capacity to achieve nationalism. I attempt to create a sense of parity of national strategies amongst Britain, Egypt, and the United

States. As long as one understands that the U.S. and Britain also engaged in nationalist activity, then it is appropriate to address the Egyptian strategies as nationalistic.

³⁵ Marlowe, *Anglo – Egyptian Relations*, p. 95.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.101.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 113, 116.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 123 - 125.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 131.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 129.

⁴⁷ *Gary Report March 31, 1918.*

⁴⁸ Marlowe, *Anglo- Egyptian Relations*, pp. 212.

⁴⁹ Phillip Baram, *The Department of State in the Middle East 1919-1945* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), pp. 29f.

⁵⁰ Marlowe, *Anglo – Egyptian Relation*, p. 214.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 215. “The Arabic word for Protectorate – *himaya* – was in itself humiliating, since it was the word habitually used to describe the status of local Christian minorities under the protection of some European power.”

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 226.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

⁵⁴ Hampson Gary (Cairo) to Secretary of State, August 6, 1919, 883.00/190, Roll 3, M571, RG 59, NARA. Many Egyptians were outraged by the outsourcing of potential government jobs to foreign Turkish people as opposed to native Egyptians.

⁵⁵ M.E. Yapp, *The Near East since the First World War* (New York: Longman, 1991), pp. 52,53, 57.

⁵⁶ Robert Tignor, *State, Private Enterprise and Economic Change in Egypt, 1918-1952* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) Tignor has published many books concerning economic development and modernization in Egypt ranging from the 1880s to the 1950s. I agree with his appreciation for the importance that economics played in the political struggle for independence in Egypt, and the assessment of the failures of economic development in the 1920s. Yet the strategies of the 1920s were a direct result of previously tried reform strategies and need to be studied in this perspective in order to understand the 1920s.

⁵⁷ Stewart Johnson, American Foreign Service Report (Egypt), July 31, 1924, 883.032/7, Roll 9, M571, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁸ The complete list of the agenda as reported by Johnson was: “The revision of existing legislation, particularly that enacted since the suspension of the Legislative assembly, the revision of the Electoral Law, Economy and strict control in the number and remuneration of Government officials, the overhauling of the fiscal system, with a view to a more equitable allocation of taxation, improvement of the position of women, the spread of education, Egypt’s entry into the League of Nations, the realization of complete independence for Egypt and the Sudan.” Johnson also commented that Egypt already had a role in the League of Nations on some medical commissions at Geneva and that admittance is not out of the question. However, the claims for complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan hurt the chances because like Great Britain this United States representative saw the issue as something that Parliament alone could not fix. A solution would come in time through negotiations with the British Government. Johnson wrote that the Sudan question was the “thorniest of issues”. *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ U.S. Department of State Telegram (Washington) to American Legation (Cairo), January 23, 1924, 711.83/-, Roll M572, RG 59, NARA.

⁶² John H. Maurer, “Arms Control and the Washington Conference,” in: Steven E. Miller et al., eds. *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First Great War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991), pp. 268, 273. Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1941* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 46. For an overview of the ascendancy of the American Empire, see Niall Ferguson’s *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004). See also Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919- 1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Hughes is a pivotal figure of the early 20th century. As a member of the U.S. Supreme Court, he participated in the ruling in a classic anti-monopoly legal decision. The result of the 1911 case, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v the United States, forced the divided and fully competitive former John Rockefeller companies to seek access to foreign oil to create the surplus necessary to increase profit. This demand fostered the eventual application of the “open door” policy for China to include the Middle Eastern oil reserves. Hughes was the Secretary of State in the Harding Administration after his near defeat of Woodrow Wilson for President of the United States in 1916. He later returned to the Supreme Court in 1930 in the Hoover administration after a battle to be the voice of U.S. foreign policy between the Department of State and Commerce while both were in charge. Clearly, many competing visions of a new world order existed. Oyez, *The Supreme Court Multimedia* <http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/366/participants>, http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legal_entity/62/ and http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legal_entity/62/biography (all accessed on 11-28-2005)

⁶³ F.A. Sterling (Counselor of Embassy, London) to Secretary of State (Washington), September 19, 1924, 883.51/65, Roll 17, M571, RG 59, NARA.

⁶⁴ F.A. Sterling to Secretary of State, September 19, 1924, 883.51/65, p. 2. What is striking about the conflicts when Great Britain and the United States agree, usually in the language of colonialism and great power status, is that Egypt is seemingly written about and discussed as a nation with duties and responsibilities with extreme paternalism. However, in the instances when Egypt seeks to be addressed as a nation and not a former colony of the Ottoman Empire and British Protectorate, the general consensus is that Egypt is not ready for actual nationalism and political independence. See also: Division of Near Eastern Affairs Memorandum of Conversation with Egyptian Minister, August 4, 1924, 883.51/66.

⁶⁵ F.A. Sterling to Secretary of State, September 19, 1924, 883.51/65.

⁶⁶ J. Morton Howell to Secretary of State, April 10, 1925, 883.51/72, Roll 18 M571, RG 59, NARA.

⁶⁷ Howell to Secretary of State, April 19, 1925, 883.512/72. Likewise, his one bit of evidence of a non- negative impact on the Egyptian political struggle after the Wilson moment is that of a single American Diplomat, J. Morton Howell, who was at odds with both the British colonial oppression of Egypt and his own State Department for not doing anything about it. Erez Manela, “Goodwill and Bad: Rethinking U.S.–Egyptian Contacts in the Interwar Years,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 38, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 71-88. (here 77, 80).

www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~manela/ Howell’s political stance toward Egypt is clearly marked in his dedication of his book that stated: “To Justice and Truth.” It was written “in the hope that it will assist in lifting the burdens now being inflicted upon a nation of people who are the descendants and representatives of the world’s first civilization.” See J. Morton Howell, *Egypt’s Past, Present, and Future* (Dayton: Service Publishing Company, 1929).

⁶⁸ F. A. Sterling (Chargé d’ Affaires ad interim London) to Secretary of State (Washington), April 25, 1925, 883.51/73, Roll 18, M571, RG 59, NARA. This law suit is reminiscent of the time that Europe brought Ismail Pasha to the Mixed Courts over outstanding debt, shortly after they were created in the mid 19th century.

⁶⁹ Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, p. 1.

⁷⁰ F.A. Sterling (London) to Secretary of State (Washington), June 19, 1925, 883.51/76, Roll 18, M571, RG 59, NARA. One legal decision of the Mixed Court that actually favored the Egyptians was the reversal of the eminent domain ruling in the King Tut case.

⁷¹ F.A. Sterling to Secretary of State, September 19, 1924, 883.51/65.

⁷² J. Morton Howell to Secretary of State, Note 789, April 3, 1926, 783.003/3, M573, RG 59, NARA and 883.512/21, Roll 18, M571, RG 59, NARA.

⁷³ Howell to State, *Enclosed Speech from the Egyptian Gazette March 30, 1926*, April 3, 1926, 783.003/3, M573, RG 59, NARA.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Division of Near Eastern Affairs Memo (Allan Dulles), September 29, 1926, 783.003/4, M573, RG 59, NARA.

⁷⁶ North Winship (American Consul, Cairo) to Secretary of State, January 11, 1927, 883.51/88, Roll 18, M 571, RG 59, NARA.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Stimson (Washington) Telegram to American Legation (Cairo), October 8, 1929, 883.5122/1, Roll 18, M571, RG 59, NARA. Specifically, the U.S. after taking the consensus of the other Powers agreed to pay the tax in the cities of Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez, but in any other locations, proof of equitable collection practices would have to be approved first.

⁷⁹ Hughes to Howell, January 23, 1924, in: *FRUS 1924*, vol. I. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 710.

⁸⁰ George Wadsworth (American Consul, Cairo) Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation with the Minister at Cairo, November 2, 1923, enclosure 4: in George Wadsworth to Secretary of State, November 14, 1923, 883.512/16, Roll 18, M 571, RG 59, NARA.

⁸¹ J. Morton Howell (American Minister, Cairo) to Roger C. Tredwell (Consul General at Large), October 31, 1923, enclosure 3: in George Wadsworth to Secretary of State, November 14, 1923, 883.512/16, Roll 18, M571, RG 59, NARA. This is an example of why people labeled him an Egyptophile.

⁸² George Wadsworth (Carlton, Ramleh, Alexandria) to Secretary of State, September 6, 1929, 883.5122/2, Roll 18, M 571, RG 59, NARA.

⁸³ U.S. Department of Commerce, “The Future of Our Foreign Trade”, (Speech by Herbert Hoover), March 16, 1926, to the Export Manager’s Club of New York, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1926). in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: Volume II: Since 1914*. ed Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005). See also: Julius Klein. *The Frontiers of Trade* (New York: The Century Co., 1929). Klein was Hoover’s right hand man at the Department of Commerce and was instrumental in shaping the global economy of the 1920s.

⁸⁴ Division of Near Eastern Affairs Memo (North Winship), April 7, 1927, 783.003/5. RG 59, M573, NARA. The Parliamentary agenda sought to reduce appeals court number of judges on the Court when only one judge rules in First Instance, and increase the total number of judges on Appeal from one to three comprised of two foreigners and one Egyptian.

⁸⁵ Robert P. Skinner to Hughes, February 25, 1921, in: *FRUS 1921*, vol. I. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 903f.

⁸⁶ Skinner to Hughes, February 25, 1921, in *FRUS 1921*, I, p. 905.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 906.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Hughes to Harvey, July 8, 1921, in: *FRUS 1921*, II, p. 907.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 908.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 909.

⁹³ Harvey to Hughes, December 20, 1921, in: *FRUS 1922*, vol. II: (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 910-12.

⁹⁴ Hughes to Harvey, July 8, 1921, in: *FRUS 1921*, II, p. 909.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Hughes to Geddes, Sept. 20, 1921, in: *FRUS 1921*, vol. I, p. 915.

⁹⁷ Hughes to Sprigg, October 18, 1921, in: *FRUS 1921*, vol. I, p. 916.

⁹⁸ Jasper Yeats Brinton, *The Mixed Courts of Egypt* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 81- 84.

⁹⁹ Brinton, *Mixed Courts*, pp. 81-84. Pierre Crabitès the man who the Egyptian Government refused to promote to the Court of Appeals remained on his bench at the Court of First Instance. Crabitès a trained historian from the city of New Orleans, Louisiana, published many works during his tenure as a member of the Mixed Court. His knowledge of the area led the United States Government to seek his advice late in his career. Jamal T. Perkins, “Pierre Crabitès: An early American Expert on the Middle East,” M.A. thesis, University of New Orleans, 1992, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. He saw the importance of Egypt to the United States very quickly. He saw a market of fourteen million potential buyers and a market that was capable of damaging “Dixieland’s economy” of cotton production. In fact, he argued that Egypt was “a more logical and attractive field of business than Turkey, Persia, or India,” which are nations traditionally associated with foreign interest after the First World War. Elsie Weil, *New York Times*, September 26, 1926, Pierre Crabitès Collection, Louisiana and Special Collections, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans (Collection 73), Box 85.

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- ¹⁰⁰ *Boston Globe*, October 22, 1924, Pierre Crabitès Collection, Box 85.
- ¹⁰¹ President of the Metropolitan Museum of Art (DeForest) to Hughes, January 15, 1923, in: *FRUS* 1924, vol. I. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 714f.
- ¹⁰² Hughes to Howell, January 29, 1923, in: *FRUS* 1924, I, pp. 715f.
- ¹⁰³ Howell to Hughes, March 5, 1923, in: *FRUS* 1924, I, pp. 716f.
- ¹⁰⁴ Hughes to Howell, February 23, 1924, in: *FRUS* 1924, I, p. 718.
- ¹⁰⁵ The Director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art (Edward Robinson) to Hughes, May 20, 1924, in: *FRUS*, 1924, I, p. 719.
- ¹⁰⁶ Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Legation, May 27, 1924, in: *FRUS* 1924, I, pp. 722, 723.
- ¹⁰⁷ Phillip Baram, *Department of State in the Middle East*, 183. Baram wrote that the United States had little interest in Egypt following World War I, because of the lack of oil and that the State Department would intermittently get involved to protect the open door policy of the United States. I agree with the second point, but this paper weakens the foundations of the first idea. He also crafted an excellent depiction of the United States as being “firm[ly] moralistic – legalistic” in its foreign policy. His strongest point was that the United States was trying to get into the “great power club” of the day and this accounted for the aggressive U.S. diplomacy in Egypt. pp. 50, 182
- ¹⁰⁸ Labeling this archaeological episode as completely within the Egyptian reform strategy is difficult because it was a Frenchman, Pierre Lacau, the Director of Antiquities in Egypt, a department comprised of foreigners, initially changed the 1912 law. Zahi Hawass, *Hidden Treasures of Ancient Egypt: Unearthing the Masterpieces of Egyptian History* (Washington D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2004), p. 26. It was also the Mixed Courts that were comprised of foreign judges that made the legal ruling in the appeals case. Yet the Egyptians were still active in the diplomacy that achieved the political agreement based on trust and it rightly deserves consideration for all these factors. The international implications of a Frenchman blocking the monetary gain of the British should not be neglected, nor the instance of institutions working in tandem with the interests of Egypt.
- ¹⁰⁹ Kellogg to Howell, February 2, 1926, in: *FRUS*, 1926, vol. II, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 58, 59.
- ¹¹⁰ Sterling to Kellogg, April 9, 1926, in: *FRUS* 1926, II, p. 67. The British were leery of allowing the Americans to gain any more ground in Egyptian affairs to the detriment of their own authority and special position in the area. Around this same time, according to Pierre Crabitès, the British were unnerved by the influence the Americans had due to the American University at Cairo. The British perceived the American education of Egyptian youth as a mechanism to increase American prestige. *New Orleans State*, August 29, 1926, Pierre Crabitès Collection, Box 85.
- ¹¹¹ The American Legation to the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 17, 1926, in *FRUS* 1926, II, p. 69.
- ¹¹² The Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Legation, May 26, 1926, in: *FRUS* 1926, II, p. 75. DeForest to Kellogg, July 26, 1926, in: *FRUS* 1926, vol. II, 76.
- ¹¹³ Geddes to Kellogg, Sept. 27, 1920, in: *FRUS* 1926, II, p. 77.
- ¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹⁵ Jasper Yeats Brinton. *The Mixed Courts of Egypt* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 292.
- ¹¹⁶ Kellogg to Howard, June 23, 1926, in: *FRUS* 1926, II, p. 86.

¹¹⁷ The Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Legation, May 16, 1926, in: *FRUS* 1927, vol. II. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 558.

¹¹⁸ Kellogg to Howell, January 22, 1927, in: *FRUS* 1927, II, 565.

¹¹⁹ The Vacuum Oil Company, A. I. Mantacheff & Company, and the Asiatic Petroleum Company (Egypt) Ltd. to the Egyptian Under Secretary of State, Ministry of the Interior, May 12, 1926, in: *FRUS* 1927, II, 571.

¹²⁰ Winship to Kellogg, September 30, 1926, in: *FRUS* 1927, II, 574.

¹²¹ North Winship Division of Near Eastern Affairs Memo, April 7, 1927, 783.003/5, Roll M573, NARA.

¹²² Franklin Mott Gunther to Secretary of State, No. 83, November 22, 1928, 783.003/12, RG 59, M573, NARA, p. 2. In 1928, France, Italy, Greece, and Romania had formed an opposition block to the Egyptian proposal to reform the Mixed Courts. This need for a coalition might have been due to the strong presence that Britain still held in Egypt and the rising influence of the United States in not only Egypt but the entire international system in the late 1920s.

¹²³ North Winship Division of Near Eastern Affairs Memo, April 7, 1927, 783.003/5, Roll M573, NARA.

¹²⁴ Gunther to Hafez Afifi Bey (Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cairo) enclosed in Gunther to Secretary of State, February 1, 1929, 783.003/15, Roll M573, RG 59, NARA.

¹²⁵ Gunther to Secretary of State, February 1, 1929, 783.003/15, Roll M573, RG 59, NARA.

¹²⁶ North Winship (Cairo) to Secretary of State, No. 146, December 23, 1927, 783.003/7, RG 59, M573, NARA. The “institution more in harmony with modern times” seemingly is a strong reference to the impact of the “Wilsonian Moment” on the Egyptian nationalist movement of the 1920s

¹²⁷ The four British reservations attached to the unilateral declaration of Egyptian independence in 1922 involved: Suez, Egyptian defense and foreign policy, the Sudan, and Capitulations. Yapp, *Near East Since the First World War*, p. 52. The 1922 Declaration was the manifestation of the Milner Report representing the “transient phase British imperialism which sought to equate the doctrine of ‘self-determination’ with the realities of imperial survival.” Marlowe, *Anglo-Egyptian Relations*, p. 254.

¹²⁸ Franklin Mott Gunther to Secretary of State, No. 83, November 22, 1928, 783.003/12, RG 59, M573, NARA.

¹²⁹ Dawes (London) to Secretary of State (Washington), August 7, 1929, 783.003/18, Roll M573, RG 59, NARA. Henderson (Great Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs June 1929- August 1931) communicated British policy towards Egypt in a sixteen paragraph document. This reveals a number of things. Just as the unilateral declaration of independence in 1922 came with reservations, at the end of the decade Britain was still meticulous about protecting their interests in the region intact. On a more symbolic diplomatic level, the fact that Henderson’s proposal with the caveat of how the Egyptians should proceed (step one: gain support in Egyptian Parliament, step two: seek approval with Great Britain, and finally step three: sign a treaty) contained two more points than Wilson’s fourteen would be an appropriate response to elevating the British to the status of liberal and visionary in their foreign policy.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ Marlowe, *Anglo- Egyptian Relations*, pp. 278-283.

¹³⁶ Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919* (New York: Random House, 2003).

¹³⁷ North Winship to Secretary of State, August 26, 1928, 711.8312a/5, Roll M572, RG 59, NARA.

¹³⁸ Mahmoud Passiouni (Vice President and President *ad interim* of the Egyptian Senate) and the President of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies Address, October 6, 1928, 711.8312, Roll M572, RG 59, NARA. The Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated that “he and the present Cabinet are very happy, even touched, at the tone and nature of the Note and that they would like to be among the first to adhere.” North Winship to Secretary of State, September 1, 1928, 711.8312AntiWar/9, Roll M 572, RG 59, NARA.

¹³⁹ Enclosed Draft Treaty of Arbitration to Mahmoud Samy Pasha (Egyptian Minister to the United States), 711.8312A/1, Roll M72, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁴⁰ Enclosed Draft Treaty of Conciliation, 711.8312A/1, Roll M572, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁴¹ Secretary of State to Franklin Mott Gunther, post September 4, 1928, 711.8312AntiWar/17, Roll M572, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁴² Henrietta Lidchi, “The Poetics and the Politics of Exhibiting Other Cultures,” in Stuart Hall, ed. *Representation: Culture Representations and Signifying Practices: Culture, Media, and Identities* (London: Sage Publication: 2003), pp. 151-222.

¹⁴³ Selma Botman, *Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919-1952* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 39.

¹⁴⁴ Günter Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955: The Leverage of the Weak*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). Bischof’s thesis that Austria exerted leverage on the cold war international system inspired the foundation for viewing Egypt in a similar light after the research led me to conclude that Egypt simultaneously was hindered by and influenced international relations of the 1920s.

¹⁴⁵ Franklin Mott Gunther (Cairo) to Secretary of State (Washington), January 4, 1930, 611.8331/16, Box 3297, RG, NARA, p 1-3 and Franklin Mott Gunther (Cairo) to Secretary of State (Washington), January 30, 1930, 611.8331/17, Box 3297, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Franklin Mott Gunther (Cairo) to Secretary of State (Washington), January 30, 1930, 611.8331/17, Box 3297, RG 59, NARA, and Franklin Mott Gunther (Cairo) to Secretary of State (Washington), January 31, 1930, 611.8331/18, Box 3297, RG 59, NARA, and Cotton (Acting Secretary of State) to Amlegation (Cairo), February 6, 1930, 611.8331/18, Box 3297, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁴⁸ The British Ambassador responded in December 1921, to the American concerns with a plan to accomplish their objectives in closing the consular courts. Great Britain agreed to share information regarding the development and implementation of the new political system with the Americans. They also make a special note that they were willing to acquiesce to the American demand for “most favorable nation status” in Egypt, as opposed to a status “equivalent to the British.” While the phrases in contention appeared to be a semantic argument, the implications behind the meaning of the words cannot be understated. The British while telling the Americans that they would receive “most favorable nation status” actually did not include these words in the final agreement. They wrote that the rights of American citizens “shall not be less than those accorded to the nationals of any other foreign power in Egypt” and consuls “status shall not be inferior to that of any other consular officers in Egypt”. Great Britain revealed its diplomatic agenda in the opening paragraphs of the agreement. They stated that “ the Government of

His Britannic majesty and the Government of the United States of America recognizing the special position occupied by Great Britain in Egypt,” which indicated that Britain was not yet willing to give up the special rights of a foreign nation that they were seeking to keep from the Americans. Great Britain could in fact not agree to the title of America as a most favored nation, because it would undermine the vision that Britain had of itself as a protectorate power. If Britain sought to remove capitulations and retain its authority, it had to fall back on its claim as a protectorate power. Harvey to Hughes, December 20, 1921, in: *FRUS 1922*, vol. II: (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 910-12.

According to Zara Steiner, American officials “considered the most-favored-nation principle sacrosanct.” Steiner, *The Lights that Failed*, p. 24.

¹⁴⁹ Cotton (Acting Secretary of State) to Amlegation (Cairo), February 6, 1930, 611.8331/18, Box 3297, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁵⁰ Gunter to Secretary of State, 1930, 611, 611.8331/41. Box 3297, RG 59, NARA. Gunter reported to Washington that as of January 17, 1930, Sir Percy Loraine, British High Commissioner in Egypt 1929-1933, had informed him that Great Britain had removed their objections based on capitulations and agreed to the new accord based on assurances from the Egyptian Government.

¹⁵¹ Franklin Mott Gunter to Secretary of State, Dispatch 354, Enclosure #3, April 5, 1930, Box 3297, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁵² Alfred Nutting (American Consulate- General Clerk, London), March 23, 1927, 841.5034/119, Roll 106, M580, RG 59, NARA. Nutting reported the March 22nd debate in the House of Commons between the Labor and Conservative parties about the extent of public control of British industry. In the United States in 1920s during the tenure of Herbert Hoover and Secretary of Commerce many economic decisions about government regulation of the economy were also discussed. The economic policy of his tenure was shaped largely by his philosophy of “American Rugged Individualism”, fear of Bolshevism, access to foreign markets of raw materials, and despise of foreign monopolies that closed the doors to American interests. William J. Barber, *From New Era to New Deal: Herbert Hoover, the Economists, and American Economic Policy, 1921-1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

¹⁵³ Sally Marks, *The Ebbing of European Ascendancy: An International History of the World, 1914-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

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Vita

Scott Manguno was born on February 28, 1982 in New Orleans, Louisiana and grew up in Meraux, LA in St. Bernard Parish. He graduated from Archbishop Hannan High School in Meraux, LA, in May 2000, and from the Louisiana Scholars' College at Northwestern State University in Natchitoches, LA in May 2004. He majored in the Liberal Arts with a concentration in the Humanities and Social Thought with a minor in the Classics. At NSU, Manguno served as Senator at Large for two years and Student Government Vice-President in the 2003-4 school year in the Comeaux-Manguno Administration. He completed his thesis: "*Must Carthage Be Destroyed: A Comparisons of the Demands for the Destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE and for the Regime Change of Iraq in 2003.*" Manguno attended the University of New Orleans in the fall of 2004. Due to Hurricane Katrina, he migrated with his family to Baton Rouge, LA and attended LSU for one semester. Because of the generosity and international goodwill of the University of Graz in Austria, Manguno was able to live and study in Austria for the spring 2006 semester. He returned to the University of New Orleans in the fall 2006 and graduated in May 2007.