Sacred Dictators: A Wholly Unholy Relationship between Dictatorships and Religious Leaders

Thomas McQuaid
University of New Orleans, tmcquaid@uno.edu

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Sacred Dictators: A Wholly Unholy Relationship between Dictatorships and Religious Leaders in Africa

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of New Orleans in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Thomas Michael McQuaid

B.S. Tulane University, 2000
J.D. Loyola University, 2004
M.B.A. Loyola University, 2007
M.A. University of New Orleans, 2013

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Abstract

How a single party and personal dictatorship survive has been a question of much debate among scholars. Geddes (1999, 2003) creates a model to determine which survives the longest. Within her model, she finds that a single party dictatorship – one with a party apparatus – survives longer than a personal dictatorship – one where a single person has sole policymaking ability. She argues that the fundamental difference between the two is how each treats the opposition. The party apparatus allows a single party dictatorship the means to silence the opposition by coopting it into the party structure whereas a personal dictatorship must rely on the wealthy and military to keep any opposition at bay. With a single party dictatorship being able to coalesce the opposition, this dictatorship is more stable and survives longer. I agree with Geddes’ reasoning and seek to clarify how this situation works in Sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that a single party dictatorship can silence and use religious leaders in the opposition to gain support from the religious leaders’ followers. This additional support from the religious leaders and the followers makes single party dictatorships survive longer than personal dictatorships in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this research, I explain the importance of religion as a variable for dictatorship survival research in Sub-Saharan Africa. I show that religious leaders have a certain level of control over followers and if coopted by a dictatorship, religious leaders’ control garners support among followers. I further explain how religious leaders are in the opposition and therefore can only be coopted by a single party dictatorship. I conclude by showing that religious leaders increase a single party dictatorship’s survival likelihood.

Keywords: Sub-Saharan Africa, Africa, Dictatorship, Dictatorship Survival
Chapter 1: Holy Introduction

Since independence, dictatorships have plagued Sub-Saharan Africa since and thwarted any trajectory, for certain countries on the continent, to become democratic societies. These dictatorships committed and continue to commit atrocious human rights violations. In most cases, created societies that are instable and on the brink of economic collapse. Understanding the mechanics of dictatorship survival allows for appropriate policy making so as not to support these forms of government to endure.

According to Geddes (1999; 2003), a single party dictatorship – one that has a party apparatus for policy decisions – survives longer than a personal dictatorship – one that has a dictator who has sole policy making capacity. Both types rely on a core group of elites, typically the wealthy and military, to provide the dictatorship with the ability to guard against challenges from citizens. This dictatorship-elite relationship is paramount for dictatorship survival (Geddes 1999; 2003). Although this relationship creates a certain level of stability in a dictatorship, Geddes (2003) reasons that a substantial difference in how each treats the opposition exists and that this difference makes a single party dictatorship more likely to survive. A single party dictatorship, with its party apparatus, can silence the opposition by extending party membership. Party membership coalesces the opposition into cooperating with the dictatorship. A personal dictatorship, without this party structure, does not coalesce the opposition. Rather, it relies on its elites to guard against the opposition, usually with repression. The ability to silence and coopt the opposition strengthens the support base and is the reason why a single party dictatorship is more likely to survive than a personal dictatorship (Geddes 2003).

I agree with Geddes (2003) that the way each dictatorship treats the opposition accounts for why a single party dictatorship is more likely to survive than a personal dictatorship. However, I
believe that Geddes’ (2003) analysis does not take into account an important factor present in Sub-Saharan Africa: religion and religious leaders. I advocate for the inclusion of religion and religious leaders into a dictatorship survival analysis and seek to add explanatory variables for religion and religious leaders into the analysis.

I proceed in this chapter by showing how the European colonial powers used religion and religious leaders to aid in colonial administration. I then show that in the current Sub-Saharan African setting, religion remains very important within societies. I will then conclude by advocating for the inclusion of religious variables in a dictatorship survival analysis and outline the subsequent chapters of this study which seek to show support for how religion affects dictatorship survival.

**European Colonization**

To avoid a potential costly conflict between European states, the European rulers carved up Africa in the Berlin Conference 1884-1885 (Herbst 2000; Mazuri 2009). After the conference, the European colonial powers invested in Africa to secure resources. Each power used religious leaders to offer some level of services to the populace – education, healthcare and food (Fage 2002; Meredith 2005). To access these services, a member of the populace had to be a member of the religious organization and follow the religious leader. The Sub-Saharan African learned quickly that access to services required adherence to the religious leader who was connected to the colonial power (Herbst 2000; Fage 2002; Mazuri 2009).

**British Colonial Rule**

British colonies functioned with a certain level of autonomy; the local administration combined British agents and local colonists to administer a colony with the British appointed colonial governor having ultimate authority (Meredith 2005; Dowden 2009; Lange 2009).
Formal British establishments in its colonies existed on the coast with rails linking to the interior for resource extraction. The British governor relied on local coopted officials to manage the interior. This structure mirrored Great Britain’s primary concern for its Sub-Saharan African colonial interests: resource extraction. With British financial investment focusing on resource extraction, the British turned to religious leaders for education, healthcare and general welfare (Meredith 2005). During the colonial period, the local populace experienced a government that selected certain privileged members of society to maintain power and that relied on religious leaders to provide services to the populace (Meredith 2005; Lange 2009).

*Independence*

After the Second World War, the British needed to devote its finances to rebuilding Great Britain. British African colonies had to assume some level of self-supporting governmental infrastructure that provided for eventual independence, releasing London from potential colonial financial burdens while setting up a commonwealth for the continued association to Great Britain to guarantee access to resources (Meredith 2005). To achieve devolution, the British decided to transition each of its colonies to a democratic structure over time. Constitutions were to create the rules for the new governments and a general timeline whereby powers transferred from the British colonial governor to the local Sub-Saharan African government. Elections were to begin to fill seats in parliamentary bodies created by the constitutions (Lange 2009). With little to no experience with democracy, most emerging leaders in the former British Sub-Saharan African colonies used these democratic institutions to consolidate power as single party dictatorships and mimic British colonial government (Meredith 2005). In all of these cases, the former colonies could neither afford to set up nor provide the services offered by religious leaders. Religious leaders retained a substantial societal role post-independence (Meredith 2005).
Ghana’s Nkrumah: Prophet or President?

The Gold Coast, later renamed Ghana, became the first of the colonies to gain independence, albeit before the British timetable and expectations. Kwame Nkrumah, a self-declared Marxist socialist and staunch anti-imperialist supporter, became the leader of the “Self-Government NOW” campaign (Meredith 2005). He became known for being one of the common people, frequenting the smallest of villages and sitting on hut floors to gain support for his independence movement. Meredith (2005) explains that:

To the young, to the homeless ‘verandah boys’ who slept on the verandahs of the wealthy, he became an idol, a political magician whose performances generated a sense of excitement, of hope, of expectation. His radical appeal spread to trade unionists, ex-servicemen, clerks, petty traders and primary school teachers, to a new generation, frustrated and impatient, seeking a better way of life. To those without money, without position, without property, Nkrumah’s call of ‘Freedom’ was an offer of salvation.

Nkrumah, a baptized Catholic who had callings to become a Jesuit priest, had a consistent manner of speech with religious overtones. He offered all salvation: “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will follow” (Meredith 2005 at 19). Through him and his movement, independence meant salvation; politics and religion are one in the same.

He advocated for boycotts and strikes calling for immediate independence and denounced the British government. As his speeches grew more radical, Arden-Clarke, the British governor had Nkrumah arrested. This detention coincided with the first Ghanaian elections. While in prison, Nkrumah won a seat in the new parliament. This situation forced the governor to pardon and release Nkrumah to avoid a popular uprising (Meredith 2005).

In parliament, Nkrumah pushed for more local power and a quicker timetable for independence. In July 1953, he introduced a bill to parliament for immediate independence stating that, “We prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquility” (Meredith 2005
at 22). The British, although reluctant, granted self-government within a year. Nkrumah’s image continued to increase with newspapers equating Nkrumah as having supernatural powers, as being a prophet, as being Moses leading Africans to the promised land of independence (Meredith 2005). People started to believe Nkrumah to be a deity able to grant miracles (Meredith 2005). The Ghana example shows a leader using religious rhetoric and its powers to consolidate power over the government to usher in dictatorial rule.

The Christian Whites of the East

The British Eastern Sub-Saharan African colonies of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe have the same overall colonial administrative structure and goal of resource extraction as those in Western Sub-Saharan Africa with one exception: large amounts of White settlers (Meredith 2005). The White settlers felt a duty to educate the Sub-Saharan African in Christianity. They showed that access to White privileges, although restricted consistently restricted to locals, only came with Christianity (Meredith 2005). These White settlers made the importance of Christianity and its religious leaders even stronger than in Western Sub-Saharan Africa.

French Colonial Rule

The French goal in Sub-Saharan Africa starkly contrasted the British goal for resources. The French set out to assimilate the colonial Sub-Saharan African into a proper cultural Frenchmen, referred to as Frenchification (Chafer 2002). The colonial Sub-Saharan African was to speak French, eat baguettes and attend Catholic mass on Sundays (Chafer 2002). The Catholic religion and its leaders were directly involved in colonial administration and given a privileged status. To access any benefits, being Catholic was a requirement (Chafer 2002).
Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the French had created a certain amount of “Frenchified” colonists who quickly became privileged members in their respective societies. When the Second World War began, these “Frenchified” colonists rallied their societies in support of France. In the 1940 battle of France, 24,000 Black West African soldiers fought alongside White French soldiers to fend off the Nazi invasion of France (Chafer 2002; Meredith 2005). After the capitulation of France, The French colonial Sub-Saharan Africans refused to surrender and partook in the Allied offensive in Africa and the subsequent invasion of Italy. In the eyes of the colonial Africans, they came to the motherland’s aid when France was in dire straits and confirmed their allegiance (Meredith 2005). From this war, two Black West Africans rose to the forefront as leaders of the French colonies, Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire; both part of the culturally assimilated elite. These men felt that the devotion of the Sub-Saharan African colonies to France in World War Two merited equality between the two. Senghor, having partaken in the Battle of France and been a prisoner in a German concentration camp, felt that the future remained in a closer association with France. Houphouet-Boigny believed that no other choice but the continuation of a union with France existed. Both denounced Nkrumah as a radical and the British plan for independence of its colonies as unfeasible (Meredith 2005).

As these men advocated for growing equality between France and the Sub-Saharan African colonies, the message grew in popularity among the Black West African populace. The initial French response devised the Union Francaise whereby no more distinctions between France and the Sub-Saharan African colonies existed, rather, “full unity” (Chafer 2002). This unification existed only in maps and to appease colonial desires (Meredith 2005). The French feared being outnumbered by the Sub-Saharan Africans in government due to the Sub-Saharan Africans’
population size. For this reason, the Union Francaise’s design centered on promulgating unity while ensuring White French control over the government in Paris; Sub-Saharan Africans’ seat in Parisian government remained disproportionate to population. Feeling betrayed, Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny organized protests and demonstrations to fight for true unity. Although the protests and demonstrations sometimes became violent, both always reaffirmed their loyalty to France and the Union Francaise.

With a major rebellion in French Indo-China and Algeria and the British colonies movement toward independence, The French government feared that the demands for true unity could either turn violent or demand independency like the British colonies or both (Meredith 2005). All scenarios overstretched French capabilities to hold its empire intact. The French had already began to struggle in Indo-China and Algeria and reducing military capabilities from either to Sub-Saharan Africa equated to an almost certain collapse of the empire (Meredith 2005). To decisively end the African question, President De Gaulle called for a referendum in the Sub-Saharan African territories regarding the Union Francaise whereby the territories could either decide to remain in a newly organized union or leave. De Gaulle assumed the answer would be yes and the question of equality quelled; his message was clear that the new Union would function as the old one. He toured the Sub-Saharan African territories to campaign for a “Yes” vote and made clear that a “No” vote meant a complete and utter break from France; considered blackmail by most (Meredith 2005).

All Sub-Saharan African territories, except for Guinea, voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Union Francaise. Guinea, having voted for immediate independence, received its independence along with a cut to all French aid and destruction by the French on departure of as much French infrastructure as possible; even light bulbs were repossessed (Meredith 2005).
Although the rest of the territories reaffirmed the Union, the referendum did little to definitively end Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny from continually demanding more power and organizing the masses to demand such power. De Gaulle as well as Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny realized that no solution existed to appease both sides. With the Algerian revolt having grown into a full scale war for independence, De Gaulle needed to direct his attention to that matter. For this reason, he granted independence to thirteen new states in 1960, few of which were economically viable (Meredith 2005, Dowden 2009). Immediately after granting independence, he maneuvered to secure treaties maintaining the benefits of the former colonies to remain exclusively in French hands. Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny used their popularity to secure rule while reaffirming their commitment with a continued association to Frenchification, France and the Catholic religion, allowing this religion and its leaders to retain their privileged colonial role in society. In the 1980s, Houphouet-Boigny constructed the largest Catholic basilica in the world for these religious leaders to show his acquiescence to their authority (Meredith 2005).

**Islam in French and British Colonies**

Although Frenchification was France’s goal and leaders such as Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny embraced Frenchification, this goal was committed mainly to paper due to it being cost prohibitive to comprehensively employ throughout the colonial territory (Chafer 2002; Meredith 2005). Similar to the British, the French made only minor investment into the interior of its territories, limiting Frenchification to coastal regions (Chafer 2002). Both the French and British relied on Islamic leaders for the administration of the interior (Lange 2009). Before French and British colonization, Islamic influences had already pushed south from North Africa into West Africa to secure trade and resources. Due to these Islamic groups closing off non-Islamic groups
from beneficial commercial trade and funds, the interiors had become heavily Islamic (Fage 2002). Although The French and British set up colonial services via Christian leaders on the coast, both had to rely on Islamic leaders for services and control in the interior. In many cases, these Islamic religious leaders both provided access to services and were the official connection to the colonial administration (Chafer 2002; Lange 2009).

**Portuguese Colonial Rule**

The administration of the Portuguese colonies - Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique – was haphazard. The Portuguese wished for strong control but lacked the budget to do such. Lacking the financial means, the Portuguese government elevated Catholicism and its leaders to supply resources and gave it certain official functions while encouraging Portuguese White settlement in its colonies, giving the White settlers unfair land privileges (Meredith 2005).

**Independence**

Following British and French colonial independence, Nationalist movements in each Portuguese colony began to demand independence (Meredith 2005). Portugal responded by denying independence and a full scale war ensued. Catholic leaders provided for the populace during the struggle. In 1974, a coup d’état occurred in Portugal and the Portuguese army ceased hostilities in Sub-Saharan Africa. These colonies became independent and the leaders of the Nationalist movements secured power as head of each respective nationalist movement. These nationalist movements became the governing political parties (Meredith 2005). The Portuguese example shows an administrative privileged status for Catholic religious leaders as well as Catholic religious leaders offering services before independence and during the independence struggle.

**Current Sub-Saharan African Religious Attachment**
All of the European colonizers used religion and religious leaders to provide some level of services and, in many cases, granted religious leaders governmental roles. Religion during the colonial period played an important role in the populace’s daily life. The European colonizers gave Christianity a staunch role with the populace while elevating, in the French and British cases in West Africa, interior Islamic religious leaders.

Using 20 Sub-Saharan African countries¹ included in the 2008 Afrobarometer study, Table 1.0 shows that these two religious traditions are the largest in Sub-

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Saharan Africa. I argue that these two religious traditions and its religious leaders have had and do have a role to play in Sub-Saharan African politics.

Turning to the issue of religious membership in Sub-Saharan Africa, Table 1.1 shows that religious membership and affiliation remains strong in present day Sub-Saharan Africa with 67.1 percent of the populace having some sort of affiliation, 73.3 percent if leaders are included. With such a large part of the populace having some sort of membership or affiliation, religion is a factor that should not be ignored in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition to religious membership and affiliation among the Sub-Saharan populace, Table 1.2 shows that Sub-Saharan Africans, even those who claim no level of membership to a religion, find religion to be very important in everyday life. This response indicates that the majority of the current Sub-Saharan African populace may be highly susceptible to religious leaders’ opinions.
Given the presence of religious membership and the levels of religiosity in Sub-Saharan African society and the presence and importance of religious leaders during the colonial period, I argue that the inclusion of religion and religious leaders as explanatory variables offers deeper insight into strategies that a dictatorship can use to extend survival. Within these highly religious societies, the religious leaders may have a consistent and pervasive sway within their communities. This sway can increase a dictatorship’s longevity if the dictatorship coopts religious leaders to cultivate support among the religious communities.

**Chapter Outlines**

To show how religion and religious leaders can affect dictatorship survival, I break down my research into 5 subsequent chapters.

*Chapter 2: The Whole Holy Theory*

In Chapter 2, I explain Geddes’ (2003) research on dictatorship survival and argue that by excluding religious leaders and their influences from her research, her results do not capture an adequate picture of how these dictatorships survive in Sub-Saharan Africa. My claim is that in a personal dictatorship, religious leaders are completely excluded whereas in a single party dictatorship, religious leaders are included if they pose a credible threat to the dictatorship’s stability. These religious leaders garner support among members. By a single party dictatorship having the ability to use religious leaders for added support, this type of dictatorship survives longer than a personal dictatorship in Sub-Saharan Africa.

*Chapter 3: Holy Control: Religious Leaders’ Congregational Control*

In Chapter 3, I begin the analysis by showing that religious leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa have control over followers. In order for religious leaders to matter to a dictatorship, they must

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2 In all empirical chapters, I rely on SPSS.
control followers. Lacking control means that followers do not listen to religious leaders and, thus, religious leaders are irrelevant to a dictatorship because they have nothing to offer.

Chapter 4: Holy Support: Catholic and Islamic Leader and Member Dictatorship Support

In Chapter 4, I show the connection between respective religious leaders and followers in terms of dictatorship support. These religious leaders influence followers and can change levels of support for a dictatorship by preaching support for the dictatorship.

Chapter 5: Holy Survival – Catholic and Islamic Effects on a Dictatorship’s Survival

In Chapter 5, I show how this support can lead to differing levels of survival between a personal dictatorship and a single party dictatorship. Using Geddes’ (2003) research and including religious variables into the analysis, I show how religion increases survival likelihood for a single party dictatorship. I reason that because a single party dictatorship can include religious leaders and because these religious leaders can garner support for the dictatorship among followers, single party dictatorships in Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to survive longer.

Chapter 6: Sacred Dictators

In Chapter 6, I conclude my study with a synopsis of my findings and an in-depth discussion of how my research shows support for my argument. I further explain how my research adds to current scholarly research.
Chapter 2: The Whole Holy Argument

In 1960, Senegal achieved independence from France. Leopold Senghor, as the head of the only permitted party in the single party dictatorship, the Parti Socialiste, assumed the role as President. Senghor allied himself with the Marabouts, the religious leaders of the dominant religion, Islam. To keep their support, Senghor provided the Marabouts with large loans (never paid back), and strategically placed development programs. He appointed some into government posts and provided the leaders with other material benefits (Meredith 2005; Dowden 2009).

In 1968, Francisco Macias Nguema became the personal dictator of Equatorial Guinea. Nguema, a Catholic, saw a chance of controlling the populace by uniting himself with the Catholic Church, the majority religion. He realized that he could use the propaganda of the church to exert social control. In order to do so, he paid off select Catholic leaders to replace the church’s picture of Jesus with one of himself. Each sermon included a reference to him as, “The Only Miracle.” During masses, priests taught congregations spiritual gospel such as, “There is no other God than Macias” and “God created Equatorial Guinea thanks to Papa Macias. Without Papa Macias, Equatorial Guinea would not exist.” (Meredith 2005 at 241).

Both examples indicate that a dictatorship can use religious leaders for legitimacy and support. The scholarly literature on Sub-Saharan African dictatorship survival has yet to recognize religious leaders as potential bases of support. By ignoring religious leaders, the literature fails to recognize the potential power that these religious leaders exert over their congregations who are the active members of the religion. Religious leaders can rationalize decisions made or actions taken by the dictatorship. This rationalization stops congregations from questioning the dictatorship’s decisions; the dictatorship, through religious leaders, has the means to justify its decisions to congregations. Such support from the masses should equate to higher levels of dictatorship survival.
I add to the literature by incorporating religious leaders into dictatorship survival and by clarifying the connection between religious leaders and dictatorship survival. I proceed by offering an in-depth explanation of pertinent literature. Subsequently, I explain my research design and how I extend Geddes’ (1999; 2003) survival analysis for a single party and a personal dictatorship by incorporating a Catholic religious variable previously excluded from her analysis and clarifying the Islamic religious variable that she includes. I conclude by explaining my expectations and offering areas for future research.

**Literature Review**

*Elites and the Dictatorship – A Balancing Act*

The dictatorship survival literature focuses on the relationship between the dictatorship and elites (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In order to survive, a dictatorship needs elites to control the populace. Scholars find that elite defection leads to the collapse of a dictatorship (Bratton 1994; Clapham 1996; Dadmehr 2003; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003; Lemarchand 2003; Van De Walle 2001; 2004; 2007; Bolton 2007; Bates 2008).

*Geddes’ Model*

Although elite defection explains certain cases of dictatorship failure, exceptions abound. Geddes (1999) argues that these exceptions are a sign of poor theoretical foundations. Geddes shows that several types of dictatorship exist. She creates a typology based on the different groups and segments within a society that a dictatorship coopts as elites, such as friends, family and the military.

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3 Geddes (1999; 2003) also has categories for military and amalgams; amalgams are mixtures of her categories. I focus on personal and single party because they are the most prevalent in Africa. No military regimes exist during the period of interest, 1990-2009. I also exclude amalgams because only three exist in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Personal and Single Party Dictatorships and Survival

Within Geddes’ typology, personal and single party dictatorships make up 56 and 32 percent of Sub-Saharan African dictatorships, respectively. A personal dictatorship has one individual who acts as the central authority figure for the government. In this type of dictatorship, the elite are family and friends of the dictator and the military (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Geddes 1999; Ezrow and Frantz 2011). The relationship between the dictator and the elite becomes subject to the will of the dictator; status as part of the elite is more exclusive and closed (Geddes 1999; Ezrow and Frantz 2011). With regard to the distribution of patronage and its effects on dictatorship survival, Geddes (2003) further clarifies the relationship between this dictatorship type, its elites and the opposition. She argues that personal dictators consolidate all power in their hands. The decision as to who becomes part of the elite and thus receives patronage is a tactical decision. A personal dictatorship looks for elites that provide strong support - the ones who best aid survival: the military, family and friends. The dictatorship incorporates these elites, and the fate of both becomes the same: elites’ benefits stop if the dictatorship does not survive.


5 I use the GWF data for 2009. Geddes offers two other categories, military and monarchy that have no cases in Sub-Saharan Africa. She also includes a category for Amalgams which is a type of dictatorship that combines two of her four categories. Three cases of Amalgams exist but I focus on personal and single party, as they are the two main types in Africa.

6 Wintrobe (1998) contends that personal dictators exhibit a certain level of paranoia. Such paranoia causes elites to worry about their status in the inner circle. To maintain such a status, these elites must provide the dictator with a requisite amount of support to keep the citizens at bay or face replacement (Wintrobe 1998). Heightened paranoia on the part of the dictator causes the dictator to worry consistently about how to remain in power. This conundrum, referred to as the dictator’s dilemma, consists of two option for the dictator: repression and loyalty (Wintrobe 1998). Either option potentially generates negative externalities for the dictator. Repression may lead to general discontent sufficient to overthrow the dictator, and loyalty only lasts as long as the dictator can maintain it. Lacking predictable outcomes, a personal dictator’s paranoiac behavior may affect his survival; elites may become too fearful that their position is untenable and revolt, or citizens may react to repression or a combination of both (Wintrobe 1998). Other scholars have found that this paranoia does not necessarily translate into elites being consistently worried. Magaloni (2008) reasons that if the elites loyal to the dictator are in a constant state of worry about their status, the dictator is in a constant threat of being overthrown; he has to trust someone and make some sort of credible commitment to his elites and, in turn, the elites to him by offering protection from the citizens. I am acknowledging this distinction but find that Magaloni (2008) has a more consistent approach with the literature.

7 Patronage is the pay-off, be it cash or appointment to an office from the dictatorship to the elites.
and the dictatorship does not survive if the elites withdraw support (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Therefore, the dictatorship and the elites have a mutually vested interest in working together against all others to ensure survival. With patronage, in most instances being finite, it behooves a personal dictatorship to include the minimum winning coalition of elites; keeping the elites’ size small more likely guarantees consistent and significantly larger patronage distribution than a larger more spread out coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Geddes 2003). Moreover, a smaller coalition is more manageable (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Geddes 2003). The dictatorship hoards patronage to distribute to the minimum winning coalition of elites; the dictatorship’s best survival chance requires such hoarding.\(^8\)

The single party dictatorship has an institutional party structure and is not completely subject to the whim of one individual.\(^9\) It has one majority party for the administration of the dictatorship, with the president being the head of the party. Party members are the elites, typically with some governing council or ministers being the core group of elites. The institutional nature of the party provides a clear means for elites to see that cooperation with the dictatorship has measurable benefits; elites can rise within the party (Geddes 1999; 2003; Ezrow and Frantz 2011). A single party dictatorship is also more inclusive: party membership remains more open, regardless of tribe, ethnicity, or socio-economic background (Geddes 1999; Ezrow and Frantz 2011).\(^10\) Due to this structure, an appreciable difference exists in the treatment of the opposition. Geddes (2003) reasons that party members, like democratic counterparts, are

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\(^8\) Geddes (2003) also says that some patronage can go to the opposition but it is usually very slight, if it happens at all. The focal point is on elites and patronage to such elites forcing these regimes to hoard resources for these elites.

\(^9\) Geddes (2003) does not exclude personal dictatorships that have a party apparatus. Many personal dictatorships do, but the difference between this party apparatus and the single party dictatorships is the control over policy and distribution of state resources. In personal dictatorships, the dictator is the person in control of policy, whereas in single party dictatorships, the party elites control policy (Geddes 2003).

\(^10\) This openness does not mean that anyone can join the party but rather that extension of membership does not necessarily coincide with tribe, ethnicity or socio-economic background. Frequently in a personal dictatorship regime, the personal dictator coopts, as elites, people of similar background to him, hence the differentiation between the two.
concerned with retaining office. She notes that, “Some value office because they want to control policy, some for the pure enjoyment of influence and power and some for the illicit material gains that come with office” (Geddes 2003 at 58-59). She shows the interactions between both party members and opposition. If the opposition has potential to threaten the dictatorship, this type of dictatorship can silence the opposition by having the opposition join the party and share in the patronage.\(^{11}\)

Therefore, a theoretical difference and expectation exists with respect to the distribution of patronage. The opposition, in a personal dictatorship, receives no patronage because personal dictatorships, to maximize survival, incorporate the dictator’s friends and family and the military as elites and rely on oppression of the opposition (Geddes 2003). In a single party dictatorship, the party offers the opposition, if it poses a credible threat, patronage for compliance and silence (Geddes 2003). Due to this difference, Geddes (2003) finds that a single party dictatorship survives longer, on average, than a personal dictatorship.

**Issues that Affect Dictatorship Survival – Geddes’ Control Variables**

**Economy and Dictatorships**

Geddes (2003) arrives at this conclusion but acknowledges that each dictatorship may have unique country level factors that may affect her general finding. When a dictatorship plunders the economy to maintain the patronage payments to the point of an economic meltdown, such a meltdown forces a dictatorship to renege on payments; the coffers are drained. Without

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\(^{11}\) Geddes (2003) argues that the patronage to buy off the opposition is generally inferior to patronage for party elites, but that is better than no patronage. By receiving something, the opposition’s continued patronage becomes intermingled with the dictatorship’s survival; refusing to cooperate places the opposition in a worse situation than cooperating because the opposition loses all patronage. With both the party and opposition being better off with the dictatorship’s survival, both cooperate to ensure such survival.
consistent payments, the dictatorship destabilizes, and elites challenge the dictatorship (Bratton and Van De Walle 1997, Geddes 2003).

**Natural Resources and Dictatorship Survival**

A dictatorship that has significant oil or mineral wealth has a consistent stream of revenue, albeit dependent on price fluctuations, to use for patronage (Ross 2001; Bannon and Collier 2003; Dunning 2008). The dictatorship may use such a revenue stream to maintain the patronage structure, even in times of crisis, where a dictatorship without such revenue cannot. Therefore, natural resources increase a dictatorship’s survival for the states with such natural resource wealth by such states being more likely to avoid elites’ schisms because the patronage payment structure is more assured (Ross 2001; Dunning 2008; Escriba-Folch 2012). A dictatorship with natural resources should survive longer than counterparts without. Scholars have also viewed this revenue stream as having the opposite effect and creating a resource curse (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Ross 2006). According to the resource curse, control over the revenue stream from the resources becomes a point of contention and leads to the potential for unending conflict between societal groups. The effects of natural resources for dictatorship survival are murky.

**Islam**

In addition to economic performance and natural resources, some scholars have found that the Islamic religion has certain attributes that make democracy difficult in areas where there is a large percentage of the population following this religion (Ross 2001). There might also be something in this religion’s structure that supports a dictatorship (Geddes 2003). Geddes reasons that this religion places high importance on a hierarchical structure and that members become accustomed to accepting as fact edicts given from those in power; Muslims are less likely to question the dictatorship. These relationships purported by scholars remain questionable and
unclear, but nonetheless to be through, Geddes (2003) controls for the percentage of the Muslim populace.

*Summary of Geddes’ Model*

When controlling for presence of natural resources, economic performance and Islam, Geddes (2003) finds that a single party dictatorship survives longer than a personal dictatorship. She reasons that this difference occurs due to how each treats the opposition; a single party dictatorship can buy off the opposition whereas a personal dictatorship cannot. A personal dictatorship’s survival depends on maintaining the minimum winning coalition of elites to the exclusion of all others; no mechanism exists for the opposition to be coalesced into the dictatorship.

*Literature Review of Issues Not Present in Geddes’ Analysis*

With my research focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, other factors specific to this region can play a part in a dictatorship survival analysis.

*Ethnicity or Religion – One and the Same?*

Scholars frequently include religion as part of ethnicity. A debate exists regarding the relationship between ethnicity and religion. Horowitz (1985) defines ethnicity as a sense of collective belonging stemming from a common history, culture, language, race and religious tradition. Gellner (1983) furthers this definition by equating nation to the combination of ethnicity and statehood. This view of ethnicity runs contrary to conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa. The European powers carved up Sub-Saharan Africa with little concern for demography (Herbst 1989, 2000; Young 2009). Upon independence, states in Sub-Saharan Africa had little ethnic cohesion. For this reason, scholars have turned to fragmented ethnicity to explain problems from conflict to failed democracies (Horowitz 1985; Berman 2004; Meredith 2005;
Young 2009). Other scholars have argued that ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa never existed before the European colonization but was a European creation to use for political control (Bayart 1993; Englebert 2000; LeVine 2007). As a European invention, ethnicity became initially salient after independence when states were trying to formulate an identity, and power struggles after independence caused leaders to exacerbate the imaginary differences (Anderson 1983; Englebert 2000; Severino and Ray 2011).

Posner (2006) notes that if ethnicity were once an issue, leaders can bring it back to the forefront when needed. He shows that ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa is a fluid association for an individual. The importance an individual places on ethnicity changes based on which ethnic identity brings the most benefits; in Posner’s (2006) study, an individual placed different importance on certain ethnic identities depending if the question was local or national. Posner finds that an individual may find a tribal identity important in a local election but find a linguistic identity more important in a national election.

From this standpoint, a dictatorship would use religious leaders over ethnic ones because religion is something that individuals do not part with as easily as an identity; it is less fluid (Englebert 2000). Religion also provides a means to cross cut tribal and ethnic cleavages; two individuals may be part of different tribes, different language groups and different cultural backgrounds but have the same religion (Jelen and Wilcox 2002). For this reason, the incorporation of religious leaders over ethnic leaders is a more assured means to measure the intended benefit and outcome for a dictatorship.¹²

Religious Leaders’ Political Power

¹² The Pearson correlation estimate of .182 comparing the Quality of Governance’s ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization variables for Sub-Saharan Africa indicates that no significant relationship exists between the two.
Huntington (1996) finds that religious leaders can mobilize a society. With religion being a mobilizing factor, religious leaders, as elites, can affect dictatorship survival. The Iranian revolution shows religious leaders leading a popular uprising and achieving an Islamic state (Siavoshi 2002). In the United States, religious leaders have increasing influence in politics and elections (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2011; Wilcox and Robinson 2011).

Religious authorities have the ability to either contest or accommodate changes in society. Religious leaders can react to a moral shift in society depending on how the shift threatens the religious authorities (Casanova 1994). If a moral change in society elevates religious authorities’ status, religious leaders can advocate for the change and aid in its political legitimacy by encouraging congregational acceptance (Moen and Gustafson 1992). If the societal change threatens religious authorities’ status, the religious leaders can motivate congregations to oppose the change (Horowitz 1985). We see an example of this situation in the United States with marriage being extended to same-sex couples. Religious leaders, whose doctrine supported this change, preached acceptance to congregations and aided in the legitimacy of the law. Conversely, other religious leaders, whose doctrine opposed a change in marriage, mobilized congregations to oppose the change.

*Catholicism and a Differing View on Islam than Geddes*

Englebert (2000) argues that Roman Catholicism and Islam are the only religions with a strong hierarchical structure. With such a strong hierarchical structure, a dictatorship need only give patronage to the head religious leaders to gain the support of the entire congregational religious base. These head religious leaders mandate compliance from other subordinate religious leaders. Lacking such a hierarchy makes religious leaders and the support from their congregations more costly; patronage has to go to every religious leader and not just the head
leader. Therefore, Catholic and Islamic religious leaders’ patronage costs less and provides higher benefits for a dictatorship than other religions and their religious leaders.

**Research Design – The Addition of Religion to Geddes’ Model**

The literature shows that religious authority has a role to play in politics in general; yet, Geddes’ model on dictatorship survival ignores Catholicism and inaccurately uses Islam as a control variable. I agree with Geddes’ (2003) findings that a single party dictatorship survives longer than a personal dictatorship due to differences in how each treats the opposition. I part with Geddes (2003) and argue for the addition of Catholic as independent variables and moving Islam from being a control variable to an independent variable. I hypothesize that religious leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa can affect dictatorship survival.

To provide support for the inclusion of religion as an independent variable, I break down my argument into three vital steps. The first and second steps rely on individual level data, and the third step relies on the data from the aggregate level. With this topic being new to the debate, I begin my analysis of religious leaders by showing how and why they are attractive to a dictatorship.

**Step 1: For Participation in a Dictatorship, A Religious Leader must have Congregational Control**

In order for a dictatorship to consider religious leaders as useful for survival, the religious leaders must exhibit control over the respective congregations. Without congregational control, religious leaders serve no purpose to the dictatorship; a dictatorship’s interest in religious leaders is to gain congregational support. If religious leaders cannot generate support, a dictatorship paying off religious leaders is a waste of resources and, therefore, irrational. Thus, the first step

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13 In the Appendices for Chapter 2, two tables, created using the World Values Survey 2005-2008, offer a comparison of Sub-Saharan Africa to other world regions in terms of importance of god in an individual’s daily life and membership levels for religious organizations.
in my argument is to show that religious leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa have control, albeit at varying levels, over their congregations.

To do this, I rely on secularization theory. This theory states that an inverse relationship between development and religious leaders’ congregational control exists. This theory does not base its argument on religion disappearing or on self-identified religiosity changing (Martin 1978; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Rather, it looks at how a religious leader’s control over an individual member changes with development (Norris and Inglehart 2004). To measure development, scholars generally look at individuals’ level of survival security in terms of access to goods such as food (Taylor 2007). At low levels of development, individuals rely on religious leaders to provide security - access to food. In order to maintain such access, individuals must listen to religious leaders; these leaders have the power to deny access. Therefore, an expectation exists that at the lowest levels of development, religious leaders have the highest amount of control over individuals. As development increases, wealth increases and individuals do not necessarily have to rely on religious leaders for survival security: the increase in wealth increases individuals’ access to food. This increase in wealth also creates a middle class. This middle class makes demands on the state to supply for individuals’ security needs. The state acquiesces to the demands of the middle class and provides more for the daily life of its citizens (Norris and Inglehart 2004). As the state begins and continues to provide for its citizens, the state begins to supplant the role of providing services once monopolized by religious leaders (Chavez 1994; Hoffman 1998). As development continues to increase, congregations listen less to religious leaders because the congregations do not have to rely on religious leaders for access to security needs (Taylor 2007).
To test this step, I rely on the Afrobarometer’s individual level survey data. For my independent variable, I look at an individual’s level of food security. My dependent variable is how often an individual contacted a religious leader about a personal issue. Because my dependent variable is ordinal, I run an ordered logistical regression (Long 1997). I expect to see, in accordance with secularization theory, as an individual’s food insecurity decreases, the individual contacts a religious leader less frequently.

Table 2.0 Religious Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Personal Dictatorships</th>
<th>Cote D’Ivoire</th>
<th>Single Party Dictatorships</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote D’Ivoire</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>26.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Step 2: Religious Leaders’ Support for the Dictatorship

If religious leaders have some level of control over congregations, religious leaders can provide congregational support for a dictatorship. To maximize survival, dictatorships, be they single party or personal, rely on a minimum winning coalition of elite. For a religious leader to be included in this minimum winning coalition, I would expect that this religious leader’s influence encompasses nearly all of the country. Without such a level of influence, a dictatorship’s decision to include one religious leader to the exclusion of others risks alienating religious leaders who are left out. These excluded religious leaders can convince congregations to oppose the dictatorship. This situation does not provide the added stability sought by a dictatorship when choosing to incorporate religious leader elites. For this reason, I view this type of decision as irrational for a dictatorship; the costs outweigh the benefits. A dictatorship, whose religious leader does not have influence on almost all of the country, is better off excluding all

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the religious leaders. By doing such, a dictatorship’s minimum winning coalition is smaller and the outcome for survival clearer.

The literature further indicates that a personal dictatorship, when feeling threatened, does not offer patronage to the opposition, whereas a single party dictatorship, with the party apparatus, does. Within the countries sampled in the Afrobarometer, none have a religious group that is all encompassing. I assume that neither a personal dictatorship nor a single party dictatorship in my sample includes religious leaders as elites – it is irrational due to the congregational sizes. With Geddes’ noting the difference that only a single party dictatorship is able to offer something to the opposition if it feels threatened, I built my analysis off of this difference. I reason that single party dictatorships do buy-off some religious leaders, who are in the opposition, if they feel threatened or if they want additional support. For this reason, I expect that I will only see a statistically significant relationship in a single party dictatorship between religious leaders and likelihood of dictatorship approval. I, therefore, expect to see that if a religious leader supports the dictatorship, the respective congregation will also show a statistically significant level of support for the dictatorship. I am not challenging the literature, rather, using it to create the expectations for this step in my analysis.

To show such a relationship, I rely on the merged Afrobarometer’s individual level survey data. My dependent variable of interest throughout this step is a dichotomous variable of whether or not an individual unequivocally supports the dictatorship’s political party. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I run binary logistical regressions. To ascertain the position of religious leaders, I first recode the data to create a set of four independent variables for religious leaders depending on religion and type of dictatorship in which the religious leader resides. These independent variables of interest are: Catholic Religious Leaders in a Single Party
Dictatorship, Islamic Religious Leaders in a Single Party Dictatorship, Catholic Religious Leaders in a Personal Dictatorship, and Islamic Religious Leaders in a Personal Dictatorship. I expect to see that religious leaders in a single party dictatorship are more likely to support the dictatorship than counterparts in a personal dictatorship; religious leaders are in the opposition in both type of dictatorships but only a single party dictatorship can coopt religious leaders in the opposition. Therefore, these religious leaders in a single party dictatorship should be more likely to support the dictatorship. Part of the bargain is for the religious leaders in a single party dictatorship to garner support from congregations. I now recode the same data to create similar independent variables of interest to see if the congregations react. These variables are Catholic Members in a Single Party Dictatorship, Islamic Members in a Single Party Dictatorship, Catholic Members in a Personal Dictatorship and Islamic Members in a Personal Dictatorship. I rerun the binary logistical regression to see if the congregations react with higher support. I expect to see that Catholic and Islamic Members in a Single Party Dictatorship are more likely to support the dictatorship than counterparts in a personal dictatorship; religious leaders in a single party are coopted to gain such support.

**Step 3: Dictatorship Survival with Religion Included**

In this step, I show the effects of religious leaders garnering support amongst their congregations. I add the percentage of Catholics and Muslims as respective independent variables to Geddes’ survival model. I expect to see that single party dictatorships have higher survival likelihood than personal dictatorships - this expectation comes directly from the literature (Geddes 1999, 2003)– and that single party dictatorships with sizable religious factions have even higher survival likelihood, which is the effect of religious leaders’ garnering congregational support for the dictatorship in exchange for patronage from the dictatorship.
Conclusion

Personal and single party dictatorships have substantial differences in how each treats the opposition due to how each maximizes survival. A personal dictatorship maximizes survival by keeping the elites’ size small and hoarding patronage for distribution to this group, whereas a single party dictatorship offers inferior patronage to the opposition. This difference in patronage to the religious leaders in the opposition should affect survival rates. With a single party dictatorship more likely to share some level of patronage with religious leaders in the opposition, such difference in patronage creates religious leaders that are more likely to be supportive of the dictatorship and preach such to congregations. The congregations react with a higher likelihood of support. With a single party dictatorship having a higher likelihood of populace support than a personal dictatorship, this difference in support translates into a difference in dictatorship survival; a single party dictatorship has a higher likelihood of survival than a personal dictatorship.

This argument has many opportunities for future research. In order to begin the discussion of religious leaders in a dictatorship, I have had to exclude how religious leaders help when a dictatorship faces exogenous shocks. This situation could further clarify how the survival likelihood changes due to how the religious leaders act to insulate a dictatorship from the ill effects of such shocks. The effects of religious leaders in the decision to use repression offer an additional area for further research. Plausibly, religious leaders make the use of repression less attractive when a dictatorship can merely use the power of preaching to exert social control. In addition to these areas of future research, field research strengthening the patronage connection or ascertaining how the preaching occurs to congregations would be highly beneficial to the study of how dictatorships use religious leaders to increase survival.
Chapter 3: Holy Control: Religious Leaders’ Congregational Control

A dictatorship maximizes its survival by incorporating elites to guard against challenges to its legitimacy. The decision of who becomes part of the elites and who is excluded – thus becoming opposition – is a tactical decision on the part of the dictatorship depending on its cost-benefit analysis (Geddes 1999, 2003). Single party and personal dictatorships, in order to maximize survival, seek to extend patronage to elites who offer the highest benefits of protection compared to the relative costs of maintaining those elites. Religious leaders, if they possess a large enough congregation\(^\text{15}\), can aid the dictatorship by preaching support and compliance. Yet, I reason that given a dictatorship’s limited resources and few religions having strong congregational sizes in Sub-Saharan Africa, a dictatorship maximizes survival by focusing on more appropriate elites such as the military and wealthy; religious leaders are in the opposition.

As members of the opposition, Geddes (2003) notes the differences in how each type of dictatorship treats the opposition: personal dictatorships hoard resources to make payments to elites and exclude the opposition, whereas single party dictatorships can offer inferior patronage to silence the opposition if the single party dictatorship feels threatened. This difference creates an expectation that religious leaders, who are in the opposition, are treated differently in both types of dictatorship. A personal dictatorship focuses on excluding religious leaders whereas a single party dictatorship offers patronage to religious leaders whose congregational size may pose a threat to stability in exchange for support from the religious leaders.

For both a single party or a personal dictatorship to include religious leaders, the dictatorship must see a clear benefit offered by religious leaders. In order for religious leaders to be of interest in the cost-benefit analysis of either dictatorship, these leaders must have control over

\(^{15}\text{When I refer to congregation, I am referring to active membership. I use both terms interchangeably.}\)
their congregations; lacking control makes the incorporation of religious leaders irrelevant because they cannot supply congregational support to either type of dictatorship if the congregation does not defer to such religious leaders’ authority.

To establish the likelihood of religious leaders’ authority over congregations, secularization theory scholars find that a relationship between individual level survival security and religious authority exists; as individual level survival security increases due to development and industrialization, religious leaders’ authority diminishes (Chaves 1994; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Taylor 2007). Thus, the precursory assumption to secularization theory is that in countries with low levels of development, insufficient to spur industrialization, religious leaders have strong authority over congregations (Martin 1978). Using the HDI index\textsuperscript{16} to compare development, Table 3.0 shows that Sub-Saharan Africa is the least developed region in the world. When looking at Sub-Saharan African dictatorships, these dictatorships are among the least developed overall in the world.\textsuperscript{17} The countries in my sample, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda have HDI scores of .306, .322, .345, .414, .420, and .437, respectively. With the least developed being considered as having a score of .457 or less, these countries are at extremely low levels of development. Therefore, secularization theory, with its assumption of development triggering a change in religious leaders’ congregational control, expects that religious leaders, in these countries, have sufficient congregational control to be of interest to any dictatorship’s cost-benefit analysis.

\textsuperscript{16} The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living and is frequently used to look at development levels (United Nations 2008).

\textsuperscript{17} For comparison purposes to other pertinent dictatorships: the scores for Cuba, Saudi Arabia, China and Myanmar are .830, .791, .682 and .500, respectively. The average HDI score for a dictatorship outside of Africa is .703.
In this chapter, I argue that religious leaders do have control over congregations and are of interest to a dictatorship to garner congregational support with which dictatorship survival increases. I proceed in this chapter with a literature review on secularization theory. After the literature review, I outline my hypotheses and explain both the operationalization of my variables and my methods for testing my hypotheses. I then report my results and discuss the implications. After explaining my results, I address an alternative argument - religious market theory. I conclude this chapter by explaining how the results support my overall argument and discuss possibilities for future research.

**Literature Review**

For centuries, Christianity played an important role in the politics of Western civilizations (Martin 1978). Christian religious leaders aided the populace by providing educational, health and welfare services (Martin 1978). To access such services, religious leaders required a certain
level of devotion and deference to their authority from the populace. Lacking any alternative for these services, individuals’ survival often depended on religious leaders’ services. Failing to provide religious leaders with the required deference barred individuals from such services, lowering individuals’ survival likelihood. Religious leaders’ monopoly on these services, therefore, resulted in a strong level of societal control due to individuals wanting to maximize survival (Martin 1978).

Martin (1978) noted a decline in Christian religious leaders’ authority among industrialized states. Martin argues that industrialization is the necessary precursor to a decline in religious leaders’ control.18 The reason attributed to the decline in Christian religious leaders’ congregational control focuses on industrialization leading to apathy among the populace. Industrialization creates a strong middle class who demand inclusion within politics. As this middle class becomes more included in politics, services formerly monopolized by religious leaders, such as health, education and welfare, develop as governmental entities to guarantee access to such services by all. As a result of these religious leaders’ monopoly on such services transferring to the state, the populace has less connection to religious leaders for survival and becomes apathetic toward such leaders’ opinions; the populace does not have to acquiesce to religious leaders’ opinions to access these secular services, so religious leaders’ opinion matters less. This apathy, therefore, accounts for a decline in religious leaders’ control in that individuals become uninterested in religious leaders’ opinion.

Wallis and Bruce (1992) clarify Martin’s (1978) proposition regarding the connection between industrialization and a more secular society. These scholars attribute religious leaders’ loss of congregational control to three facets that stem from industrialization: social

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18 Martin’s (1978) original work on secularization theory stems from Huntington’s (1968) modernization theory and is a clarification on what happens to religious authority based on modernization theory.
differentiation, societalization and rationalization. Social differentiation bases the explanation on the change in institutions, rather than services that affect the roles previously fulfilled by religious leaders and is the closest facet to Martin’s (1978) original secularization theory (Wallis and Bruce 1992). They reason that industrialization provides public schools and hospitals, previously monopolized by religious organizations. By supplanting religious organizations’ monopoly, individuals have less need for religious leaders. Consequently, the religious leaders’ congregational control diminishes due to a public institutional option.

Societalization turns to demographic changes produced by industrialization as a potential explanation (Wallis and Bruce 1992). According to societalization, industrialization’s large factories draw individuals from diverse religious backgrounds into close proximity with each other. As these individuals socialize, they want to become a part of this greater society and subsequently assimilate rather than remain secluded in religious enclaves. As individuals’ attention centers on becoming part of the society as a whole, religion becomes less salient for the individuals. With saliency of religion diminishing, religious leaders lose control of congregations (Wallis and Bruce 1992).

Giorgi (1992) focuses on what attribute of societalization leads to apathy and, thus, to secularization by accounting for all differing levels of personal belief using the European Values Survey. Employing church attendance, self-assessed religiosity, doctrinal orthodoxy and devotionalism as dependent variables and dividing the sample into religious groups to account for certain cultural and political factors, she confirms Martin’s (1978) theory that religious institutions decline; thus religious leaders’ control declines. Although this study confirms the overall effect of industrialization and societalization, Giorgi (1992) contends that an appropriate measure must separate the individual’s religiosity and the decline of religious institutions;

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19 This term refers to diverse groups coming into close proximity with each other.
although religious institutions decline, personal religious beliefs remain a function of culture and may plausibly change due to cultural influences.

On par with Giorgi (1992), McLeod (1992) advocates for a micro-level approach to the effects of societalization on a decline in religious leaders’ control. If industrialization occurs in major urban centers, these centers become a vital means to test the effects of industrialization on religious authority. Examining New York, London and Berlin, McLeod (1992) finds that within these cities, secularization occurs as a direct reaction to the historical, political and demographic changes to the city. This finding shows that urban centers show a decline in religiosity in concurrence with the idea of societalization; as the diverse society becomes more intertwined, religion loses its place as means for community involvement.

Rationalization differs from societalization and social differentiation in that it links industrialization and security to a decline in religious leaders’ congregational control. Industrialization creates jobs. Jobs need employees. Employees work these jobs for a wage. This wage allows individuals to fulfill the basic security needs. As individuals become more secure, individuals’ rationalization for the need of an intervening God lessens; individuals who are secure, no longer turn to religious leaders to explain their low levels of security. Therefore, high individual level security weakens religious leaders’ control by making the will of God as an explanation to insecurity irrelevant (Wallis and Bruce 1992).

Norris and Inglehart (2004) argue that economic development and growth encompass the three facets of secularization theory: social differentiation, societalization and rationalization. They merge all prior scholarly thought regarding secularization theory and religious leaders’ control into terms of a shift in economic growth and development as the appropriate measurement to account for a change in religious authority. According to these scholars, an
increase in economic growth and development provides an increase in individuals’ survival security. As growth and development continue, all individuals’ security concerns decrease. As individuals become more secure, religious authority decreases; the void in individuals’ survival security previously fulfilled by religious leaders becomes supplanted by the security provided by economic growth and development.

Hirschle (2010) refines the economic growth and development argument of Norris and Inglehart (2004). He argues that deference to religious authority is a learned behavior during formative years. Once formed, this level of attachment follows individuals throughout their lifetime. Therefore, different generational cohorts react to religious authority depending on the economic growth and development during their formative years and continue such deference during the course of their lifetime. This attachment in the formative years to religious leaders’ authority follows individuals regardless of what economic shifts occur after the formative years (Hoffman 1998).

From the economic growth and development argument, other scholars clarify how to measure religious leaders’ control (Chaves 1994, Taylor 2007). Previous scholars equate religious service attendance to religious leaders’ control, assuming that attendance is indicative of control (Chaves 1994). Chaves (1994) argues that the appropriate focal point is on the change in trust of religious authority to show a change in religious leaders’ control over congregations. By focusing on the change in trust, secularization theory becomes distinguishable from individuals’ personal beliefs and spirituality; the theory does not claim a change in personal beliefs and spirituality but rather that religious leaders’ control declines. Klieman and Ramsey (1996) support Chaves’ (1994) argument by finding that confidence in religious leaders
decreases while religious attendance increases; merely attending services does not make religious leaders have control.

Although secularization theory proponents find support for a connection between economic development and religious leaders’ authority, other scholars prefer a competing theory known as religious market theory. According to religious market theory, religious leaders compete for congregations (Stark 1997). To attract members and maintain membership, these religious leaders use incentives to keep and attract new membership (Stark 1997). The more religious present in a society, the higher the competition and the better the incentives. To continue to receive the incentives, individuals must listen and defer to religious leaders (Norris and Inglehart 2004). With this incentive structure, this theory assumes that religiously plural societies have religious leaders with strong congregational control. Although plausible, this theory does not explain where the religious leaders gain the resources to offer continuous incentives.

**Hypotheses**

Merging all of these scholars’ refinement, secularization theory purports that high levels of economic growth and development equate to a substantial loss of religious authorities’ control over congregations; this congregational control continues to diminish on par with economic development and growth. Yet, I presented evidence at the beginning of this chapter that development is slight, at best. Therefore, I am arguing that, in my sample, religious leaders have control over congregations because they are providing individuals with survival security. To determine if I am correct, I look for support for secularization theory.

Scholars have approached an analysis of secularization theory by looking at changes in individual level survival security (Micro-Level), shifting demographics, industrialization and cultural issues (Macro-Level), as well as overall development (Macro-Level). To clarify if
secularization theory’s expectations occur in my sample, I create hypotheses to do a multi-level analysis on factors that affect religious leaders’ authority. For the micro-level analysis, I look at individual countries and posit that:

**H1: In each country, as an individual’s food insecurity increases, an individual is likely to contact a religious leader more often.**

By turning to a religious leader for help, the individual displays a level of trust in the religious leader sufficient to lend support to the idea that the religious leader has a certain level of control over the individual (Chaves 1994).

Georgi (1992) notes that, in certain societies, culture and religion intertwine to the point where they are one in the same; the culture is the religion and the religion is the culture. These societies grant a certain amount of authority to religious leaders. Wallace and Bruce (1992) and McLeod (1992) show support for demographic shifts and differences in industrialization affecting religious leaders’ authority. To test these scholars’ findings, I posit that in the macro-environment:

**H2: A country has unique attributes that affect the frequency of an individual contacting a religious leader.**

If these scholars are correct and culture, demographic shifts and differing levels of industrialization affect religious leaders’ authority, I expect to see that country dichotomous variables show significance in the analysis.

In addition to these scholars, Norris and Inglehart (2004) find that in the macro-level, development directly affects the relationship between an individual and religious leaders’ authority. To test the effects of development, I follow Norris and Inglehart’s (2004) analysis and posit that in the macro environment:

**H3: The more developed the country that an individual lives in, the less often an individual is likely to contact a religious leader.**
If Norris and Inglehart (2004) are correct, I expect to see that development and religious authority have a negative relationship.

**Operationalization**

With my hypotheses being in the micro and macro levels of analysis, I do a multi-level analysis. I rely on the Afrobarometer 2008 Round 4 survey data for Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. I am limited to these countries because they are the only dictatorships included in Round 4 and Round 4 is the only round that has a variable that can proxy for a dependent variable for trust in religious authority – frequency of contacting a religious leader. This dependent variable is ordinal. As such, the most appropriate method is an ordered logistical regression for both the micro and macro levels (Long 1997).

**Dependent Variable for all Hypotheses - Contact Religious Leader:** The literature on secularization theory indicates that the appropriate focal point to establish whether or not a religious leader has congregational control surrounds the level of trust granted the religious leader (Chaves 1994). To account for this trust, I use the question in the Afrobarometer question that asks individuals how often they contact a religious leader about an important issue. I reason that the more often an individual contacts a religious leader about an issue, the more likely an individual trusts the religious leader.

**Micro-Level: Hypothesis 1**

In the micro-level, I do an ordered logistical regression on each country’s individual level variables (Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The independent variable of interest is food insecurity.

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20 All Afrobarometer questions used in this chapter and Chapter 4 are in the appendices for Chapter 3.

21 Unfortunately, there is no question that asks directly the level of trust for religious leaders in the Afrobarometer survey data. For this reason, I use contacting a religious leader.
**Independent Variable – Food Security:** This variable measures how often an individual went without food in the past year. This variable also encompasses income; the more money one has the less likely one goes without food. With income being highly correlated with education, this variable also encompasses a certain level of individual educational differences. For these reasons, I believe this variable is appropriate to measure individual level survival security.

**Control Variables:**

**Active/Inactive:** These dichotomous variables measure whether or not an individual is an active member or an inactive member of a religious organization.

**Catholic and Muslim:** With both of these religions being the most prevalent across Sub-Saharan Africa, I include two dichotomous variables to control for the effects of each.

**Age:** With previous scholars noting a connection between religious authority and economic growth and development during an individual’s formative years, I include an age variable to control for the generational cohort differences (Hirschle 2010).

**Gender:** Certain religions have certain traditional roles and limitations based on gender. To control for these differences, I include a gender control variable.

**Macro-Level: Hypothesis 2**

To test hypothesis 2, I include all of aforementioned variables and add country dichotomous variables to account for differences in industrialization, demographic shifts and culture (Georgi 1992, McLeod 1992, Norris and Inglehart 2004). I rely on the Round 4 Merged Afrobarometer date.²²

**Macro-Level Hypothesis 3**

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²² These data are merged by the Afrobarometer, housed at the University of Michigan. The Afrobarometer ensure that the standard errors are appropriate for an analysis.
To test hypothesis 3, I follow Norris and Inglehart (2004) and use the UN’s HDI Index to proxy for development in 2008. I include all the same variables from Hypothesis 1 except food insecurity. I exclude food insecurity because the Pearson correlation estimate shows that food insecurity and HDI are significantly correlated.

Results

Table 3.1 Ordered Logit. DV: Contact Religious Leader In the Past Year About a Personal Issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1: Micro-Level</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>HDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>(..054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Insecurity</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>(-.2.173***</td>
<td>(-1.353***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>(.236)</td>
<td>(.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>(-.141)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.184)</td>
<td>(.083)</td>
<td>(.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>(.219)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.159)</td>
<td>(.142)</td>
<td>(.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>(-.558***</td>
<td>(-.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.130)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
<td>(.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.097)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.090)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.090)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For all the models, the two log likelihood shows that including the variables improves the models, the goodness of fit indicates that the models fit well with the data and the test for parallel lines shows that none of the models violate ordered logistical regression’s assumption of proportional odds; ordered logistical regression is more appropriate than multinomial logistical regression with the ordinal dependent variable of interest (Long 1997).

**Micro-Level-Model 1-Hypothesis 1**

*No Support for Secularization Theory*

The results for model 1 show that the only countries that have a significant relationship between individual level survival food insecurity and contacting religious leaders are Tanzania and Zimbabwe with only Zimbabwe going in the expected direction. When looking at the situation in Zimbabwe, there is little support for hypothesis 1 and secularization theory. The dictator, Robert Mugabe, since independence, has confiscated farms from White people and handed these farms off to friends who have little to no farming knowledge (Meredith 2005). This confiscation has caused food output to plummet. In addition to growing food insecurity, he has also meddled in the economy causing extremely high inflation rates – some years as much as 1000 percent (Meredith 2005). His meddling has led to food supply issues and the inflation rate
has complicated matter with citizens lacking funds to access the food that is available (Meredith 2005). Given these issues, I think Zimbabwe does not support secularization theory and hypothesis 1; the significance is not due to development or lack thereof changing an individual’s level of food security inasmuch as it is due to country specific factors. Although I dismiss secularization theory’s development explanation of this finding, I do believe that religious leaders do have control over the congregations; it is just not due to development. I suspect, given the food situation in this country that individuals are indeed relying on religious leaders for food security. If an individual does not follow the religious leader’s expectation, the individual potentially places himself in a precarious survival position. I believe this explanation better accounts for Zimbabwe’s results.

Tanzania’s results completely refute hypothesis 1 and secularization theory; as food security increases, individuals contact religious leaders more frequently. For these reasons, I believe there is little overall support for hypothesis 1 and secularization theory in this model.

Potential Explanation for Age and Gender Control Variables

Age shows positive significance with respect to the frequency of contacting a religious leader in Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. These results support Hirschle’s (2010) findings that age matters for religious authority due to an individual’s attachment made in formative years. I suspect that older generations who lived through independence movements have closer ties to religious leaders. In Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia, Great Britain granted independence with little preparation given to these countries. Post-Independence was turbulent and these countries were not able to provide for all of its citizens. Older generations plausibly had to rely heavily on religious leaders’ generosity for survival, thus explaining the positive and significant result for age in these countries (Meredith 2005).
Mozambique, on the other hand, was a Portuguese colony and independence was not granted but rather a war for independence ensued to rid the country of the Portuguese. This war ravaged the country with human rights atrocities on both sides (Meredith 2005). The older generations who lived through this war had to likely turn to charity to survive it. Older generations potentially have a strong attachment to religious leaders, who helped them survive during the struggle. This reasoning is in line with Hirschle’s (2010) addition of generational cohorts. Nonetheless, these results do not support hypothesis 1.

The gender variables in Burkina Faso and Zambia show significant results in that females are more likely to contact religious leaders more often than male counterparts. I suspect that these results are due to country specific reasons regarding gender roles.

_Affiliation Control Variable - Conundrum Explained_23

Model 1 results run against expectations for affiliation; as an individual becomes more active in a religion, the individual contacts the religious leader less frequently, indicating that non-members contact religious leaders more frequently than active or inactive members. I suspect that the reason my affiliation results contradict secularization theory is not so much that the theory is wrong but more so that these countries are at the precursory period to the theory. Martin (1978) and secularization theory scholars state that the theory’s effect only starts with sufficient development that has led to industrialization. Development is stagnant if not nonexistent in these countries (Table 3.0 at the beginning of this chapter). With development insufficient to trigger industrialization, a weakening of religious leaders’ control has not occurred. Rather, the precursory period in the literature is when religious leaders have maximum

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23 The Catholic control variable shows positive significance in Mozambique and Zambia. These results are difficult to interpret because the positive coefficients are not large enough to change the affiliation trend discussed in this section. Catholic active and inactive members still contact a religious leader less frequently than unaffiliated individuals.
control over the populace because they are supplying security services. I believe that these results are showing that membership has its privileges; active and inactive members may be already reaping benefits of some form of association with religious leaders - food. These non-members might know that these religious leaders have such resources and contact them more often to beg for help. I suspect that this finding indicates that religious leaders plausibly have a level of control over the populace.

Macro-Level-Model 2-Hypothesis 2

Some Support for Hypothesis 2 but No Support for Secularization Theory

The results in model 2 show some support for country level factors affecting the frequency of an individual contacting a religious leader. The results indicate that Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda have significance. I believe that Mozambique shows significance for the reasons mentioned earlier – the independence war (Meredith 2005). Tanzania, Uganda and Burkina Faso show results indicating that there is something unique to each that drives their citizens’ frequency in contact religious leaders. Although the results show some support for hypothesis 2, they show no support for secularization theory – food security is insignificant.

Control Variables of Gender and Age

The control variables for gender and age both show significance and directionality in concurrence with Model 1. As discussed previously, I believe that these control variables are picking up on gender roles placed by religion and Hirschle’s (2010) generational cohort argument.

Affiliation Control Variable – Conundrum Continues

As was the case in Model 1, the Catholic control variable shows positive significance; yet, the positive coefficient is not large enough to change the affiliation trend. Catholic active and inactive members still contact a religious leader less frequently than unaffiliated individuals.
The affiliation variables follow the same pattern exhibited in Model 1. I believe that these results in Model 2 are lending support to my belief that these countries are in a precursory period to secularization theory and that religious leaders do have control (Martin 1978).

Macro-Level-Model 3-Hypothesis 3

No Support for Hypothesis 3 or Secularization Theory

The results show a positive and significant relationship between development and how often an individual contacts a religious leader. These results run contrary to both hypothesis 3 and secularization theory which expects that a negative relationship between development and individuals contacting religious. Secularization theory has no support from this model.

Control Variables of Gender and Age

The control variables for gender and age follow the same trend as in Model 1 and 2; as age increases, individuals contact religious leaders more often and females contact religious leaders more often. I believe that this finding lends support for Hirschle’s (2010) generational cohort findings as discussed previously. I also believe that the gender results are due to gender roles within the societies.

Affiliation Control Variable – Conundrum Still Present

As was the case in Model 1 and 2, the affiliation results are significant and follow a negative directionality. I surmise that this result is showing that the development, in terms of HDI, is insufficient to trigger industrialization and, therefore, insufficient to weaken religious leaders’ control and influence over the populace. With this finding spanning across all models, I believe that these countries are in a pre-industrialization state lending credence to my belief that religious

25 The Catholic and Muslim control variables show positive significance. Yet, the positive coefficients are not large enough to change the affiliation trend. Catholic and Muslim active and inactive members still contact a religious leader less frequently than unaffiliated individuals.
leaders have strong levels of control over congregations and possibly unaffiliated individuals consistent with pre-secularization scholarly thought (Martin 1978).

**Implications**

All three models show little to no concrete evidence to support either the hypotheses or secularization theory. The evidence does, however, suggest that religious leaders do have a certain and appreciable level of control over the populace as a whole. I come to this reasoning by looking at development in all of these countries and the consistent results across all models with respect to affiliation and contacting a religious leader. Table 3.0 at the beginning of this chapter indicated that in terms of development, all of these countries fall below what the UN considers the least developed category.\textsuperscript{26}

With secularization theory’s effects needing industrialization to diminish religious leaders’ control, I believe a reasonable expectation exists that religious leaders do have control and are providing for the citizenry’s survival security; the states’ development levels are too low for widespread industrialization or for the state to have resources to guarantee survival security for its citizens. I believe that the consistent findings across all of the models showing that those who contact religious leaders most often are those that are unaffiliated further supports my belief that religious leaders have control in the society and are providing for the society’s survival security. My reasoning is that membership has its benefits and if members are following religious leaders, they are attaining some level of benefits to guarantee survival. The unaffiliated populace sees that these members are being provided for and contacts religious leaders more often to beg for help. Therefore, the religious leaders have not only a certain level of control over active and inactive members but also a level of control over unaffiliated members.

\textsuperscript{26} HDI score for the following countries are: Mozambique=.306, Burkina Faso=.322, Zimbabwe=.345, Tanzania=.414, Zambia=.420, Uganda=.437, least developed is considered as having a score of .457 or less.
Alternative Explanation

A counterargument to these implications stems from a competing theory - religious market theory. According to religious market theory, religions act as firms within the religious market place. Religious leaders, the firm’s employees, vie for consumers. These leaders compete for consumers - congregational members. The competition forces religious leaders to offer incentives to individuals, coaxing the individuals to join the congregations as members via such incentives (Stark 1997, Norris and Inglehart 2004). From this theory, an expectation exists that in religiously pluralistic societies, the pluralism forces competition.

As competition increases, religious leaders increase enticements to the populace. These enticements continue to maintain membership and attract new members. Therefore, if religious market theory were correct, I would expect to see that as religious pluralism increases, religious authority becomes more likely; enticements are benefits that could plausibly supply individuals with survival security.

To test religious market theory, I redo model 3 and add in religious fractionalization from the Quality of Governance’s data. As this measurement increases, religious society becomes more fractionalized. Therefore, I expect to see that as fractionalization increases, religious authority becomes more likely.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.2 Religious Fractionalization Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 3 Redone Ordered Logit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox Snell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***=99%, **=95%, *=90%
I first run a model that incorporates HDI and religious fractionalization. In this model, religious fractionalization is statistically significant. I then look at the coefficients to see the effects that religious fractionalization’s coefficient has on the likelihood to contact a religious leader. As a society becomes more fractionalized, thus more religiously plural, the likelihood of contacting a religious leader decreases; the opposite of the expected effect if religious market theory were correct. To ensure that HDI did not affect the results, I did the model again and excluded HDI. The results showed the same pattern for religious fractionalization.

With the model including religious fractionalization unable to show a significant relationship between an increase in religious pluralism and religious leaders’ contact, I do not believe that this theory is a sound explanation for religious authority within my sample.

**Conclusion**

By religious market theory failing to show a real explanation for religious authority and the findings in this chapter showing minor to no support for secularization theory, I surmise that religious leaders have deference and a level of control over the general populace. I come to this conclusion by looking at the low levels of development in these countries and reasoning that the situation in each is in a precursory stage to secularization theory; levels of development are too low to begin industrialization and without such industrialization, religious leaders do not lose control. The findings regarding affiliation across all three models support my deductive reasoning. Religious leaders do have control over both members, be it active or inactive, and non-members in their respective societies.

This chapter offers several areas for future research. The first possible avenue for future research is to look at democracies and see if democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa have similar results. Such a similarity could indicate that Sub-Saharan Africa stands in a unique situation.
regarding secularization theory and religious leaders’ authority. In addition to looking at
democracies, further research could show differences in denominational control and how it
changes from state to state. All of these possibilities would aid to clarify issues in this chapter.
Chapter 4: Holy Support: Catholic and Islamic Leader and Member Dictatorship Support

In Chapter 3, I presented evidence that in Burkina Faso, Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, religious leaders may influence the populace that affiliates with a religion. I reasoned that with this populace going to religious leaders with problems, religious leaders’ opinions matter and, therefore, religious leaders have a certain level of control over the populace. By having such control, these leaders are valuable assets to a dictatorship if they support the dictatorship; they exert their opinion on others to support the dictatorship.

A dictatorship, when deciding whether or not to gain support from religious leaders, weighs the costs of such support – opportunity cost for including the religious leaders – and the benefits attained – the size of the religious leaders’ following that will support the dictatorship. Not all dictatorships are the same, and this cost-benefit analysis depends on a plethora of country level factors such as development and religious plurality²⁷.

In addition to these country level factors, the type of dictatorship further constrains the dictatorship’s cost-benefit analysis. Geddes (1999; 2003) draws a distinction between the cost-benefit analysis for a single party and a personal dictatorship. A personal dictatorship is better off hoarding resources and keeping the amount of elites to a minimum. The dictatorship looks for the greatest benefits with a cost structure that is easy to maintain; the wealthy and military meet these requirements (Geddes 1999; 2003).

A single party dictatorship, on the other hand, has a cost-benefit analysis that does not focus on hoarding the resources to the same extent as a personal dictatorship. This type of dictatorship functions through a party structure and resources are allocated to party members who are the

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²⁷ I assume that dictatorships act as rational actors.
elites. However, a single party dictatorship allows for an easy means to coopt opposition by either extending party membership or paying off the opposition. Paying off the opposition silences the opposition; the opposition is better off remaining silent because some payment is better than no payment (Geddes 1999; 2003).

Catholic and Islamic religious leaders, due to the religious hierarchy of each, are the likely choices for elites when the benefits of these leaders’ support outweigh the costs of excluding other groups as elites. This hierarchy lowers the potential costs by allowing a dictatorship to pay off the head leaders of the religious hierarchy who can demand compliance from subordinates; non-hierarchical religions require a payment to each religious leader and are cost prohibitive. Both a single party and a personal dictatorship can incorporate Catholic and Islamic religious leaders as elites when the cost-benefit analysis allows for such. These circumstances of inclusion as elites, in my sample of countries, are likely rare; Burkina Faso, Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are not unequivocally Catholic or Muslim.

With both dictatorship types rationally including Catholic and Islamic religious leaders as elites but very few instances existing in my sample, the appropriate focal point is not how and when these dictatorships choose religious leaders as elites but rather how they treat religious leaders in the opposition. In this chapter, I agree with Geddes (2003) that these two types of dictatorship treat the opposition differently, and I argue that if Catholic and Islamic religious leaders are in the opposition, their support for the dictator should differ depending on the type of dictatorship. A connection should exist between Catholic and Islamic religious leaders being more likely to support the dictator in a single party dictatorship than in a personal dictatorship. Clarifying this relationship explains the mechanics of how these types of dictatorships’ cost-
benefit analysis functions, as well as how Catholic and Islamic religious leaders matter to a dictatorship.

I proceed in this chapter by offering a literature review on the theory of social capital and patronage. I then explain my hypotheses and expectations. I follow the hypotheses section with an operationalization section where I explain my variables. After explaining my variables, I report my results and offer implications from my results. I subsequently consider alternative explanations to my results. I then conclude by restating my theory and results and offer avenues for future research.

**Literature Review**

Social capital theory links government and institutional effectiveness to trust among a state’s social organizations (Putnam 1993). In states that have trust among social organizations, such trust facilitates all social organizations to coordinate efforts to make institutions and government effective; trust among social organizations leads to a civic culture that promotes institutional performance (Putnam 1993; Inglebert 2000). From this theory, high levels of trust among groups in a state lead to strong institutions and state development by all groups supporting policy for the betterment of society as a whole (Putnam 1993).

The implication of this theory with respect to Sub-Saharan African institutions is that weak institutions derive from lack of ethnic homogeneity (Inglebert 2000). This lack of homogeneity leads to ethnic leaders’ rivalry with the state’s resources being the point of contention rather than cooperation; each leader fights to secure resources for his group to the detriment of other groups (Inglebert 2000). Weak institutions provide the means for each ethnic group to vie for state resources in lieu of cooperation through trust to create mutual long term development and
institutions; resource accumulation in the short term is more important than long term goals of effective institutions due to the mistrust among the groups (Inglebert 2000).

However, scholars note that ethnic heterogeneity in Sub-Saharan Africa does not adequately explain weak institutions due to ethnicity being fluid (Bayart 1993; Inglebert 2000; Posner 2006). Ethnicity is not a primordial relationship between the individual and a group but rather is fluid depending on what cleavage offers the best benefits (Inglebert 2000; Posner 2006). Therefore, social capital does not explain weak institutions because the causal mechanism of ethnic heterogeneity is faulty (Widner and Mundt 1998).

Rather than a social capital explanation, weak institutions are a product of a dictatorship wishing to maximize survival. Weak institutions afford a dictatorship more ease to use state resources to extend survival; a strong and pesky legislature controlling the budget or a judiciary invalidating the dictator’s decisions gets in the way of maintaining power by potentially negating the dictator’s distribution of patronage (Nafziger 1988). Therefore, the continuance of such weak institutions becomes a necessary precursor to increase dictatorship survival. Weak institutions allow a dictatorship to achieve a level of stability, and thus higher survival, through clientelism.

Clientelism is an agency relationship where a principal trades patronage with agents who, in turn, provide the principal a benefit (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2008). This relationship takes the form of a bilateral agreement, a patronage contract, between the two. The contract provides for how the principal, the dictatorship, distributes state resources to the agents, the elites, and the agents’ obligations to the principal for such resources. This resource distribution occurs by either the agents directly accessing the states’ resources through political appointment or by receiving direct state resource payments from the dictatorship (Van de Walle 2007; Ariola 2009). One side failing to live up to the agreement in the patronage contract creates a breach of contract. Such a
breach potentially creates a conflict. Scholars find that this breach directly affects a dictatorship’s likelihood of survival (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003). When a breach occurs between the dictatorship and the elites, both sides try to incentivize the general populace to fight for a side (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This breach can lead to the ultimate societal breakdown, civil war. In addition to a conflict between the dictatorship and its elites, intra-elites’ conflict can similarly destabilize the patronage contracts for all and include the general populace in the conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Therefore, a breach in the patronage contract proves salient in explaining the destabilization of a dictatorship and a change in a dictatorship’s survival likelihood.

Combining the literature on the theory of social capital and thought regarding clientelism, a dictatorship, therefore, prefers weak institutions because weak institutions allow for patronage contracts whereby a dictatorship has stronger control over resources to fulfill its end of the contract; weak institutions avoid justifications for patronage pay outs by a dictatorship. Having control over the patronage, payments remain steady provided no exogenous shocks occur. Steady payments provide stability. In addition to a dictatorship’s stability and survival, the continued stability provides the dictatorship with a sense of international legitimacy (Migdal 1988; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Therefore, legitimacy becomes a product of this clientelistic relationship and patronage contracts and is more likely achievable with weak institutions (Hyden 2006; Van de Walle 2007).

Some scholars turn to the effects that natural resources provide. Natural resources provide a consistent source of revenue from which a dictatorship can guarantee payments to elites (Bannon and Collier 2003; Dunning 2008). Being able to make consistent patronage contract payments shows a commitment on the part of the dictatorship to its elites. The elites, in turn, aid survival
by keeping the populace at bay. From this standpoint, these scholars find that a dictatorship’s survival can equate to the presence of natural resources (Ross 2001). Yet, Sub-Saharan African examples challenge this stance. Botswana, a resource rich country, has used such resources to democratize and maintain a democratic government. The rulers and elites in Botswana, rather than hoarding the benefits from these resources, have extended the benefits throughout the state to the citizenry, using said resources to strengthen and create institutions. What matters more is how the revenue from the resources is treated; an ipso facto expectation that natural resources equate to a dictatorship’s survival does not necessarily hold true.

Other scholars have found the opposite effect, with the presence of natural resources correlating with a consistent lack of stability for any type of government. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) reason that a resource curse exists that makes states with natural resources less stable. This lack of stability occurs due to either the greed of the elites or the grievances of the populace or a combination of both. Greedy elites seize natural resources and use revenue to try to seize power. They can use revenues from such resources to address grievances among the populace, gaining support of the populace. The populace itself can also seize the resources and use the proceeds to overthrow the government, or some combination of all scenarios may occur. The end result of all scenarios is that natural resources have a negative survival effect due to greed or grievance.

Due to the inconsistencies in the natural resource explanation, other scholars turn to a dictatorship’s strategic decisions when choosing elites to explain stability. Bayart (1993) argues that dictators incorporate ethnic representatives as elites to unite the state. These different ethnic elites cooperate to divvy up state resources and pass enough along to the citizens to keep the dictatorship stable. With all ethnic groups being represented in the patronage structure, stability
ensues. Yet, this argument assumes that the dictator has the capabilities to include all ethnic
groups and that the dictator treats all elites equally enough to avoid an intra-elites conflict. If this
argument were plausible, no breakdown on ethnic terms should occur, yet, Horowitz (1985)
notes that is has. Furthermore, some dictatorships exclude certain ethnic groups; if this is not
wise and places a dictatorship in peril of revolt, such exclusion should never occur due to its
irrationality (Ronniger 2004).

According to Roessler (2011), the type of dictatorship accounts for who the elites are. In a
single party dictatorship, the elites are party members and the structure is open (Geddes 1999;
2003; Ezrow and Frantz 2011). Therefore, the arguments looking merely at incorporating ethnic
leaders fail to acknowledge such openness and how not only ethnic leaders but also religious
leaders can become elites through party membership. This structure’s inclusiveness links to an
expectation that patronage spreads across party members; membership has some benefits or
trickle down benefits due to party association. Ronniger (2004) explains that patronage does not
have to be equal but rather a proportional representation of the elites’ or oppositions’ benefit to
the dictatorships’ costs. Some elites can have higher levels of patronage than others depending
on what these elites offer as benefits to the survival of the dictatorship. The overall logical
expectation for this type of dictatorship is that the inclusive access to elites’ status spreads
patronage, although in some cases unequally, among party members. Most can become party
members. With most being party members and having some level of patronage from the
dictatorship, most support the dictatorship. Thus, this type of dictatorship should have higher
survival likelihood than a personal dictatorship.

A personal dictatorship does not have this inclusive structure and is exclusive (Geddes 1999;
2003; Enzrow and Frantz 2011). Furthermore, the elites are a minimum winning coalition to
ensure dictator survival; too many elites create a potential funding issue for the patronage contracts given limited resources (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Roessler 2011). The incorporation of elites becomes a strategic and tactical decision based on the ability of the dictator to meet patronage contract obligations and the benefits offered by potential elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Roessler 2011). With the exclusivity of elites’ status and requiring a minimum winning coalition, a personal dictatorship incorporates elites that best supply benefits based on how much the dictatorship can afford. Therefore, patronage should be more concentrated and less spread out than in single party dictatorships. With the exclusivity of the elites’ status, the populace should have less trickle down patronage than in a single party dictatorship where elites’ status is more open. This difference in patronage should translate to a difference in support: a single party dictatorship’s spreading the wealth should equate to a higher likelihood of support than in a personal dictatorship.

**Hypotheses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dictatorship Type</th>
<th>Percent Catholic</th>
<th>Percent Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote D’Ivoire</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Single Party</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Single Party</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Single Party</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Single Party</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the noted differences by scholars between single party and personal dictatorships, I argue that these dictatorships can strategically include Catholic and Islamic religious leaders as elites in instances where these leaders’ benefit of support, in terms of influence over followers, outweigh the costs of patronage to such leaders.

For the benefits to outweigh the costs, these religious leaders need to exist in a state where enough of the populace follows the faith so that this mass, if mobilized, may threaten the dictatorship’s survival. Without threat capacity, each dictatorship’s patronage is better spent on
other elites, such as the military who can subjugate these religious leaders and their followers. Table 4.0 shows the religious breakdown for Catholicism and Islam in my sample. No state has a majority of the populace adhering to either religion. For this reason, I assume that the overwhelming majority of the Catholic and Islamic religious leaders are in the opposition in both dictatorships. Thus, the focal point on the potential effects of such religious leaders shifts to the noted differences by Geddes (2003) in how a personal and a single party dictatorship deals with the opposition; a single party coopts opposition with patronage whereas a personal dictatorship excludes opposition.

Due to such a difference, I contend that:

**H1: Catholic and Islamic religious leaders in a single party dictatorship are more likely to support the dictatorship than counterparts in a personal dictatorship.**

If a single party dictatorship coopts Catholic and Islamic religious leaders by offering some form of patronage, I expect to see these leaders react to such cooptation by significantly supporting the dictatorship. Furthermore, I expect the opposite to hold true when the dictatorship is personal; Catholic and Islamic religious leaders in a personal dictatorship should receive no patronage and therefore show no significance in support.

With a difference in support between religious leaders and dictatorship type, Catholic and Islamic religious leaders, to maintain patronage, need to provide a benefit to the single party dictatorship. These leaders preach support to congregations. To ascertain such a connection, I hypothesize that:

**H2: Catholic and Islamic religious members in a single party dictatorship are more likely to support the dictatorship than counterparts in a personal dictatorship.**
If religious leaders in a single party dictatorship gain patronage and want to continue such patronage, their preaching of support should equate to members being more likely to support it; they are being paid off to produce support. Conversely, religious leaders in a personal dictatorship are excluded, they do not preach support and subsequently, religious membership has no significance on support.

To test my hypotheses, I use the merged Afrobarometer 2008-2012 individual level data for Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Mozambique, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. With my dependent variable being dichotomous, I run a binary logistical regression (Long 1997).

**Operationalization**

_Dependent Variable:_ To ascertain support, I recode a variable to represent if an individual unequivocally supports the dictator’s party. All the states in the sample have a political party linked to the dictator. Geddes (2003) explains that part of each dictatorship’s survival strategy is the decision of whether or not to incorporate a political party. Although all the states in the sample have political parties, the difference between a single party and a personal dictatorship centers on the strength of the party to make policy according to Geddes (2003). Geddes (2003) further explains that a personal dictatorship can have parties but the dictator has ultimate authority on policy whereas the party in a single party dictatorship has some level of control over policy. With all the states having parties, using this dependent variable facilitates a comparison between both dictatorship types.

**Independent Variables:**

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28 In the appendices for Chapter 4, Table 4.A gives the state information for the sample: type of dictatorship, dictatorship’s leader and political party associated with the dictatorship.
Catholic and Islamic Religious Leaders (Hypothesis 1): I filter the respondents in the merged data to create four dichotomous variables for Catholic and Islamic Leaders in Single Party and Personal dictatorships. These individuals are those who self-reported as being religious leaders in the merged Afrobarometer.

Catholic and Islamic Members (Hypothesis 2): I filter the respondents in the merged data to create four dichotomous variables for Catholic and Islamic members in Single Party and Personal dictatorships. These individuals are those who self-reported as being active members in a religious organization in the merged Afrobarometer.

Control Variables:

Cash Security: Cash security is a dichotomous variable for individuals that never go without cash. With this variable, I am controlling for the elites within the society, the wealthy and military. I assume that since both of these groups are essential to a dictatorship, as noted by scholars, neither will likely ever go without money.

Income: Income is different from cash security in that it measures the level of employment an individual has as either no, part time or full time employment. I use this variable to proxy for state level economic conditions. This variable does not significantly correlate with cash security.

Demographics (Age, Gender, Education and Urban): With African populaces’ age distribution being skewed to the rest of the world, I include a control for Age. With some religions placing females in a more subservient role, I include a control variable for Gender. Education Level frequently links to a negative relationship to the likelihood of religious authority’s deference, for this reason, I control for education level. I include a dichotomous variable, Urban, if the individual lives in an urban or rural area to account for differing levels of development. Herbst (2000) notes that migration to cities in a dictatorship has pushed urban infrastructure to its limits.
Dictatorship development has been arguably concentrated in urban areas to the detriment of the rural society; this plausibly could lead to a difference in patronage access.

**Results**

The results for hypothesis 1 indicate that in a single party dictatorship, Catholic and Islamic religious leaders are significantly more likely to support the dictatorship than Catholic and Muslim religious leaders in a personal dictatorship. Catholic and Islamic leaders in a single party dictatorship are 95 and 96 percent more likely to support the dictatorship, respectively.\(^{30}\) This finding lends support to hypothesis 1 and indicates that plausibly Catholic and Islamic leaders in a single party dictatorship are 95 and 96 percent more likely to support the dictatorship, all things being equal. Given all the control variables, these results support hypothesis 1.\(^{31}\)

Hypothesis 2 turns to a potential connection between these religious leaders and their congregations. If these religious leaders in a single party dictatorship are receiving patronage, patronage in exchange for support in a single party dictatorship but not in a personal dictatorship,

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\(^{29}\) Because I am using a binary logistical regression, I need to exclude a group to be used as a reference to make a comparison possible. In Model 1, Catholic and Muslim Leaders in a personal dictatorship are the reference group. In Model 2, Catholic and Muslim Leaders in a single party dictatorship are the reference group. By running both of these models, I am also checking for the robustness of my findings.

\(^{30}\) Table 4.B in the Appendix has the predicted probabilities.

\(^{31}\) In Table 4.1, Model 1 reports significance for the control variables of Cash Security, Gender and Education and Model 2 reports significance for the control variable of Education. With the results being a comparison to a reference group, these control variables have little predictive capabilities other than to add onto the independent variables of interest’s predictive probabilities.

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Table 4.1: Catholic and Muslim Leader Support Likelihood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.141***</td>
<td>.635*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.554)</td>
<td>(.379)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Leaders Single Party</td>
<td>.723***</td>
<td>.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.297)</td>
<td>(.314)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Leaders Personal</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Leaders Single Party</td>
<td>1.022**</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.483)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Leaders Personal</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(.423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Security</td>
<td>.677**</td>
<td>1.435**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.330)</td>
<td>(.646)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.554**</td>
<td>-.457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.248)</td>
<td>(.297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.114</td>
<td>.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.105)</td>
<td>(.128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-.307</td>
<td>.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.272)</td>
<td>(.382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.394***</td>
<td>-.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.089)</td>
<td>(.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox Snell</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ***=99%, **=95%, *=90%
such patronage is likely tied to the garnering of support from the congregation. In addition to such a connection in a single party dictatorship, these results should show no connection in a personal dictatorship if no patronage exchange exists as suggested by the results for hypothesis 1.

The results for hypothesis 2 affirm the possibility of such a connection. These results show that Catholic and Muslim members in a single party dictatorship are significantly more likely to support the dictatorship than members of other religions. In a personal dictatorship, however, Catholics and Muslims show no significance indicating that they do not act significantly different in terms of dictatorship support. These results follow my expectations for hypothesis 2.

When comparing the Catholics and Muslims in each dictatorship type and their expected likelihood of support, Catholic and Muslim members have a substantially higher level of likelihood for dictatorship support. The findings indicate that potentially a connection exists

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32 Table 4.C in the Appendix has the predicted probabilities. Because I am using a binary logistical regression, I need to exclude a group to be used as a reference to make a comparison possible. In Model 1, Catholic and Muslim Members in a personal dictatorship are the reference group. In Model 2, Catholic and Muslim Members in a single party dictatorship are the reference group. By running both of these models, I am also checking for the robustness of my findings.

In Table 4.2, Model 1 reports significance for the control variables of Cash Security, Gender, Urban and Education and Model 2 reports significance for the control variables of Cash Security, Income, Urban and Education. With the results being a comparison to a reference group, these control variables have little predictive capabilities other than to add onto the independent variables of interest’s predictive probabilities.
between Catholic and Islamic religious leaders and their congregations in a single party dictatorship. In a personal dictatorship, neither leaders nor members are significant. With both in a single party dictatorship having significance and both in a personal dictatorship lacking significance, I reason that each dictatorship is treating Catholic and Islamic religious leaders differently, and differential treatment leads to different support for each dictatorship among congregations.

**Implications**

These findings imply that Catholic and Muslim leaders in a single party dictatorship are likely receiving some form of patronage to provide support for the dictatorship. To continue such payment, these leaders must garner support amongst their respective congregations. With the results indicating that the active religious members of each respective religion are significantly more likely to support the single party dictatorship, I believe that these religious leaders are indeed preaching support and that the congregations are reacting. The personal dictatorships show the opposite; no likelihood of leader support and, in turn, no likelihood of active members’ support for the dictatorship.

**Alternative Explanations**

Although feasible, scholars have alternative explanations to explain the same connection. One such explanation surrounds the use of natural resources. Plausibly, a single party dictatorship may have higher levels of natural resources than a personal dictatorship. These natural resources allow a dictatorship more flexibility with patronage spending by providing a consistent and constant revenue stream. However, in the Afrobarometer sample, the only states that have natural resources are Cameroon and Cote D’Ivoire, both personal dictatorships. If natural resources played a connection between a dictatorship and its purchasing power to include
religious leaders, I would expect Catholic and Islamic religious leaders in these two states to have a higher likelihood of support. To verify, I reran the binary logistical regressions with a dichotomous variable controlling for both states. No significance resulted from my attempts. Due to such, I conclude that natural resources are not playing a factor in my analysis.

Apart from the alternative explanation of natural resources, an additional explanation exists to challenge my reasoning. With the difference between a single party and a personal dictatorship in the level of access to elites’ status, scholars argue that such a difference equates to differences in repression between both dictatorship types. A single party dictatorship can coopt critics and opposition by including such in party membership and thus patronage access. Personal dictatorships do not have such a means to address critics and opposition, and therefore are more likely to resort to repression. Such repression plausibly means that my findings of support between the two types of dictatorship could be biased; individuals in a personal dictatorship fear responding in the negative. If such a fear exists, as a result of either repression or a credible threat that it may occur, exists, I expect that Catholic and Islamic religious leaders and members should support the personal dictatorship sufficiently to show significance.

I further think that little fear exists. I come to this conclusion by looking at whether or not religious members in a personal dictatorship are willing to partake in or have partaken in the signing of a petition, a boycott or a protest. If such fear existed, the respondents would not question such permanent and traceable acts of defiance against the personal dictator and merely answer that they fully support said dictator. Yet, 77, 59 and 73 percent of Religious Leaders, Active Members and Inactive Members respectively report having done or are willing to partake in the signing of a petition, a boycott or a protest. Such willingness to defy the dictator leads me
to believe that the results for higher likelihood of support in a single party dictatorship are not
due to repression fears by the respondents in a personal dictatorship.

Conclusion

Having found little evidence that alternative arguments better explain my results than my
argument, I conclude that this chapter shows support the hypothesis that patronage access
differences between a single party and a personal dictatorship exist and are due to the structural
differences of the accessibility to elites’ status. With a single party dictatorship being generally
inclusive, the patronage access becomes spread to include Catholic and Islamic religious leaders,
whereas a personal dictatorship’s exclusivity targets select elites and such elites provide, if
needed, trickle down patronage to the citizenry. For this reason, religious leaders in a personal
dictatorship have less likelihood of patronage access than those in a single party dictatorship. To
maintain such access, these religious leaders garner support among congregations, explaining
why members in a single party dictatorship are significantly more likely to support the
dictatorship than those in a personal dictatorship.

This chapter has several avenues for future research that can strengthen the argument. Much
literature looks to see the size of and who makes up the minimum winning coalition of elites in a
dictatorship. Clarifying this issue contributes by showing the distinctions between religious
denominations and the reasoning behind choosing some religious leaders over others if such
choices exist. Apart from the coalition building process, future research should also focus on the
differences in patronage between political appointments and pay offs and how each affects
religious leaders. This finding would help in establishing a more cohesive argument regarding
patronage access.
Chapter 5: Holy Survival – Catholic and Islamic Effects on a Dictatorship’s Survival

Chapter 4 explored the differences in Catholic and Islamic religious leaders’ support and subsequent congregational support depending on the dictatorship type. The chapter showed that due to internal mechanics, a single party dictatorship more frequently includes such leaders for the benefit of congregational support. This chapter concerns how such support translates into a difference in survival expectations between a single party and personal dictatorship.

In terms of survival expectations, scholars find that the relationship between a dictatorship and its elites alters a dictatorship’s survival expectancy depending on whether the dictatorship maintains its patronage structure to its elites. The elites are quintessential for a dictatorship to maintain power by insulating the dictatorship from citizenry challenges. According to scholars, these elites are the wealthy and the military; both logically provide insulation from citizens by providing the necessary resources to the dictatorship to remain in power (Clapham 1996; Dadmehr 2003; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003; Lemarchand 2003; Van De Walle 2001; 2004; 2007; Bolton 2007; Bates 2008; Ezrow and Frantz 2011).

This explanation sufficiently creates a basis for a survival analysis but fails to account for other nuances that are at a dictatorship’s disposal such as elections (Ghandi and Prezworski 2006; Magaloni 2006; 2008). Elections create a means for a dictatorship to establish some form of international legitimacy, albeit that many of these institutional structures are far from free and fair. I agree with all of these scholars and seek to add an additional nuance to a dictatorship’s survival analysis: support garnered from religious leaders for the dictatorship.

I proceed by offering a literature review on dictatorship survival, followed by a hypotheses section where I outline the hypotheses and explain the testing. In the operationalization section, I explain my variables. I subsequently report the results and account for alternative explanations. I
conclude by restating my argument and the support from this chapter and end by offering possible areas for future research.

**Literature Review**

Geddes (1999, 2003) finds that a personal and a single party dictatorship differ in survival likelihood due to the differences in incentives for cooperation and the distribution of patronage. In a personal dictatorship, with the dictatorship being tied to the whim of an individual, the dictator needs to keep the elites to a minimum winning coalition to see an increase in dictator survivability. With a small coalition, the dictator can easily manage the elites by either a credible threat of exclusion and replacement or an instant transfer of funds (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003). So long as the patronage to the elites continues, this dictatorship, barring exogenous shocks, can endure. In this dictatorship, little cooperation exists outside of the relationship between the dictator and the elites. Geddes finds these dictatorships exclude opposition from patronage; a personal dictatorship needs a minimum coalition of elites, and the patronage payments must continue to this group of elites to increase survival likelihood.

A single party dictatorship differs from a personal dictatorship in that the dictatorship centers on a party structure. In this structure, elites are party members. Some governing council typically exists with the party leader being the dictator. To increase survival, the party can extend membership to an opposition or offer such an opposition some level of inferior patronage for its support. Receiving some patronage is better than none and effectively silences the opposition.

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34 An additional nuance to Geddes’ argument is that an important destabilizing factor for both of these dictatorships comes from exogenous shocks. A personal dictatorship has a harder time weathering such shocks than a single party dictatorship. What is quintessential for a personal dictatorship is that the dictatorship be able to continue the system of patronage. If the dictatorship has a hard time meeting its patronage obligations, shocks destabilize the dictatorship. Not being able to pay the military or political officials creates destabilization that in turn leads to a decrease in dictator survival. A single party dictatorship, due to its institutional structure, can fare through exogenous shocks by coopting critics to join the party. I do not account for what happens during such shocks, my argument is currently focused on the nuance of how religious leaders and members change survival expectations in the absence of such shocks.
With such patronage flowing from the dictatorship, the opposition has incentives to cooperate with the dictatorship to continue patronage payments. By having the means to include opposition, a single party dictatorship survives longer than a personal dictatorship due to its ability to include the opposition.

Levitsky and Way (2002) argue that the distinction between a personal and a single party dictatorship is not as clear cut as presented in Geddes’ (1999, 2003) argument. These scholars note the presence of elections in most dictatorships that are in some cases competitive. In Sub-Saharan Africa, all current dictatorships have some form of elections. These scholars argue that the usage of elections may better explain survival than Geddes’ distinction between dictatorship types. These scholars advocate for a more concise distinction to be that of the competitiveness of such elections – deemed competitive authoritarian.

Magaloni (2006; 2008) notes that in the current time period, most dictatorships exhibit a competitive authoritarian structure. Such a structure consists of routine elections, although not always free and fair, that directly affect the dictator’s survival. According to Magaloni (2006; 2008), the institutionalization of elections provides a key means for the dictatorship to increase survivability. Apart from a way to redistribute spoils, elections serve to show members of the party that some order of succession and upward mobility is plausible, thus keeping members in rank and file with the prospects of upward mobility. A dictatorship may dole out such mobility or spoils in exchange for a service among party members to keep excluded citizens at bay. Thus, the power sharing structure acts as a means for maintaining the status quo and guarding against citizens.

Apart from a means to guard against citizens, elections send a public message to these citizens. When a dictatorship’s party consistently wins at levels of 75 percent or higher, citizens
perceive a level of invincibility for the dictator’s party and in turn the dictator. Such invincibility sends a clear signal to citizens that the dictator has a strong hold on the office; strong enough to signal a credible threat to dissuade any revolt by the citizens or defection by the elites (Magaloni 2006).

Svolik (2009) extends Magaloni’s findings by clarifying the relationship between the dictator and the ruling coalition. Svolik argues that the nature of the relationship creates a conflict of interests; the dictator consistently wants more power at the expense of the ruling coalition, and the ruling coalition wants to confine the dictator’s power. The ruling coalition may threaten the dictator with a coup d’état to try to dissuade the dictator’s power grab. The ability to confine the dictator centers on the ruling coalition’s credible threat. This threat credibility depends on whether or not the dictatorship is, in Svolik’s terms, “established” or “contested.” Contested dictatorships exhibit the power struggle between the dictator and the ruling coalition. In time, if the dictator achieves more power, he turns into an established dictator and his survival substantially increases. This change from contested to established occurs due to the ruling coalition’s level of credible threat changing. During the contested phase, the threat from the ruling coalition is credible so long as they act on it, succeed and keep the dictator in check. If the ruling coalition fails, the dictator gains more power. With the loss of credibility and a more powerful dictator, the ruling coalition becomes more hesitant to threaten, thus increasing the dictator’s survival rate and changing his status to an established dictator.

Ghandi and Prezworski (2006) turn to a discussion of the dictator’s rationale for the creation of institutions and which institutions guarantee a higher likelihood of dictator survival so as to understand the nuances between a single party and personal dictatorship. They reason that dictators create legislatures as a response to a growing opposition (Ghandi and Prezworski 2006).

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35 All dictatorships in Sub-Saharan Africa currently have some form of party apparatus.
The legislature allows the dictator the ability to co-opt opposition members with some form of patronage by offering a legislative seat in exchange for support. Ghandi and Prezworski (2006) further reason that creating legislatures was an option of last resort; so long as the opposition remains weak, they expected to see no legislative institution.

Geddes (2003) clarifies her typology with respect to elections and parties and addresses the nuances noted by previous scholars. She explains that a personal and single party dictatorship can have parties and elections, rather, the distinction remains between the two due to who essentially makes policy. She shows that in a personal dictatorship, the presence of a party or elections does not necessarily lead to a change in policy. Rather, in a personal dictatorship, the control over policy remains in the hands of the personal dictator, whereas policy in a single party dictatorship can be affected by the party and elections. Therefore, her typology and distinction between a single party and a personal dictatorship remains salient if a personal dictatorship has a party or elections. Moreover, her typology does not limit the analysis to a discussion of elections and parties but rather extends the discussion to a more in-depth look at the internal mechanics of both dictatorship types as to how each addresses the opposition. This decision has ramifications if the opposition poses a credible threat to destabilize the dictatorship.

Religious authorities in the opposition can hinder a dictatorship (Casanova 1994). They have the ability to organize their congregations to react to a dictatorship in a negative manner (Moen and Gustafson 1992; Leege 1993; Jelen and Wilcox 2002). With such an ability, religious leaders in the opposition matter to a dictatorship if the congregational size poses a credible threat to the dictatorship (Jelen and Wilcox 2002). Little discussion in the dictatorship survival literature exists regarding the exact effects of religious authorities and congregations with respect to a dictatorship’s survival.
Hypotheses

The survival literature finds that due to cooperation incentives in a single party dictatorship, this dictatorship has a higher survival rate than a personal dictatorship (Geddes 1999; 2003). To verify the findings, I posit that:

**H1: A single party dictatorship, all things being equal, has a higher survival likelihood than a personal dictatorship.**

If the literature is correct, I should see that a difference in survival exists. By testing the literature in such a fashion, I am able to set a base line survival expectation for each dictatorship. With such a general expectation, I can subsequently include religious factors to see the effects that such factors have on the survival likelihood between the two dictatorship types.\(^{36}\)

My overall argument contends that Catholic and Islamic religious leaders can be elites within both a single party and a personal dictatorship. In concurrence with the literature, the decision in both type of dictatorship as to who becomes part of the elites is a strategic decision by the dictatorship depending on the cost-benefit analysis for the dictatorship. Catholic and Islamic religious leaders who have a strong enough sway among the populace, I reason, logically become part of the elites due to the benefits of congregational support outweighing the costs of redirecting patronage to such religious leaders.

With so few states having large swaths of Catholic or Islamic religious congregations, I reason that the vast majority of Catholic and Islamic religious leaders are not included as elites and remain in the opposition to the dictatorship. In the opposition, I contend that the effects that these religious leaders have on dictatorship survival depends on how each dictatorship treats the opposition.

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\(^{36}\) The aggregate data for religion and religious variables are limited. Due to such limitations, I have to set a basis for survival and look at how the dictatorship coefficient changes in the Cox Hazard model.
Using Geddes’ (1999’ 2003) distinction between a personal and a single party dictatorship in how the dictatorship treats the opposition, these religious leaders, if the congregational size poses a credible threat, are likely offered some level of patronage, albeit inferior, in a single party dictatorship. To continue such patronage, these religious leaders garner support among the congregation. A personal dictatorship, rather than sharing with the religious opposition, excludes religious leaders. This dictatorship is better served by keeping the elites to a minimum size. In this case, the military and the wealthy become quintessential elites to thwart potential opposition. This dictatorship, therefore, receives little to no additional support from religious leaders. To test such a difference in dictatorship mechanics, I posit that:

**H2:** When accounting for the Catholic and Islamic populace, survival likelihood further increases in a single party dictatorship.

In order for a single party dictatorship to need Catholic and Islamic religious leaders to increase survival, these leaders need to pose a credible threat in terms of congregational size. If I am correct that at a certain congregational size, a single party dictatorship coopts religious leaders and these religious leaders react by garnering congregational support, I expect to see that this added support equates to an increase in survival likelihood. Moreover, if I am correct that a personal dictatorship excludes religious leaders in the opposition, they are not receiving support and should therefore have a lower survival likelihood than a single party dictatorship, all things being equal.

**Operationalization**

To test such a hypothesis, I organize my data by type of dictatorship-dictatorship failure and run a Cox hazard model using the year of failure as the observed event. A Cox hazard model allows for my analysis to determine the hazard rate which is the likelihood of an event happening – the risk of failure (Long 1997). As the coefficient for the hazard rate goes down, the risk of
failure goes down; conversely, the survival rate goes up (Long 1997). I include observations from 1990 to 2012. If the dictatorship was on going before 1990, it is included in the analysis.  

**Dependent Variable - Dictatorship Survival:** I create my dependent variable by using Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz (2013) data on autocratic breakdown and dictatorship transitions. From this data set, I use cases from Sub-Saharan African dictatorships from 1990 to 2012. I create a dichotomous variable to represent whether or not the dictatorship failed in a specific year; 0 being on-going dictatorship (no failure) and 1 being dictatorship failure. The time for survival is therefore measured in years. The unit of analysis is dictatorship-year.\(^{37}\)  

**Independent Variables:**  

*Single/Personal:* From the GFW (2013) data, I code a dichotomous variables for a single party dictatorship as a 1 and a personal dictatorship as a 0 depending on the data’s classification.  

*Catholics and Muslims:* I use the Religious Denomination variable from the Quality of Governance data set to account for these two variables. These variables provide percentages for each state’s population as either Catholic or Muslim.  

**Control Variables:**  


*Elections:* Magaloni (2006; 2008) finds that a dictatorship can use elections to increase survival. To control for such a possibility, I rely on the African Elections Database for this variable. This database is created and maintained by the African Studies Centre in the Netherlands. It records

\(^{37}\) I also reran the Cox hazard model with the time being measured in months. The reported results in this chapter remain consistent when changing the time period to months.
the type of election and when it took place from 1960 to 2012. I code these data as 0 if no elections took place, 1 if elections took place.

**Natural Resources:** A debate exists as to whether or not natural resources help or hinder a dictatorship’s survival. To account for natural resources, I include from the World Bank Data mineral rents as percentage of GDP.\(^{38}\)

**Military:** To control for the military repression capabilities, I include from the World Bank data the total armed forces personnel.\(^{39}\)

**Ethnicity:** With Sub-Saharan Africa’s borders being drawn by Europeans with little regard to ethnicity or language (Herbst 2000), I need to control for the power of one ethnic identity over another to ensure that it is religious leaders and not tribal leaders as well as congregations and not tribal affiliations that might change a dictatorship’s survival expectation. I use the Quality of Governance’s Ethnic Fractionalization Measurement. This measurement “reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized a society is. The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics.”\(^{40}\) This variable allows for a distinction between religious affiliations and tribal affiliations.

**Results**\(^{41}\)

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\(^{38}\) Ideally, I would like to include Oil as well. Due to lack of observations, any use of the Oil variables from the World Bank Data drops my observations to 8 and no results are possible.

\(^{39}\) I also used military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The results were similar to the ones reported in this chapter but decreased my observations. For this reason, I report my results using total armed forces.

\(^{40}\) Toerell et al. (2011).

\(^{41}\) States included in the analysis: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritania, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Namibia, Senegal, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. I have also rerun the analyses including variables for population, state size, colonial heritage, and region. None of these variables show significance or affect the reported results. For this reason, I did not include these variables in the reported results.
The results for hypothesis 1 (Model 1) confirm the general scholarly thought that a single party dictatorship’s ability to gain cooperation from the opposition sets it apart from a personal dictatorship’s exclusion of the opposition in terms of survival. Without accounting for Catholics

Table 5.0: Dictatorship Survival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single/Personal</td>
<td>-.902***</td>
<td>-1.554***</td>
<td>-1.473**</td>
<td>-1.470***</td>
<td>-1.335**</td>
<td>-1.017**</td>
<td>-.919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.537)</td>
<td>(.571)</td>
<td>(.635)</td>
<td>(.589)</td>
<td>(.621)</td>
<td>(.564)</td>
<td>(.563)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.084***</td>
<td>-.086***</td>
<td>-.056***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita Current US $</td>
<td>-.003**</td>
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<td>-.003***</td>
<td>-.003***</td>
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<td>(.001)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita Annual Growth</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<td>.002</td>
<td>-.001</td>
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<td>(.015)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
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<td>-.183</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>-.368</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.608)</td>
<td>(.647)</td>
<td>(.574)</td>
<td>(.612)</td>
<td>(.571)</td>
<td>(.619)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
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<td>-.698</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.574</td>
<td>-.058</td>
<td>.264</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.691)</td>
<td>(1.863)</td>
<td>(1.921)</td>
<td>(1.941)</td>
<td>(2.020)</td>
<td>(1.841)</td>
<td>(2.031)</td>
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<td>Mineral Rents as % of GDP</td>
<td>.015</td>
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<td>-.043</td>
<td>-.040</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.009</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.044)</td>
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<td>(.055)</td>
<td>(.050)</td>
<td>(.054)</td>
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<td>(.050)</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = 99%, ** = 95%

The results for hypothesis 1 (Model 1) confirm the general scholarly thought that a single party dictatorship’s ability to gain cooperation from the opposition sets it apart from a personal dictatorship’s exclusion of the opposition in terms of survival. Without accounting for Catholics

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42 Including total armed forces causes one observation from Cote D’Ivoire and all of Somalia to drop out of the analysis. In the appendices for Chapter 5, Table 5.A has the religious break down for each state and Table 5.B has the leadership history and the leaders’ religious affiliation for each state.
and Muslims, the coefficient of -.902 indicates that as a basis of analysis, a single party dictatorship, in general, is 71 percent more likely to survival than a personal dictatorship.

When including the Catholic and Muslim population variables (Model 3), the coefficient rises from -1.473. The coefficient for Model 3 indicates that a single party dictatorship is 81 percent more likely to survive; the addition of religious variables increases the likelihood of survival. Acknowledging religion in a survival analysis increases the survival rate for a single party dictatorship. This finding supports hypothesis 2 and my overall argument that Catholic and Islamic religious leaders, due to potential control abilities over congregations, merit inclusion in a survival analysis; these leaders can affect survival.

To ascertain if one religion affects the survival rate more so than the other, I rerun all models and isolate the Catholic and Muslim populace (Model 5 and Model 7). The results show that the Catholic populace remains significant to the analysis whereas the Muslim populace shows no significance. As to the effects of each religion on a single party dictatorship’s survival rate, excluding Muslims and focusing on Catholics leads to similar results as when both variables are included together in the analysis; the survival coefficient is significant and similar in size. The Muslim populace has no significance and its effects on the survival rate when included in the analysis are minimal.

From these findings, I surmise that the Catholic populace is what alters the survival rate when included in the analysis; Muslims have minimal effects, if any. This finding confirms the expectations with respect to Catholics for hypothesis 2 by indicating that if included in a single party dictatorship, Catholics alter survival expectations.

43 For the remainder of my analysis of the results, I am relying on the results that include all of the control variables. The dropping of two observations does not significantly impact the reported results.
To show how a Catholic populace size affects the survival expectations for single party and personal dictatorships, I apply the results by pairing countries single party and personal dictatorship with similar Catholic populations.

When pairing states with ongoing dictatorships and similar Catholic percentages, Table 5.2 shows the effects on each dictatorship of the Catholic populace on dictatorship survival compared to expected survival rate without accounting for the Catholic populace. 44 These results show the difference of the effects of religious leaders on congregations depending on whether or not such leaders are in the opposition or treated as elites. With Sub-Saharan African religious societies being highly fractionalized, the results for the Republic of Congo, a personal dictatorship with 53.9 percent Catholics, and Angola, a single party dictatorship with 68.5 percent Catholics, show a very similar survival rate expectation. Plausibly, due to religious

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44 To calculate these percentages, I rely on the Cox model that reports a -1.335 coefficient for dictatorship type and -.055 coefficient for Catholic populace. The percentage of Catholics comes from the Quality of Governance’s religious denominations data and the dictatorship type classification comes from the GFW data. These state’s dictatorships are all ongoing as of 2009.
fractionalization and the size of the Catholic populace being large, both states’ benefit from including Catholic leaders as elites; the benefits outweigh the costs due to size of the congregation. This reasoning reforms my argument in that due to such fractionalization, the requisite amount of congregational size that religious leaders need to be part of the elites is plausibly lower than previously theorized; at some point, both dictatorships cannot ignore religious leaders and must include such leaders as elites due to congregational size.

When looking at the difference between Mozambique, a single party dictatorship, and Cameroon, a personal dictatorship, the analysis becomes clearer (Table 5.2). Catholic leaders are in the opposition (Serapiao 1993; Takougang 2004; 2004a). Paul Biya, the personal dictator of Cameroon focuses on maintaining control over the state with using the military’s repressive capabilities at will (Takounga 2004; 2004a). Catholic Cardinals criticize Biya’s leadership and preach in opposition to Biya (Takougang 2004; 2004a). No indication exists to suggest at any time that Paul Biya included Catholic leaders as elites; the evidence indicates that these leaders are routinely excluded and repressed (Takougang 2004; 2004a). The Catholic Church and its leaders in Mozambique, a single party dictatorship, have had a different treatment during FRELIMO’s duration, the main party of Mozambique. From independence in Mozambique, the head of FRELIMO, Machel (1976-1986) viewed the Catholic Church and its leaders as being in cahoots with the Portuguese colonial administration (Serapiao 1993). Machel tried to punish church by outlawing the religion and seizing its property; Catholic leaders were, thus, in the opposition (Serapiao 1993). This policy created strife for Machal due to the large portion of the populace that was devout Catholics. Catholic leaders did not disappear but rather acted against the dictatorship by organizing its congregations to defy the dictatorship (Serapiao 1993). Such strife led to the liberalization of opposition parties and the change of FRELIMO’s party leader to
Chissano (1986-2005).\textsuperscript{45} During Chissano’s leadership, the Catholic leaders allied with oppositional parties. With such alliance and these Catholic leaders’ congregational size, Chissano began offering concessions to Catholic leaders. Catholic leaders have received property back and an official status as a religion in the state as well as some level of state support (Serapiao 1993).

With Cameroon and Mozambique having similar amount of Catholics and both being in the opposition, I conclude that the difference in survival rate stems from the above noted difference in how each dictatorship treats the opposition: Cameroon excludes and Mozambique coopts Catholic leaders in the opposition. Moreover, the evidence indicates that since Mozambique has coopted Catholic leaders, the state has had less strife and the Catholic populace supports the dictatorship (Serapiao 1993).

From the Mozambique and Cameroon cases, as the size of the Catholic populace drops, the results show a growing difference in survival rate between a single party and a personal dictatorship. I reason that these results support my theoretical position that this change is due to how each dictatorship type treats the religious leaders in the opposition. For a single party dictatorship, offering these religious leaders in the opposition some form of inferior patronage to gain the Catholic populace’s support accounts for the difference in the survival rates between both types of dictatorship; depending on the Catholic populace’s size posing a credible threat to the dictatorship. This support aids in my general argument by showing a basis of when a dictatorship includes religious leaders as elites. Furthermore, these results show support for how a potential difference in treatment of Catholic religious leaders in the opposition exists. With a single party dictatorship having the ability to coopt such religious leaders, whereas a personal dictatorship likely excludes such leaders, the inclusion of such leaders creates support among the

\textsuperscript{45}The current head of the party, Guebuza has continued to give Catholic leaders concessions (Serapiao 1993).
Catholic populace. Such support equates to the difference in the survival rate between the two dictatorship types when Catholic leaders are in the opposition and their congregations pose a credible threat.

**Implications**

These results indicate that ignoring religion from a survival analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa hinders results. With the African populace being particularly devout, religion has a role to play. The results indicate that Catholic religious leaders have a role to play in a single party dictatorship’s survival. As opposition, this type of dictatorship can coopt these religious leaders for additional support to help extend the duration of the dictatorship if these leaders’ congregational size poses a credible threat.

Although the inclusion of Catholics as a variable increases a single party’s overall survival, the actual effects of the Catholic populace’s coefficient shows that these effects are dependent on the size of the Catholic population in each state. I reason that such effects support the notion that these leaders, when in the opposition, become coopted if the congregational size poses a credible threat and become elites in both dictatorship types when the adhering populace is of such a size that the exclusion of Catholic leaders would be irrational. With the decision of elites being strategic on the part of the dictatorship, barring a substantial effect on the part of the Catholic populace, inclusion of Catholic leaders as elites is irrational for a dictatorship; the benefits are too slight. From such a stance, these findings imply that Catholic religious leaders in the opposition are only of interest to a single party dictatorship if the Catholic populace poses a credible threat; only single party dictatorship has the mechanics to coopt these leaders and gain the cooperation.

**Alternative Explanation**
Even though I surmise that the results support my overall argument, the results show that the amount of Catholics, regardless of dictatorship type, is significant to a survival analysis. The means of testing make it difficult to ascertain if this populace is significant to only one dictatorship type or the other. This finding challenges my argument by showing that the mere presence of Catholics increases both dictatorships’ survival rate.

Although this result appears problematic, my reasoning remains sound due to a lack of differences in religious affiliations of dictatorship leaders and populace between both dictatorship types. Catholic religious leaders, and congregations, plausibly have some level of good will to a Catholic dictatorship leader. With Africa having the highest level of religious fractionalization and the size of the Catholic populace in each state not always being the plurality, Catholic leaders may consistently worry about the status of their religion within a state. Catholic leaders and thus their congregations plausibly might feel some level of safety with a Catholic head of state. With the head of state being part of Catholicism, Catholic leaders and congregations have an expectation that someone of the like faith would not cause harm to fellow brethren.

When looking at the correlation between duration of dictatorship type and the dictatorship having a Catholic affiliated dictator, a single party dictatorship has a Catholic dictator 39 percent of the time whereas a personal dictatorship has a Catholic dictator 36 percent of the time, while both have an average Catholic populace of 21 and 25 percent, respectively. This populace is of potential equal importance to both dictatorships and has potential for similar connection and feeling between dictators of the same faith and Catholics religious leaders and their congregations. With both of these relatively equal, I would not expect the inclusion of the

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46 I am not equating dictatorship survival to leader survival. My research remains focused on dictatorship survival. Rather, I am estimating the duration of time that each dictatorship had a leader that affiliates with Catholicism.

47 The appendix has a comprehensive list of dictatorship leaders and their religious affiliation.
Catholic populace in a survival analysis to have a larger increase in a single party’s survival rate if it were not for Catholic religious leaders being treated differently. The significance of Catholics, therefore, for both a single party and a personal dictatorship likely has some level of goodwill toward the heads of states affiliated with the Catholic religion. With the total duration of Catholic affiliated heads of state in power being the largest out of all the religions, the significance of the Catholic coefficient is likely equating to the good will in both dictatorships, but the overall increase in single party survival is likely due to the single party coopting Catholic religious leaders whose congregational size poses a credible threat.

Conclusion

The results in this chapter show that general scholarly thought that a single party dictatorship has the ability to coopt critics and that such an ability extends its survival rate to that of a personal dictatorship is true. However, I extend this analysis by showing the effects of religious factors on a single party dictatorship’s survival rate. My results indicate that if a Catholic populace poses a credible threat to a single party dictatorship, this dictatorship likely includes religious leaders in the opposition to gain the additional insurance of support from the leaders’ congregations. When including the Catholic populace into a survival analysis, the survival rate for a single party dictatorship increases. This finding confirms my overall argument that religious leaders and their congregations can alter a dictatorship’s survival, and that such a change is due to how each dictatorship type treats religious leaders in the opposition; a single party dictatorship likely coopts whereas a personal dictatorship likely excludes. The different treatment explains why, when accounting for the Catholic populace, a single party dictatorship’s survival rate increases and remains higher than that of a personal dictatorship.
This chapter has several avenues for possible future research. Religious variables are extremely limited. With my argument focusing on religious leaders and their effects on congregations, the collection of data that estimates the number of religious leaders in each state would help by allowing for an analysis to see if size is a factor. Potentially, too many religious leaders make it difficult to coopt a religion. Moreover such data aid to allow a more in-depth analysis of religious leaders on a dictatorship’s survival rate.
Chapter 6: Sacred Dictators – Holy Conclusion

Dictatorships continue to remain problematic to the democratic development and individual level freedoms in Sub-Saharan Africa. Scholars have not fully explained the mechanics of how these dictatorships have maintained power and legitimacy in this region of the world. By looking at the history of religion in the region and its power over the citizenry, scholars can better understand an additional nuance that allows dictatorships to continue.

Religion’s saliency as an explanatory variable has had scant incorporation into comparative political science research. At best, scholars use it to control for issues without recognizing the importance it plays in an analysis. In this research, I argue for the inclusion of religious explanatory variables; religious variables create a substantial difference to research outcomes in places like Sub-Saharan Africa. This research shows that by excluding religious factors in a dictatorship survival analysis between a single party and personal dictatorship in Sub-Saharan Africa, results fail to account for an important nuance.

In Geddes’ (2003) research on dictatorship survival, she uses a control variable for Muslims to account for previous scholars noting an association between countries that are predominantly Muslim and weak democratic values. To control for this effect, she uses the population percentage of Muslims in each country. She offers little to no insight in the analysis as to why the predominance of this religion shows significance in her results. I contend that this lack of analysis is due to a fundamental dismissal of religion as a focal point in comparative politics.

In this chapter, I begin by outlining Chapter 1 and explain how former colonial rulers used religion and its religious leaders Sub-Saharan Africa. I further explain how the saliency of religion has not disappeared among these Sub-Saharan African dictatorships. In my Chapter 2
outline, I discuss Geddes’ (2003) research and how my contribution is the addition of religion and religious leader explanatory variables and an explication of how these variables change dictatorship survival in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 3 begins the analysis of my argument by showing that religious leaders have control over congregations in Sub-Saharan Africa and are, thus, a potential means for a dictatorship to use to extend survival. Chapter 4 turns to the differences between a single party and personal dictatorship and discusses how each type of dictatorship treats religious leaders. This chapter shows how religious leaders garner support among congregations for a dictatorship. Chapter 5 offers a survival analysis with the inclusion of religion to show how the garnering of support noted in Chapter 4 translates into appreciable survival differences for a dictatorship. I conclude this chapter by my restating my argument that religion matters and explaining avenues for future research.

Chapter 1: Holy Introduction

In Chapter 1 of my research, I explain how the European colonial powers used religion and its religious leaders in the colonial administration to provide services for citizens; privileging religious leaders, in many cases, with colonial administration positions. By the European powers interweaving religion and politics, emerging Sub-Saharan dictators learned the usefulness of religion and religious leaders in maintaining order. The question remains as to the saliency post-independence of this dictatorship-religious leader connection. To address such a question, I show that the current situation in Sub-Saharan Africa is one in which the saliency of religion is high; high levels of religious membership and religiosity exist. I reason that with the colonial experience teaching future dictators the usefulness of religion to maintain order and with current levels of religiosity and membership being high, religion and religious leaders are as much of
importance now as they were in colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. By ignoring religion and religious leaders, scholars fail to capture the in its entirety the mechanics behind dictatorship survival.

**Chapter 2: Holy Argument**

Having shown in Chapter 1 the importance of religion and religious leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa, Chapter 2 outlines Geddes’ (2003) research and how my argument of how religion and religious leaders work in a dictatorship survival analysis – the contribution to the literature of this research. Geddes’ (2003) classifies dictatorships based on who has policymaking decisions. Two classifications, important to Sub-Saharan Africa, are a single party dictatorship and a personal dictatorship. In Geddes’ (2003) analysis, she claims that single party dictatorships are more likely to survive than personal dictatorships due to how each treats the opposition. With single party dictatorships having a party apparatus, these dictatorships can coopt opposition into the party structure whereas a personal dictatorship relies on a small core of elites – the wealthy and military - to insulate it from the opposition. This distinction, according to Geddes (2003), is the reason why single party dictatorships survive longer; peaceful incorporation of the opposition leads to more stability whereas personal dictatorships’ reliance on repression of the opposition leads to destabilization. I agree with Geddes’ (2003) distinction and reasoning but argue that religion needs to be included as an explanatory factor in the analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa.

I argue that dictatorships use religious leaders to garner support for the dictatorship among congregations depending on the strength of the religious leaders’ congregation. I agree with Geddes (2003) that either type of dictatorship includes religious leaders as elites when the benefits of including these religious leaders outweigh the costs. I reason that this inclusion occurs when the religious leaders have a near majority of followers within a country: the benefits of religious leaders supplying support from nearly the entire populace outweigh the costs of
either excluding the religious leaders who have a small or insignificant amount of followers or angering elites. None of the Sub-Saharan African countries in my sample has a near majority of followers subscribing to one faith. Therefore, I reason that religious leaders are in the opposition regardless of type of dictatorship. In accordance with Geddes’ (2003) research expectation that only single party dictatorships coopt the opposition, I expect that only single party dictatorships incorporate religious leaders if these religious leaders’ congregational size can pose a threat to the dictatorship’s stability. For this reason, single party dictatorships that include religious leaders are likely to survive the longest in Sub-Saharan Africa.

An additional nuance to my argument exists and that nuance concerns which religions matter in the cost benefit analysis of a dictatorship. I reason that the focal point is on Catholicism and Islam. Both of these religions are hierarchical (Englebert 2000; Philpott 2007). The hierarchy makes these religions more affordable for a dictatorship to include because the dictatorship only needs to buy off the head religious leaders who will demand compliance from subordinates to preach support for the dictatorship.

Chapter 3: Holy Control

Having outlined my argument in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 clarifies why religious leaders would be of interest to dictatorships; religious leaders’ level have control over congregations and can garner support for dictatorships among congregations. To show support for religious leaders’ congregational control, I use the scholarly thought on Secularization Theory.

This theory reasons that in a society that is pre-industrialization, religious leaders provide survival services to the populace – healthcare, food and education (Martin 1978). Failing to listen to religious leaders makes the individual ineligible to ascertain services – adherence has its
privileges. Once industrialization takes place, individuals become more survival secure; more jobs equate to steady cash flow and steady cash flow means less need to listen to religious leaders due to the cash flow providing individuals with access to survival services independent of religious leaders. As industrialization continues, individuals demand that the state provide such services. The end outcome is that the state supplants religious leaders’ influence by institutionalizing access to services once provided by these religious leaders (Norris and Inglehart 2004).

I approach the testing in this chapter by looking at the micro-level effects, country-level effects and macro-level effects.48

Micro-Level Effects

The micro level attempts to show Secularization Theory effects on individual level survival security; an inverse relationship between individual level food security and religious leaders’ influence over the individual. The results show significance for only Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Tanzania shows no support for Secularization Theory because the expected effect is opposite; Tanzanians contact religious leaders more often when their food security increases. Zimbabwe does go in the expected direction but has some complicating factors that I reason are affecting the results; food output is plummeting due to the dictator’s meddling into the economy not due to industrialization. For these reasons, I find that the results for hypothesis 1 show no support for Secularization Theory.

With the results showing no support for Secularization Theory, I surmise that religious leaders have control over their congregations. These dictatorships have little to no levels of

48 I use the Afrobarometer 2008 Round 4 survey data for Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe throughout Chapter 3.
development indicating that industrialization has not occurred. Without industrialization, religious leaders’ control over congregations exists (Martin 1978).

Country-Level Effects

The country-level effects attempt to show if there are unique attributes to certain societies in the sample that make religious leaders’ influence more likely by including country dichotomous variables into the same analysis for micro-level effects. The results show no support for Secularization Theory; food security is insignificant. Burkina Faso, Uganda and Mozambique show positive, negative and positive significance respectively.

With the country-level effects showing no support for Secularization Theory, I reason that this result supports the micro-level results; religious leaders have congregational control due to these societies being in a pre-industrialization situation. The results for Burkina Faso, Uganda and Mozambique show dictatorships that are potentially mimicking the former colonial governments. French and Portuguese colonies gave religious leaders an administrative role in the societies. Burkina Faso, a former French colony, and Mozambique, a former Portuguese colony, have societies where religious leaders were and are still important to present day. With Uganda being landlocked and a former British colony, the negative results are likely exhibiting the British colonial style; control the coast and let certain religious leaders control the interior. Religious leaders’ control in Uganda may be different due to it being landlocked and a former British colony.

Macro-Level Effects

The macro-level looks at development and its connection to religious leaders’ control. The results show no support for Secularization Theory because the directionality goes against expectation: the more developed a country is the more often a religious leader is contacted.
These results further support all the previous results; development is not sufficient to lead to industrialization. With no industrialization, Secularization Theory expects that religious leaders have congregational control.

Implications of Chapter 3

With no clear results in favor of Secularization Theory, this chapter shows a pre-Secularization Theory situation. These countries have not developed sufficiently either to spurn industrialization. Without industrialization, religious leaders’ control does not diminish; religious leaders do have congregational control.

By having religious leaders having control, religious leaders, if coalesced into a dictatorship, can influence their congregations. This influence supplies a dictatorship with support. In further support of the importance of religious leaders, the control variable for religious membership consistently shows significance. With Chapter 1 indicating high levels of religious membership, these religious leaders can affect a large portion of the populace and sway this populace to support a dictatorship.

Therefore, religious leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa can change a dictatorship’s survival depending on how the dictatorship treats the religious leaders. In addition to the saliency of religious leaders for a dictatorship survival analysis, this chapter further underscores my overall advocacy for the incorporation of religious variables when looking at political phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although this chapter shows support for religious leaders’ congregational control being countrywide, European colonizers and subsequently Sub-Saharan African dictatorships, invested unevenly between the coast and interior; future research should focus on if religious leaders’ congregational control is countrywide or in specific areas.

Chapter 4: Holy Support: Catholic and Islamic Leader and Member Dictatorship Support
Having shown support for religious leaders having control over congregations in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 combines Geddes’ (2003) distinction that only single party dictatorships can coopt the opposition and my argument in favor of religious leaders being included in the analysis. With the sample being the same from Chapter 3, no country has a majority religion; therefore, religious leaders are in the opposition. A single party dictatorship may decide based on a cost-benefit analysis, to coopt religious leaders in exchange for congregational support for the single party dictatorship. I further advocate that dictatorships only choose Catholic or Islamic religious leaders due to the hierarchical nature of these religions. This hierarchy makes these religions, and the respective religious leaders, the least costly for a dictatorship to gain the maximum of benefits; a dictatorship need only include the head religious leader who can then command subordinates to do his bidding. I, thus, focus on Catholic and Islamic religious leaders in this chapter.

Religious Leaders’ Support for Single Party Dictatorships

If religious leaders are being coopted in a single party dictatorship and excluded in a personal dictatorship, these coopted religious leaders should show more support for a single party dictatorship than counterparts should in a personal dictatorship. The results show this situation to be true; Catholic and Islamic religious leaders in a single party dictatorship are significantly more likely to support the dictatorship than these same religious leaders in a personal dictatorship.

This difference in religious leaders’ support dependent on the type of dictatorship implies that single party dictatorships are treating religious leaders differently than personal dictatorships; these religious leaders are receiving something to support the single party dictatorship. This finding underscores my argument that religious leaders are being coopted
when needed by a single party dictatorship and that religious leaders do have a role to play in a dictatorship. It further aids my argument that the focal point should be on Catholicism and Islam because these religious leaders show a higher likelihood of support than other religious leaders.

**Religious Members’ Support for Single Party Dictatorships**

If religious leaders in a single party dictatorship are being coopted for support, reason indicates that a connection should exist between these religious leaders and congregational support; this support is the benefit the single party dictatorship wants that minimizes the costs of coopting religious leaders. The results show that Catholic and Muslim members in a single party dictatorship are significantly more likely to support the dictatorship. The expected connection does exist.

By the results showing a connection between religious leaders and members of the same religion in support of a single party dictatorship, these results add credence to the findings in Chapter 3 that religious leaders do have control over congregations. In addition to this control, these results also indicate that a single party dictatorship is coopting religious leaders in the opposition in exchange for congregational support for the dictatorship. This finding further emboldens my advocacy for the addition of religious variables in a dictatorship survival analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa; religious leaders do have a role to play.

**Implications of Chapter 4**

I reason that these results are due to Catholic and Muslim leaders in a single party dictatorship likely receiving some form of patronage to provide support for the dictatorship. To continue such payment, these religious leaders must influence their respective congregations to support the dictatorship. With the results indicating that the active religious members of each
respective religion are significantly more likely to support the single party dictatorship, I believe that these religious leaders are indeed preaching support and that the congregations are reacting.

This chapter aids my overall argument by showing that religious leaders in a single party dictatorship are acting differently than religious leaders in a personal dictatorship. I reason that this difference is due how each treats the opposition. As noted by Geddes (2003), single party dictatorships coopt the opposition whereas personal dictatorships exclude the opposition. In addition, this chapter shows a connection between religious leaders and their congregations in terms of support. Future research should focus on what exact benefits are being given to religious leaders to see if differing levels of benefits connect to differing levels of congregational support.

Chapter 5: Holy Survival – Catholic and Islamic Effects on a Dictatorship’s Survival

Having found support for religious leaders controlling congregations, being incorporated into a single party dictatorship and garnering support among congregations, Chapter 5 turns to how the previous chapters’ findings change a dictatorship survival expectation. Geddes (2003) researches the difference in survival between a single party and personal dictatorship across the world. My first step in this chapter is to see if this same difference exists when looking at Sub-Saharan Africa.

Dictatorship Survival Expectations in Sub-Saharan Africa

With much of my research and evidence showing that, in general, Sub-Saharan Africa has some unique attributes, I begin this chapter by confirming Geddes (2003). The results show that single party dictatorships are more likely to survive than personal dictatorships.

These results indicate that Geddes’ (2003) approach remains consistent when honing in on Sub-Saharan Africa. With her approach showing similar results in Sub-Saharan Africa, I believe that her explanation that the survival difference between single party and personal dictatorships
surrounds how each treats the opposition – only a single party can coopt the opposition leading to higher survival likelihood – is justified. This finding further aids my research by providing a basis of analysis to apply religious variables to see how religious variables change the survival expectation.

Dictatorship Survival Expectations with Religious Variables

Using Geddes’ (2003) approach, I add variables for the percentage of Catholics and Muslims for each country. The results show significance for Catholics but no significance for Muslims. These results show that a single party dictatorship with Catholics is more likely to survive than a single party without and even more likely to survive than a personal dictatorship with or without Catholics.

The results in this chapter indicate that the Catholic religion and the presence of Catholics can change a dictatorship’s survival expectations; making a single party dictatorship with Catholics the likelihood to survive the longest. Chapter 4 showed that Catholic religious leaders and Catholic congregations have a higher likelihood of support for a single party dictatorship than counterparts in a personal dictatorship. This chapter’s results show that this support connection in a single party dictatorship translates into higher survival likelihood for this type of dictatorship. Although Chapter 4 showed a similar connection between Muslim religious leaders and Muslim congregations, the failure for this connection to show results in this chapter does not imply that my argument is not fundamentally sound. Rather, I suspect that the lack of results in this chapter for Islam is due to a religious difference; Catholicism has no sub-sects whereas Islam has many. I think that in Chapter 4’s sample, some Islamic sects were over represented, making those results overstated.
Implications of Chapter 5

This chapter aids my overall argument by showing that the inclusion of religious explanatory variables in a dictatorship survival analysis changes Geddes’ (2003) findings. The findings in this chapter show that there is a significant correlation between the proportion of Catholics in the populace and an increase in the likelihood for a single party dictatorship to survive. In addition to this specific finding regarding Catholics, this chapter indicates that Catholic religious leaders may have kept their privileges gained under European colonization until present day. Catholic leaders are gaining something to go against Papal doctrine that the Pope’s Church does not support dictatorships. This chapter has several areas for future research. The first area should focus on explaining this “Catholic” effect and what the exact difference is between this religion and others in Sub-Saharan African dictatorships. The second area should focus on the lack of results for Muslims in this chapter and see if there are certain Muslim sects that have the expected affect.

Significance of Research

This research advocates that religion should be included in comparative politics as an explanatory variable. Not including it, when merited, leads to results that have less saliency. The Sub-Saharan African society is one where religion plays a strong role and by ignoring this role, I have shown that expectations for dictatorship survival are less accurate. Geddes (2003), although a good baseline for researching dictatorship survival, needs to include religious variables in regions where religion has high levels of followers and religiosity; there is more to a dictatorship survival analysis than the type of dictatorship.

Conclusion

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Throughout my study, I have shown support that in Sub-Saharan Africa, religious leaders have control over congregations and that a connection exists between religious leaders’ support for a dictatorship and congregational support for a dictatorship. Religious leaders have a role to play in a dictatorship survival analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa. I have further shown evidence that including religion changes the expectations for single party dictatorship survival. With all of the evidence showing saliency for religious variables, my argument seems justified that Geddes (2003) and other scholars must incorporate such variables for dictatorship survival. Moreover, this study has shown that religion and religious leaders can and do play a role in dictatorship survival in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ignoring religion and religious leaders in a Sub-Saharan African study limits the study’s explanatory ability.

Future research into this topic should focus on field research and specifically target religious communities and the religious leaders’ ability to influence such communities. In addition to this connection, field research can also clarify religious leaders’ support for dictatorships. Apart from these possibilities for future research, two other avenues exist to help clarify the effects shown in this study; religious size and exogenous shocks. To show a baseline and advocate for religious leader inclusion, I have had to leave out how these dictatorships may use religious leaders in times of exogenous shocks. This area of research would help clarify the mechanisms behind the decision of when and whether or not to include religious leaders for additional support for the dictatorship. I have also had to leave in question the level of exact size that matters for dictatorships to consider a religion and its leaders as a credible threat. Research into this area of the topic would help clarify the expectation of when a dictatorship includes religious leaders.
References


Appendices

Appendix Chapter 2

**2.A: WORLD VALUES SURVEY 2005-2008: IMPORTANCE OF GOD IN DAILY LIFE BY REGION**

- Not Important
- Somewhat Important
- Very Important

- **Region**
  - Sub-Saharan Africa
  - Middle East/N. Africa
  - Europe
  - Asia
  - Latin America
  - N. America
  - Oceania

**2.B WORLD VALUES SURVEY 2005-2008: MEMBERSHIP IN A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION BY REGION**

- Not A Member
- Inactive Member
- Member

- **Region**
  - Sub-Saharan Africa
  - Middle East/N. Africa
  - Europe
  - Asia
  - Latin America
  - N. America
  - Oceania
Appendix Chapter 3

Afrobarometer Round 4 Questions

The individual level survey data come from the Afrobarometer Round 4 collected on each country between 2006-2008.

Dependant Variable: Contact Religious Leader

Question Number: Q27A Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: A religious leader? Variable Label: Contact religious leader Values: 0-3, 9, 998, -1 Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, 1=Missing data Source.

Independent Variables:

Religious Membership:

Question Number: Q22A Question: Let’s turn to your role in the community. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: A religious group (e.g., church, mosque)? Variable Label: Member of religious group Values: 0-3, 9, 998, -1 Value Labels: 0=Not a Member, 1=Inactive member, 2=Active member, 3=Official leader, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data.

Note: I exclude Leaders.

Food Security:

Question Number: Q8A Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: Enough food to eat? Variable Label: How often gone without food Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data Source.

Note: I reverse this coding.

Control Variables:

Catholic and Muslim:

Question Number: Q90 Question: What is your religion, if any? Variable Label: Religion of respondent Values: 0, 1-30, 140-143, 420-421, 461-465, 500-504, 580, 620, 660, 700-701, 995,998-999, -1 Value Labels: 0=None, 1=Christian only (i.e., respondents says only “Christian”, without identifying a specific subgroup), 2=Roman Catholic, 3=Orthodox, 4=Coptic, 5=Anglican, 6=Lutheran, 7=Methodist, 8=Presbyterian, 9=Baptist, 10=Quaker/Friends, 11=Mennonite, 12=Evangelical, 13=Pentecostal ( e.g., “Born Again” and/or “Saved”), 14=Independent (e.g., “African Independent Church”), 15=Jehovah’s Witness, 16=Seventh Day Adventist, 17=Mormon, 18=Muslim only (i.e., respondents says only “Muslim”, without identifying a specific subgroup), 19=Sunni only (i.e., respondents says only “Sunni Muslim”, without identifying a specific subgroup), 20=Ismaeli, 21=Mouridiya Brotherhood, 22=Tijaniya Brotherhood, 23=Qadiriya Brotherhood, 24=Shia, 25=Traditional/ethnic religion, 26=Hindu, 27=Bahai, 28=Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God), 29=Atheist (Do not believe in a God), 30=Other Christain (Moravian), 140=Dutch Reform, 141=UCCSA, 142=ZCC, 143=IPCC, 420=Calviniste (FJKM), 421=Jesosy Mamonjy, 461=Sukuti, 462=African Abraham, 463=Church of Christ, 464=Apostolic Faith/New United, 465=Last Church/Reform, 500=Trabliya Brotherhood, 501=Hamadiya (Hamalite) Brotherhood, 502=Wahhabiyah Brotherhood, 504=Sidya, 580=Dutch Reformed, 620=Izala, 660=Haynes brotherhood, 700=Zionist Christian Church, 701=Dutch Reformed, 995=Other, 998=Refused to answer, 999=Don’t know, -1=Missing data Source.

Note: I use response 2 for Catholic and response 18 for Muslim.
Age:

Question Number: Q1 Question: How old are you? Variable Label: Age Values: 18-110, 998-999, -1 Value Labels: 998=Refused to answer, 999=Don’t know, -1=Missing data.

Gender:

Question Number: Q101 Question: Respondent’s gender Variable Label: Gender of respondent Values: 1, 2 Value

Note: The Afrobarometer does have a question regarding the importance of religion in one’s life. I exclude this potential variable as a control variable because the Pearson correlation between it and religious membership is too highly correlated.

Appendix Chapter 4

Table 4.A State Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>GFW Classification</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Blaise Compaore</td>
<td>Congres pour la Democratie et le Progres (CDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Personal</td>
<td>Paul Biya</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Movement (RDPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Personal</td>
<td>Alassane Ouattara</td>
<td>Rassemblement des Republicains (RDR)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Single Party</td>
<td>Jakaya Kikwete</td>
<td>Charma Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Personal</td>
<td>Faure Gnassingbe</td>
<td>Rassemblement du Peuple Togoloais (UNIR)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Personal</td>
<td>Yoweri Musevini</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement (NRM)</td>
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<td>Patriotic Front (PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Single Party</td>
<td>Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.B Likelihood of Catholic and Islamic Leader Dictatorship Support

Catholic Leaders  | Muslim Leaders
--- | ---
Single Party: 95% | 73%
Personal: 96% | 79%

Table 4.C Likelihood of Catholic and Islamic Member Dictatorship Support

Catholic Members  | Muslim Members
--- | ---
Single Party: 88% | 76%
Personal: 92% | 78%
### Appendix Chapter 5

Table 5.A: State Catholic and Islamic Percentage From the Quality of Governance Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Muslim</th>
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</table>
Vita

The author grew up in Manchester, New Hampshire. He moved to New Orleans, Louisiana to attend Tulane University where he majored in Finance and French. After completing his undergraduate degrees in 2000, he started working on his J.D. and M.B.A at Loyola University completing each in 2004 and 2007, respectively. He passed the Louisiana Bar Examination in February of 2007. He joined the University of New Orleans to attain a PhD in 2010. After doing exploratory dissertation research in Senegal in 2011, he decided to focus on comparative politics with a Sub-Saharan Africa area specialization.