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The Use of German Prisoners of War in Louisiana's Agricultural Labor Force, 1942 - 1946

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The Use of German Prisoners of War in Louisiana's Agricultural Labor Force, 1942 - 1946

A Thesis

Submitted to the Department of History
University of New Orleans
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of

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in
History

by
Ronald N. Brady

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\(^1\) Jas. 1: 4-6 [KJV].
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Abbreviation

ASF ................................................................. Army Service Force
CCC ............................................................... Civilian Conservation Corps
CFEP ................................................................. Committee on Fair Employment Practices
CSC ................................................................. Civil Service Commission
EFL ................................................................. Emergency Farm Labor
EFLP ................................................................. Emergency Farm Labor Program
ESC ................................................................. Eighth Service Command
FSA ................................................................. Federal Security Administration
LSU Ag ...............Louisiana State University Agricultural Cooperative Extension Service
OWP ................................................................. Office of War Production
POW ................................................................. Prisoner of War
SDC ................................................................. Southern Defense Command
SSS ................................................................. Selective Service System
USDA .............................................................. United States Department of Agriculture
WFA ................................................................. War Farm Administration
WMC ................................................................. War Manpower Commission
WPB ................................................................. War Production Board
WMCA ............................................................. Young Men's Christian Association
Abstract

In September 1943, the initial group of ten thousand German prisoners of war began arriving in the United States for distribution throughout forty-six of the forty-eight states. At the same time, some industries in the United States lacked an adequate labor force due to the rapid expansion of the armed forces and war-related essential industries. The Louisiana forestry, dairy, and agricultural industries were among those industries in dire need of labor.

To solve these problems several agencies within the federal government, both civilian and military, and representatives of the Louisiana state government arrived at a mutual agreement on the process for using prisoners of war to help solve the labor shortage.

This thesis will describe and explain how these various agencies came together to solve the labor problem facing Louisiana agriculture and the United States during a time of national emergency.

Keywords: Eighth Service Command; Louisiana State University Agricultural Cooperative Extension Service; Prisoners of War; Second World War; Southern Defense Command; War Manpower Commission
Chapter 1: Introduction

By the end of November 1941, the unemployment lines in the United States had shortened but the financial upheaval and resulting unemployment of the Great Depression of 1929 were still very much a part of the American scenery. Some of the improvement in the economic and labor situation was due to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's September 1939 declaration of a state of national emergency brought on by the conflict that engulfed Europe that same month. Then, on September 16, 1940, the United States Congress enacted the Selective Service and Training Act that instituted the first peacetime draft in American history.\(^2\) A little more than a month later, in November 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called for the mobilization of armed force reserve units, as well as the federalization of state National Guard units.

On March 11, 1941, Congress passed the Lend Lease Act.\(^3\) This act permitted the United States to supply certain nations with war related materials and partially suspended the Neutrality Acts of 1935 - 1939.\(^4\) In addition, defense industries also began a slow growth to meet the resulting demands of Lend Lease, the state of emergency declaration, and the expansion of the armed forces. In September 1941, Congress extended the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor and Germany's and Italy's declaration of war on the United States slightly over two months later would result in unemployment lines all but disappearing from American streets. Unemployment lines shrank as the armed forces expanded and the dramatic growth in the defense industry created a labor shortage.


The active duty armed forces of the United States grew from 458,365 in 1940 to a high-water mark of 12,055,844 by 1945, with over 16 million ultimately serving. Mining, food processing, livestock, packaging, textile, lumber, and agriculture were the extractive industries most adversely affected due to the loss of their labor force to the armed forces and defense industries. Several agencies within the federal government had the responsibility to address the vexing labor problems and resolve the deficiencies in the availability of an adequate labor pool. The War Department, the War Manpower Commission, the Department of Labor, the War Labor Board, the Federal Security Agency, and the Department of Agriculture were the major federal agencies that responded to the needs of these affected industries.

In Louisiana, the labor drain most affected the agricultural and forestry industries, and the state could offer little help in dealing with these problems. However, with the arrival of large numbers of German prisoners of war to Louisiana in September 1943, the labor-intensive agricultural and forestry industries saw a potential solution to their dwindling labor force. This paper will illustrate how the problems of Louisiana's agricultural industry during the Second World War were addressed and how the several federal agencies in concert with an international agency and a state government worked together to address the needs of the industries affected by the labor drain.
Chapter 2: Louisiana and Louisiana Agriculture Extension Service

The Louisiana agricultural industry prospered during the first two decades of twentieth century. Demand in 1915-1919 called for increased productions to meet the needs of the First World War.\(^5\) The decline of Louisiana agriculture began in 1920 with the collapse of agriculture prices after the November 11, 1918 armistice that ended the demands of the First World War.\(^6\) The economic calamity that followed the stock market crash of October 1929 and the drought of 1930 further contributed to the crisis that Louisiana farmers faced.\(^7\) Farmers throughout the United States experienced a fall in prices by more than fifty per cent.\(^8\)

Louisiana in 1940 could boast having 150,007 farms. Louisiana cultivated 9,996,070 acres, approximately one-third of the state.\(^9\) The early stages of mechanization in the cultivating and harvesting of crops began to replace the traditional horse and mule in Louisiana as well as in other states. In 1940 of the slightly over 150,000 farms in Louisiana, tractors cultivated only 6,937, with the horse, mule and human labor functioning as the predominant mode of plant farming.\(^10\) The 1940 farm population of Louisiana stood at 853,949 of a total population of 2,363,880.\(^11\)

\(^6\) Ibid, 223.
\(^10\) Ibid, 192.
The system of cultivation and harvesting crops worked well enough in Louisiana until 1940. Farmers planted, weeded, fertilized, and harvested; crops did not waste in the fields because of labor shortages. Louisiana agriculture and farmers survived without any financial catastrophe. All this would change, however, as a direct result of the start of war in Europe in September 1939. Within a year, the plight of the farmers and agriculture in Louisiana increased with the growth of the defense industry and the institution of a military draft in late 1940. The labor force in Louisiana agriculture dropped farther after December 1941. A solution was required or the agriculture industries in Louisiana would most certainly bring ruin to the farmers of Louisiana, the state of Louisiana and the United States. The solution would come, but only after the defeat of the German and Italian armies in Tunisia in May 1943. Another part of the solution for Louisiana agriculture labor shortages would come from the coordination of a number of federal agencies and one of Louisiana's state agencies.

The Louisiana state agency responsible for the coordination between the War Manpower Commission and Louisiana farmers requiring labor was the Louisiana State Agricultural Extension Service (LSU Ag). The LSU Ag grew out of the enactment by the United States Congress of the Smith-Lever Act on May 8, 1914. The Smith-Lever Act sought:

"To provide for cooperative agriculture extension work between the agricultural college in the several states receiving the benefits of an act of Congress approved July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, and of acts supplementary thereto, and the United States Department of Agriculture."12

In 1941 Harry C. Sanders became the director of Louisiana State University's Agriculture Cooperative Extension Service (LSU Ag). The LSU Ag staff included sixth-three county agents, twenty-eight assistant county agents, and sixty-three home demonstration agents, who served Louisiana's sixty-four parishes.\textsuperscript{13}

Among the services provided to those engaged in commercial agricultural in the state were 4-H Club guidance, preparation of meals, preservation of foods, reuse of clothing, and proper sanitation procedures, and conservation projects. LSU Ag also conducted meetings related to agricultural activities and provided expert advice on all types of agriculture.\textsuperscript{14} County agents also functioned as the conduit between the federal government's War Manpower Commission, the commanders of the numerous prisoner of war camps in Louisiana, and those in Louisiana's agriculture industry who had a need for the labor force of German prisoners of war.

\textsuperscript{13} Martha Lois Dunlap, \textit{The Administrative Organization, Program Procedures and Personnel Policies of the Louisiana Cooperative Extension Service}, 56-57.

Chapter 3: Federal Civilian and Military Agencies

War Manpower Commission

Paul V. McNutt directed the War Manpower Commission (WMC) throughout the Second World War. The WMC, established by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9139 on April 18, 1942, came under the supervision of the Federal Security Agency (FSA) and included representatives of the War Department, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Labor, Navy Department, War Production Board (WPB), Selective Service System (SSS), and the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

As the primary civilian agency responsible for the utilization of prisoners of war as a labor force, the WMC duties also entailed the recruitment of labor and the training of workers for industries that designated as war essential industries. The WMC made decisions on the advice of the various representatives of other agencies on the commission.

The WMC directed all domestic work force policies designed to compensate for the reduction of the labor force in the United States because of war requirements. The WMC attempted to strike a balance between the needs of the military (as it applied to draft classification, deferments and exemptions), the needs of the civilian defense industries, and those of other civilian industries deemed essential for maintenance of home front morale.

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15 Note: Prior to his appointment to the WMC, Paul V. McNutt had served as governor of Indiana (1932-1936) and High Commissioner to the Philippines (1937-1939).
17 Ibid.
The WMC underwent a number of changes with other agencies placed under WMC authority; some agencies under WMC became separate agencies or were transferred to other commissions. Two such examples were the Committee on Fair Employment Practices (CFEP), transferred to WMC on July 30, 1942; it became an independent agency under the same name (CFEP) effective May 27, 1943. The SSS came under direction of the WMC on December 5, 1942 by Executive Order 9279, but became an independent agency by Executive Order 9410 on December 23, 1943.\(^\text{18}\) Convoluted and inefficient as the bureaucratic system may seem, the eventual outcome satisfied the needs and requirement of war, albeit with some restrictions like rationing and absence of civilian durable goods like household appliances. One of the federal agencies involved in work force allocation was the Selective Service System.

**Selective Service System**

Executive Order 8545 of September 23, 1940 established the Selective Service System (SSS). On July 31, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt named Brigadier General Lewis B. Hershey director of the SSS and General Hershey served as director until retiring on December 31, 1946.\(^\text{19}\) The SSS functioned under the WMC by Executive Order 9279 until December 5, 1942, finally reverting to its original independent status on December 23, 1943 by virtue of Executive Order 9410 of December 5, 1943.\(^\text{20}\) In carrying out its function under the WMC or as

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\(^\text{19}\) Note: General Hershey, a product of Indiana farm country, remained on active duty the day after his retirement as director of the SSS, finally retiring on February 5, 1970.

an independent agency the SSS registered and classified all males in the age groups 21 to 35 for military service. During the Second World War period, the SSS established four major draft classifications, ranging from Class I to Class IV. Within each major draft classification were a number of sub-categories, totaling twenty-one for all four major draft classifications. Those men classified as Class I-A would almost certainly expect to swap their civilian attire for a uniform. Those fortunate enough or unfortunate, depending on the individuals' personal desires, to receive a Class IV-F deferred for a physical unsuitability, were apt to remain civilians for the duration.

Those engaged in farming or the timber business received Class II-C draft classification and remained there until their status changed, depending on work availability in that field. This deferment initially applied only to the farm owners, later expanded to include employees engaged in agriculture. In May 1941, Secretary of Agriculture Claude R. Wickard anticipated the wartime drain on agricultural labor and the needs of the country urged the assistant director of the SSS to look more closely at the need for agriculture labor and to consider this requirement when granting deferments from the draft.\textsuperscript{21}

The USDA forecasted that the United States would require slightly over two million agriculture workers by January 1942. But Louisiana, as with other states, experienced a depletion of work force due to higher wages offered in defense industries and the departure of workers for the armed forces.\textsuperscript{22} A solution was required to ensure an adequate work force to plant, weed, and harvest Louisiana crops. As a short-term solution to this problem, it was suggestion that army troops not presently engaged in training could pose a possible answer to the

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, 20-21.
lack of a labor force. The U.S. Army acted on this suggestion and in 1943, several thousand troops to North and South Dakota, New York and Maine in thirty-day increments to harvest crops.\textsuperscript{23} Once farmers learned of the utilization of soldiers in harvesting crops, the War Department became flooded with requests and the use of soldiers to solve the agricultural work force problem was abandoned.

The importation of Mexican or Caribbean labor for Louisiana agricultural needs became a consideration, but this idea failed, as the United States Employment Agency wanted the Mexican labor force in the southwestern United States.\textsuperscript{24} Utilization of labor from the Bahamas and other West Indies islands came under discussion but Great Britain controlled those islands and the British government would not permit their citizens to work in the Southern States due to the segregation policies that existed in the South at that time.\textsuperscript{25}

Fortunately, by this time, the German forces in Tunisia had surrendered and several hundred thousand of POWS were on their journey to Louisiana and other states would fill the need. Accordingly, the War Department and the War Food Administration (WFA) began planning for the use of prisoners of war to replace those troops used as agricultural labor as well as in other labor fields.\textsuperscript{26} The passage of Public Law 45 offered a small degree of assistance for farmers in that it established exemptions for workers engaged in vital agricultural industry as well as those persons who claimed, and ultimately granted, conscientious objector status.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25} Joseph T. Butler, Jr., "Prisoner of War Labor in the Sugar Cane Fields of Lafourche Parish, Louisiana: 1943-1944", in \textit{The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History}. Vol. XVI. (The Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1997), 268.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid, 95-96.
Department of Agriculture

The USDA’s duties were to provide directions for research, production, conservation, marketing, extension services of all federal programs related to the agriculture industry as well as to rural development and regulations pertaining to the agricultural field. In April 1943, with the impending arrival of German prisoners of war from North Africa, and the decision of the War Department and WFA to utilize prisoners of war in agriculture, the USDA established procedures for their use. Wages for prisoner of war labor, housing, security, feeding and transportation issues would be decided through conference with the agencies responsible for those aspects. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Claude R. Wickard to the post of Secretary of Agriculture in September 1940, and Wickard remaining in that capacity until he resigned in June 30, 1945.

Southern Defense Command

The War Department established the Southern Defense Command (SDC), by letter AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M-WPB-M on March 17, 1941. The SDC included the states of New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama and the panhandle of Florida.

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29 Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), 86.
31 Note: Claude R. Wickard was born on his family’s Indiana farm. He became an Indiana state legislator and worked in the USDA in a number of positions from 1933 until his appointment as Secretary of Agriculture in 1940.
In addition, it also included the waters of the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to those states bordering it and extended roughly to the waters slightly north of Cuba. The SDC, one of five such Defense Commands established immediately prior to the entry of the United States in the Second World War.\footnote{Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engleman, and Byron Fairchild, \textit{Guarding the United States and Its Outposts}, (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1964), 28.}

The SDC established policies related to its primary responsibility for protecting those areas within its designated area of operations (\textit{Figure A}). As it applies to those states having a border on the Gulf of Mexico (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and the panhandle of Florida), the SDC established a policy that if allowed to stand, might have spelled disaster to Louisiana farmers and, in part, to American consumers. Fortunately, the Office of the Chief of Staff rejected this policy and the prisoner of war camps were established where they most needed.
Eighth Service Command

The Eighth Service Command (ESC), established by War Department General Order 35 on July 22, 1942, had the primary responsibility to provide technical assistance to the army in Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico and Oklahoma, an area comprising approximately 560,000 square miles. Among the technical services that this command provided, it established and operated all prisoners of war camps in these five states (Figure B). As such, this command would have the additional duty of supplying all prisoner of war labor for those industries authorized to utilize prisoner of war in the area of its responsibility.

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34 Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engleman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, 39.
Throughout the war years, the ESC would ultimately control 224 prisoner of war camps, with thirty-eight camps in Arkansas, fifty-two in Louisiana, twenty-two in New Mexico, thirty-two in Oklahoma and eighty in Texas.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{Figure B: Eighth Service Command Area of Operations} \textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36} Kathy Kirkpatrick, Appendix A to \textit{Prisoners of War Across America} (Salt Lake City, UT: GenTracer, 2012), Kindle edition.

Chapter 4: Camps and Utilization Process

The exact number of POW camps in Louisiana, the names used to identify some of the camps and the geographic locations of some camps within the state remains incomplete. Kathy Kirkpatrick's *Prisoners of War across America* (fifty-two camps) is most convincing, based on government documents. Some misidentifications in this book occur as to the names of some camps but these were minor.

Military installations in existence in Louisiana prior to the United States' entry into the Second World War were Fort Polk (August 1941), Camp Livingston (1940), Camp Claiborne (1930) and the New Orleans Port of Embarkation (1914), all served as *base camps* for prisoners of war. Camp Ruston, completed in 1942, also served as a base camp. Each of these five *base camps* established branch camps in areas in need of labor during planting and harvesting seasons.

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38 Note: Minor errors in the geographic locations and names of some of camps listed in Kirkpatrick's book were found. As an example, Kirkpatrick lists Jackson Barracks as being in St. Bernard Parish when it is in Orleans Parish. Camp Plauché, listed as being in Orleans Parish, is actually in Jefferson Parish. Still another example of confusion is the case of the branch camp at McCain's Gin. In a report of July 1, 1945 listing the number of prisoners of war confined in each camp in Louisiana (as well as those in all camps in the United States), this report lists McCain's Gin as being in Lincoln Parish. However, an extension service report from the same year indicates that McCain's Gin is located in Caddo Parish. Caddo Parish is in the extreme northwest corner of Louisiana while Lincoln Parish is in the north central, four parishes east of Caddo.

39 Note: Camp Ruston is located in the unincorporated village of Grambling, Louisiana. As Grambling did not have a post office, the mailing address became the camps name. Camp Plauché comes up once more in that Kirkpatrick lists this as Camp Plauché New Orleans Port of Embarkation. In 1941, the U.S. Army designated New Orleans Port of Embarkation as their *main* port of embarkation for U.S. Army supplies due in part to its geographic location linking the Mississippi River to Lake Pontchartrain via the Industrial Canal. Camp Plauché, located over thirteen nautical miles further up river from New Orleans, has no port facilities comparable to New Orleans.
What can be deduced from Kirkpatrick's sources, within a reasonable degree of certainty, is that thirty-six of Louisiana's sixty-four parishes had at least one POW camp located (in two instances, at least partially) within its geographic boundaries. Not all Louisiana parishes had POW camps within their geographic boundaries. If work was required in one of the thirty parishes not having a POW camp, POW labor was none-the-less available in the form of the

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41 Note: Eunice is located in both St. Landry and Acadia Parishes.
POW camps closest to the work site requiring a labor source. The POWS could not be required to work any longer than the normal daily work hours of U.S. residents, which in that time in history was ten hours. Additionally, Article 30 of the 1929 Geneva Conventions stipulated that the daily work hour included time traveled to and from the work site.

The use of POWS in parishes not having POW's camps within their geographic boundaries can be illustrated by a EFL Form 19, *Certification of Need for Employment of Prisoners Of War, (Figures D & E)* document from the Commanding General, Eighth Service Command to the Director, Agricultural Extension Service. The document indicates that POWS from the branch camp in Hammond (present day Hammond Regional Airport in Tangipahoa Parish) would be performing work between July 1 and October 31, 1945, for Bogalusa Tung Oil, Inc. at their Tung oil groves twelve miles north of Covington, St. Tammany Parish. The maximum number of days permitted for POW labor usage on the EFL contracts was restricted to ninety days by War Department policy.

Branch camps sites came and went from month to month and as the use of POWS were no longer needed in a particular area, the POWS moved to other branch or base camps depending

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44 Judge Leon Ford, III Collection, Local History, *EFL Form 19, dated June 23, 1945, from Commanding General, 8th Service Command to Director, Agricultural Extension*, Box 15, Folder 6, Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies and Archives, Southeastern Louisiana University, Hammond, Louisiana.  

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on the harvesting time and availability of local labor. An illustration of this is in a comparative look at the POW camps during the months of April and May 1945. The April 1, 1945 monthly reports of ESC lists twenty-eight named camps in Louisiana. The ESC report of May 1, 1945 lists thirty-five named camps in Louisiana.
CERTIFICATION OF NEED FOR EMPLOYMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

To: Commanding General
6th Service Command

The Director, Agricultural Extension certifies that:

1. The employer to whom this certificate is issued and whose name, address and place of business are listed below, has need for the labor hereinafter described for essential work at his establishment or farm.

   a. Name of employer: Bogalusa Tung Oil Inc
   c. Type of business: Farming
   d. Location of work (if not at above address): 12 miles north of Covington

   e. Labor needed: From 7/7/45 to 10/21/45 For period of approximately 90 days - months

   f. Detail of type of work, number of prisoners, and wage rates:

      Number: 8 or 17
      Occ. Title and Code for Industry: Farm labor
      Man days: 624 or 1326
      Unit: hour
      Prevailing wage: 36¢ per hr. or 25¢ per hr.

   g. If at piece rate, average civilian labor will complete 10 units per day.

   h. The employer usually furnished the following services free of charge to civilian labor:

   Transportation

   i. The employer will supply transportation to and from prisoner of war enclosure.

   j. The employer will not provide the noon day meal.

   k. Length of work day in this locality for this type of work is customarily 10 hours.

   Enter if appropriate, one or more of the following: transportation to and from work; noon meal; housing accommodations.

   - over -

Figure D: EFL Form 19, dated June 23, 1945, from Commanding General, 8th Service Command to Director, Agricultural Extension (Front side)
2. Conditions of employment offered by this employer are not less favorable than those for other workers in the same or similar employment at this establishment or farm, or less favorable than those prevailing in the locality for similar work.

3. The prevailing wage, or price per unit, certified above is that paid to free labor in this locality for this type of work. (For agricultural work, the prevailing wage, or price per unit, certified by the State Director of Extension may be based on public hearings conducted by County Farm Wage Boards.)

4. It has been impossible to secure the necessary workers for this employer through an active campaign of recruitment which has taken into account not only all persons normally engaged in the activities listed above, but also potential workers from other fields of activities.

5. The employer is willing to use, through contract with the Government, the labor of prisoners of war detained by the United States of America and in the custody of the War Department. It is the understanding of the undersigned that such contract will follow substantially War Department contract Form No. , and that amount to be paid and conditions stated in the contract will be in accord with those certified in this statement.

   EXHIBITS

I. Approval of the above certificate is recommended:

   Signature
   [Signature]
   County Agent (Title)

   June 20, 1945
   Date
   Covington, La.
   Address

II. The above certificate is approved:

   Signature
   [Signature]
   Director, Agricultural Extension (Title)

   JUN 23 1945
   Date
   University Station, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
   Address

Figure E: EFL Form 19, dated June 23, 1945, from Commanding General, 8th Service Command to Director, Agricultural Extension (Reverse side) 47

47 Judge Leon Ford, III Collection, Local History. EFL Form 19, dated June 23, 1945, from Commanding General, 8th Service Command to Director, Agricultural Extension, Box 15, Folder 6, Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies and Archives, Southeastern Louisiana University, Hammond, Louisiana.
One camp listed on April 1, 1945 is missing from the May 1, 1945 report while eight new camp names appear.\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Figure F} shows a list of named POW camps in Louisiana for the first and fifteenth day of April, first of May, October, November and December, 1944, and the first and fifteenth of January, 1945, and the first day of April and May, 1945, illustrates this fact most clearly.

An additional example of the establishment of branch camps and disappearing of others is that of the branch camps at Bell City in Calcasieu Parish. The 1 October 1944 monthly report of the ESC lists Bell City as being \textit{authorized construction}.\textsuperscript{49} The 1 November 1944 monthly report of the ESC lists Bell City as having 223 POWS and the 1 January 1945 monthly report lists 115 POWS.\textsuperscript{50} Bell City never appears again in any monthly report.

\textsuperscript{48} April and May 1945 Monthly List of Prisoner of War Camp locations by State. Special Collections, RG 319, Box 1, NACP.
\textsuperscript{49} 1 October 1944 Monthly list of Prisoner of War camp locations by state. Special Collections, RG 319, Box 1, NACP.
\textsuperscript{50} 1 November 1944 and 1 January 1945 Monthly list of Prisoners of War camp locations by state. Special Collections, RG 319, Box 1, NACP.
In implementing policies related to their responsibilities to protect that portion of the Continental United States assigned to them from attack (both external and internal), the SDC

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51 April, May, October, November and December 1944, and January, April and May 1945, Monthly list of Prisoner of War camp locations by State. Special Collections, RG 319, Box 1, NACP.
enforced a policy that stipulated that POW camps could not be located within 150 miles of any coastline. The establishment of this "exclusion zone" addressed the concerns by the SDC that POWS could use the waterways as an avenue of escape but also preventing sabotage by POWS housed in areas in close proximity to vital war industries or other sensitive areas. Resistance also came from Louisiana Senator Allan J. Ellender, who initially voiced objections to the use of POWS because he did not believe the system would work.

Fortunately, the Chief of Staff’s Office did not view the justifications of the SDC in establishing the 150-mile exclusion zone in a favorable light. However, the SDC was simply enforcing the established policies of the War Department in implementing the 150-mile exclusion zone. The exact reason for this position by the Chief of Staff in unclear, however, it probably has some basis in political pressure brought to bear by the American Sugar Cane League. What is clear is that the American Sugar Cane League carried a respectable amount of political power, along with local county agents, the extension service and the WMC to lobby Washington on its behalf. A number of factors may explain Senator Ellender's change of position on the use of German POWS. Firstly, Senator was a staunch Democrat and supporter of President Roosevelt and had personal financial interest in the sugar cane industry. Secondly, Senator Ellender relied on political support from the American Sugar Cane League for his political career.

52 Letter dated July 19, 1943 from Headquarters Southern Defense Command to Chief of Staff. Office of the Chief of Staff, RG 165, Entry 13, NACP.
54 Letter dated July 30, 1943 from Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel Division. Office of the Chief of Staff, RG 165, Entry 13, NACP.
Finally, there was the stipulation by the WMC that the usage of POW labor would have no adverse effect on the use of local labor. These factors in all probability may have played some part in Senator Ellender’s change of position on this issue. Senator Ellender later wrote Chief of Staff Marshall on the issue of using German POWS indicating his change of mind in regards to this issue. Of course sugar cane constituted the majority of crops in Louisiana, it was not the only crop, albeit the one most used by POW labor. Rice and cotton, like sugar cane, were seasonal crops. POWS moved from one location to another to coincide with the various harvesting seasons for each type of crop to ensure the fullest employment of the POWS.

The 150-miles exclusion zone established by the War Department, if allowed to stand, would have effectively eliminated over 82% of all POW camps in those Louisiana parishes needing labor in the agricultural field. The imposition of War Department and SDC policy would have negatively affected the sugar cane, rice, cotton and other agricultural products. The map in Figure C illustrates the 150-mile exclusion zone and its negative effect on Louisiana agriculture. As can be seen, only nine POW camps in Louisiana would have survived the 150-mile exclusion zone recommended by the SDC, the remaining thirty-nine would not have. Seventeen parishes were beyond the exclusion zone while the major portions of five and all of the remaining forty-two parishes were within the zone.

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The security concerns of the SDC about mass escapes ultimately evaporated along with the fear of sabotage caused by POWS confined in the United States, two of the reasons listed by the SDC for the exclusion zones. The photograph in Figure G shows the buildings comprising the Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft (Franklin Avenue at Lakeshore Drive in New Orleans by Lake Pontchartrain). On the opposite side of Franklin Avenue is the western portion of New Orleans Army Air Base (now University of New Orleans' East Campus). Figure G shows the location of the POW camp, within New Orleans Army Air Base and in relation to the Consolidate-Vultee plant.

Figure G: New Orleans Army Air Base at Industrial Canal and Lake Pontchartrain Looking West (Depiction of location of POW camps and aircraft plant added by author)

60 Note: The eastern portion of New Orleans Army Air Base (not shown) is now New Orleans Lakefront Airport (formerly Shushan Airport).
The twelve or so wooden structures standing apart from the mass of other buildings are the POW compound. The large cluster of buildings in the foreground was for the Army Air Forces Personnel assigned to the airfield. As with the security of all POW camps, U.S. Army Military Police personnel guarded the POWS and the area housing the POWS consisted of security perimeter fencing consistent with a prison facility. Initially the U.S. Army established a guard to prisoner ratio of 1 to 10. Later as concerns for sabotage and escapes diminished this ratio changed to 1 to 32.\(^62\) This reduction in the ratio of guards to POWS was set at a February 1944 conference of the commanding generals of the eleven Service Commands at a conference in Dallas, Texas. As it was becoming clearer that U.S. POW camp military police personnel were becoming more experienced in handling POWS, a policy of "calculated risk" was adopted, and less and less guards were used in guarding the POWS from this point until the last of the POWS departed the United States in July 1946.\(^63\)

Not all POWS lived in wooden barrack as at New Orleans Army Air Base (Figure G). Some, in more remote areas, lived in military tents, as in St. Martinville, Louisiana (Figure H) and had rather primitive guard towers (Figure I). Former Civilian Conservation Corps camps, unused portions of existing military camps, fairgrounds, tents and auditoriums were parts of a plan submitted by the Provost Marshal General's Office in September 1943 to accommodate the influx of German POWS.\(^64\) During the era of the Civilian Conservation Corps' existence (1933-1942), Louisiana has eighty-four CCC camps throughout the state.\(^65\)

\(^{62}\) Kathy Kirkpatrick, Managing the Camps in *Prisoners of War Across America*.


\(^{64}\) Arnold Krammer, *Nazi Prisoners of War in America*, 26-27.

A few statistical facts about the prisoners of war incarcerated in the United States reveal their benign captivity. Of the more than 476,000 German, Japanese and Italian prisoners of war incarcerated in the United States between 1941 and 1946, 2,499 prisoners tried to escape from detention. As of January 1946, there were still twenty-four Italian and twenty-nine German POWS of that number still at large. Of the total number of Japanese POWS held in the United States, fifteen escaped but recaptured. Twelve Italian and ninety-two German POWS committed suicide (some German POWS may have been forced to commit suicide by rabid pro-Nazis POWS) and nine murdered by other POWS and forty-three POWS shot to death by prison guards while attempting to escape.\footnote{66}{None of the Japanese POWS chose suicide.}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{POW_Camp_St_Martinville_Louisiana.jpg}
\caption{POW Camp St. Martinville, Louisiana \footnote{67}{Courtesy of James B. "Bill" Bailey}}
\end{figure}

\footnote{66}{"All POW to Be Out of Country in Four Months," \textit{Morning Advocate} (Baton Rouge, LA), January 7, 1946.}

\footnote{67}{James B. Bailey, \textit{St. Martinville Prisoner of War Camp}. Private Collection of James B. Bailey, New Iberia, Louisiana. (Note: Eighth Service Command Insignia above St. Martinville)}
Deaths by accidents occurred. In Louisiana, the amount of accident fatalities involving motor vehicles apparently required a written notice by Colonel Tom B. Martin, Commanding Officer, Camp Livingston Prisoner of War camp in late October, 1945. Colonel Martin, citing the numerous fatalities, sent instructions to all safety officers and branch camp commander: be cognize of, and adhere to, the provisions of Army Service Forces (ASF) Manual M-811

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68 James B. Bailey, *Guard Tower St. Martinville Prisoner of War Camp.*
(Handbook for Work Supervisors of Prisoners of War) in addition to ASF Manuals M-805 and M-806.69

The rate of escapees to the POW population almost disappeared at a rate of .0052%, an exceedingly low figure. The suicide rate was even lower at .00021%. In its policy of treatment and adherence to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the United States must have had some effect on the POWS. Proportionately speaking, the vast majority chose to sit-out the war rather than escape and make their way back to their country of origin so they could again take up arms and once more, place themselves in harm's way.

The Geneva Conventions of 1929 addressed a number of issues regarding the treatment, housing, feeding and caring for prisoners of war. It also stipulated which POWS could be required to perform labor, which ones could not70, the number of work hours per day, and numbers of workdays per week allowed. In addition, it established rules as to payment for labor performed, type of labor, religious issues, sanitary conditions, recreation and medical treatment prisoners were entitled.

While the United States made every attempt to fully comply with all articles of the Geneva Conventions of 1929, one instance of deliberate non-compliance bear mentioning in some detail as they related to fifty-eighty special German POWS incarcerated in Louisiana. This most interesting incident occurred less than a year before Germany's surrender on May 7, 1945, and is one of the few instances where the United States, a signatory to the Geneva Conventions of 1929 deliberately violated at least two provisions of that document.

69 Jules A. Dornier Collection, Letter dated October 18, 1945 from Lieutenant Colonel Tom B. Martin, 8th Service Command to Safety Officers and Branch Camp Commanders. Call Number 50:15, Box 1, Hill Memorial Library, Special Collections, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
70 Note: Officers were not required to perform labor; non-commissioned officers could if they desired but only in a supervisory role.
With the capture of U-505 by the United States Navy on June 4, 1944, the United States recovered codebooks as well as Germany's Enigma coding machine. In order to maintain the illusion that U505 sunk along with its codebooks and Enigma coding machine, the crew of U-505, incarcerated at Camp Ruston, Louisiana, and held incommunicado for the remainder of the war in violation of Articles 871 and 3672 of the Geneva Conventions of 1929. The United States deliberately concealed the existence of the crew of U-505 from inspection teams of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Legation and the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) during their regular inspection of Camp Ruston.73

The captivity of German POWs confined in Louisiana POW camps became more bearable by the humane treatment they received from the local civilian population. The German POW’s were both “shocked and overwhelmed at how they were treated.”74 No doubt, this attitude by the locals and its effect it had on the German POW’s, most certainly contributed to the absence of the much-feared mass escapes. Certainly, the quantity and quality of food the POWS consumed also had some positive effect as well. A typical day’s meal consisted of:

- **Breakfast** - Corn flakes, cake or bread, marmalade, coffee, milk, sugar
- **Lunch** - Potato salad, Roast Pork, Carrots, Ice water
- **Dinner** - Meat Loaf, Scrambled Eggs or Boiled Eggs, Coffee, Milk, Bread

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71 Note: Article 8 required all belligerent parties to notify each other of their capture of prisoners within the shortest period and to supply an official address so the captured prisoners could correspond with their families.
72 Note: Article 36 required each of the belligerents to allow a certain number of letters and post cards to be sent by each prisoner per month and shall not delay or prevent the sending of correspondence as a means of punishment. Further that the prisoners shall be allowed to send correspondence within no more than one week after arrival at the camp.
In retrospect, the process involved in obtaining POW labor for agricultural efforts while relatively easy, once the interactions between the ASF, CFEP, CSC, EFLP, ESC, FSA, SDC, SSS, USDA WFA, WPB and WMC is understood, became nonetheless, a laborious one. The process began once the POWs were in their respective detention facilities and their availability and the necessary steps taken made known to those in need of the services.

The guidelines on this issue were very specific indeed, as can be seen by the policy portion of a WMC bulletin 63 of August 14, 1943 that states:

Prisoners of war will be employed only when other labor is not available and cannot be recruited from other areas within a reasonable length of time. Before the War Manpower Commission certifies to the need or using prisoners of war, all supplies of labor, including secondary sources, within the area from which workers normally come to perform work of this type must be exhausted. Prisoners of war shall not be used in any way which will impair the wages, working conditions, and employment opportunities of resident labor, or displace employed workers.

As evidence of the fact that the use of prisoners of war will not affect local conditions of employment adversely, the employer must place a bona fide order for the workers needed within the local employment office. It is advisable to allow the local office a reasonable time to fill the order before preparing a certification of the need for prisoners of war.  

In implementing this policy, the WMC bulletin defined their interpretation of exhausting the labor supply as,

1 Determination of the availability of workers registered with the local employment office.
2 Advertisement for workers through newspapers, radio, posters, trade papers, and other suitable media.
3 Solicitation of the cooperation of labor organizations and other community group to direct qualified workers to the local employment office.
4 Active recruitment of workers by visiting their homes, canvassing places of business and other places where workers congregate.
5 Recruitment of workers on relief rolls.
6 Utilization of Selective Service Questionnaires.

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7 Recruiting auxiliary labor supplies, if they can be used, such as youth, women, organizations of volunteers.\textsuperscript{77}

The various steps required in the process of obtaining POW labor, to the exclusion of native labor, created a typical governmental bureaucratic nightmare in the instance of identifying a need for POW labor in the agriculture field. In accordance with the request for POW labor, the State Extension Service Director Harry C. Sanders, prepared and transmitted EFL (Emergency Farm Labor) form 19 (Figures D & E) to the directors of the State War Manpower Commission. The director sends the form to the appropriate office in the War Department for action.\textsuperscript{78}

The War Department transmits the form to the ASF who then forwarded it to the ESC for Louisiana. The ESC sends the form to the POW camp commander closest to the farm requesting POW labor. The locations chosen for the camp, determined initially by the locations of permanent U. S. Army camps, i.e., Camp Ruston, Camp Livingston and Fort Polk. Next, camps closest to the fields requiring labor were next to be utilized. Finally, if none of these camps were near enough to the fields, the farmers or company owning the fields, would have to provide acceptable accommodations for the prisoners.\textsuperscript{79}

The number of camps grew as the number of POWS increased. The United States initially agreed to accept 50,000 POWS from the British in August 1943 to relieve their overcrowding.\textsuperscript{80} As the war progressed and more Germans became POWS, the number of

\textsuperscript{77} War Manpower Commission, \textit{United States Employment Services Headquarters Bulletin No. 63, dated August 14, 1943}, Records of the War Manpower Commission, RG 211, Entry 11, NACP.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{80} Arnold Krammer, \textit{Nazi Prisoners of War in America}, 2.
POWS arriving in the United States likewise grew, at a rate of approximately 10,000 to 20,000 per month beginning in September 1943. The high-water mark for POWS occurred in May 1945 when the United States held 425,871 POWS of which 371,683 were Germans.

In some instances, would be employers of POW labor attempted to use existing state or parish facilities closest to the work by offering these locales in lieu of those farther away. This required an inspection team from the POW camp to ensure the site met those conditions in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 1929. Among agricultural products designated as war essential were the various products obtained from the Tung Oil tree. In Louisiana, St. Tammany Parish had the sole Tung Oil industry in the state. The Tung Nut Growers requested the use of seven locations in St. Tammany Parish to house POWS. After an inspection by representatives of Tung Oil Growers, local county agent and officers from the POW camp, two of the seven sites were determined to be unacceptable, in their existing conduction, to Army requirements (Figure J).

The type of work performed by the POWS came in three categories: Class I type work ranged from beautifying the camps to planting gardens. Class II work involved laboring in agriculture, factories and lumbering thought contracts with local employees. Class III work consisted of menial task such as picking up trash.

81 Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 41-42.
82 Ibid, 272.
83 Judge Leon Ford, III Collection, Letter dated 17 July 1944 from Lieutenant Colonel Tom B. Martin, commanding officer, Eighth Service Command, to Mr. L. O. Murrell, County Agent, Washington Parish, Franklin, Louisiana. Local History, Box 15, Folder 6, Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies and Archives, Southeastern Louisiana University, Hammond, Louisiana.
84 Antonio S. Thompson, Men in German Uniform: POWs in America during World War II (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2010), 86.
Figure J: July 17, 1944 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Tom B. Martin to County Agent L. O. Murrell.85

85 Judge Leon Ford, III Collection, Letter dated July 17, 1944 from Lieutenant Colonel Tom B. Martin, commanding officer, Eighth Service Command to Mr. L. O. Murrell, County Agent, Washington Parish, Franklin, Louisiana. Local History, Box 15, Folder 6, Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies and Archives, Southeastern Louisiana University, Hammond, Louisiana.
Not all POWS worked in the physically demanding agricultural industry in Louisiana. Those fortunate POWS housed at New Orleans Army Air Field on the lakefront in New Orleans tended to have less physical jobs. As can be seen in the photograph in Figure K, the POWS are removing plants from the 1000 block of Leonidas Street in uptown New Orleans for eventual transplanting at LaGarde Army General Hospital at 421 Robert E. Lee Boulevard, a few blocks from the airfield where the POW camp was located.\textsuperscript{86} POWS from Camp Harahan performed similar duties and this gave the POWS performing this type of labor, a sense of freedom.\textsuperscript{87}

\textbf{Figure K: Photograph of German POWS working in uptown New Orleans} \textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{86} Note: LaGarde Army General Hospital was located on the entire land mass between the north side of Robert E. Lee Boulevard to Lakeshore Drive and between West End Boulevard and Canal Boulevard. All land reclaimed from Lake Pontchartrain in the 1930's as part of a Works Progress Administration project.

\textsuperscript{87} David Clarke, \textit{The Utilization of P.O.W. Labor in Louisiana During World War II: A Comparison of Wehrmacht P.O.W. Labor Production With That of Prewar Civilian Agricultural Labor}, 49-50.

\textsuperscript{88} \textquotedblleft Our Times: POWs on the Streets of New Orleans,\textquotedblright \textit{Times-Picayune} (New Orleans, Louisiana), March 3, 2012. Photo is from either 1944 or 1945.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

How then, could a country, burdened with so many layers of bureaucracy and the inherent inefficiency and time delays associated with it, managed to produce and supply products for its own not only population, but also supply vast quantity of those goods for shipment to its allies? With all the various programs and agencies discussed in the preceding pages, and many more not mentioned, how did the United States manage to accomplish the extraordinary feats of production and distribution that helped achieve victory?

Given their totalitarian regimes, certainly some, if not all the Axis Powers suffered through similar adversities, as did the United States? Germany, known for its orderliness and precision in so many areas, failed to accomplish what the United States managed to accomplish. One critical factor that is most telling is that the industries and populations of the United States never was subjected to the massive aerial bombing campaign that Germany and Japan had to contend with and this most certainly played a decisive part.

That it worked at all is an amazing story considering all the internal hurdles to overcome. There were the obvious human factors of personal power desires, individual prestige concerns, and personal animosities that came into play. Additionally, there were genuine differences of opinions on how to address specific problems or if it needed addressing. In addition, there were policies poorly written that caused confusion as well as agency territorial prerogatives within the bureaucracies of the various federal agencies involved needed resolution as well. It is the overriding element in explaining the processes involved as it applies to the telling of this story.

Then one must consider that President Roosevelt managed to retain all his essential administrators, both civilian and military, in place during the United States participation in the Second World War. This most certainly had some impact on the continuity of operations of the
various branches of government. Their familiarity with each other, contrary to breeding contempt, must have served to overcome any differences they may have had. That factor must have some positive results that helped to ensure victory. Coincidentally, the fact that the heads of the WMC, USDA, and SSS were Indianans from farming families or farming areas must have influenced their identification with the plight of those engaged in the agricultural industry, even if sub-conscientiously.

The inescapable fact that it did indeed work is certainly a testimony to the political system of the United States and the perseverance and determination of its people in what they believed to be a just cause. Louisiana farmers harvested their crops and other non-military types of work provided for. The much-feared sabotages never occurred and the equally feared mass escapes held to a minimum and all escapees eventually apprehended.

Kurt Richard Westphal, Louisiana's last German POW escapee, discovered by German authorities living in Hamburg in 1954, escaped from Camp Ruston in August 1945. The last German POW to escape and remain at-large longer than any other was Georg Gaertner. Gaertner, captured in Tunisia in 1943, surrendered to federal authorities in California in September 1985, forty years after escaping from Camp Deming, New Mexico on September 21, 1945.

There were monetary benefits for all parties involved as well. All prisoners of war who chose to work were paid eighty cents per day, for a maximum of ten hours work per day and a

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89 Mark 6:1-6 [KJV].
maximum of six workdays per week during those months when needed. However, an incentive program was in place that allowed POWS to make as much as $1.50 per day if the prisoner worked hard.\textsuperscript{92} Each POW had a bank account opened in his name and the money earned placed in it until the POW was repatriated to Germany in late 1946. Given the Germany economy at that time, the U. S. dollar, no matter the amount, had a greater worth than the Reich mark or Deutschemark.\textsuperscript{93}

The Louisiana agricultural industry also experienced as benefit from the use of German POWS beyond the obvious that Louisiana farmers harvested their crops rather than have them rot in the fields. The statistical data all indicate an improvement in production. Overall, agricultural production increased.\textsuperscript{94} Taking into account the sugar cane production alone, the figures show an increase in output compared to the period before the use of POWS and the output during their employment.\textsuperscript{95} The increase in sugar cane production is evident in a comparison of the Office of War Production (OWP) estimates of the maximum capacity of Louisiana sugar cane capabilities in 1941 and the actual acreage of sugar cane harvested during the years that German POWS labor was use. The OWP projected a harvest of approximately 300,000 acres in 1942, the year prior to arrival and usage of Germans POW labor. During the 1942-1944 periods, Louisiana sugar cane harvest stood at 772,000 acres or approximately 384,000 acres per year an increase of 84,000 acres on yearly average.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{92} Arnold Krammer, \textit{Nazi Prisoners of War in America}, 68.
\textsuperscript{93} Note: The Reichmark was Germany's currency from 1924 until replaced by the Deutschmark in 1948.
\textsuperscript{94} David Clarke, \textit{The Utilization of P.O.W. Labor in Louisiana During World War II: A Comparison of Wehrmacht P.O.W. Labor Production With That of Prewar Civilian Agricultural Labor}, 35-37.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid, 48.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid, 35-36.
The monetary benefits can be more clearly understood when viewing statistics from the fourth quarter of 1943, the infancy of POWS labor in Louisiana. The monies paid by farmers for POW labor totaled $1,479,216.26. By 1944, that amount had grown to $17,780,357.44. By July 31, 1945, it had reached a staggering $25,422,220.52. The American investment in utilizing POW labor resulted in a profit of $46,000,000.00. This represents $611,244,382.02 in 2016 dollars.

The United States and its allies successfully prosecuted the war and brought it to a victorious conclusion. The federal government realized a monetary profit, produced and supplied the needed resources and managed to successfully incarcerate hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war. Louisiana farmers brought in their crops and thus maintained their livelihood. Louisiana farmer and Louisiana’s county agents feeling for the work provided by German POWS was expressed in their gratitude for the labor qualities of the German POWS, when they claim the Germans POWS were, "the salvation of Louisiana agriculture." A 1945 statement by the chairman of the Labor Committee of the American Sugar Cane League stated most succinctly that, "the labor return of PWs has become so efficient . . . it is practically equivalent to, or even sometimes exceeds the return of our own labor."
The majority of Louisianans who used German POWS expressed satisfaction with their hard work ethic. 101 Louisiana's agriculture survived and the state profited financially, and when the German POWS arrived in their devastated homeland they, at least, had money in their pockets to survive and start life anew.

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Vita

Ronald Brady was born and raised in New Orleans, Louisiana. In 1968, Ronald received his General Education Diploma (GED) from Francis T. Nicholls Senior High while serving in the United States Marine Corps. Ronald began his undergraduate studies at Saint Mary's Dominican College in 1974, eventually transferring to Loyola University of New Orleans in 1977, where he received a Bachelor of Criminal Justice in January 1979. Ronald began his graduate studies at University of New Orleans in August 2012.

A retired 26-year veteran of the New Orleans Police Department and a retired 25-year veteran of the United States Marine Corps Reserve, Ronald has directed and taught anti-terrorism training courses for the U. S. Department of States Antiterrorism Assistance Program for 17 years in both the United States as well as numerous foreign countries. Ronald has also conducted security audits and vulnerability assessments for a variety of private corporations.

Ronald is married and resides in Covington, Louisiana with his wife of forty-three years. Ronald and Jeanne have four sons and four grandchildren. His hobbies are genealogical research and collecting U. S. military decorations.