University of New Orleans

ScholarWorks@UNO

University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations

Dissertations and Theses

Fall 12-20-2018

Seeing Red: Immigration and Asymmetrical Partisan Polarization in the United States

Robert M. Worth
University of New Orleans, rworth@uno.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td

Part of the American Politics Commons

Recommended Citation

Worth, Robert M., "Seeing Red: Immigration and Asymmetrical Partisan Polarization in the United States" (2018). *University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations*. 2537.
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/2537

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by ScholarWorks@UNO with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself.

This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uno.edu.

Seeing Red: Immigration and Asymmetrical Partisan Polarization in the United States

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
University of New Orleans
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Political Science

by

Robert Worth

B.A. University of Southern Mississippi, 2009
M.A. City College of New York, 2011
M.A. University of New Orleans, 2014

December, 2018

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Gerald and Mary Worth, without whose unwavering support and encouragement it would not have been possible. I am also grateful for the support and mentorship of Dr. Christine L. Day, who has been a constant source of invaluable knowledge, guidance, and encouragement. I thank Dr. Daniel L. Lewis for his support and guidance during my coursework, and for continuing to serve on my committee after leaving UNO. Finally, I thank Marc Rosenblum for agreeing to sit on my committee as an outside member, and for sharing his invaluable immigration expertise and his assistance and guidance throughout.

Table of Contents

List of Figures iv
List of Tables v
Abstract vi
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory 12
Chapter 3: Individual-Level Tests 47
Chapter 4: State-Level Tests 69
Chapter 5: U.S. Senate Tests 85
Chapter 6: Conclusion 97
Bibliography: 104
Vita: 120

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Kansas percent foreign born and Senate delegation ideology 9
Figure 2.1: House party means on liberal-conservative dimension 14
Figure 2.2.: Senate party means on liberal-conservative dimension 15
Figure 2.3: White portion of electorate in presidential elections, 1980-2012 26
Figure 2.4: Percentage of Census respondents identifying as white 27
Figure 2.5: Percentage of Census respondents reporting black or Hispanic......................27
Figure 2.6: Percentage of U.S. population identifying as white, Hispanic, black, and Asian; 1960, 2011, and 2050 projections...28
Figure 2.7: Percent of parties' electorate by race 29
Figure 2.8: Non-white vote share by party 30
Figure 2.9: White vote share by party..31
Figure 2.10: Foreign-born residents by region of origin...45
Figure 3.1: Partisans' and leaners' ideology 52
Figure 3.2: Predicted probabilities at different rates of immigration of respondent reporting "extremely conservative" (7) on 7-point self-reported ideology measure 63
Figure 4.1: Percent foreign-born and state House Republican ideology in Louisiana and Wisconsin, 1993-2014 71
Figure 6.1: Immigration as the Nation's Top Problem 101

List of Tables

Table 3.1: Partisans' and Leaners' presidential vote choice 53
Table 3.2: Seemingly-unrelated OLS regression conservative-liberal feeling thermometer 59
Table 3.3: Seemingly-unrelated ordered logit regression on self-reported ideology 61
Table 3.4: Seemingly-unrelated OLS regression on conservative-liberal feeling thermometer with immigration*inequality interaction 64
Table 3.5: Seemingly-unrelated ordered logit regression on self-reported ideology with immigration*inequality interaction 66
Table 4.1: Linear regression on citizen ideology (panel-corrected standard errors) 77
Table 4.2: Seemingly-unrelated OLS regression on roll-call ideology in state houses 79
Table 4.3: Seemingly-unrelated OLS regression on roll-call ideology in state senates 80
Table 4.4: predicted values of Republicans' mean roll-call ideology in state houses and senates at minimum and maximum observed values of immigration 81
Table 5.1: OLS regression on first-dimension DW-NOMINATE without party 92
Table 5.2: OLS regression on first-dimension DW-NOMINATE with party 93
Table 5.3: Predicted values of DW-NOMINATE at minimum and maximum observed values of immigration 94

Abstract

Since the mid-1970s, partisan polarization has been increasing in Congress and the Presidency, and, although most voters lack a stable, consistent ideology, non-ideological forms of partisan polarization have emerged in the mass public in recent decades. Moreover, ideological polarization among elites is highly asymmetrical, with increased Republican conservatism accounting for most of the increased ideological distance between the parties. Here, I develop a racial-threat backlash theory and argue that increased rates of immigration are associated with increased asymmetrical ideological polarization among elites and in the mass public. Tests of this theory on voters, the mass public in the states, state legislators, and Senators provide support for my theory. In addition, when accounting for the effects of immigration, I do not find support for the alternative explanation that increased income inequality leads to increased asymmetrical partisan polarization.

Keywords: polarization; partisan polarization; immigration; political parties; ideology; inequality

Chapter 1: Introduction

It often seems that the only thing modern American partisans can agree on is that the opposing party, with its bewilderingly misguided opinions and positions, inhabits a social, cultural, and political space somewhere opposite a yawning, probably unbridgeable divide. Nonetheless, we tirelessly, and often sanctimoniously, lament the rancor and acrimony surrounding the so-called red state/blue state divide over deeply held values like abortion and the definition of marriage, as well as more esoteric, but no less passionately held, opinions about equality, hard work, and just rewards. However, this consensus collapses when it comes time to assign blame for internecine partisan warfare, and we dutifully return to our places on either side of the bright line separating the red and blue Americas. Amid this white noise of division and dysfunction, it is easy to forget that, within many voters' living memories, the parties stood on staid, similarly centrist platforms—so much so that in 1950 the American Political Science Association issued a special report lamenting that there was too *little* ideological distance between the Republican and Democratic parties to offer voters meaningful, easily distinguishable choices (APSA 1950). In fact, David Mayhew argued in 1974—just as the current trend of increasing polarization was beginning—that Congress could in theory devolve into an arena for destructively adversarial, zero-sum partisan combat, but nonetheless insisted:

> The general picture of the congressional party system is one of a system in slow decline—or, to put it another way, a system whose zero-sum edges have been eroded away by powerful norms of institutional universalism (Mayhew 1974, 104-105).

Whether one views the post-war consensus as ideological lethargy or principled cooperation in pursuit of the greater good, how we went from there to the extreme polarization of today in a few short decades is an open question. Just as perplexingly, while Lewis et al's (2018) DW-NOMINATE data show that partisan polarization in Congress and the Presidency began in

the 1970s, the mass public did not begin polarizing until the 1990s. Polarization in the mass public is so slight that the literature is inconclusive as to whether or not it is appropriate to describe the mass public as polarized, or whether or not partisan polarization is largely an elite phenomenon separate from a more politically moderate mass public (Lewis et al. 2018; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Pew Survey Center 2015; Barber and McCarty 2013).

Although the reasons we set off on the road to polarization may remain complex and controversial, the stops we took along the way are, in retrospect, obvious. By the 1980 election, it was clear that the parties had solidified their opposing stances on salient social issues, for example women's rights, and that the racial polarization of the parties was well underway. Nonetheless, the idea of a polarized country did not enter the mainstream discourse until Pat Buchanan's 1992 claim that the United States faced a "culture war," followed by the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 and the emergence of "angry white males" as a media theme and Republican voting bloc. Then, in 1998, the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal brought bitter interparty acrimony to the forefront of the news cycle, and added a partisan dimension to the until-then vague and largely anecdotal perception of a widening "values gap." By the 2000 presidential election, the media's fascination with the "red state/blue state" map of electoral college results, which showed a conservative South and heartland rallying behind Bush, while the coasts and industrial Midwest voted Democratic, made for an ever-present reminder of a putatively divided country (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Wolbrecht 2000, Lewis et al. 2015).

Over the next eighteen years, the trend of increasing partisan polarization held steady in Congress and the Presidency, leading to each Congress being more polarized than its predecessor, and the 114th gaining the dubious title of being the most polarized since at least the early 20th century, if not in all of U.S. history. The effects of extreme partisan polarization on the

governmental process have been numerous, ongoing, and almost uniformly negative. Legislative productivity has been in decline, and the 112th Congress took the title of least productive on record; the 113th would have stolen that distinction were it not for a last minute flurry of legislation (Bump 2014). Bipartisan cooperation on legislation has also been in decline. Much is made of the fact that the Affordable Care Act was passed on a strict party-line vote, but the much less salient and ambitious Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 enjoyed only four Republican votes in the Senate and three in the House (govtrack.us). Most recently, no Democrats in the House or Senate voted for the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (Lai et al. 2017; Lee and Simon 2017). Other bills, notably one to create a fund that would assist victims of sex trafficking, which had previously enjoyed bipartisan support, have unexpectedly stalled over polarizing issues, in this case abortion provisions (Steinhauer 2015). Partisan discord was also apparent in the 2013 government shutdown, caused in large part by Republican insistence on defunding the Affordable Care Act despite an all-but-certain presidential veto, and again in 2018, when the government shut down twice in a single month. None of this has been lost on the public, which, not surprisingly, reports near-record dissatisfaction with all three branches of government (Gallup 2018; Pew Research Center 2014a; Montgomery and Helderman 2013).

Although frequently overlooked by the media, contemporary partisan polarization did not result from both parties moving similar distances toward their respective ideological extremes. In fact, the Republican Party in Congress and the Presidency has moved to the extreme right, and is responsible for about 80 percent of the increased ideological distance between the parties since the 1970s, and is the most conservative party-in-government of the 20th century; their Democratic counterparts, on the other hand, have moved leftward, but only slightly so by comparison. Furthermore, the modest leftward drift of the Democratic Party is almost entirely

due to the loss of relatively conservative white Southern Democrats, but the causes of the Republicans' sharp increase in conservatism remains a mystery. Given this, the puzzle of increased partisan polarization in the United States since the 1970s is really a puzzle about increased Republican conservatism over that time period (Lewis et al. 2018).

In 2004, Thomas Frank entered the popular debate over the red state/blue state divide with the observation that blue-collar whites in his native Kansas had seemingly forgone their economic self-interest to overwhelmingly support Bush and his fellow Republicans in the 2000 election, prompting the now-famous question "what's the matter with Kansas?" To drive the point home, he noted that the poorest county in America at the time, exactly the type of place where one would expect strong support for New-Deal-style Democratic programs, gave Bush over 80 percent of its vote in 2000, leaving him baffled that "so many people could get it so wrong" (Frank 2004, 1). Frank argued that so many Kansans "got it so wrong" because they were caught up in the "Great Backlash," in which Republican elites stir up heartland whites into a fit of resentful anger at a vague, but ubiquitous, liberal elite that works tirelessly to undermine basic values of family, religion, hard work, and love of country, providing cover for a Republican economic platform that favors the rich at the expense of these very voters.

Then, on June 16, 2015, Donald Trump announced that he was running for president, and made the now-infamous claim that:

> The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else's problems. When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people…It's coming from more than Mexico. It's coming from all over South and Latin America, and it's coming probably— probably— from the Middle East. But we don't know. Because we have no protection and we have no competence, we don't know what's happening. And it's got to stop and it's got to stop fast (*Time* 2015).

Like Frank, Trump recognized that a large portion of white America was angry, but he also appeared to understand that out-of-touch elites were at best only a partial explanation for that anger. Instead, Trump made inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric the cornerstone of his primary and general election campaigns, and sparked a backlash more intense than just about anyone could have imagined prior to the 2015 Republican primary. Soon, white nationalists were endorsing Trump, and, during the 2016 Republican National Convention, a tweet by a white nationalist Twitter account with the telling handle @Western_Triumph was projected on the giant overhead screens of Quicken Arena (Frizell 2016). Although he never publicly accepted the endorsement of any prominent white nationalists, Trump's anti-immigrant, populist message clearly resonated with these groups (Berger 2016). During the primary campaign, Republican elites almost universally rejected this message, but Republican primary voters quickly began moving into Trump's camp, and eventually voted him into the White House in one of the biggest political upsets in modern history (Rucker 2016; Enten and Bacon 2017).

Although Trump's comments about immigration dominated news coverage of his announcement speech, he also broke with Republican orthodoxy on a number of other policy issues; however, rather than being castigated as a Republican in Name Only (RINO), his popularity with Republican voters steadily increased (Real Clear Politics 2018). Notably, he proposed to raise the federal minimum wage and to not only "save," but *expand* Social Security, Medicare, and even *Medicaid*. He also proposed to "rebuild our infrastructure," presumably through massive government spending, and arguably even alluded to a desire for some form of universal healthcare (*Time* 2015). After winning the Republican primary, he continued to take positions well to the left of the Republican leadership in Congress—for example, proposing to raise taxes on the wealthy and eliminate the carried-interest loophole, and signaling his comfort

with a large national debt—leading Henry Enten to declare him the “most moderate Republican presidential candidate since 1972 (Yglesias 2017, Johnson 2016).

Trump’s apparent immunity to charges of being insufficiently conservative was clearly evident in a remarkable exchange with Ted Cruz during the Republican primary debate in Houston. In a previous debate, Trump, in response to a question about Obamacare, claimed that some people would inevitably find themselves without coverage under even the best private health insurance systems, and that, “*as a Republican* [emphasis added]” he would not tolerate people “dying in the street.” During the Houston debate, Marco Rubio referenced Trump’s New Hampshire comments, and Ted Cruz went on the offensive:

> CRUZ: Did you say if you want people to die on the streets, if you don't support socialized health care, you have no heart.
>
> TRUMP: Correct. I will not let people die on the streets if I'm president.
>
> CRUZ: Have you said you're a liberal on health care?
>
> TRUMP: Excuse me. Let me talk. If people...
>
> CRUZ: Talk away. Explain your plan, please.
>
> TRUMP: If people -- my plan is very simple. I will not -- we're going to have private -- we are going to have health care, but I will not allow people to die on the sidewalks and the streets of our country if I'm president. You may let it and you may be fine with it...
>
> CRUZ: So does the government pay for everyone's health care?
>
> TRUMP: ... I'm not fine with it. We are going to take those people...
>
> CRUZ: Yes or no. Just answer the question.

TRUMP: Excuse me. We are going to take those people and those people are going to be serviced by doctors and hospitals. We're going to make great deals on it, but we're not going to let them die in the streets.

CRUZ: Who pays for it?

After a few moments of crosstalk, Trump concluded by saying, "You know what…call it what you want. People are not going to be dying on the sidewalk" (Black 2016).

Why did Republican voters not only tolerate, but perhaps even reward, Trump's break with the strict conservative principles that have come to define the modern Republican Party? Why was Trump immune to attacks on his lack of conservative purity, when so many Republicans in Congress, to say nothing of his primary competitors, lived in fear of being labeled a RINO? Given how popular Trump's anti-immigrant rhetoric and border wall proposal were with Republican voters, could it be that the real source of the anxiety and anger that characterize Frank's Great Backlash was the rapid demographic and cultural changes, both real and imagined, brought on by historically high levels of immigration in the late 20th and early 21st century? In particular, is it possible that Republican voters' support for the most conservative party-in-government since Reconstruction was because of an intense racial-threat backlash in response to historically high rates of immigration, and that Trump, by giving voice to that anger and promising to drastically restrict immigration, mollified that backlash and the concomitant demands for far-right policies?

As it happens, increases in the proportion of the U.S. population that is foreign born and the ideological distance between the parties in Congress were both historically low following World War II, but both began increasing in the 1970s, and were near their historic highs when Trump gave his announcement speech. More specifically, from 1970 to 2017, the portion of the

U.S. population that was foreign born increased from 4.7 percent to 13.2 percent; over the same period, congressional Republicans' average conservatism went from near-historic lows to unprecedented highs (U.S. Census 2018; Lewis et al. 2018). Furthermore, by at least the 1990s, immigrants were largely non-white, and were bypassing the traditional urban destinations of the coasts for smaller towns across the heartland—places like Kansas (Census 2018). For example, from 2000-2013, Minneapolis, Baltimore, and Charlotte received more immigrants in absolute numbers than Los Angeles; over the same time period, the immigrant population in Scranton, Cape Coral, Knoxville, Indianapolis, Nashville, Charlotte, Louisville, Charleston, and Raleigh *doubled* (Wilson and Svajlenka 2014). In fact, Frank's native Kansas provides a striking anecdote; as Fig. 1.1 shows, its foreign-born population grew 458 percent over the last 40 years, and, over the same period, its Senate delegation became about 350 percent more conservative:



Figure 1.1: Kansas percent foreign born and Senate delegation ideology

There is, of course, nothing controversial in arguing that Republicans in Kansas are likely to oppose high rates of immigration, but is there any reason to expect a full-fledged backlash like the one Frank describes and that Trump exploited? I argue that there is: large influxes of non-white immigrants should spark a racial-threat backlash among Republicans for several reasons. First, immigrants have been shown to create a sense of economic threat among natives (Hero 2010; Brader 2008; Citrin et al. 1997). Second, immigrants have also been shown to create a sense of cultural threat, particularly among the dominant social group in a society—in America, whites, and, especially, white Protestants (Fetzer 2000; Citrin et al. 1990). Third, countries with more diverse populations tend to have smaller welfare states and more conservative attitudes about redistribution, and immigration has increased U.S. diversity far quicker than disparities in

fertility could have (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Alesina et al. 2001). Moreover, Republicans consistently categorize immigration policy as too liberal, and voice frustration at government failure to respond to their demands for more restrictive immigration policy (Gallup 2012; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Gimpel and Ewards 1999; Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Finally, immigration occasionally spills over into other salient issue areas, for example, security after 9/11 (Barry 2005). Taken together, this suggests that high rates of immigration should lead to greater economic and social conservatism among Republicans who feel that their status, values, and very way of life are under attack in a changing America.

Democrats, for their part, should on average show no such effect from immigration, in large part because they tend to be members of non-dominant cultural groups, making them less susceptible to cultural threat, and because they often come from diverse communities with a history of hosting immigrant populations (Fetzer 2000). Moreover, while lower-income Democrats, especially African-Americans lacking a high school diploma, often face a real economic threat from immigrants, this effect should be mitigated by these constituencies' strong support for redistributive policies (Dawson 1994; Bowler and Segura 2012).

Kansas offers an intriguing example, but I argue that this racial-threat backlash should occur nationwide, and in doing so help to explain the extreme partisan polarization seen in Congress, and perhaps in the public. As mentioned above, the puzzle about elite partisan polarization is not a question about why *both* parties have become more extreme, but a puzzle about increasing Republican conservatism. A second element of this puzzle is why a non-ideological, ostensibly moderate public has been electing these increasingly extreme Republicans in the first place, as well as why they have not elected similarly extreme Democrats.

Here, I present and test a racial-threat backlash theory that helps to solve both of these puzzles. In short, I argue that increased rates of immigration have sparked a racial-threat backlash among Republicans by creating of a sense of economic and cultural threat, unease with redistributive policy in a multicultural immigrant society, and frustration with disequilibrium between public opinion and federal immigration policy; this backlash has, in turn, led the Republican Party to become increasingly conservative. Importantly, I also argue that the Democratic Party's coalition of racial and ethnic minorities and urban whites should not be affected by increased rates of immigration. This theory helps to explain asymmetric polarization by explaining why Republicans in government have become more conservative but their Democratic counterparts have shown little ideological change. Second, an immigration-fueled backlash is an "easy," sociotropic issue whose effects are not contingent on high political awareness or a consistent ideology, helping to explain how an otherwise unengaged, moderate public can elect extreme leaders (Carmines and Stimson 1986; Key 1949; Citrin et al. 1997; Fetzer 2000; Skocpol and Williamson 2013).

In the next chapter, I survey the literature on polarization in Congress and the mass public, and on immigration and public opinion; I also develop my theory of racial-threat backlash in response to immigration. Then, in Chapter Three, I test this theory on voters in the mass public. Next, in Chapter Four, I test the theory on state legislators and citizen ideology in the states. I conclude my empirical tests in chapter Five, where I test this theory on roll-call voting in the Senate. In the final chapter, I discuss the implications of my findings, ways that future versions of this study can be improved, and possibilities for future study.

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theory

Introduction

In this chapter, I review the partisan polarization literature, then develop my theory that increased rates of immigration have caused a racial-threat backlash among white Republicans, which has pushed the Republican Party to the right, but have had no effect on Democrats. In the literature review section, I argue that many existing explanations for partisan polarization—e.g. gerrymandering, partisan sorting, increased income inequality—are, at worst, unconvincing, or, at best, explain it only at the margins. Importantly, existing explanations struggle to explain why contemporary partisan polarization in Congress and the Presidency is highly asymmetric. In my theory section, I argue that increased rates of immigration cause Republicans to exhibit a racial-threat backlash based on economic, racial, and cultural anxieties, which has moved the Republican Party to the right. I further argue that immigration should not spark a similar backlash among the Democratic coalition, which is made up of groups not traditionally hostile to immigration, namely racial and ethnic minorities, urban whites, and non-Protestant whites.

Polarization

Political polarization, in the broadest sense, simply denotes a bimodal distribution of some political measure, most commonly ideology. Implicit in this definition of polarization is that political actors can be arrayed on a spatial measure, most commonly a left-right spectrum of ideology. Also implicit is that a bimodal distribution indicates that most of these political actors occupy their respective extremes on this spatial measure, rather than most of them occupying a space near the center. This, in turn, requires that polarized actors' positions on a given spatial measure (in this case, ideology) are not only different, but extreme relative to one another

(McCarty et al. 2016). Finally, polarization usually entails that the actors at each end of the distribution are not otherwise disconnected, but constitute a meaningful political group.

A polarized group could occur around any politically relevant distinction—young and old, rich and poor, urban and rural—but it is most commonly defined as *partisan* polarization, meaning that Democrats are clumped to the far left of the ideological distribution, and Republicans to the far right. However, Levendusky (2009) points out that Democrats and Republicans could develop more extreme ideologies without increasing partisan polarization if the parties were sufficiently ideologically heterogeneous, or, conversely, that partisan polarization could occur without changes to individual ideology if party members sorted themselves into sufficiently homogeneous parties (Levendusky 2009). Nonetheless, Lewis et al.'s (2018) DW-NOMINATE data show that, since the mid-1970s, these two phenomena have occurred in tandem in Congress, as the distribution of individual ideologies has become increasingly bimodal, and the most liberal Republicans have moved to the right of the most conservative Democrats. Given this, I treat changes to the ideology of the parties' members as the relevant phenomenon, and assume that more homogeneous parties are a natural result of an increasingly bimodal ideological distribution. In this sense, polarization is a measure of the amount of ideological distance between members of the parties, be it the mass public or Congress (Lewis et al. 2018).

While there is little evidence that the mass public has adopted the extreme ideologies necessary for high levels of polarization, Lewis et al.'s (2018) NOMINATE data have all but ended debate over the existence of Congressional polarization by showing that it has increased steadily since the mid-1970s, and that the ideological distance between the two parties' roll-call voting in recent Congresses is higher than at any other time in the post-Reconstruction era.

Moreover, they show that polarization has been asymmetrical, with Republicans accounting for the majority of the effect. Most notably, Republicans in both chambers have moved from a mean DW-NOMINATE score of .26 in 1973 to .5 in 2018; over the same period, Northern Democrats in both chambers have shown virtually no change, and the slight leftward drift of the party as a whole is almost entirely attributable to the loss of conservative Southern Democrats (Lewis et al. 2018).



Figure 2.1: House Party Means on Liberal-Conservative Dimension, 1879-2014 (Poole and Rosenthal 2015)



Figure 2.2: Senate Party Means on Liberal-Conservative Dimension, 1879-2014 (Poole and Rosenthal 2015)

Mass Polarization

As Figures 1 and 2 above show, there is no doubt that partisan polarization has occurred in Congress, but Barber and McCarty (2013) identify an "emerging consensus" that most voters hold moderate policy and ideological positions, and that mass polarization is limited to the small portion of the electorate that is highly engaged (Barber and McCarty 2013; Fiorina, et al. 2006; Asnolabehere et al. 2006, Bafumi and Herron 2010). Following Converse's (1964) seminal argument about the non-ideological nature of American voters, this literature finds that all but a small segment of the electorate lack the skills, knowledge, or inclination to develop and maintain any sort of consistent ideology, to say nothing of an extreme one—a consistent ideology need not be extreme, but a bimodal distribution of mass ideology requires a large proportion of the public to hold ideologically consistent views.

Nonetheless, there is some evidence that the most politically aware members of the public do hold consistent political attitudes, and that they make up a larger proportion of the electorate than in previous decades (Abramowitz 2010). However, even this literature acknowledges that the effect is limited to no more than twenty percent of the population, too little to explain historically unprecedented partisan polarization in recent Congresses (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Lewis et al. 2018). And, while a recent Pew Poll (2014b) found that growing proportions of partisans hold consistent beliefs across a range of issues, here, too, the evidence suggests that the effect is limited to only about twenty percent of the population, and there is little if any evidence that these voters' beliefs are both consistent *and* extreme (Pew Research Center 2014b; Fiorina 2014).

There is, however, some evidence of mass polarization around a few specific issues, with the largest effect surrounding abortion (Levendusky 2009; Garner and Palmer 2011; Mouw and Sobel 2001; Abramowitz 2010). But here, too, the literature is far from unanimous, and Fiorina et al. (2006) argue that voters are no more divided on the issue of abortion than they were in past decades, only that they have better sorted into the party that reflects their views on this and other issues. In keeping with most literature, Prior (2013) observes that, with the exception of abortion, such issue-based polarization is limited to highly engaged voters. Moreover, he argues that there is no evidence that increased partisan voting in response to clearer elite signals is the result of more coherent or extreme individual attitudes (Prior 2013). Finally, Abramowitz's (2010) data show that even Republicans and Democrats with moderate to high political awareness, in this case as measured by campaign involvement, are virtually indistinguishable in their positions on cultural issues, and that the only those reporting the most conservative or liberal positions on a 7-

point scale show more than a ten-point difference by party on a wide range of issues (Abramowitz 2010).

Though voters may not have become more polarized in their issue attitudes, the relationship between partisanship and ideology may have changed in recent decades. Levendusky (2009) and others convincingly argue that, although the distribution of issue positions may not have changed much in recent decades, voters have better sorted themselves into the party that best reflects their positions on controversial issues (Levendusky 2009; Garner and Palmer 2011). Fiorina and Abrams (2008) insist that, even if voters have in fact better sorted into the party that best matches their ideology, the ideological composition of voters in general has not changed; in this sense, they argue that mass sorting neither leads to nor requires extreme mass ideologies. The literature generally supports this view, and finds that partisan identity remains a largely psychological phenomenon, and that voters are more likely to update their positions to reflect those of their party, rather than switch parties (Campbell, et al. 1960; Carsey and Layman 2006; Levendusky 2009). Carsey and Layman (2006) find that voters will change their party identification to reflect their preference on an issue only if they consider an issue to be salient and perceive a difference in the parties' positions on that issue; if the issue is not salient, then voters are more likely to change their issue preference to match that of their party. Levendusky (2009) echoes Carsey and Layman (2006) in his finding that voters update their positions far more often than their party identification. These findings support the consensus that only highly engaged partisans have developed ideologies that are more consistent, extreme, or both. And, again these highly engaged partisans are too few to explain extreme polarization in Congress (Abramowitz 2008).

Although most voters remain moderate in their positions and ideology, there is strong evidence that partisans have increased their antipathy toward the opposing party. Shaw (2012) finds that the difference between partisans' feeling thermometer ratings of their own party and the opposing party increased by 10 to 15 points in recent decades. Iyengar et al. (2012) argue that this reflects "affective polarization," wherein partisans not only increasingly dislike the opposing party as an institution, but also "impute negative traits to the rank-and-file of the out party" (Iyengar et al. 2012, 407). Thus, “affective polarization” is the defining feature of any mass ideological polarization that does exist. Moreover, they find that these views are only weakly related to policy preferences (Iyengar et al. 2012, 2015).

Congressional Polarization

Thanks to Lewis et al.’s (2018) DW-NOMINATE data, it is now beyond dispute that the parties in Congress face each other from either side of a yawning, and probably historically unprecedented, ideological gulf (See figures 2.1 and 2.2) (Lewis et al. 2018). But while the fact of polarization is almost universally accepted, explanations for *why* that polarization has occurred are in many cases disputed, and at best explain it only at the margins, or under limited circumstances. For example, as noted above, there is no question that the Southern Realignment contributed to Congressional polarization by eliminating conservative Southern Democrats, and, in some cases replacing them with more liberal minority representatives. However, although the Southern Realignment explains a small portion of polarization, it cannot explain the loss of liberal Republicans in the North (Theriault 2003). In addition, the Southern Realignment had slowed considerably since the 1990s, but polarization has accelerated. Notably, the Republican share of Southern House seats rose only 11 percentage points—from 60 percent to 71 percent—

from 1998 to 2012, too small of an increase to explain the large increase in polarization over the same period (Stonecash 2000, 10; House of Representatives 2012).

Changes in geographic living patterns as an explanation for polarization feature frequently in the media—for example, the red state/blue state Electoral College maps—but these at best explain polarization only at the margins. Prominent among these explanations is that voters are increasingly choosing to live near like-minded people, creating predominately liberal and conservative areas. Unfortunately, these theories are difficult to test, and while it is plausible that neighborhoods or even cities have become more ideologically homogeneous, Fiorina et al. (2006) are convincing that the states have not done so; given this, geographic sorting can perhaps explain some House polarization, but little to none in the Senate. Nonetheless, Bishop and Cushing (2008) argue that counties have become increasingly homogeneous, observing that in the 2004 presidential election 60 percent of counties voted in a landslide—one candidate achieving over 60 percent of the vote—but the last time this happened was 1972, when Congressional polarization was near its historic low; if geographic sorting drove the trend of increased polarization in the intervening years, landslide voting should have occurred in those years (Bishop and Cushing 2008, 9-11, 131-132). Stonecash and Mariani (2000) find that, perhaps due to sorting, income disparities across House districts are increasing, and that districts are in turn realigning themselves according to income, with wealthier districts in the South and North becoming more Republican and Democratic, respectively (Stonecash and Mariani 2000, 110-111). However, at the state level the opposite appears to be occurring, as poorer states vote more Republican, and richer states more Democratic (Gelman et al. 2009). Given that the House and Senate have shown similar patterns of increased polarization since the 1970s, driven in large part by increased Republican conservatism, these conflicting findings for the relationship

between wealth and ideology in House districts and the Senate leave income-based sorting explanations for polarization inconclusive (Lewis et al. (2018).

Gerrymandering is another popular, but unconvincing, explanation for Congressional polarization. Carson et al. (2007) find that substantially altered House districts produce somewhat more extreme representatives than their unchanged counterparts, but the difference is slight relative to chamber-wide polarization, and cannot account for polarization in the fixed-district Senate. Similarly, Mann (2006) allows that safe districts do sometimes lead to co-partisan challengers campaigning on fidelity to party orthodoxy, but credible challengers are too rare to explain the consistent trend of increased polarization. Others point to ideologically-driven primary voters taking advantage of lower turnout relative to general elections to demand increasingly extreme nominees (King 2003). However, the lowest recorded levels of polarization coincided with the spread of direct primaries in the mid-20th century, and did not begin rising until the 1970s, in some cases 70 or more years after direct primaries had become widespread (McCarty et al. 2016). Furthermore, McCarty et al. observe that there is no statistically significant difference between candidate polarization in midterm elections—when primary turnout is lower, giving engaged, ideological partisans greater influence—and higher-turnout elections held in conjunction with presidential elections (McCarty et al. 2016).

Increased party discipline also fails to adequately explain record-high Congressional polarization. Rohde's (1991) theory of conditional party government—given intra-party homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity, the majority party in the House will exploit rules to its advantage—is a good explanation for why representatives in an individualized Congress will cede power to their party leadership, but does not explain why this homogeneity or heterogeneity emerged in the first place. Furthermore, Rhode (1991) acknowledges that institutional features of

the Senate, most importantly more heterogeneous constituencies than House districts, strong minority rights, and fewer mechanism by which Senate leadership can enforce party loyalty, limit the ability of his theory to explain polarization in the Senate. He argues that the weakness of conditional party government in explaining Senate party unity is consistent with his observation that in 1991 partisanship in the Senate had been increasing much slower than in the House. However, Lewis et al.'s (2018) data show that the trend toward greater polarization in the Senate, while weaker than in the House, has nonetheless reached historic highs.

Similarly, Cox and McCubbins' (1993) cartel theory, which argues that parties enforce discipline by privileging loyal members' interests on the agenda, is reasonable on its face. However, Snyder and Groseclose (2000) find that while party leaders can sometimes convince legislators to forgo self-interest in favor of party when casting roll-call votes, they only exert this costly influence on important, closely-contested votes. These votes are too infrequent to explain polarization, leading Snyder and Groseclose to conclude that, "...party influence is only loosely related to party polarization" (Snyder and Groseclose 2000, 193-195, 199). Cox and McCubbins (2005) more recently refined their theory to emphasize the majority party's control over the House agenda, but, like conditional party government, their theory is of limited use in explaining the phenomenon of tandem polarization in both the House and the Senate. Finally, Jones (2010) finds that polarization has created incentives for parties to cooperate in pursuit of chamber-wide approval, and argues that his findings are in line with both conditional party government and cartel theory. But, as noted above, while these findings illuminate some of the *effects* of polarization in Congress, they do little if anything to explain its *causes.*

The literature has long argued that partisan elites can shape public opinion, especially among their co-partisans, on emotionally resonant issues, and recent research finds that partisan

activists often see their chosen issues become salient among their fellow party members (Carmines and Stimson 1986; Layman et al. 2010). Levendusky (2009) builds on this observation and attempts to reconcile moderate mass attitudes with elite polarization by arguing that although the public is not ideologically polarized, increasingly clear messages from polarized elites have enabled voters to move into the party that best reflects their views, leading to greater intra-party homogenization and inter-party heterogeneity. He makes a strong case for increased partisan sorting, but does not explain why elites polarized and in turn offered voters clearer messages, at best answering only a portion of the polarization puzzle.

Masket (2011) argues that informal party organizations (IPOs) of party elites have become increasingly powerful, and in turn have more assertively used their control over the nomination process to demand ever-greater ideological fidelity from their representatives. Masket’s study of California is a good explication of this theory, but suffers from the fact that the reforms that empowered California IPOs took effect several decades ago; these reforms roughly coincided with the beginning of modern polarization, which has continued apace in the absence of further reform. Moreover, his theory does not account for asymmetric polarization; if IPOs do in fact cause polarization, the two parties’ IPOs presumably operate differently, but he does not explain how or why.

Bawn et al. (2012) build on Masket's work to put forth a similar, convincing theory that coalitions of activists and interest groups use the nomination process to elect candidates who support their agendas. They are particularly convincing in their argument that politicians, knowing that they are reliant on these coalitions' support and that the narrow policy goals of each coalition member are in aggregate more extreme than their typically moderate constituents in the mass public, exploit "electoral blind spots" to enact their supporters' preferences. Similarly,

Layman et al. (2010) argue that party activists with relatively extreme positions on one or a few issues of particular importance to them use the open nomination process to demand that ambitious politicians adopt similar position on a given issue, leading to nominees with relatively extreme positions on a variety of issues. These positions then diffuse among party activists, leading them to adopt the relatively extreme positions of their fellow activists (Layman et al. 2010).

Both Bawn et al. (2012) and Layman et al. (2010) provide plausible explanations for a polarized Congress despite generally moderate voters; however, like Masket (2011), they fail to explain asymmetric polarization. Moreover, these theories do not explain why this asymmetric polarization has steadily increased over the past decades, despite no major reforms to the nomination process. The authors do argue that new actors with more extreme views have entered the nomination process, most notably abortion activists in the 1980s, but fail to explain why these and other activists developed more extreme views than their predecessors; they offer a potential explanation for how more extreme party elites have caused more polarized elected officials, but not for why these elites themselves polarized (Bawn et al. 2012).

Abrajano and Hajnal (2017) test the effects of immigration on public opinion issues and partisanship. Specifically, they find that whites living in close proximity to immigrants are more likely to have conservative opinions about immigration, and are more likely to identify with the Republican Party. Abrajano and Hajnal's research supports my own theory that increased immigration in a state is associated with greater conservatism among Republican voters and legislators in that state, but that there is no effect on Democrats. However, this study differs from Abrajano and Hajnal in two important ways. First, my theory accounts for the asymmetric nature of partisan polarization since the 1970s—Republicans have moved to the far right, while

Democrats have drifted only slightly leftward—by arguing that increased immigration should affect Republicans, but not Democrats; Abrajano and Hajnal limit their study to Republicans. Second, Abrajano and Hajnal (2017) provide compelling evidence that exposure to immigration changes whites' attitudes on specific issues and moves them into the Republican Party, but do not account for changes in partisans' overall ideology, and, again, do not explain why Democrats have not exhibited a similarly large leftward shift in ideology.

Finally, McCarty et al. (2016) identify a striking correlation between inequality and the percentage of the population that is foreign born, on the one hand, and Congressional polarization, on the other, and offer a complicated theory linking the three. They argue that, beginning in the 1970s, steady increases in the percentage of the U.S. population that was foreign born increased inequality among all U.S. *residents,* but moved the median *citizen* up the income distribution, because non-citizen immigrants are on average much poorer than citizens. This has caused citizens, who, unlike immigrants, can vote, to view their relative economic situation as improving, leading to fewer demands for redistributive policies. These citizens have in turn joined the Republican party in large numbers, moving the party to the right. Around the same time, the Southern Realignment absorbed conservative Southerners, further pushing the Republicans to the right. This also increased the influence of liberal Northern Democrats within the Democratic party, pushing it modestly to the left. McCarty et al. (2016) further argue that this process led to racial issues being "absorbed into the main redistributive dimension of liberal-conservative politics," increasing leftward pressure on the Democrats, while all but eliminating it from the Republican's constituency (McCarty et al. 2016, 6-14, 138).

Garand (2010) extended McCarty, et al.'s (2016) theory (first presented in the 2006 edition) to the state level by testing the effect of state income inequality on Senate roll-call

conservatism and individual attitudes and ideology, and found that income inequality is positively related to both mass and Senate roll-call conservatism (Garand 2010). However, Gelman et al. (2009) find that, while the relationship between higher incomes and conservatism is positive *within* states, *across* states the relationship is reversed: the poorer a state, the more conservative its population. In addition, the effect of income on partisanship is strongest in the poorest states, and barely registers in the richest states. Furthermore, race accounts for about half of this effect, as African-Americans tend to be poorer, to live in poorer states, and to be liberal, while whites in poor rural states are almost uniformly Republican—for example, 89 percent of white Mississippians voted for Republican John McCain in 2008 compared to 55 percent of whites nationwide (Gelman, et al. 2009; *New York Times* 2012). This literature suggests that inequality may not be as strongly related to polarization as McCarty et al. (2016) and Garand (2010) suggest.

McCarty et al. (2016) identify an important puzzle in the striking correlation in the 20th century between Congressional polarization and national rates of immigration and inequality, but I argue that their theory is both too complicated to allow convincing inference and suffers from the absence of an immigration variable in their models. Instead, I provide a simpler explanation for the immigration-inequality-polarization puzzle: immigration creates a racial backlash among native whites, increasing Republican conservatism, and with it, asymmetric polarization. This backlash is enhanced by the increasing ethnic and racial diversity of the voting-age population, which has come at the expense of the white voting-age population. As figure 2.3 shows, whites have accounted for a rapidly shrinking portion of the presidential electorate since at least 1980, and in the 2012 election dropped to well under 75 percent:



Figure 2.3: White portion of electorate in presidential elections, 1980-2012 (Cizzilla and Cohen, 2012).

As Figure 2.3 shows, the decline in the white vote share tracks closely with the portion of the U.S. population identifying as non-Hispanic white in the U.S. Census. And, as figure 2.5 shows, as the portions of both the population and voters that are white have declined, the portion identifying as Hispanic and black has increased:



Figure 2.4: Percentage of Census respondents identifying as white (U.S. Census 2014)



Figure 2.5: Percentage of Census respondents reporting black or Hispanic (Census 2010)

These trends are expected to continue, with Hispanics making up nearly a third of the population by 2050, and whites losing their majority status, despite retaining a large plurality:



Figure 2.6: percentage of the U.S. population identifying as white, Hispanic, black, and Asian, 1960, 2011, and 2050 projections (Taylor and Cohn 2012).

Finally, using the 2011 and 2050 projections in figure 2.6, growth in the Hispanic share of the population caused about 60 percent of the decline in the white portion of the population between 1960 and 2011, and is expected to account for about 75 percent of the predicted decline from 2011 to 2050 (Pew Research Center 2011). As I argue below, this suggests that native whites should be particularly sensitive to changes in the Hispanic population, and especially influxes of Hispanic immigrants.

As the U.S. population has grown more diverse, the parties have also become increasingly racially polarized. However, despite persistent media reporting on the fact that Mitt Romney's vote share was almost 90 percent white, the Republican presidential electorate has actually become more diverse in recent decades, but at nowhere near the rate of the population at large. Similarly, in recent decades the Democratic presidential electorate was very white--84 percent white in 1976. However, the Democratic electorate has rapidly diversified since then, reaching a minority proportion of 44 percent in the 2012 presidential election:



Figure 2.7: Percent of Parties' Electorate by Race (Cilliza and Cohen 2012).



Figure 2.8: Non-white vote share by Party (U.S. Census 2014)



Figure 2.9: White vote share by party (U.S. Census 2014)

<u>Immigration and Public Opinion</u>

Because determining the effect of immigration on individual opinion and ideology is a significant component of this research project, it is important to address the endogeneity problem inherent in this relationship: does immigration affect ideology, or does ideology affect attitudes about immigration? Unfortunately, while the relationship between individual-level factors and opinion *about* immigration has been extensively studied, the effects of exposure *to* immigration on *other* attitudes, namely partisan identification and ideology, have scarcely been examined at all. As I explain in the methods section, well-specified models including appropriate exogenous variables help to mitigate this inherent endogeneity. Here, I survey the literature on both schools of thought.

Fetzer (2013) divides research on sources of opinions and attitudes about immigration into socioeconomic and psychological schools of thought (Fetzer 2013, 302). The socioeconomic school identifies many variables—age, for example—that are entirely exogenous to attitudes about immigration, as well as others that are at least somewhat endogenous, for example education. The psychological school examines inherently endogenous variables, including self-reported ideology and partisanship.

The sociological school has consistently found that greater educational attainment is associated with more liberal attitudes toward immigration, especially in democracies, where curriculums tend to emphasize liberal values (Coenders 2001). Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) emphasize the role of education's effect on "cultural values and beliefs," and find little effect from educational attainment insulating individuals from immigrant labor competition. In keeping with this finding, Cornelius and Rosenblum (2007) find that immigrant labor exerts little if any wage pressure on all but the most poorly educated workers, further suggesting that cultural, rather than economic, forces explain the liberalizing effect of education on attitudes about immigration.

The sociologically-based literature also consistently finds that older people have more conservative attitudes about immigration (Hoskin 1991; Heath and Tilley 2005). However, the literature is inconclusive as to the effect of other demographic factors, namely gender (Illatov and Shamai 1998; Chandler and Tsai 2001) and marital status (Espenshade 1997; Givens and Luedtke 2004). Fetzer (2013) suggests that gender and marital status likely reflect the effects of other demographic factors, such as religiosity and occupation.

Despite Hainmueller and Hiscox's (2007) finding that the liberalizing effect of education on attitudes about immigration is not due to its effect on workers' ability to compete with

immigrant labor, extensive research does find that members of labor unions and those in low-skill or working-class occupations tend to be more opposed to immigration (Espenshade 1997; Hoskin 1991; Fetzer 2000; Kunovich 2002). On the other hand, Citrin et al. (1997) and Fetzer (2000) return conflicting evidence for the effect of income. An extensive literature finds no effect from individual employment status, but does find a sociotropic effect in response to changes in the national unemployment rate (Citrin et al. 1997; Hoskin 1991; Fetzer 2000). While Schissel, et al. (1989) found that the regional unemployment rate had no effect on Canadian attitudes toward immigration, others find that perceptions of a declining national economy increase opposition to immigration in the United States (Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Chandler and Tsai 2001).

The sociological approach to immigration attitudes also draws on group conflict theory. All else equal, blacks and whites seem to hold similar attitudes about immigration, and there is modest evidence that Hispanics and Latinos harbor views similar to those of whites about the proper level of immigration (Chandler and Tsai 2001). However, those in marginalized cultural groups often have more welcoming attitudes toward immigrants (Fetzer 2000), while being a member of the dominant religious group tends to increase opposition toward immigrants, including those who are co-religionists; conversely, members of disadvantaged cultural groups are less likely to oppose immigrants (Fetzer 1998; 2000). Although immigrants themselves usually hold more liberal attitudes toward new immigrants, the longer they spend in their adopted society and the greater their level of acculturation, the less welcoming their attitudes (Hood et al. 1997; Richardson 2005). More recently, Byrne and Dixon (2013) found that attachments to both ethnocultural and civic-political ideals of American identity are related to preferences for reduced levels of immigration. Finally, living in an urban area is associated with

more liberal attitudes toward immigration, as is living in the Northeast compared to the West, Midwest, or South (Hoskin 1991; Hood and Morris 1997).

Chandler and Tsai (2001) find that "group-comparison" variables, namely holding a college degree and fearing that immigrants are a threat to the English language, are the strongest predictors of immigration attitudes. Similarly, Wilson (2001) found that perceived threats to group status were the best predictors of opposition to immigration among native-born Americans, but that, in keeping with Citrin et al. (1997), perceptions of threat to individual circumstances had a much smaller effect. Berg (2013) likewise found that group threat was the strongest predictor of attitudes about levels of immigration and the appropriate citizenship status of the children of illegal immigrants, but that symbolic racism was a better predictor of attitudes about general government action regarding immigrants, especially government aid to legal immigrants. The most consistent measure of symbolic racism in predicting attitudes toward immigration issues was the GSS question asking if immigrants receive undeserved special treatment, but Berg (2013) notes that his survey years, 1994 and 2004, followed recessions, perhaps heightening the salience of government assistance to different groups. In keeping with Citrin et al. (1997), Hoskin (1991), and Fetzer (2000), unemployment associated with these recessions likely increased general opposition to immigration, including government assistance for immigrants.

Traditionally, there has been at best only very weak evidence that partisanship is related to opinions about immigrants or immigration policy among the mass public nationwide. However, Gimpel and Edwards (1999) argue that a partisan cleavage over immigration emerged in the 1990s, when Republicans began taking increasingly conservative positions, and that the public slowly followed suit. In particular, members of the public in states where a high immigration rate

has made the issue salient show a more pronounced partisan divide than their counterparts in other states. Moreover, when immigration is salient, attitudes among partisans tend to reflect the parties' positions on social spending and the size of the federal government (Espenshade and Hemspsteaed 1997; Citrin 1997; Gimpel and Edwards 1999), reflecting the literature's findings that ideology is usually a better predictor of immigration than partisanship (Barkan 2003; Wilson 2001). For example, Gimpel and Edwards (1999) found very small differences during the 1990s in Republican and Democratic support for changing the level of legal immigration, but much larger differences among self-identified liberals and conservatives. More recently, Abrajano and Hajnal (2017) found that concerns over immigration are increasingly associated with native whites moving from the Democratic to the Republican Party.

Theory

I present a parsimonious argument that increased immigration has led to a racial-threat backlash among native whites, leading to greater conservatism among Republicans because of economic and cultural threat, unease with redistributive policy in a multicultural immigrant society, and frustration with disequilibrium between public opinion and federal immigration policy. In turn, I argue that this has led to greater Republican conservatism in the Senate.

Key (1949) proposed the theory of racial threat after observing that Southern white racial intolerance seemed to be highest in areas with large African-American populations (Key 1949). Over time, two schools of racial threat emerged. One argues that increased white racial animosity in response to large black populations results from resource competition, political competition, or both (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989). The other argues that, since the Civil Rights era, whites have exhibited a conservative backlash in response to increased black visibility and social and political rights (Kinder and Sears 1981; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Voss and Miller 2001).

More recently, the literature has applied racial threat theories to natives' response to immigration (Green et al. 1998; Frisbie and Niedert 1977; Rocha and Espino 2009, Hero 1998).

However, political competition with immigrant communities is unlikely to explain why native conservatism would increase in response to immigration. First, Key (1949) found that racial threat became strongest when blacks approached forty percent of an area's population, and Lublin (1997) convincingly argues that responsiveness to minority constituents reaches a tipping point of sorts when minorities constitute more than forty percent of a Congressional district's population, regardless of the representative's race. In my sample years of 1970-2012, the minimum state-level Latino population is .3 percent, and the maximum is 42.1, with a mean of only 7.3 percent. Moreover, only one state, New Mexico, has a Latino population over 40 percent, while California and Texas both reach 32 percent near the final years of the sample, and Arizona 25 percent. No other states have a Latino population over 20 percent in any year of my sample. Given this, at most only four, and more likely only two or three, states are likely to have exhibited state-wide racial threat in response to political competition, and in only a few recent years. In any event, these four states cannot account for chamber-wide polarization in Congress.

A more plausible explanation for increased white native conservatism amid increased immigration is that natives perceive both an economic and cultural threat from immigrants. An extensive literature finds that sociotropic economic factors, such as perceptions of the national economy or changes in per capita income levels, are strongly related to attitudes about immigrants, but that one's own personal economic circumstance is not (Citrin et al. 1997; Fetzer 2000; Hoskin 1991; Fetzer (2000). Citrin et al. (1997) argue that this is due to elites in government and the media using immigrants as scapegoats during economic decline. Because immigrants tend to be a net drain on state and local government budgets, despite being a net

contributor to the federal budget, economic threat should be particularly pronounced in the states (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). Hero (2010) provides support for this argument with his finding that Californians passed Proposition 187 in large part because of beliefs that education and social spending disproportionately benefits immigrants. Finally, Brader et al. (2008) find that news about economic threats from immigrants—displacing native workers or driving down wages—leads to anti-immigrant sentiment only if the immigrants are portrayed as a stigmatized out-group, which provides strong support for the argument that anti-immigrant affect results from a combination of economic and cultural threat (Abrajano and Hajnal 2017; Hopkins 2010; Santa Ana 2004).

Cultural threat, that is, the fear that immigrants pose a threat to "American" values, is a similarly convincing explanation for increased white native conservatism amid immigration (Citrin et al. 1990, 1997; Glen and de Jon 1996; Johnson et al. 1997; Hajnal et al 2000). In particular, Fetzer (2000) offers a cultural-marginality theory of native attitudes toward immigrants, which proposes that culturally marginalized groups—e.g. Catholics, African-Americans, and Jews in the U.S.—are more sympathetic to similarly marginalized immigrants, but members of the dominant cultural group—white Protestants in the U.S.—oppose the arrival of such immigrants. Importantly, Fetzer's theory is limited to *cultural* marginality, not political or economic "powerlessness." For example, he characterizes Jews in the United States or Protestants in France as culturally marginalized, despite both groups being economically and politically more powerful than, say, African-Americans or North African immigrants in France.

Specifically, the cultural-marginality theory predicts that in the U.S.:

> ...the dominant white, Anglophone Protestants will seek public approval of their cultural characteristics at the expense of such immigrants as mestizos, Spanish-speaking Catholics...Feeling culturally threatened by rising "multiculturalism" and increasing non-European immigration, the WASPs react by fighting for...symbolic endorsement of their culture (Fetzer 2000, 12).

Fetzer's (2000) tests find strong support for cultural-marginality theory as a predictor of opposition to immigrant-friendly policy and support for anti-immigrant political groups, albeit with weaker results for predictions of anti-immigrant affect.

In keeping with Fetzer (2000), extensive literature identifies cultural anxieties over immigration to the U.S. Citrin et al. (1990) found that conceptions of nationality in the U.S in the 1980s were marked by "ethnocultural or exclusionary elements," and that traditional notions of faith in God and speaking English are central to popular conceptions of "true" Americanism. They also found that personal effects from immigration played little role, but found a strong effect from "issues of group worth and cultural recognition" (Citrin et al. 1990, 1147-1148). In addition, since at least the 1990s, and probably since the 1980s, about half of the U.S. population has perceived a significant cultural threat from immigration, and has resented immigrants' perceived unwillingness to assimilate (Lapinksi et al. 1997). Glen and de Jong (1996) observe that the most recent waves of immigrants to the United States "...are physically identifiable, and they and their children will continue to be so" no matter how well they assimilate (Glen and de Jong 1996, 30). Moreover, they argue that, by the 1990s, native-born Americans had begun perceiving immigrants as monochromatically "ethnic." Similarly, Johnson et al. (1997) find evidence of white resentment of the "browning of America" beginning in the 1970s as immigrants began forgoing traditional immigration centers for small and medium-sized

communities, and Hajnal et. al (2000) argue that white-Hispanic cleavages will likely supplant traditional white-black cleavages.

Furthermore, there is strong evidence that greater ethnic and racial diversity in a given society corresponds with less support for redistributive policies, in large part out of fear that these policies benefit an out-group, which is often perceived as lazy and underserving (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Alesina et al. 2001). In the United States, evidence shows that both increased racial diversity and increased immigration lead to opposition to redistributive policies, and the comparative literature finds that states with more diverse societies have smaller welfare states. Moreover, this literature has found a similar effect from modern immigration as a driver of increased multiculturalism. Given that immigration to the United States in recent decades has been predominately Hispanic, the effect should be particularly pronounced in states experiencing increased rates of immigration (Freeman 1986; Alesina et al. 2001; Johnston et al. 2010). Furthermore, fears that redistributive policies directly benefit immigrants have consistently featured in both public and Congressional debate, including California's Proposition 187, Congressional efforts to pass immigration reform in the mid-1990s, and Tea Party anger over perceptions that illegal immigrants enjoy taxpayer-funded benefits (Hero 2010; Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Gimpel and Edwards 1999). Gimpel and Edwards (1999) argue that "immigration has been translated into a redistributive issue..." (Gimpel and Edwards 1999, 297).

Finally, because immigration policy has consistently been quite liberal compared to public opinion, and in particular that of conservatives, immigration should be a potent source of frustration and anger at a non-responsive government perceived to be more responsive to immigrants and the business interests they benefit than the average member of the public (Gallup 2012; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Gimpel and Ewards 1999; Skocpol and Williamson

2012). Until the 1990s, both parties in Congress largely supported liberal immigration policies, despite public disapproval; although Gimpel and Edwards (1999) argue that Republicans began moving toward more restrictive positions in the 1990s, there has been no comprehensive change to immigration policy, and in early June 2015—before Donald Trump launched his presidential campaign—Gallup found that a plurality favored a reduction in the number of immigrants coming to the United States (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Fennelly et al. 2015; Gallup 2018).

Amid this Congressional inaction, pluralities have consistently called for tighter restrictions on immigration (Segovia and Defever 2010; Schuck 2007). The failure of the government to end illegal immigration has figured heavily into Tea Party anger at the federal government, with 82 percent calling it a "very serious problem" (while 60 percent of the general public agreed) (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). However, illegal immigration has become almost synonymous with immigration of all kinds, given that, since the mid-2000s, 70 to 80 percent of respondents have mistakenly claimed that most immigrants were in the country illegally Segovia and (Defever 2010; Schuck 2007).

Here, I argue that the combination economic and cultural threat, unease with redistributive policy in a multicultural immigrant society, and frustration with disequilibrium between public opinion and federal immigration policy, sparks a racial threat backlash among native whites. While backlash theory originally referred to increased white conservatism in response to post-Civil-Rights era black empowerment, more recent interpretations have emphasized changing demographic and political patterns (Voss and Miller 2001). Unfortunately, the literature typically presents backlash as a you-know-it-when-you-see-it phenomenon, complicating both theoretical clarity and operationalization. Masnbridge and Shames (2008) provide theoretical underpinnings for a less colloquial, ideologically-neutral conception of

backlash, but stop short of proposing a precise definition (Mansbridge and Shames 2008, 623-624). Conversely, Lipset and Raab (1970) define backlash as an explicitly right-wing phenomenon resulting from an in-group's perception of threats to their values and status (Lipset and Raab 1970). Similarly, Hewitt (2005) characterizes white backlash as increased conservatism in response to post-Civil-Rights "equalities discourses," and identifies a "second wave" of white backlash in the U.S. dating to the 1970s and the Republican party's increasing racial conservatism (Hewitt 2005, 4-11). However, after Republicans began appealing to working class whites through social and cultural conservatism, white backlash took on a broader—and vaguer—conception as anger at "liberal elites." In keeping with Lipset and Raab (1970), Frank (2004) argues that modern conservatism is fueled by a backlash based on:

> Outrage over explosive social issues...a crusade in which one's material interests are suspended in favor of vague cultural grievances that are all-important and yet incapable of ever being assuaged. The hallmark of backlash conservatism is that it approaches politics not as a defender of the existing order or as a genteel aristocrat but as an average working person offended by the arrogant impositions of the (liberal) upper class (Frank 2004, 5, 121, 254)

Frank's characterization is appealing in that it is intuitive, but it, too, lacks precision, and is inherently unfalsifiable.

I define backlash in the Lipset and Raab (1970) tradition as a conservative response by native whites to perceived threats to their values and status, in this case from increased inflows of foreigners. The combination of economic and social threat from highly visible immigration, opposition to redistributive policies in response to increasing multiculturalism due to immigration, and frustration with government unresponsiveness to consistent public demands for more stringent implementation of immigration policy and lower inflows of immigrants means that this backlash should be broad and spread across multiple issue areas. Post-9/11 security

debates provide a striking, albeit recent and potentially short-lived example, as immigration was quickly recast by many opponents as a threat to security (Barry 2005).

Here, I test the argument that this backlash has been growing in strength since the current trend of increased Latin American immigration began in the 1970s. As mentioned, backlash is something of a you-know-it-when-you-see-it phenomena that can be difficult to precisely pin down, but an extreme example is found in the rise of the Tea Party following the Great Recession—not coincidentally, the Tea Party emerged as Congressional polarization rose to unprecedented levels. Tea Party members and rallies consistently called for greater conservatism on both economic and cultural issues, all under the umbrella of the ubiquitous demand to "give *us* back *our* country" (emphasis added)—a coded reference to "real" Americans. Prominent among their demands was to end a perceived deluge of illegal immigrants and the "illegitimate and costly use of government funds and services by illegal immigrants" (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, 7, 71). In the words of one Tea Party member Skocpol and Williamson (2012) interviewed:

> I feel like my country is being stolen by people who have come here illegally. People come in and have the benefits of taxes (*sic*), and the money spent on them puts a burden on the state, which makes me have to pay more (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, 72).

Skocpol and Williamson (2012) provide ongoing examples to show how anxiety over immigration bleeds over into other issue areas. Perhaps the most infamous example prior to Donald Trump's candidacy for president was South Carolina Republican Representative Joe Wilson's "you lie" rebuttal to Obama's State of the Union claim that illegal immigrants would be excluded from Affordable Care Act benefits. However, bound up in these concerns about government benefits is a pervasive sense of cultural threat stemming from the fear that growing numbers of minorities and immigrants—who Tea Partiers see as almost invariably having a

weaker work ethic and stronger sense of entitlement than "real" Americans—are fostering a cultural decline that will render America unrecognizable compared to idealized visions of the past (Layman et al. 2010; Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Schuck 2007).

Then, in June 2016, Donald Trump announced that he was running for president, and included in his speech the argument that:

> When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. (Time 2015)

Following his announcement speech, Trump steadily gained popularity among Republican primary voters, eventually gaining the Republican nomination, and, defying most predictions, going on to win the presidency. Throughout his first year in office, he cast immigrants in a decidedly negative light, frequently insulting Mexico and Mexican immigrants, and lamenting that the U.S. does not receive fewer immigrants from Sub-Saharan African countries and more from countries such as Norway (Reilly 2016; Dawsey 2017). Despite the controversy generated by these and countless similar remarks, Trump's approval rating remained steady throughout his first year in office at around 35 percent, suggesting that his base found these attitudes toward immigration at least tolerable, if not attractive (Gallup 2018). Moreover, initial research into the motivations of Trump supporters has found racial resentment to be a more important factor than economic anxiety, an explanation that was popular with journalists and pundits. These two factors are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but of particular note is the fact that Tesler has found that racial anxiety leads to economic anxiety, rather than the other way around, further suggesting that racial resentment is the most important factor. (Tesler 2016; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017).

Argument: Mass Effect

Increases in immigration rates should spark a conservative backlash among white natives for several reasons. First, over the last 30 years, opinion polls have consistently found that large pluralities, and occasionally majorities, of native whites have considered immigration policy too liberal (Gallup 2012; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). In addition, immigration is salient across multiple issue dimensions. At least since the 1990s, and probably since the 1980s, about half of the population has perceived a significant cultural threat from immigration, and has resented immigrants' perceived unwillingness to assimilate (Lapinksi et al. 1997). By the mid-2000s, between 70 and 80 percent of respondents believed most immigrants were in the United States illegally, and the government's response to immigration, both legal and illegal, was inadequate (Segovia and Defever 2010). Moreover, increases in immigrant populations often lead to conservatism on redistributive issues, for fear that immigrants are a fiscal drain, the most prominent example being California's Proposition 187, which sought to reduce support for education and social spending; Hero (2010) argues it was sparked largely by fears that such spending disproportionately benefits immigrants (Hero 2010. Finally, immigration has occasionally had a salient national security dimension, particularly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Barry 2005). Hajnal et al. (2000) go so far as to speculate that, in many areas, the traditional white-black cleavage is being supplanted by the white-Hispanic cleavage.

The literature has consistently found that increases in immigrant inflows, rather than the size of the existing immigrant population, are linked to backlash (Citrin et al. 1997). Hopkins (2010) finds that local populations become more anti-immigrant not when living among large existing immigrant groups, but when faced with rapid, visible changes in local demographics. He argues that, "while *levels* of ethnic heterogeneity might escape notice, *changes* are less likely to

do so" (Hopkins 2010, 42, 56). Similarly, Green et al. (1998) found that new influxes of immigrants spark an "admixture of outright racism, nostalgia, and self-interest" that leads to increased racially-motivated crime (Green et al. 1998, 395-398).

Finally, highly visible immigrant inflows are more likely to elicit a white backlash (Money 1999; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). Increases in the visibility of immigrants to the United States roughly coincided with the beginning of the trend of increasing Congressional polarization. It was in the 1970s—just as polarization began increasing—that Hispanics overtook Europeans as the largest group of migrants to the United States; by the 1990s, the height of anti-immigration backlash, over half of all immigrants living in the United States came from Latin America and the Caribbean (Martin and Midgley 2006, 3):



Figure 2.10: Foreign-born residents by region of origin (Wasem 2013, 3)

Argument: Legislators

In previous work (Worth 2012), I found modest evidence that increases in the foreign-born population at the state level lead to more conservative white opinions on social and racial issues, and weaker evidence for an interactive effect of immigration and inequality on

conservatism. Given evidence suggesting that when an issue becomes important to a subset of a party's activists it will usually diffuse and become salient to most party members, it is reasonable to argue that this increased white social and racial conservatism will lead to greater overall conservatism in the Republican party (Layman, et al. 2010). I also assume that legislators are strategic actors seeking reelection, and pursue that goal by responding to the preferences of a somewhat broad reelection constituency by reflecting its preferences in their roll-call voting (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974). Because Republican legislators' reelection constituencies are overwhelmingly white, it is reasonable to argue that increased white conservatism in response to higher rates of immigration should lead to greater roll-call conservatism by Republican Senators (Bowler and Segura 2012).

In the next chapter, I test my theory that increased immigration has led to a racial-threat backlash among native whites, leading to greater conservatism among Republicans while having no effect on Democrats, among voters in the mass public.

Chapter Three: Individual-Level Tests

Introduction

Following Mitt Romney's poor showing among minorities in the 2012 election, the Republican National Committee commissioned an "autopsy" of the party and its appeal to voters. Among the report's many conclusions and recommendations, it flatly stated that "[the Republican Party] must embrace and champion comprehensive immigration reform" if it is to improve its electoral performance among the fast-growing Hispanic population (Growth and Opportunity Project 2013, 8). But by the next presidential election, the party had moved further toward capitalizing on native whites' racial resentment than toward appealing to the Latino vote. Nowhere was this more evident than in Donald Trump's speech announcing his bid for the Republican presidential nomination, in which he castigated Mexican immigrants as criminals, drug smugglers, and rapists; within a month, he rose to first place in a crowded field of primary candidates (Washington Post 2015). Shortly thereafter, his first position paper called for a wall running the length of the U.S.-Mexican border, mass deportations of undocumented immigrants, and an end to birthright citizenship for the children of undocumented immigrants—and his lead grew. He went on to not only win the Republican presidential nomination, but, defying expectations on both the left and the right, to defeat Hilary Clinton and become president of the United Sates.

In Trump's first year in office, he did little to temper his anti-immigrant message, for example repeatedly insulting Mexico and Mexican immigrants to the United States, and complaining to a group of Congressional representatives that the United States receives too many migrants from "shithole countries" in the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, and too few from countries such as Norway (Dawsey 2017). As journalists raced to explain the "Trump

phenomenon," his supporters expressed a range of economic, cultural, security, and demographic anxieties created by immigration, and initial research suggests that one of Trump voters' main motivations was racial anxiety (Lind 2015; Sides 2017). Why has immigration resonated so strongly with Republican voters? As explained in chapter two, I argue that increased immigration since the 1970s has created a racial-threat backlash among Republicans, causing them to become more conservative across the issue space. In this chapter, I test that theory in the mass public.

Argument

In chapter two, I developed my theory that immigration should lead to greater conservatism among Republicans by sparking a racial-threat backlash in response to economic and cultural threat from immigration, unease with redistributive policy amid growing multiculturalism, and frustration with disequilibrium between policy and public opinion on immigration.

Since at least the 1990s, and probably since the 1980s, about half of the population has perceived a significant cultural threat from immigration, and has resented immigrants' perceived unwillingness to assimilate (Lapinksi et al. 1997). Evidence of economic threat and unease with redistribution is apparent in findings of a common fear that immigrants are a fiscal drain, the most prominent example being California's Proposition 187 in 1994, which sought to reduce support for education and social spending; Hero (2010) argues it was sparked largely by fears that such spending disproportionately benefits immigrants. Economic concerns should be particularly pronounced at the state level, because, over the long term, immigrants are generally a net fiscal cost to state and local governments, but are net contributors to the federal government (Blau and Mackie, 2016).

Furthermore, highly visible immigrant inflows are more likely to elicit a backlash (Money 1999; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). Increases in the visibility of immigrants to the

United States roughly coincided with the beginning of the trend of increasing Congressional polarization. It was in the 1970s—just as polarization began increasing—that Hispanics overtook Europeans as the largest group of migrants to the United States; by the 1990s, the height of anti-immigration backlash, over half of all immigrants living in the United States came from Latin America and the Caribbean (Martin and Midgley 2006, 3).

Moreover, public opinion on immigration and policy have been in disequilibrium for decades. Over the last 30 years, opinion polls have consistently found that large pluralities, and occasionally majorities, of native whites have considered immigration policy too liberal (Gallup 2012; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). By the mid-2000s, between 70 and 80 percent of respondents believed most immigrants were in the United States illegally, and the government's response to immigration, both legal and illegal, was inadequate (Segovia and Defever 2010). In addition, immigration is salient across multiple issue dimensions.

However, there is strong evidence that Republicans and Democrats have different responses to immigration. For example, Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) found that whites with negative attitudes about immigration have moved into the Republican Party in recent decades, and that these attitudes are an increasingly strong predictor of support for Republican candidates. Similarly, I argue that a racial-threat backlash to immigration that leads to greater conservatism should be strongest in the groups most antagonistic to immigration, who are disproportionately Republican, and weaker, if present at all, in groups more tolerant of immigration, who are disproportionately Democratic. Given this, any racial-threat backlash in response to increased immigration should be strongest among Republican voters, and weakest, if present at all, among Democrats.

The first important group characteristic that affects attitudes toward immigrants and immigration is cultural status; members of culturally marginalized groups—for example, African-Americans and Catholics in the United States—are more welcoming of immigrants than the culturally dominant group, which, in the United States, is white Protestants, who are disproportionately Republican (Fetzer 1998, 2000). Along similar lines, higher symbolic racism scores are associated with less tolerant views of immigrants (Berg 2013), and Republicans exhibit far more symbolic racism than Democrats (Valentino and Sears 2005). Moreover, while ideology has traditionally been a better indicator of attitudes toward immigrants than partisanship, Gimpel and Edwards (1999) find that, by the 1990s, immigration had cleaved along partisan lines as the Republican Party became more conservative on immigration (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). Finally, beginning in the 1970s, white Americans began expressing resentment over the "browning" of America, and, by the 1980s, white conceptions of U.S. nationality were marked by "ethnocultural or exclusionary elements" (Johnson et al. 1997; Citrin 1990).

Because these group characteristics are far more prevalent among Republicans than Democrats, racial-threat backlash in response to immigration should also be far more prevalent among Republicans than Democrats. Granted, white Southern Democrats should exhibit a similar response; however, the Southern Realignment coincided with the modern trend of increased immigration, and, given that it was nearly complete by the 1990s, and that the whites who remained in the Democratic Party were typically urban, members of a culturally marginalized group, or both, few white Democrats in my sample years should exhibit a racial-threat backlash in response to immigration.

Finally, the literature has consistently found that increases in immigrant inflows, rather than the size of the existing immigrant population, are linked to backlash (Citrin et al. 1997).

Hopkins (2010) finds that local populations become more anti-immigrant not when living among large existing immigrant groups, but when faced with rapid, visible changes in local demographics. He argues that, "while *levels* of ethnic heterogeneity might escape notice, *changes* are less likely to do so" (Hopkins 2010, 42, 56). Similarly, Green et al. (1998) found that new influxes of immigrants spark an "admixture of outright racism, nostalgia, and self-interest" that leads to increased racially-motivated crime (Green et al. 1998, 395-398).

Research Design

In this chapter, I use a series of regressions to test the theory that increased rates of immigration lead to greater conservatism and affective polarization among Republican voters, but have no effect on Democratic voters, as well as the alternative theory that increased inequality leads to greater conservatism and affective polarization among Republican voters, but has no effect on Democratic voters. Specifically, I test the effects of increased rates of immigration on negative partisanship and partisans' self-reported ideologies.

As stated previously, Congressional polarization has been highly asymmetrical, and owes largely to increased Republican conservatism, so I approach mass polarization as a puzzle about Republicans, rather than all voters (Lewis et al. 2018). Given the convincing evidence that leaners are in fact "closet partisans" who behave much like those who claim a partisan affiliation, both in terms of vote choice and policy positions, I include leaners in my operationalization of Republicans and Democrats (Keith et al. 1992; Magleby and Nelson 2012). For example, recent polling by Pew shows that leaners are almost indistinguishable from their co-partisans on both specific issues and ideological consistency:



Figure 3.1: Partisans' and Leaners' Ideology (Pew 2014b)

The media frequently report that self-described independents have grown to be the largest electoral group, and while this is true, the media erroneously present these voters as being "up for grabs"—a claim that made its way into the political science literature almost 30 years ago—and that "independents will decide the election." (Brooks 2012; Wattenberg 1986; Klar and Krupnikov 2014). The votes of *true* independents may in fact be up for grabs, but twenty years ago, Keith, et al. (1992) argued:

> Those who leaned toward the Democratic party were very similar to outright Democrats in their voting habits, opinions on the issues, and views of the Democratic party. The same was true of people who initially labeled themselves as Independents and then admitted they were closer to the Republican Party (Keith et al. 1992).

The American National Election Survey data (1970-2012) bear this out:

	Voted With Party	Voted Against Party
Republicans	91.77	8.23
Republican Leaners	85.33	14.67
Democrats	83.67	16.33
Democratic Leaners	83.22	16.78

Table 3.1: Partisans' and Leaners' Presidential Vote Choice

As the above chart shows, leaners behave much like those who profess membership in the party toward which they lean. Because these voters reliably vote for their preferred party and share a very similar ideology, explaining increased Republican conservatism requires explaining changes not just among strong partisans, but among leaners, as well, so I include leaners in my subsamples of Republicans and Democrats.

Data

I use the ANES cumulative file for data about respondents' demographic and political characteristics, and my inequality, immigration, and state-level demographic data are taken from the U.S. Census. The sample begins in 1970 to correspond with the decade when partisan polarization in Congress began its steady increase, and to accommodate decennial Census data, and it ends in 2012 (Lewis et al. 2018).

Hypotheses and Dependent Variables

Hypothesis 1: As the rate of immigration to a state increases, Republicans in that state will report more positive feelings toward conservatives and more negative feelings toward liberals, but Democrats will be unaffected.

> *Hypothesis 1b: As the level of inequality in a state increases, Republicans in that state will report more positive feelings toward conservatives and more negative feelings toward liberals, but Democrats will be unaffected.*

Building on Iyengar et al.'s (2012) finding of "affective polarization,"—increased support for one's own ideological group or party and increased dislike for the other—I operationalize my dependent variable for hypothesis one as the difference between respondents' feeling thermometer scores for conservatives and liberals. A positive coefficient indicates warmer feelings toward conservatives than liberals. Both the possible and observed range is -97 to 97 (the ANES codes responses of 97-100 as 97). These questions were asked in all years of my sample except 1978.

Hypothesis 2: As the rate of immigration to a state increases, Republicans in that state will express more conservative self-reported ideologies, but Democrats will be unaffected.

> *Hypothesis 2b: As the level of inequality in a state increases, Republicans in that state will express more conservative self-reported ideologies, but Democrats will be unaffected.*

When testing hypothesis two, I operationalize self-reported ideology as responses to the ANES question asking respondents to place themselves on a 7-point liberal-conservative scale. 1=extremely liberal, 4=moderate, and 7=extremely conservative. This question was asked in every survey year from 1972 to 2012.

Hypothesis 3: Increases in the interaction of the rate of immigration and the level of inequality in a state will be associated with Republicans reporting more positive feelings toward conservatives and more negative feelings toward liberals, but Democrats will be unaffected.

Hypothesis 4: Increases in the interaction of the rate of immigration and the level of inequality in a state will be associated with more conservative self-Reported ideologies among Republicans, but Democrats will be unaffected.

Hypotheses three and four are further tests of McCarty et al.'s (2016) theory that immigration leads to greater inequality, which in turn leads to greater conservatism among Republicans. If their theory is correct, the interaction of immigration and inequality should be associated with more conservatism and greater affective polarization among Republicans, but should have no effect on Democrats.

Independent Variables

My explanatory variables are immigration and inequality. *Inequality* is the annual gini coefficient of family income for each state.

The main variable of interest is *immigration percent change*, which I operationalize as the yearly percentage change in the proportion of each state's population that is non-native (Citrin et al. 1997). The literature has found that living among large existing immigrant communities does not elicit a backlash, but that rapid, visible increases in the non-native population do—ten thousand immigrants arriving in California is one thing, the same number arriving in Alabama is another entirely (Green et al. 1998; Hopkins 2010).

. Immigration and inequality data come from the decennial U.S. Census, so I linearly interpolate the data for the intervening years (the 2012 data come from the 2013 American Community Survey estimates). Immigration flows are stable enough to justify this interpolation, because Hopkins (2010) finds that immigrants tend to follow existing networks, and in counties with immigration rates above the 75th percentile, the correlation between immigration rates in 1980 and 1990 was .62. (Hopkins 2010). Furthermore, I run robustness checks using two sets of gini data that rely on yearly estimates, the first provided by Guetzkow, Western, and Rosenfeld (2007), the second by Voorheis (2015; also, see McCarty, Shor, Voorheis 2015). The results in models using these data are consistent with models using the interpolated Census data; however, the Guetzkow et al. (2007) data end in 2004, and the Voorheis (2015) data have not been officially published, so I report only the results from models using the Census data.

The interaction of the rate of immigration and the level of inequality is the product of *immigration* and *gini* centered on their means.

In addition, I control for *education*, because higher education corresponds to more positive attitudes toward immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). This variable is a 7-point scale of educational attainment, with 1 being "8 grades (of education) or less," and 7 being "advanced degree." I also control for individuals' *income*, which the ANES measures as quintiles. I include a dummy variable for *gender* (1=male), because women tend to vote for Democrats more frequently than men (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004). Extensive research finds that members of labor unions and those in low-skill or working-class occupations tend to be more opposed to immigration, so I include a dummy for *union* membership (Hoskin 1991; Fetzer 2000). I include a dummy for *Protestants,* because members of the dominant religious group tend to oppose immigrants more than those from more marginalized groups (Fetzer 1998; 2000). Finally, I include two controls for economic anxiety. First, *state median income* captures sociotropic effects similar to perceptions about the national economy (to ease interpretation, I scale this variable so that 1=$1,000). Second, the ANES variable asking if respondents expect their family's economic circumstances to be worse, the same, or better, in the coming year is included to control for anxiety about one's personal *economic expectations* (Burns and Gimpel 2000).[1]

My immigration and inequality data are at the state level, so I include the *percent Latino* in each state and *percent urban* in each state; these data are taken from the U.S. Census. I also control for *elite ideology* in the states, because the literature suggests that voters update their ideology in response to (elites in) their party (Campbell, et al. 1960; Carsey and Layman 2006; Levendusky 2009). The variable is operationalized as Berry et al.'s (1998) measure of the

---

[1] To better capture the effects of economic anxiety, I ran separate models that included unemployment, inflation, and the misery index in the states, but none of those variables were statistically significant and they did not substantively change the results of those tests; in the interest of clarity, I present only the model that includes state median income and respondents' expectations for their families' future economic circumstances.

ideology of the members of each state's government. Finally, I include a dichotomous measure of *border states,* to control for the high salience of immigration in California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and Florida (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).

Methods

My hypotheses propose that immigration will affect Republican responses to my dependent variables, but will have no effect on Democrats, which requires separate tests of each partisan sample. However, simply running a separate regression on each sample relies on the assumption that there is no relationship between the resulting error terms in each model. This assumption is, in a word, unrealistic, because there are almost certainly state-level factors that affect Republicans and Democrats similarly, and yet are impossible to control for. Given this, I test my hypotheses using a two-stage seemingly-unrelated estimation model, which first estimates a separate regression for each sample, then identifies any correlations between the resulting equations and jointly estimates robust standard errors, which I cluster on each state-year group of observations (Weesie 1999; White 1982; Peterson 2009). Finally, I use a chi-square test to determine if the differences between the coefficients in each sample are statistically significant. I control for fixed effects with a dummy variable for each year, omitting the first year (Wooldridge 2009).

The dependent variable for hypotheses one and three—the absolute difference of respondents' feeling thermometer scores for conservatives and liberals—is continuous, allowing the use of OLS regression. The dependent variable for hypotheses two and four—respondents' self-reported ideology—is ordinal, so I use ordered logit regression when testing this hypothesis (Peterson 2009).

Results

The results found in tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 provide strong support for my hypotheses. In each test, the rate of immigration to a state was associated with more affective polarization and more conservative self-reported ideologies among Republicans, but there was no relationship between these variables among Democrats. These results do not support the alternative explanation that inequality is associated with increased affective polarization and more conservative self-reported ideologies among Republicans. Finally, the results did not indicate a relationship between the interaction of the rate of immigration and inequality and either self-reported ideology or affective polarization, casting further doubt on the alternative explanation.

Table 3.2: Seemingly-Unrelated OLS Regression
Conservative-Liberal Feeling Thermometer

	Republicans	Democrats
Immigration	17.89*** (5.28)	-2.74 (4.67)
Inequality	32.63 (21)	21.1 (17.4)
Education[2]	1.97*** (.2)	-4.15*** (.18)
Income	2.21*** (.3)	1.1*** (.3)
Union Member	.88 (.94)	.62 (.56)
Gender	4.25*** (.6)	-.27 (.48)
Protestant	5.3*** (.64)	4.6*** (.54)
Economic Expectations	1.7*** (.56)	.94** (.46)
Elite Ideology	-.02 (.01)	-.017 (.01)
Urban	-.09** (.05)	-.12*** (.04)
Latino	-.12 (.07)	.03 (.07)
Median Income	.3 (.7)	-.1*** (.06)
Border State	4.2*** (1.6)	1.28 (1.5)
N	9515	12758
Pseudo R^2	.09	.11

Standard errors in parentheses
***=p<.001; **=p<.05; *=p<.1

Tests of Differences of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples

Immigration	Prob>chi^2: .002
Inequality	Prob>chi^2: .68

The results in table 3.2 support the hypothesis that increased rates of immigration are associated with more negative feelings among Republicans toward liberals, and there is no relationship among Democrats between immigration and feelings toward conservatives. The immigration

[2] Because education is highly significant in both the Republican and Democratic samples, and because it is, perhaps unexpectedly, associated with greater conservatism among Republicans, I tested the interaction of education and immigration. This interaction term did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in either sample; in the interest of clarity, I do not report the results of those tests.

coefficient in the Republican sample is positive and significant ($p<.001$) indicating that when immigration to a state increases, so, too, does Republican affective polarization. The coefficient in the Democratic sample is not significant, providing no evidence of a relationship between immigration and Democrats' affective polarization. More specifically, the model estimates that each percentage point increase in the rate of immigration to a state is associated with an 18.38-point increase in the difference between Republicans' conservative and liberal feeling thermometer scores, which have an observed range in my sample of -97 to 97; the observed range of the rate of immigration is -.113 to .434. Finally, the chi-squared test of the difference between the immigration coefficients in the Republican and Democratic samples indicates that they are in fact not equal at the 99-percent confidence level.

The inequality coefficients for both samples do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, casting doubt on the alternative explanation that increased inequality is associated with greater affective polarization among Republicans.

Table 3.3: Seemingly-Unrelated Ordered Logit Regression on Self-Reported Ideology

	Republicans	Democrats
Immigration	.9*** (.31)	.21 (.3)
Inequality	-.3 (1.34)	1.26 (1.29)
Education	.1*** (.01)	-2.6*** (.01)
Income	.08*** (.02)	.06*** (.02)
Union Member	-.003 (.06)	.0007 (.04)
Gender	.24*** (.04)	.02 (.03)
Protestant	.36*** (.04)	.39*** (.04)
Economic Circumstances	.07** (.03)	.09*** (.03)
Elite Ideology	-.001* (.0008)	-.002* (.0009)
Urban	-.002 (.002)	-.009*** (.003)
Latino	.0004 (.004)	-.003 (.005)
Median Income	.2 (.1)	-.6 (.04)
Border State	.03 (.09)	.21** (.1)
N	9052	11444
Pseudo R^2	.02	.03

Standard errors in parentheses
***=p<.001; **=p<.05; *=p<.1

Tests of Differences of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples

Immigration	Prob>chi^2: .01
Inequality	Prob>chi^2: .41

The results in table 3.3 provide strong support for my second hypothesis that increased immigration is associated with more conservative self-reported ideology among Republicans, but not Democrats. The immigration coefficient is positive and significant (p<.001) in the

Republican sample, suggesting that as immigration increases, Republicans' self-reported ideology becomes more conservative. However, the immigration coefficient does not reach conventional levels of significance in the Democratic sample, suggesting that there is no relationship between immigration and Democrats' self-reported ideology. Moreover, the chi-squared test of the difference between coefficients indicates that the coefficients on immigration in the Republican and Democratic sample are not equal at the 99-percent confidence level.

It is worth noting that, in table 3.3, higher incomes are, as expected, associated with more conservative self-reported ideologies among both Republicans and Democrats. However, the education variable, while statistically significant for both Republicans and Democrats, is associated with much more liberal ideologies among Democrats—as expected—but has a very small effect on Republicans. (Both the education variable and the dependent variable—self-reported ideology—are 7-point ordinal variables). In the case of table 3.2—Republicans' and Democrats' feeling thermometer scores for one another—perhaps the education variable is capturing the effects of political awareness, which typically increases as education increases (Carpini and Keeter 1996; Zaller 1992; Converse 1964). In this case, increased political awareness would explain having any opinion, much less a strong opinion, about members of the other party. On the other hand, the significant, but very small, education coefficient for Republicans could be the result of Republican politicians and the conservative media successfully stigmatizing "liberal" as a pejorative, giving even Republicans with low political awareness a greater likelihood of self-identifying as conservative than Democrats with similar levels of political awareness are of self-identifying as liberal. If this is the case, perhaps the very weak effect of education on Republicans' self-reported ideology compared to the effect on Democrats is due to other variables in the model—namely, immigration—explaining the bulk of

Republicans' variation on the dependent variable, while failing to explain any of the Democrats' variation (Neiheisel 2016; Schiffer 2000).

As figure 3.3 below shows, as the rate of immigration to a state increases, Republican respondents are more likely to report the highest level of conservatism on the 7-point self-reported ideology measure:



Figure 3.2: Predicted probabilities at different rates of immigration of respondent reporting "extreme conservative" (7) on 7-point self-reported ideology measure

The results in table 3.3 do not support the alternative explanation that inequality is related to greater polarization, as the coefficient on inequality does not reach conventional levels of significance in either sample, and the chi-squared test does not support rejecting the null of equal coefficients. Finally, table 3.4 shows that the interaction of immigration and inequality does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, casting further doubt on McCarty et al.'s (2016) theory that immigration leads to greater inequality, which in turn leads to increased partisan polarization.

Table 3.4: Seemingly-Unrelated OLS Regression on Conservative-Liberal Feeling Thermometer with Immigration*Inequality Interaction

	Republicans	Democrats
Immigration * Inequality	-69.92 (180.2)	10.4 (166.7)
Immigration	17.29*** (5.53)	-2.6 (4.71)
Inequality	33.07 (21.26)	21.17 (17.39)
Education	1.98*** (.21)	-4.16*** (.18)
Income	2.21*** (.3)	1.13*** (.3)
Union Member	.88 (.94)	.62 (.56)
Gender	4.24*** (.6)	-.23 (.48)
Protestant	5.32*** (.65)	4.6*** (.54)
Economic Expectations	1.7*** (.56)	.94** (.46)
Elite Ideology	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)
Urban	-.09* (.05)	-.11*** (.04)
Latino	-.12* (.077)	.03 (.08)
Median Income	.2 (.7)	-.2*** (.06)
Border State	4.2*** (1.59)	1.25 (1.5)
N	9513	12757
Pseudo R^2	.09	.12

Standard errors in parentheses
***=p<.001; **=p<.05; *=p<.1

Test of Differences of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples

Immigration*Inequality	Prob>chi^2: .75

As table 3.5 below shows, the interaction of *immigration* and *inequality* does not reach conventional standards of statistical significance when regressed on either dependent variable—self-reported ideology and feeling thermometer scores for liberals and conservatives—casting further doubt on McCarty et al.'s (2016) that increased inequality leads to increased polarization.

Table 3.5: Seemingly-Unrelated Ordered Logit Regression on Self-Reported Ideology with Immigration*Inequality Interaction

	Republicans	Democrats
Immigration*Inequality	.41 (10.2)	9.59 (11.69)
Immigration	.91*** (.33)	.31 (.32)
Inequality	-3 (1.36)	1.21 (1.28)
Education	.1*** (.01)	-.26*** (.01)
Income	.08*** (.02)	.06*** (.02)
Union Member	-.003 (.06)	.001 (.04)
Gender	.2*** (.04)	.03 (.04)
Protestant	.36*** (.04)	.39*** (.04)
Economic Circumstances	.07** (.03)	.08*** (.03)
Elite Ideology	-.001* (.0008)	-.002* (.001)
Urban	-.002 (.003)	-.009*** (.003)
Latino	.0005 (.004)	-.002 (.005)
Median Income	.03 (.04)	-.07 (.05
Border State	.03 (.09)	.21** (.1)
N	9050	11443
Pseudo R^2	.02	.03

Test of Difference of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples

Immigration*Inequality	Prob>chi^2: .57

As table 3.5 shows, the interaction of *immigration* and *inequality* does not reach conventional standards of statistical significance, casting further doubt on McCarty et al.'s

(2016) theory that increased inequality leads to increased polarization. However, it is possible that the effect of the interaction at different levels of each component variable (rather than at the observed values of each component variable) increases the likelihood of a change in the dependent variable. Because of this, I estimated a hazard ratio of the effects of the *immigration*inequality* variable at one, two, and three times the observed value of each component variable. In none of these cases did the hazard ratio did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance; in the interest of clarity, I did not report those results here.

Conclusion

Iyengar et al. (2012) conclude by noting, "The evidence is strong that partisans are affectively polarized. It is less clear exactly what underlies this development" (Iyengar et al. 2012, 428). I provide a partial answer to this question by showing that increased rates of immigration are strongly associated with greater affective polarization and more conservative self-reported ideology among Republicans in the public, but not Democrats. These findings are an important contribution toward explaining partisan polarization for three reasons. First, these findings help to resolve the apparent paradox of a generally non-ideological mass public, on the one hand, and extreme partisan polarization in Congress, on the other. Identifying immigration as a source of greater self-reported conservatism and increased antipathy toward Democrats among Republicans helps to explain why Republicans in the public tolerate, if not outright demand, increasingly extreme conservatism on the part of their representatives in Congress. That this effect is present in Republicans, but not Democrats, highlights the second important contribution: helping to explain why partisan polarization in Congress has been asymmetrical, despite rank-and-file members of both parties displaying about the same level of ideological consistency. Finally, these findings allow for a qualified prediction about the future of partisan polarization.

Should immigration rates decline in the coming decades, be it because of stricter policy and enforcement, changes in economic incentives for immigrants, or both, then we should expect Republican conservatism, and, in turn, partisan polarization, to level off and decline.

These findings are particularly interesting in light of the growing urgency with which the Republican Party must attract non-white voters if it is to remain electorally competitive. Should historically high rates of immigration continue, these findings suggest that Republican voters will become increasingly resistant to the efforts to attract minorities upon which the party's survival increasingly depends; worse, party elites will face increasing pressure to placate the racial anxiety among traditional Republicans. However, the Republican Party may enjoy a stroke of luck as it faces down the browning of America: should the post-1970s era of historically high immigration level off and decline, as many expect given the sluggish global economy, then Republican voters' sense of racial threat, and with it their historically high conservatism and affective polarization, may follow suit, freeing up Republican elites to appeal to non-white voters without alienating their traditional base. Should this come to pass, an important avenue of future research will be untangling the racial-threat effects of immigration and of fertility disparities as post-1970s immigrants go on to raise native children. If Republicans continue to view these second-generation minorities as a threatening other, immigration may be the least of the Republican Party's demographic challenges.

In the next chapter, I test my theory that increased immigration has led to a racial-threat backlash among native whites, leading to greater conservatism among Republicans, on the policy mood in the states and on state legislators' roll-call ideology.

Chapter 4: State-Level Tests

Introduction

In Chapter Three, I tested at the individual-voter level my theory that higher rates of immigration spark a racial-threat backlash among Republicans, leading to greater conservatism, but that there is no relationship between immigration and conservatism among Democrats. More specifically, I found that higher rates of immigration to a state are associated with more conservative self-reported ideologies and more antipathy toward liberals among Republican voters in that state, but found no relationship among Democrats. In this chapter, I test this theory on citizen ideology in the states and roll-call ideology among state legislators.

In the midst of the Great Recession of the late-2000s, conservative anger over immigration, government bailouts of banks and automobile manufacturers, and increasingly liberal attitudes and policies on social issues, perhaps most prominently same-sex marriage rights, coalesced around the Tea Party faction of the Republican Party. Amid this conservative backlash, two young, ambitious, and ardently conservative Republicans governors, Bobby Jindal of Louisiana and Scott Walker of Wisconsin, joined with their states' Republican-controlled legislatures to push through ardently conservative agendas. Walker generated controversy almost immediately after taking office by quickly joining with Republicans legislators to end collective bargaining rights for state public employees. This proved so controversial that a group of Democratic legislators fled the state prior to a floor vote on the bill to prevent a quorum, and protestors occupied the Wisconsin State Capitol. Nonetheless, Republicans in the legislature successfully exploited rules to allow a vote and passed the legislation. Furious, Democrats petitioned to hold a special election asking voters whether to recall Walker, but he continued to

enjoy widespread support, and not only defeated the recall, but easily won a second term in office three years later (Williams and Skocpol 2012; Stein 2105).

In Louisiana, Jindal's cuts to both taxes and spending sparked less outrage, although eight consecutive years of mid-year budget cuts eventually took their toll on his popularity (UNO Survey Research Center 2015). Jindal's fiscal policy was, by any measure, extremely conservative: over the course of his eight years in office, per capita state government spending decreased by ten percent, while the national average was an *increase* of eight percent. Louisiana's education budget was cut by 52 percent, and the state's charity hospital system was privatized. The Cato Institute awarded Jindal an "A" in its 2010 fiscal report card, but reduced his grade to "B" in 2012 and 2014—not because of spending increases or tax hikes, but because of his supply-side incentives designed to lure out-of-state businesses, including a film industry tax credit worth 40 percent of all in-state spending (Kaeding and Edwards 2014). Jindal also took a hardline conservative stance on social issues, most notably instructing Louisiana state agencies not to comply with the Supreme Court's 2015 ruling legalizing same-sex marriage (O'Donoghue 2015). Fiscal conservatives criticized Jindal's approach to "balancing" the budget repeatedly with one-time funds—selling off state assets and raiding trust funds—and leaving the state with a $2 billion deficit. But the policy reforms of the Jindal era were decidedly conservative.

Despite stirring controversy, the state legislatures in Wisconsin and Louisiana enacted most of each governor's conservative agenda, and voters awarded both with easy reelection—Jindal was so popular that he ran for reelection unopposed. The Republican-controlled Wisconsin state legislature eagerly backed Walker's policies, and, following Jindal's exit in 2015, the Republican-controlled Louisiana legislature went so far as to deny incoming Democratic governor John Bel Edwards the customary privilege of naming his preferred Speaker

of the House. What accounts for the hard-right turn in these states, and fervent Republican support for their governors' conservative policies? Could it be that Republican governors and state legislators have exhibited a racial threat backlash in response to increased immigration similar to the effect identified in Chapter 3 among Republican voters? Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below suggest that this may have been the case in Louisiana and Wisconsin.



-

Figure 4.1: Percent foreign-born and state House Republican ideology in Louisiana and Wisconsin, 1993-2014

Argument

In chapter two, I explained my theory that immigration should spark a racial-threat backlash among Republicans in response to economic and cultural threat from immigration, unease with redistributive policy amid growing multiculturalism, and frustration with disequilibrium between policy and public opinion on immigration, but should have no effect on Democrats (Lapinkski et al. 1997; Hero 2010; Money 1999; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). In Chapter 3, I found strong evidence for this effect among Republican voters. In this chapter, I build on those findings by testing immigration on public ideology in the states and roll-call ideology among state legislators. I also test the alternative explanation that increased inequality leads to greater Republican conservatism, but has no effect on Democrats (McCarty et al. 2016).

My tests of the effects of immigration and inequality on citizen ideology in the states support my theory—increased rates of immigration are associated with more conservative citizen ideology, while there is no relationship between increased inequality and citizen ideology. My tests of the effects of immigration and inequality on state legislators' roll-call ideology is mixed. In both the upper and lower chambers of state legislatures, my results are consistent with my theory: increased rates of immigration to a state are associated with greater conservatism among Republican legislators, but there is no effect on Democrats. However, I find that increased inequality is associated with greater liberalism among both Republican and Democratic legislatures. I discuss this unexpected finding in the conclusion section of this chapter.

Research Design

My first test is of the relationship between immigration and citizen ideology in the states, and between inequality and citizen ideology in the states.

H1: As the rate of immigration to a state increases, citizen ideology in that state will become more conservative.

H1b: As the level of inequality in a state increases, citizen ideology in that state will become more conservative.

The dependent variable in hypotheses 1 and 1b, *citizen ideology,* is operationalized as Berry et al.'s (1998) revised 1960-2013 citizen ideology series, which captures citizen ideology in the form of "policy mood." These data are preferable to Erikson, Wright, and McIver's (1993) static public opinion data, because they capture year-to-year changes in public opinion, thus reflecting changes in the "policy mood" in the states (Berry et al. 1998, 328, 343-346). These data are continuous, with a possible range of 0-100; higher values indicate greater liberalism.

My second test is of the relationship between immigration and roll-call ideology in state legislatures, and between inequality and roll-call ideology in state legislatures.

Hypothesis 2: As the rate of immigration to a state increases, the Republican delegation in that states' legislature will cast more conservative roll-call votes, while the Democratic delegation will be unaffected.

Hypothesis 2b: As the level of inequality in a state increases, the Republican delegation in that states' legislature will cast more conservative roll-call votes, while the Democratic delegation will be unaffected.

The dependent variable in hypotheses 2 and 2b, *roll-call ideology,* is operationalized as Shor and McCarty's (2011) mean ideological scores for Democrats and Republicans in each state legislative chamber (Shor and McCarty 2011), which are calculated from state legislative roll-call votes in a manner similar to Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE data (1997). These roll-call data allow comparisons of the members within the *same* state legislative chamber, but, because the members of *different* state legislatures do not vote on identical bills in a given session, the data cannot be compared across the states. To overcome this limitation, Schor and McCarty (2011) use Project Vote Smart's National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) survey, which asks identical questions of legislative candidates in nearly all state legislative elections, which allows them to generate comparable ideal points for each member of each legislature. These data are continuous, with higher values indicating greater conservatism.

The sample for hypothesis one begins in 1970, to capture the beginning of the trend of increasing Congressional polarization in the mid-1970s (Lewis et al. 2018). Both samples end in 2012. The sample for hypothesis two begins in 1993, the beginning year of the Shor and McCarty (2011) data.

Methods

As noted above, the dependent variable in hypothesis one is Berry et al.'s (1998) citizen ideology data, which are continuous, allowing for the use of OLS regression. However, because they are panel data, I use panel-corrected standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity across

panels (Beck and Katz 1995). Because my *n*—states—is larger than my *t*—years—(50 and 42, respectively) I also estimated a model with standard errors clustered on the states, but my results were not substantively different than when using panel-corrected standard errors. Furthermore, many of my variables, including a variable of particular interest, the state gini coefficients, exhibit very little variation over time, so I also estimated a fixed-effects vector decomposition model. The results of this model do not differ substantively from the panel-corrected standard errors model. Because of controversy surrounding the fixed-effects vector decomposition model (Greene 2011) and in the interest of simplicity, I present only the panel-corrected standard errors results.

As explained in chapter two, my hypothesis that immigration will affect the ideology of Republican delegations to state legislatures, and will have no effect on Democratic delegations, requires separate tests of each delegation's roll-call sample. However, simply running a separate regression on each sample relies on the assumption that there is no relationship between the resulting error terms in each model. This assumption is, in a word, unrealistic, because there are almost certainly state-level factors that affect Republicans and Democrats similarly, and yet are impossible to control for. Given this, I test my hypotheses using a two-stage seemingly-unrelated estimation model, which first estimates a separate regression for each sample, then identifies any correlations between the resulting equations and jointly estimates robust standard errors, which I cluster on each state-year group of observations (Weesie 1999; White 1982; Peterson 2009). Finally, I use a chi-square test to determine if the differences between the coefficients in each sample are statistically significant. I control for fixed effects with a dummy variable for each year, omitting the first year (Wooldridge 2009).

My main variables of interest are *immigration* and *inequality* in the states. I operationalize *immigration* as the annual percentage change in the portion of each state's total population that is foreign born. This operationalization, rather than the percentage of each state's population that is foreign born, is appropriate, because the literature has found that living among large existing immigrant communities does not elicit a backlash, but that rapid, visible increases in the non-native population does (Hopkins 2010; Green et al. 1998).

My measure of *inequality* is the annual gini coefficient of family income for each state (U.S Census 2012).

My immigration and inequality data are drawn from the decennial U.S. Census, so I linearly interpolate the data for the intervening years. Although this requires interpolating an admittedly large amount of data, I argue that this is justified, because these demographic factors follow very stable trends. In particular, I argue that immigration flows are stable enough to justify this interpolation, because Hopkins (2010) finds that immigrants tend to follow existing networks, and in counties with immigration rates above the 75th percentile, the correlation between immigration rates in 1980 and 1990 was .62. (Hopkins 2010, 45-46).

I include several controls for several state-level demographic factors: *median household income;* the percentage of each state's residents that are *under 18, over 65,* and the percentage who live in an *urban* area. I further control for the percentage of each state's residents with at least a *high school* education, because higher education tends to correspond with more positive attitudes toward immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Finally, I control for the percentage of each state's residents who are *Latino,* and include *Latino squared,* because I expect very large Latino populations to have a particularly pronounced effect on immigration attitudes.

In addition, extensive research finds that members of labor unions and those in low-skill or working-class occupations tend to be more opposed to immigration, so I control for the percentage of each state's population that is a member of a *union*, using Hirsch and Macpherson's (2003) updated data, which they compiled using the U.S. Census (Hoskin 1991; Fetzer 2000; Hirsch and Macpherson 2003).

The literature suggests that voters update their ideology in response to (elites in) their party (Campbell, et al. 1960; Carsey and Layman 2006; Levendusky 2009), so in model two I control for *elite ideology* with Berry et al.'s (1998) measure of state representative's ideology. Berry et al. (1998) offer two measures of state representative ideology, one that uses a version of the NOMINATE technique, and another that uses interest group ratings; I use the former.

Finally, I include a dichotomous variable *South* to control for unique political attitudes among the eleven formerly Confederate states, and a dichotomous variable *Border State* to control for unique attitudes toward immigration in California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and Florida (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).

Results

Table 4.1: Linear Regression on Citizen Ideology (Panel-Corrected Standard Errors)

Variables	No Elite Ideology	Elite Ideology
Immigration	-69.09*** (.02)	-69.81*** (9.34)
Inequality	2.47 (19.69)	1.45 (19.62)
Elite Ideology	----	.22*** (.02)
Latino	-.29*** (.11)	-.14 (.13)
Latino squared	.01*** (.003)	.01*** (.003)
Under 18	-.81*** (.12)	-.77*** (.12)
Over 65	1.76*** (.16)	1.94*** (.18)
Mean Household Income	.6*** (.07)	.7*** (.07)
High School	.08 (.07)	.11 (.08)
Union	.65*** (.05)	.63*** (.05)
Urban	-.1*** (.02)	-.1*** (.02)
South	-1.72** (.87)	-.97 (.91)
Border State	-4.8*** (.97)	-4.02*** (1.1)
N	2150	2150
R^2	.66	.67

Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.05

The results in table 4.1 support my hypothesis that increased rates of immigration to a state will be associated with more conservative citizen ideology in that state, as indicated by the statistically significant, negative immigration coefficient. In addition, the inequality coefficient does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, casting further doubt on the

alternative explanation that inequality leads to greater partisan polarization (McCarty et al. 2016). However, this test includes all citizens of a given state, and does not make a distinction between the effects of immigration and inequality on Republicans and Democrats, as my and McCarty et al.'s (2016) theories do. Current data do not allow for partisan-specific tests of ideology in the states, so I also test my theory on Republicans and Democrats in the state legislatures.

Table 4.2: Seemingly-Unrelated OLS Regression on Roll-Call Ideology in State Houses

Variables	Republicans	Democrats
Immigration	1.09*** (.27)	.09 (.28)
Inequality	-1.6** (.74)	-4.15*** (.74)
Latino	-.03*** (.005)	-.02*** (.004)
Latino squared	.0005*** (.0001)	.0002** (.00008)
Under 18	-.02*** (.003)	.03*** (.003)
Over 65	-.14*** (.006)	.001 (.009)
Mean Household Income	.02*** (.002)	-.01 (.001)
High School	.01*** (.004)	-.05*** (.003)
Union	-.005* (.003)	-.02*** (.003)
Urban	.002 (.001)	.005*** (.0009)
South	-.08** (.03)	-.01 (.03)
Border State	.77*** (.06)	-.37*** (.06)
N	811	911
$\mathbf{R^2}$	.61	.75

Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.05; *=p<.1

Tests of Differences of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples

Immigration	Prob>chi^2: .01
Inequality	Prob>chi^2: .02

Table 4.3: Seemingly-Unrelated OLS Regression on Roll-Call Ideology in State Senates

Variables	Republicans	Democrats
Immigration	20.28*** (5.79)	.44 (.45)
Inequality	-2.86*** (.8)	-6.04*** (.77)
Latino	-.03*** (.005)	-.009* (.005)
Latino squared	.0005*** (.0001)	.0001 (.0001)
Under 18	-.02*** (.003)	.02*** (.003)
Over 65	-.13*** (.007)	.01 (.008)
Mean Household Income	-.02*** (.002)	-.02*** (.002)
High School	-.004 (.003)	-.05*** (.004)
Union	.002 (.003)	-.02*** (.003)
Urban	.002 (.001)	.008*** (.001)
South	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.03)
Border State	.69*** (.07)	-.44*** (.06)
N	823	823
R^2	.51	.63

Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.05; *=p<.1

Tests of Differences of Coefficients Across Republican and Democratic Samples

Immigration	Prob>chi^2: .49
Inequality	Prob>chi^2: 003

The results in tables 4.2 and 4.3 support my second hypothesis that when a state experiences increased rates of immigration, the Republican delegation to that state's legislature will become more conservative, but Democrats will show no change. Among Republican legislators in state house and senate chambers, the immigration coefficient is significant at the

99-percent confidence level and is positive, indicating greater conservatism; among Democrats, the immigration coefficient does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. In the model of house members, the chi-square test of the difference of the means shows that there is a statistically significant difference between the immigration coefficients for Republicans and Democrats, but the difference is not significant in the senate model. However, the immigration coefficient is not significant in the Democratic subsample in either model, but is for the Republican subsample in both models, suggesting that the effect is limited to Republicans.

The predicted effects of *immigration* at its highest and lowest observed values (-.207 and .424, respectively) on Republicans' *roll call ideology* when all other variables are held at their mean values is as follows. At the lowest observed value for *immigration,* the predicted mean *roll call ideology* of state house Republicans is .4, a decrease of .28, or 16 percent, from the observed mean *roll-call ideology* of .68; the predicted value of at the maximum observed value of *immigration* is 1.09, and increase of .41, or 24 percent. Performing the same test of predicted values in the state senates, where the mean roll-call ideology is also .68, returns a predicted value when immigration is set at its lowest value of .44, a decrease of .24, or 10 percent; at the highest immigration value, the predicted value of state senate roll-call ideology is 1.02, an increase of .34, or 15 percent.[3]

Immigration at observed minimum (-.207)	Immigration at observed maximum (.424)
House Republicans roll-call ideology: -16%	House Republicans' roll-call ideology: +24%
Senate Republicans' roll-call ideology: -24%	Senate Republicans' roll-call ideology: +15%

Table 4.4: predicted values of Republicans' mean roll-call ideology in state houses and senates at minimum and maximum observed values of immigration

[3] Shor and McCarty (2011) do not specify the possible range of their state legislative roll-call data, so I calculated the percentages in this paragraph based on the observed ranges in the data. The observed range among state house Republicans is -.17 to 1.53; the observed range among state senate Republicans is -.62 to 1.7.

The results of my test of hypothesis 2b, that increased levels of inequality in a state are associated with increased conservatism among that state's Republican delegation to the state legislature, but will have no relationship with Democrats' ideology, are mixed. In both models, the inequality coefficients for both Republicans and Democrats is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level, but the negative coefficient indicates that both Democrats *and* Republicans display more *liberal* roll-call behavior amid increased inequality. Moreover, the chi-square test for difference of the means shows that the differences between the inequality coefficients for each party are statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level in state houses, but not in state senates. This unexpected result further casts doubt on the alternative theory that inequality leads to greater polarization. In fairness, the inequality coefficient for the Democratic sample is larger than the coefficient for the Republican sample, which suggests that, all else equal, increased inequality could be a cause of increased ideological distance between the parties. However, contemporary partisan polarization is highly asymmetrical, with Republicans having moved much further to the right than Democrats have to the left; given this, the fact that inequality is associated with Republicans becoming more *liberal* casts further doubt on the alternative explanation that inequality best explains asymmetrical partisan polarization.

Conclusion

My tests of the relationship between the rate of immigration to a state and ideology among both citizens and state legislators support my theory that increased immigration leads to a racial-threat backlash, and in turn greater conservatism among Republicans, but has no effect among Democrats. Furthermore, these results are consistent with my findings in Chapter 3 that exposure to increased immigration is associated with greater conservatism among Republican voters, but has no effect on Democratic voters. My findings about citizen ideology provide only very

qualified support for my theory, because I am unable to test partisan subsamples of citizen ideology in the states. However, when coupled with the strong results showing greater conservatism amid increased immigration among Republican delegations to state legislatures, but no change among Democrats, I find strong support for my theory.

The finding that inequality is associated with greater liberalism among both Democratic and Republican delegations to state legislatures is unexpected, and deserves greater attention in future studies. On the one hand, in both chambers of state legislatures, Democrats show much greater liberalism in response to inequality than do Republicans, suggesting that inequality may help to explain some of the distance between the parties in a given state legislature; however, given that Republicans show greater *liberalism* amid higher levels of inequality, any relationship between inequality and increased distance between the parties is likely very limited. On the other hand, I find that immigration is associated with ideological change only among Republican delegations, indicating that is likely a far more important factor in explaining partisan polarization in state legislatures than inequality. Moreover, the absence of a relationship among Democrats is consistent with the asymmetric polarization observed in Congress, providing further evidence that immigration is an important factor in partisan polarization in state legislatures.

These findings are consistent with the contemporary trend of Republicans increasingly bypassing a gridlocked Congress and using state governments to enact conservative policies on issues ranging from redistricting, to taxes and spending, to same-sex marriage rights. On the other hand, Democrats have been characterized as failing to match their success in national elections in state legislative and gubernatorial elections. These results suggest that immigration to the states may

be prompting Republicans in state governments to pursue increasingly conservative policies (Wilson 2015).

In the next chapter, I build on my findings about the relationship between immigration and roll-call ideology in the state legislatures by testing the relationship between immigration and roll-call ideology in the U.S. Senate.

Chapter 5: Congressional-Level Tests

Introduction

When considered in light of contemporary partisan gridlock and rancor, the American Political Science Association's (APSA) 1950 special report calling for reforms to create stronger, more disciplined parties that would offer voters clear alternatives might bring to mind the admonishment to be careful what you wish for (APSA 1950). Given that many post-war Democratic representatives' roll-call voting records were to the right of many Republicans, and vice versa, perhaps APSA's argument was well taken then, but in 2012 Americans gave Congress its lowest election-year approval ratings ever, and evidence suggests that frustration with Congress' inability to compromise and cooperate may be to blame (Gallup 2012). Twenty-four years after the APSA report, David Mayhew described the party system in Congress as being in "slow decline," and argued that the theoretical possibility that Congress could devolve into internecine, zero-sum conflict was nearly unimaginable (Mayhew 1974, 104-105). Curiously, Mayhew published that assessment just as the parties began drifting apart, a trend that continues today and has left the 115th Congress the most polarized since Reconstruction—maybe ever (Lewis et al. 2018). This polarization has led Congressional moderates to retire in significant numbers, driven citizen approval of Congress to all-time lows, hampered Washington's ability to deal with mounting fiscal challenges, and contributed to the most rancorous Supreme Court confirmation hearings of the modern era (Lewis et al. 2018; Paletta 2018; Snell 2018).

Despite unprecedented levels of Congressional polarization (herein, "polarization") the political science literature has made only halting progress toward explaining its causes, much less proposing solutions. To date, the most compelling explanations have been rooted in the

striking correlation between immigration, inequality, and polarization, but while the correlation is clear, the prevailing theory linking these phenomena is at best murky (McCarty et al. 2016). In Chapter 3, I found that increased rates of immigration to a state are associated with greater affective polarization and more conservative self-reported ideologies among Republican voters in that state, but are not associated with any change among Democrats; I had similar findings in Chapter 4 for citizen ideology in the states and state legislators. In this chapter, I test this theory on Senators' roll-call ideology.

Argument

I argue that increases in the rate of states' immigration are positively related to Republican Senators' roll-call conservatism, but that there is no relationship between rates of immigration to the states' and Democratic Senators roll-call ideology. My argument differs from McCarty et al. (2016) and Garand's (2010) in two important ways. First, I argue that immigration leads to polarization by causing a conservative backlash among white natives, rather than affecting voters' perceptions of their relative economic situation (Key 1949; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Kinder and Sears 1981; Green et al. 1998; Rocha and Espino 2009, Hero 1998).

In Chapter 3, I found that increased rates of immigration to a state are associated with greater affective polarization and more conservative self-reported ideologies among Republican voters in that state, but are not associated with any change among Democrats. Given evidence suggesting that when an issue becomes important to a subset of a party's activists it will usually diffuse and become salient to most party members, it is reasonable to argue that this increased white social and racial conservatism will lead to greater overall conservatism in the Republican party (Layman, et al. 2010). I also assume that Senators are strategic actors seeking reelection, and pursue that goal by responding to the preferences of a somewhat broad reelection constituency by reflecting its preferences in their roll-call voting (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974,).

Because Republican Senators' reelection constituencies are overwhelmingly white, it is reasonable to argue that increased white conservatism in response to higher rates of immigration should lead to greater roll-call conservatism by Republican Senators (Bowler and Segura 2012). Increases in immigration rates should spark a conservative backlash among white natives for several reasons. First, over the last 30 years, opinion polls have consistently found that large pluralities, and occasionally majorities, of native whites have considered immigration policy too liberal (Gallup 2012; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). In addition, immigration is salient across multiple issue dimensions. At least since the 1990s, and probably since the 1980s, about half of the population has perceived a significant cultural threat from immigration, and has resented immigrants' perceived unwillingness to assimilate (Lapinksi et al. 1997). By the mid-2000s, between 70 and 80 percent of respondents believed most immigrants were in the United States illegally, and the government's response to immigration, both legal and illegal, was inadequate (Segovia and Defever 2010). Moreover, increases in immigrant populations often lead to conservatism on redistributive issues, for fear that immigrants are a fiscal drain, the most prominent example being California's Proposition 187, which sought to reduce support for education and social spending; Hero (2010) argues it was sparked largely by fears that such spending disproportionately benefits immigrants (Hero 2010. Finally, immigration has occasionally had a salient national security dimension, particularly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Barry 2005). Hajnal et al. (2000) go so far as to speculate that, in many areas, the traditional white-black cleavage is being supplanted by the white-Hispanic cleavage.

The literature has consistently found that increases in immigrant inflows, rather than the size of the existing immigrant population, are linked to backlash (Citrin et al. 1997). Hopkins (2010) finds that local populations become more anti-immigrant not when living among large

existing immigrant groups, but when faced with rapid, visible changes in local demographics. He argues that, "while *levels* of ethnic heterogeneity might escape notice, *changes* are less likely to do so" (Hopkins 2010, 42, 56). Similarly, Green et al. (1998) found that new influxes of immigrants spark an "admixture of outright racism, nostalgia, and self-interest" that leads to increased racially-motivated crime (Green et al. 1998, 395-398).

Finally, highly visible immigrant inflows are more likely to elicit a white backlash (Money 1999; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). Increases in the visibility of immigrants to the United States roughly coincided with the beginning of the trend of increasing Congressional polarization. It was in the 1970s—just as polarization began increasing—that Hispanics overtook Europeans as the largest group of migrants to the United States; by the 1990s, the height of anti-immigration backlash, over half of all immigrants living in the United States came from Latin America and the Caribbean (Martin and Midgley 2006, 3).

Research Design

Dependent Variable

My dependent variable is Senators' roll-call ideology, measured by their first dimension DW-Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). These scores have possible values of -1 to 1, with low values denoting liberalism and high values conservatism. The observed range in my data is -.915 to .846. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) also measure representatives' ideology on a second dimension that captures highly salient issues, for example racial issues during the Civil Rights era, but find that including this dimension only slightly improves the first-dimensions 84 percent accuracy in predicting future roll-call votes. Given this, using only the first-dimension score is justifiable on grounds of simplicity (McCarty et al. 2016). I include the years 1970-2012

because the current trend of Congressional polarization began in the mid-1970s (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).

Independent Variables

I operationalize *immigration* as the biennial percent change in the proportion of each state's population that is foreign born, with observed values of -.12 to .17. From 1994-2012, these data are available biennially from the Current Population Survey. From 1970-1993, these data are only available every ten years in the U.S. Census, so I interpolate the intervening observations as a linear function of the difference between the value reported in each Census (U.S. Census 2012). Although this results in interpolating a substantial amount of data, the stability of immigrant flows justifies doing so. For example, Hopkins (2010) finds that immigrants tend to follow existing networks, and in counties with immigration rates above the 75th percentile, the correlation between immigration rates in 1980 and 1990 was .62. (Hopkins 2010).

I measure state *inequality* with gini coefficients drawn from Guetzkow, Western, and Rosenfeld's (2007) data set of state income and inequality. A gini coefficient of 0 indicates perfect equality, and 1 perfect inequality; the observed values in my data are .272 to .485. These data have been rescaled by Garand (2010) to have values between 0 and 1 (Garand 2010, 1114).[4]

Finally, in the party-effects model I include a dichotomous variable *Republican,* which is coded 1 for members of the Republican Party, 0 for all others. The lone study investigating state-level effects on polarization includes a dummy variable capturing Republican Senators (Garand 2010, 1116-1117). Simply regressing first-dimension DW-Nominate scores on a dichotomous variable coded 1=Republican yields an R^2 of .68; given this, I also test my hypotheses using a model

---

[4] Because the gini coefficient is a continuous variable and unit changes in it convey meaningful information, the original, non-scaled data are preferable, and should be used in revised versions of this study. Unfortunately, the nature of my data—a varying number of DW-Nominate observations for each state in each Congress—make adding the non-scaled gini coefficients a time-intensive undertaking that was not feasible for this project.

without the party dummy. In all of my models I control for fixed-effects in different sessions of Congress with dummy variables for each Congress[5].

Control Variables

I expect Southern states to be more conservative as a rule, as well as more hostile to increased rates of immigration. I control for region with a dummy variable for *South*, which is coded 1 for the 11 Confederate states. Using Census data, I control for the proportion of each state's population that is: *white, Latino, Urban*¸ and has at least a *high school* population; I also control for the percentage of each state's population that is *Under 18* and *Over 65*, as these populations tend to be particularly reliant on social programs (Garand 2010); finally, I also control for *median household income* in the states.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Senators' roll-call voting will be more conservative when their home states experience increased rates of immigration.

Hypothesis 2: Senators' roll-call voting conservatism will not be related to inequality in their home state.

Hypothesis 3: Senators' roll-call voting will be more conservative when their home states experience both increased rates of immigration and increased levels of inequality.

I present the results of my tests of hypotheses one through three below. I find that increased rates of immigration to a given state are associated with greater roll-call conservatism among Republicans in that state's Senatorial delegation, but that there is no relationship between rates of immigration and Democratic Senators' roll-call ideology.

Methods

---

[5] Both because the Congress dummies are of no substantive interest and because STATA drops several of them because of multicollinearity, I do not specify a particular Congress dummy as a baseline variable.

My dependent variable, first-dimension DW-Nominate scores, is continuous, with potential values of -1 to 1 measured in thousandths, allowing the use of OLS regression in all of my models. My data are organized as panels or each Senator's first-dimension DW-Nominate score in each Congress in which he served, so I use robust standard errors clustered on each Senator. Being panel data, a time series analysis *Senator* as the panel variable and *Congress* as the time variable is possible, but the results when running a time series are nearly identical to a standard OLS regression using clustered standard errors. In the interest of simplicity I report only the non-time series results. Finally, to ease interpretation, I do not report the results of the Congress dummies.

Results

Table 5.1: OLS Regression on first-dimension DW-NOMINATE without Party

	Model 1
Immigration	.919*** (.318)
Inequality	-1.84 (1.38)
White	.004*** (.001)
Latino	.005 (.004)
High School	.01** (.005)
Under 18	.007 (.005)
Over 65	-.043*** (.012)
Urban	.0007 (.002)
Income	-.0013*** (.00067)
South	.2*** (.07)
N	2133
R^2	.33

Note: *** = p<.01; ** = p<.05; * = p<.1
Results for fixed-effects Congress dummies not shown

The results in table 5.1 suggest that changes in a state's rate of immigration has an important effect on Senators' roll-call conservatism. The coefficient on the immigration variable is positive and significant at the 99 percent confidence level, indicating that higher rates of immigration to a state are associated with more conservative roll-call ideology among that state's Senators. As model four shows, the effect of immigration is not significant when variables capturing both inequality and an interaction between inequality and immigration are present. This offers support for my hypothesis that increases in the rate of immigration will increase Senators' expected roll-

call conservatism, but does not support my hypothesis that immigration and inequality will have a positive interactive effect on roll-call conservatism.

The inequality variable does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, casting doubt on the theory that increased inequality is associated with increased partisan polarization (McCarty et al. 2016).

Table 5.2: OLS Regression: First-dimension DW-Nominate with Party

	Model 2	**Model 3**
Immigration	.576*** (.136)	.576*** (.136)
Inequality	-.297 (.387)	-.297 (.387)
Inequality * Immigration	----	5.27 (3.58)
Republican	..61*** (.018)	.61*** (.018)
White	.0003 (.0008)	.0003 (.0008)
Latino	.001 (.002)	.001 (.001)
Urban	.0007 (.001)	.0007 (.001)
Percent under 18	.004 (.003)	..004 (.003)
Percent over 65	-.02*** (.005)	-.02*** (.005)
High School	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)
Income	-.0014*** (.0002)	-.0072*** (.0002)
South	.108*** (.028)	.108*** (.028)
N	2119	2119
R^2	.84	.84

Note: *** = p<.01; ** = p<.05; * = p<.1
Results for fixed-effects Congress dummies not shown

The results in table 5.2, which includes a dichotomous variable for *party*, support my hypotheses. In both models 2 and 3, the immigration variable is positive and significant at the 99-percent confidence level, providing strong support for my hypothesis that increases in the rate of immigration to a state are associated with greater roll-call conservatism among that state's Senators. Moreover, the inequality variable is does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance in either of the models, casting doubt on the alternative explanation that increases in inequality lead to greater partisan polarization. Finally, the interaction of immigration and inequality does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance, casting further doubt on McCarty et al.'s (2016) theory that immigration increases inequality, which in turn increases partisan polarization.

In my sample, the mean DW-NOMINATE first-dimension score is -.007. When all independent variables are held at their means and the *immigration* variable is set at its lowest observed value (-.207), the mean predicted value of the DW-NOMINATE variable is -.14, a 6.65 percent decrease; when the *immigration* variable is set at its maximum observed value (.424), the mean predicted value of the DW-NOMINATE variable is .17, an a 8.85 percent increase.[6]

Immigration at minimum (-.207)	Immigration at maximum (.424)
DW-NOMINATE: -6.65%	DW-NOMINATE: +8.85%

Table 5.3: predicted values of DW-NOMINATE at minimum and maximum observed values of immigration

[6] First dimension DW-NOMINATE scores have a possible range of -1 to 1; therefore, a .17 increase is an 8.85 percent increase. If calculated based on the range of observed DW-NOMINATE scores (-.717 to .973), the predicted change based on the minimum and maximum observed values of *immigration* are 7.1 and 10.1 percent, respectively.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tested the effects of immigration and inequality on Senators' roll-call conservatism, as well as the alternative explanation that inequality leads to greater roll-call conservatism. My state-level tests show that Senators' roll-call conservatism is positively related to increases in their respective states' rates of immigration, but that there is no similar relationship between roll-call conservatism and inequality. In addition, I did not find an effect from the interaction of inequality and immigration on roll-call conservatism. These results cast doubt on the prevailing theory of polarization, McCarty et al.'s (2016) theory that it results from immigration increasing population-wide inequality while improving the median voter's position on the income spectrum. If this were the case, one would expect a positive interaction between immigration and inequality.

Instead, these results on balance support my argument that higher rates of immigration lead to greater white conservatism, which in turn drives polarization by increasing Republican conservatism in the U.S. Senate. Both explanations argue that immigration leads to greater conservatism, but differ in that McCarty et al. (2016) claim that inequality is the causal factor, while I argue that it is conservative backlash. The strong results for immigration, coupled with the insignificance of inequality and the immigration-inequality interaction, are important in that they help to clarify which causal mechanism is most likely at work: the conservative backlash. However, it should be noted that when controlling for party, inequality appears to have a greater effect on Republican roll-call conservatism than immigration, although immigration remains significant for all Senators. This perhaps provides limited, party-specific support for McCarty et al.'s theory, but the overall results suggest that the relationship between immigration, income inequality, and polarization owes to a conservative backlash against increased immigration, not

immigration's effects on inequality.

In the next and final chapter, I discuss my findings, ways in which future versions of this study could be improved, ways in which future research can build upon this study, and the implications of my findings.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

In 2015, after 40 years of sending increasingly conservative Republican delegations to Congress—the Republican Party in the 114th Congress was the most conservative since Reconstruction—Republican voters selected Donald Trump as their presidential nominee, and eventually sent him to the White House in one of the greatest political upsets in U.S. history (Lewis et al. 2018). Trump, particularly in the primary campaign, ran on an inflammatory mix of xenophobic attacks on immigrants and, relative to his primary challengers and previous Republican presidents, a surprisingly moderate platform on issues like Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and trade. At the same time, the United States was at the height of a third wave of mass immigration, and the proportion of the population that was foreign born was nearing historic highs. All the while, the Democratic Party remained ideologically moderate, and was, if anything, criticized for failing to offer new ideas or candidates (Rucker 2016; Enten and Bacon 2017; Time 2015). What explains this extreme, asymmetric polarization? The success of Trump's anti-immigrant platform, coupled with his apparent ability to flout Republican orthodoxy with impunity is a puzzle of its own, but it suggests, however anecdotally, that perhaps historically high rates of immigration were fueling ever-increasing Republican conservatism, and that, by responding to Republicans voters' apparent unhappiness with the immigration status quo, Trump was able to assuage those anxieties and move toward the center on redistributive issues (Enten and Bacon 2017).

This dissertation addresses this puzzle of historically high, asymmetrical partisan polarization by testing the theory that increased rates of immigration sparked a racial-threat backlash among Republicans, pushing them to the right, but did not affect Democrats. This theory, which I developed and explained in Chapter 2, argues that exposure to increased rates of

immigration should lead to greater conservatism among Republicans by sparking a racial-threat backlash in response to perceived economic and cultural threat from immigration, unease with redistributive policy amid growing multiculturalism, and frustration with disequilibrium between policy and public opinion on immigration. The theory also argues that the Democratic Party's ascriptive coalition of minorities and urban whites should be unaffected by increased rates of immigration.

Throughout, multiple tests of this theory on both the mass public and elites found that increased rates of immigration are in fact associated with greater Republican conservatism and antagonism toward Democrats, but that there is no effect from immigration on Democrats. In Chapter 3, I tested this theory on voters, and found that increased rates of immigration are associated with greater affective polarization and self-reported ideology among Republicans, but found no relationship between rates of immigration and Democrats' affective polarization or self-reported ideology. In Chapter 4, I tested the theory on state legislators, and found similar results: increased rates of immigration to a state are associated with greater roll-call conservatism among that state's Republican legislators, but there was no relationship between rates of immigration to a state and Democratic legislators' roll-call ideology. In chapter 4, I also found a relationship between higher rates of immigration to a state and a more conservative policy mood among the citizens of a state. In chapter 5, I tested the relationship between rates of immigration to a state and Senators' roll-call ideology, and found that increased rates of immigration to a state were associated with greater roll-call conservatism among Senators from that state when controlling for party. Finally, in all of the above cases I tested the alternative theory that inequality has led to increased Republican conservatism but has not affected Democrats; none of my tests supported this alternative explanation (McCarty et al. 2016). The consistency of my

findings across multiple levels of analysis—voters, state legislators, the public in the states, and Senators—provides strong support for my argument that increased rates of immigration have contributed to greater asymmetrical polarization.

These findings have several important implications. First, the proportion of the U.S. population that is foreign born is near its historic high (U.S. Census 2018), but this study found that it is the rate of *change* in the foreign-born proportion of a given area, not the absolute proportion, that affects partisans' behavior. Given this, if the rate at which immigrants are coming to the United States continues its current trend of stabilizing, or even decreases, then one would expect the Republican Party to become more moderate. While beyond the scope of this study, the most recent DW-NOMINATE data show that the Republican Party in the 114th House is the first in over 40 years to that was not more conservative than its predecessor (Lewis et al. 2018).[7] Given that this coincides with a leveling off of the rate of immigration to the United States, it suggests that the historically conservative Republican Party may in fact moderate in coming years should current immigration trends continue, or should the rate of immigration to the U.S. decline.

On the other hand, it is possible that increased racial and ethnic diversity arising from immigration, rather than the proportion of the population that is foreign born, is the true demographic issue driving increased partisan polarization. If this is the case, although the proportion of the population that is foreign born will likely fall as the members of the current wave of migration to the United States die, the trend of increasing racial and ethnic diversity will continue as first generation immigrants have children at higher rates than whites; perhaps more

[7] The Republican Party in the 114th House was the first in over 40 years to be more liberal than its predecessor, but the Republican delegation to the 114th Senate was more conservative than its predecessor. Lewis et al. (2018) find that the combined Republican delegation to the 114th Congress was more conservative than their predecessors in the 113th Congress.

importantly, the diversity of the *electorate* will increase even more rapidly as those second-generation children reach voting age. This raises an important question for future research: as the source of demographic change in the United States shifts, will foreign-born residents continue to affect Republican ideology and attitudes, as this study argues, or will demographic change among the potential electorate become the more important factor?

Importantly, all of these predictions rely on the assumption that the Republican electorate remains almost uniformly white, which, as the 2012 Republican National Committee "autopsy" found, would leave the party increasingly unable to compete in national elections as the white share of the electorate declines (Growth and Opportunity Project 2013). This gives the Republican Party a strong, if not existential, incentive to diversify its membership and electorate; should it do so, perhaps the effect of immigration on Republicans will become similar to its effect on Democrats, which is to say that it would have no effect at all. The rise of Trump has done nothing to help the Republican Party diversify, but, so long as it appears that demography is in fact destiny, one would expect a 164-year-old, major United States political party to adapt as necessary to prevent political extinction.

Finally, exactly how and why Trump was able to make immigration such a salient issue remains an open question. While I did not test the effects of the political salience of immigration on partisan polarization, figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that the increase in partisan polarization has been very stable—the increase in House Republican's mean conservatism has been almost liberal, with the exception of the 104th "Republican Revolution" House—but, the political salience of immigration has varied widely since at least the 1980s:



Figure 6.1: Immigration as the Nations' Top Problem (Gallup 2018)

Trump has certainly displayed great skill as a political demagogue, and it is entirely possible that his focus on immigration simply reflects his political entrepreneurship; nonetheless, future research should attempt to explain why and how immigration becomes salient at some points and recedes from the political agenda at others. Moreover, despite the anecdotal evidence that the rates of partisan polarization do not appear to be associated with changes in the political salience of immigration, in light of my finding the rates of immigration are associated with partisan polarization, future research should explore this issue.

Future versions of this study can be improved in several ways. First, much of the demographic data used here, including measures of the foreign born population, rely on interpolation between the decennial Censuses. This is defensible on the ground that demographic trends tend to be stable, but future studies would benefit from collecting annual estimates of these data in the non-Census years, while retaining the more accurate decennial census data in Census years. Second, future versions should test my hypotheses about immigration, inequality and Congressional roll-call ideology in the House (here, I only tested these hypotheses in the

Senate). Doing so would provide important new insights into this relationship, given that most House districts are smaller in both population and area than most Senate districts. I chose to test the hypotheses in the fixed-district Senate to take advantage of the fact that it offers a natural control for the effects of gerrymandering, but extending these tests to the House would be an improvement. Finally, while my finding that increased rates of immigration in the states is associated with a more conservative public "policy mood" in the states does add support to my argument, this finding is limited, because it does not differentiate between Republicans and Democrats. Developing a way to account for partisanship in a state—say, presidential vote share, or estimates of states' partisanship—would improve this portion of my argument.

This study also provides avenues for new research. Europe offers many comparative politics possibilities, because many European countries have experienced high rates of immigration in recent years, now have foreign-born proportions of their populations that are similar to that of the U.S., and have seen numerous far-right parties perform surprisingly well in recent elections (Kirk 2016). Of particular interest is the fact that Germany, the United Kingdom, and France now have similar proportions of their populations that are foreign born, but their far-right parties have had considerably different platforms, popularity, and electoral success. Determining what role, if any, immigration has had on far-right parties in Europe would be an important contribution to our understanding of the effects of immigration on partisans (BBC News, 2018).

Finally, this study should be revisited in the coming decades, because, as mentioned earlier, the rate of immigration to the United States appears to have stabilized in the years following the Great Recession. As noted above, my theory and findings suggest that stabilization of the rate of immigration to the United States should correspond to a leveling off of the

Republican Party's trend toward increasing conservatism, and, should rates of immigration decline, the Republican Party should become more ideologically moderate. Whatever the future trends of immigration to the United States turn out to be, the question of the role of immigration on the parties' ideologies and behavior will remain an important one that is deserving of study. Having begun this project in 2014, it is only slightly hyperbolic to say that it is surreal to write this conclusion only twenty-one months after Donald Trump took office, and only four months after his zero-tolerance border policy and resulting separation of migrant children from their parents consumed the political news cycle. Voters routinely cite immigration as among the most important problems facing the country, and migrant detentions at the Southern border have surged in the months since Trump ended the policy of family separation (Miroff and Dawsey 2018). This political scientist is reluctant to prognosticate in the age of Trump, but it feels safe to say that immigration will remain a controversial and consequential issue going forward. Here, I have done my best to contribute to the body of knowledge about those consequences, and have hopefully made a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of the effects of immigration on the parties in the electorate and in government.

References

Abrajano, Marisa, and Zoltan Hajnal. 2015. *White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics.* Princeton University Press.

Abramowitz, Alan I., Kyle L. Saunders. “Is Polarization a Myth?” 2008. *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2:542-555.

Abramowitz, Alan I. 2010. *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Alesina, Alberto, Edward L. Glaeser, and Burce Sacerdote. 2001. “Why Doesn’t the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2): 187–277.

The American National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org) TIME SERIES CUMULATIVE DATA FILE [dataset]. Stanford University and the University of Michigan [producers and distributors], 2012.

The American Political Science Association. 1950. “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties.” *APSR*, Vol. 44 (3).

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder. 2006. “Purple America.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20(2): 97-118.

Bafumi, Joseph, and Michael C. Herron. 2010. “Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress.” *American Political Science Review* 104(03): 519-542.

Balz, Dan. 2013. "Washington Confronts Still-Divided America." Washington Post. 12 April. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-12/politics/38481463_1_compromise-immigration-bill-2012-election-partisan-gaps (Accessed April 2013)

Barber, Michael, and Nolan McCarty. 2013. "Causes and Consequences of Polarization." In *Negotiating Agreement in Politics.* Ed. by Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.

Barbour, Henry, Sally Bradshaw, Ari Fleischer, Zori Fonalledas, and Glenn McCall. 2013.”Growth and Opportunity Project.” *The Republican National Committee.*

Barkan, Elliott R. 2003. "Return of the Nativists?." *Social Science History* 27(2): 229.

Barry, Tom. 2005. “Anti-Immigrant Backlash on the ‘Home Front.’” *NACLA Report on the Americas* 38 (6):28-41.

Bawn, Kathleen, et al. 2012. "A theory of political parties: Groups, policy demands and nominations in American politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(03): 571-597.

BBC News. 2018. “Europe and Nationalism: A Country-By-Country Guide.”

Bean, Frank D., and Gillian Stevens. *America's Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity*. Russell Sage Foundation, 2003.

Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. “What to Do (And Not to Do) With Time-Series Cross-Section Data.” *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 634-647.

Berg, Justin Allen. 2013. “Opposition to Pro-Immigrant Public Policy: Symbolic Racism and Group Threat.” *Sociological Inquiry* 83(1): 1-31.

Berger, J.M.. 2016. “How White Nationalists Learned to Love Trump.” *Politico.* October 25.

Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording and Russell L. Hanson. 1998. "Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(1): 327-348.

Bishop, Bill, and Robert G. Cushing 2008. *The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America is Tearing Us Apart.* New York: Mariner Books.

Black, Eric. 2016. “People Won’t Die in the Streets, So Shut Up.” *MinnPost.* February 26.

Blau, Francine D., and Christopher Mackie, eds. 2016. *The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration.* The National Academies Press: Washington, DC.

Bowler, Shaun, and Donovan, Todd. 2002. “Measuring the Effect of Direct Democracy on State Policy: Not All Initiatives Are Created Equal.” *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 4(3): 345-363.

Bowler, Shaun, and Gary M. Segura. 2012. *The Future is Ours: Minority Politics, Political Behavior, and the Multiracial Era of American Politics.* Los Angeles: Sage.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Suzanna De Boef, and Tse-Min Lin. 2004. "The dynamics of the partisan gender gap." *American Political Science Review* 98(3): 515-528.

Brader, T., Valentino, N. A., & Suhay, E. 2008. “What triggers public opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and immigration threat.” *American Journal of Political Science*, *52*(4), 959-978.

Breitman, Kendall. “Where the Republican Presidential Candidates Stand on Birthright Citizenship.” *Bloomberg Politics.* 19 August.

Brooks, David. 2012. "What Independents Want." *The New York Times.* *http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/opinion/06brooks.html?_r=1*

Bump, Phillip. 2014. "The 113th Congress is Historically Good at Not Passing Bills." *The Washington Post.* July 9. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/07/09/the-113th-congress-is-historically-good-at-not-passing-bills/

Burns, Peter, and James G. Gimpel. 2000. “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy”. *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (2).

Byrne, J., and G.C. Dixon. 2013. “Reevaluating American Attitudes toward Immigrants in the Twenty-First Century: The Role of a Multicreedal National Identity.” *Politics and Policy* 41(1): 83-116.

Campbell, Angus, Phillip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue evolution: Race and the Transformation of American politics*. Princeton University Press.

Carpini, M. X. D., and S. Keeter. 1996. *What Americans know about politics and why it matters*. Yale University Press

Carson, Jamie, Michael H. Crespin, Charles J. Finocchiario, and David W. Rhode. 2007. “Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives. *American Politics Research* 35 (6):878-904.

Carsey, Thomas M., and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2006. "Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate*." American Journal of Political Science* 50, No. 2: 464-477.

Chandler, Charles R., and Yung-mei Tsai. 2001. "Social factors influencing immigration attitudes: an analysis of data from the General Social Survey." *The Social Science Journal* 38 (2): 177-188

Chervenak, Edward. 2015. “2015 Louisiana Gubernatorial Runoff Survey.” The University of New Orleans Survey Research Center.

Chervenak, Edward, Elizabeth Juhasz, and Deborah Toscano. 2015. “2015 Louisiana Gubernatorial Runoff Survey.” *The UNO Survey Research Center.*

Citrin, Jack, Beth Reingold, and Donald P. Green. 1990. "American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change." *The Journal of Politics* 52(4): 1124-1154.

Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong. 1997. "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations." *Journal of Politics* 59 (3):858-881.

Cizilla, Chris, and Jon Cohen. 2012. "President Obama and the White Vote? No Problem." *The Washington Post.* November 8.

Coenders, Marcel Theodorus Aloysius. 2001. *Nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in a comparative perspective: An empirical study of attitudes toward the country and ethnic immigrants in 22 countries*. Vol. 78. Radboud University Nijmegen.

Converse, Phillip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent,* ed. by David E. Apter. Glencoe, IL: Free Press of Glencoe.

Cornelius, Wayne A. and Marc R. Rosenblum. 2005. "Immigration and Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 8: 99-119.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House.* Berkley: University of California Press.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives*. Cambridge University Press.

Dawsey, Josh. 2017. "Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from 'Shithole' Countries." *The Washington Post.* January 12.

Dawson, Michael C. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Enten, Harry, and Perry Bacon, Jr. 2017. "Trump's Hardline Immigration Stance Got Him to the White House." *538.* September 12.

Espenshade, T.J., and K. Hempstead. 1996 "Contemporary American Attitudes toward US Immigration." *International Migration Review*, Summer: 535-570.

Espenshade, T. 1997. *Keys to Successful Immigration: Implications of the New Jersey Experience.* Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.

Erikson, Robert S., Wright, Gerald C., and McIver, John P. 1993. Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fennelly, Katherine, Kathryn Pearson, and Silvana Hackett. 2015. "The US Congressional Immigration Agenda: Partisan Politics, Policy Stalemate and Political Posturing." *Journal*
Fetzer, Joel S. 2000. *Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany*. Cambridge University Press.

Freeman, Gary P. 1986. "Migration and the political economy of the welfare state." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*: 51-63.

Free, Lloyd A., and Hadley Cantril. 1968. *The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Fenno, Richard. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts.* New York: Haper Collins.

Fetzer, Joel S. 1998. "Religious Minorities and Support for Immigrant Rights in the United States, France, and Germany." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*: 41-49.

Fetzer, Joel S. *Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany*. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Fetzer, Joel S. 2013. "Public Opinion and Populism." In *The Oxford Handbook of International Migration,* eds. Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jermey C. Pope. 2006. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America.* New York: Pearson.

Fiorina, Morris P., and Samuel J. Abrams. 2008. "Political Polarization in the American Public." *The Annual Review of Political Science* 11:563-588.

Fiorina, Morris P. 2014. "Americans Have Not Become More Politically Polarized." *The Washington Post.* June 23.

Fiorina, Morris P. 2013. "If I Could Hold a Forum for Political Journalists..." *The Forum* 10(4): 2–10.

Frizell, Sam. 2016. "GOP Shows White Supremacist's Tweet During Trump Speech." *Time.* July 22.

Fossett, Mark, and Jill Kiecolt. 1989. "The Relative Size of Minority Populations and White Racial Attitudes." *Social Science Quarterly* 70(4): 820-835.

Frank, Thomas. 2004. *What's the Matter With Kansas?* New York: Metropolitan Books.

Frisbie, W. Parker, and Lisa Neidert. 1977. "Inequality and the Relative Size of Minority Populations: A Comparative Analysis." *American Journal of Sociology* 82(5): 1007-1030.

Gallup. 2012. "Congress Ends 2011 With Record-Low 11% Approval." 9 December. http://www.gallup.com/poll/151628/congress-ends-2011-record-low-approval.aspx.

Gallup. 2012b. “Americans’ Views on Immigration Holding Steady.” 5 December. http://www.gallup.com/poll/148154/Americans-Views-Immigration-Holding-Steady.aspx

Gallup. 2013. "American's Approval of Supreme Court Near All-Time Low." Ahttp://www.gallup.com/poll/163586/americans-approval-supreme-court-near-time-low.aspx

Gallup. 2014. "Congress and the Public." http://www.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx

Gallup. 2014. "Presidential Approval Ratings—Barack Obama." http://www.gallup.com/poll/116479/barack-obama-presidential-job-approval.aspx

Gallup. 2017. “Gallup Daily: Trump Job Approval

Gallup. 2018. “Topics: Immigration.” July 20, 2018.

Garand, James C. 2010. “Income Inequality, Party Polarization, and Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. Senate.” *Journal of Politics* 72 (4):1109-1128.

Garner, Andrew, and Harvey Palmer. "Polarization and issue consistency over time." *Political Behavior* 33, no. 2 (2011): 225-246

Gelman, A. (2009). *Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do-Expanded Edition*. Princeton University Press.

Gimpel, James G. and James R. Edwards, Jr. 1999. *The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform*. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

Givens, T., & Luedtke, A. 2004. The politics of European Union immigration policy: institutions, salience, and harmonization. *Policy Studies Journal 32*(1), 145-165.

Glenn, Charles L., and Ester J. De Jong. *Educating immigrant children: Schools and language minorities in twelve nations*. Routledge, 1996.

Govtrack.us. 2015. “S. 181 (111th): Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.” https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s181.

Graham, David A. 2015. “Is Running for President Donald Trump’s Worst Business Decision Yet?” *The Atlantic*. July 2.

Green, Donald P., Dara Z. Strolovitch, and Jenelle S. Wong. 1998. “Defended Neighborhoods, Integration, and Racially Motivated Crime.” *American Journal of Sociology* 104 (2):372-403.

Greene, William. 2011. “Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition: A Magical Solution to the Problem of Time-Invariant Variables in Fixed Effects Models?” *Political Analysis* 19(2): 135-146.

Guetzkow, Joshua, Bruce Western, and Jake Rosenfeld. 2007. “State-Level Data on Income Inequality: 1963-2003.” http://www.inequality.org

Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2007. "Educated preferences: Explaining attitudes toward immigration in Europe." *International Organization* 61(2): 399-442.

Heersink, Boris, and Jeffery A. Jenkins. 2015. “Who Can Get Trump to Tone it Down? Reince Priebus is Trying.” *The Washington Post.* July 13.

Hajnal, Zoltan, Marisa Abrajano, and Nicholas Warner. 2000. “Immigration and the Political Transformation of White America: How Local Immigrant Context Shapes White Policy Views and Partisanship.” Unpublished Manuscript.

Hero, Rodney E., and Caroline J. Tolbert. 1996. "A racial/ethnic diversity interpretation of politics and policy in the states of the US." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (3): 851-871.

Hero, Rodney E. 1998. *Faces of Inequality: Social Diversity in American Politics.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Hero, Rodney E. 2010. “Immigration and Social Policy in the United States.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 13:445-468.

Hewitt, Roger. 2005. *White Backlash and the Politics of Multiculturalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hill, Kim Quaile and Angela Hinton-Andersson. 1995. “Pathways of Representation: A Causal Analysis of Public Opinion-Policy Linkages.” American Journal of Political Science 39(4): 924-935.

Hirsch, Barry T., and David A. Macpherson. 2003. "Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population Survey: Note." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 56(2): 349-54.

Hood III, M. V., and I..L. Morris. 1997. “¿ Amigo o enemigo?: Context, attitudes, and Anglo public opinion toward immigration.” *Social Science Quarterly*, 309-323.

Hood M., I. Morris, and K. Shirkey. 1997. “‘¡Quedate o Vente!: Uncovering the Determinants of Hispanic Public Opinion Toward Immigration*.” Political Research Quarterly* 50: 627–647

Hoskin, M. 1991. *New Immigrants and Democratic Society: Minority Integration in Western Democracies*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

Hopkins, Daniel J. 2010. “Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition.” *American Political Science Review* 104 (1):40-60.

The House of Representatives. 2014. “Records and Research.”

Illatov, ZZ, and S. Shamai. 1998. “Teacher-student classroom interactions: the influence of gender, academic dominance, and teacher communication style.” *Adolescence* 33 (130): 269-277.

Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. "Affect, not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76 (3): 405-431.

Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). “Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization.” *American Journal of Political Science*, *59*(3), 690-707.

Jacobsmeier, Matthew L., and Daniel C. Lewis. 2013. "Barking Up the Wrong Tree: Why Bo Didn't Fetch Many Votes for Barack Obama in 2012." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 46(1): 49-59.

Johnson Jr, James H., Walter C. Farrell Jr, and Chandra Guinn. 1997. "Immigration Reform and the Browning of America: Tensions, Conflicts and Community Instability in Metropolitan Los Angeles." *International Migration Review*: 1055-1095

Johnson, Jenna. 2016. “I Will Give You Everything: Here are 282 of Donald Trump’s Campaign Promises.” *The Washington Post.* November 28.

Johnson, Kevin R. 2010. "It's the Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate over Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (Or the War on Drugs, War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, Etc.)." UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 203.

Johnson, Martin, Paul Brace, and Kevin Arceneaux. 2005. Social Science Quarterly. “Public Opinion and Dynamic Representation in the American States: The Case of Environmental Attitudes.” Social Science Quarterly 86(1): 87-108.

Jones, David R. 2010. "Partisan polarization and Congressional accountability in House elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2): 323-337.

Johnston, Richard, Stuart Soroka, and Keith Banting. 2010. "National Identity and Support for the Welfare State." *Canadian journal of political science* 43 (2): 349-377.

Kaeding, Nicole, and Chris Edwards. 2014. “Fiscal Policy Report Card on America’s Governors 2014.” The Cato Institute.

Kaufmann, Karen M., and John R. Petrocik. 1999. "The changing politics of American men: Understanding the sources of the gender gap." *American Journal of Political Science*: 864-887.

Keith, Bruce E., David B. Magleby, Candice J. Nelson, Elizabeth Orr, Mark C. Westlye, and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1992. *The Myth of the Independent Voter.* Berkley, CA: University of California Press.

Key, V.O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation.* Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press.

Kinder, Donald R., and David O. Sears. 1981."Politics and Prejudice: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40(3): 414-431.

King, David C. 2003. “Congress, Polarization, and Fidelity to the Median Voter.” Unpublished manuscript.

Kirk, Ashley. 2016. “Mapped: Which Country Has the Most Immigrants?” *The Telegraph*. January 21.

Klar, Samara, and Yanna Krupnikov. 2014. "Independents Didn't Decide the Midterm Election. *The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/06/independents-didnt-decide-the-midterm-election/*

Kunovich, R. M. 2002. “Social structural sources of anti-immigrant prejudice in Europe: The impact of social class and stratification position*.” International Journal of Sociology* 32(1), 39-57.

Lai, K.K. Rebecca , Wilson Andrews, and Alicia Palapiano. 2017. “How Every Member Voted on the House Tax Bill.” *The New York Times.* November 16.

Lapinski, John S., Pia Peltola, Grew Shaw, and Alan Yang. 1997. “Trends: Immigrants and Immigration.” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 61 (2):356-383.

Layman, Geoffrey C., Thomas M. Carsey, John C. Green, Richard Herrera, and Rosalyn Cooperman. 2010. “Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics.” *American Political Science Review* 104 (2):324-346.

Lee, Jasmine, and Sara Simon. 2017. “How Every Senator Voted on the Tax Bill.” *The New York Times.* December 19.

Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet. 2018) *Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database*. https://voteview.com/

Levendusky, Matthew. 2009. *The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Lind, Dara. 2015. "Donald Trump's Anti-Immigrant Demagoguery Works Because it's not about Jobs. It's About Fear. *Vox.* July 29.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Earl Raab. 1970. T*he Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970*. New York: Harper and Row.

Lowndes, Joseph E. 2008. *From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern Conservatism.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lublin, David. 1997. *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Magleby, David B., and Candice Nelson. 2012. "Independent Leaners as Policy Partisans: An Examination of Party Identification and Policy Views. *The Forum* 10(3): online n.p..

Malloy, Tim. 2015. "Trump Tops Republican Pack by Wide Margin, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds But Dems Trump Trump in General Election." *Quinnipiac University Poll.* July 30.

Mann, Thomas E. 2006, "Polarizing the House of Representatives: Does Gerrymandering Matter?" in *Red and Blue Nation?: Consequences and Correction of America's Polarized Politics*, ed. Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady 2007. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Mann, T. E., and Ornstein, N. J. (2016). *It's Even Worse than it Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism.* Basic Books

Mansbridge, Jane and Shauna L. Shames. 2008. "Toward a Theory of Backlash: Dynamic Resistance and the Central Role of Power." Politics and Gender 4 (4): 623-634.

Martin, Philip, and Elizabeth Midgley. 2006. "Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America." *Population Bulletin* 61 (4):1-30.

Martin, Jonathan, and Alan Rappeport. 2015. "Donald Trump Says John McCain is No War Hero, Setting Off Another Storm." *The New York Times.* July 18.

Masket, Seth. 2011. *No middle ground: How informal party organizations control nominations and polarize legislatures*. University of Michigan Press.

Masket, Seth E., and Hans Noel. 2011. "Serving Two Masters: Using Referenda to Assess Partisan versus Dyadic Legislative Representation." Political Research Quarterly 20(10)1-20.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

McCarty, Nolan M., Boris Shor, and John Voorheis. 2015. "State Legislative Political Polarization and Income Inequality in the United States, 1993-2013." Working paper.

McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal 2016. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Miroff, Nick, and Josh Dawsey. 2018. "Record Number of Families Crossing U.S. Border as Trump Threatens New Crackdown." *The Washington Post.* October 17.

Money, Jeannette. *Fences and neighbors: The political geography of immigration control*. Cornell University Press, 1999.

Montgomery, Lori and Rosalind Helderman. 2012. "Obama: Fiscal Cliff Deal Must Include Higher Taxes for Top Earners." *The Washington Post.* 4 December.

Montgomery, Lori, and Rosalind S. Helderman. 2013. "Congress Sends Bill to Raise Debt Limit, Reopen Government." *The Washington Post.* October 13. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/house-effort-to-end-fiscal-crisis-collapses-leaving-senate-to-forge-last-minute-solution/2013/10/16/1e8bb150-364d-11e3-be86-6aeaa439845b_story.html;

Mouw, Ted, and Michael E. Sobel. 2001. "Culture Wars and Opinion Polarization: The Case of Abortion." *American Journal of Sociology* 6(4): 913-943.

Murray, Mark. 2014. "A Long Division: Political Polarization Is Worse Than Ever, and Here to Stay." *NBC News.* http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/long-division-political-polarization-worse-ever-here-stay-n228441.

Newman, Mark. 2012. "Maps of the 2012 Presidential Election Results." http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/election/2012/ (Accessed April 2013)

New York Times. 2008. "Election Results." *The New York Times* 9 December. http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/states/exitpolls/mississippi.html

The New Times. 2012. "Presidential Exit Polls." http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/results/president/exit-polls

Neiheisel, Jacob R. 2016. "Anti-liberal Campaign Rhetoric, Symbolic Ideology, and the Electoral Fortunes of Democratic Candidates." *Political Research Quarterly* 69(3): 418-429.

O'Donoghue, Julia. 2015. "Bobby Jindal Administration Says Louisiana Won't Recognize Gay Marriage Yet." *The Times Picayune*. June 26.

O'Keefe, Ed, and Rosalind Helderman. 2013. "Old Fights Shadow the New Congress." The Washington Post. 2 January.

Oliver, J. Eric, and Tali Mendelberg. "Reconsidering the environmental determinants of white racial attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science* (2000): 574-589.

Pacheco, Julianna. 2011. "Using National Surveys to Measure Dynamic U.S. State Public Opinion A Guideline for Scholars and an Application. " State Politics Quarterly 11(4): 415-439.

Paletta, Damian. 2018. "McConnell Calls Deficit 'Very Disturbing,' Blames Federal Spending, Dismisses Criticism of Tax Cut." *The Washington Post*. October 16.

The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 2014a. "Public Trust in Government: 1958-2014." http://www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/

Pew Research Center. 2014b. "Political Polarization in the American Public"

Peterson, Mitchell. 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches." *The Review of Financial Studies* 22(1):435-480.

The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 2014a. "Public Trust in Government: 1958-2014." http://www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/

Pew Research Center. 2014b. "Political Polarization in the American Public"

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 2012. "Vote View." http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm. Accessed February 9, 2012.

Prior, Markus. 2013. "Media and Political Polarization." *Annual Review of Political Science* 16:101–27.

Rappaport, Alan. 2015. "Donald Trump is Tied with Jeb Bush in National Poll." *The New York Times.* July 15.

Reilly, Katie. 2016. "Here Are all the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico." *Time.* August 31.

Real Clear Politics. 2018. "2016 Republican Presidential Nomination." *Real Clear Politics.*

Richardson, G. 2005. "The Origins of Anti-Immigrant Sentiments: Evidence from the Heartland in the Age of Mass Migration." Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy 5 (1).

Rocha, Rene R., and Rodolfo Espino. 2008. "Racial Threat, Residential Segregation, and the Policy Attitudes of Anglos." *Political Research Quarterly* 62(2): 415-426.

Rohde, David. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. University of Chicago Press.

Rucker, Phillip. 2016. "GOP Elites are now Resigned to Donald Trump as Their Nominee." *The Washington Post.* April 28.

Santa Ana, Otto, ed. 2004. *Tongue-tied: The lives of multilingual children in public education*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Schiffer, Adam J. 2000. "I'm Not that Liberal: Explaining Conservative Democratic Identification." *Political Behavior* 22(4): 293-310.

Schissel, B., R. Wanner, and J.S. Frideres. 1989. "Social and economic context and attitudes toward immigrants in Canadian cities." *International Migration Review* 23(2): 289-308.

Schuck, Peter H. 2007. "The Disconnect Between Public Attitudes and Policy Outcomes in Immigration." In *The Politics of Immigration Reform*, Carol Swain ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Segovia, Francine and Renatta Defever. 2010. "American Public Opinion on Immigrants and Immigration Policy." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 74 (2):375-394.

Shaw, Daron. 2012. "If Everyone Votes Their Party, Why Do Presidential Election Outcomes Vary So Much?." In *The Forum* 10 (3).

Shor, Boris, and Nolan McCarty. 2011. "The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 530-551.

Sides, John. 2017. "Resentful White People Propelled Trump to the White House—And He's Rewarding Their Loyalty. *The Washington Post.* August 3.

Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2017. "How Trump Lost and Won." *Journal of Democracy* 28(2): 34-44.

Skocpol, Theda, and Vanessa Williamson. 2012. *The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism*. Oxford University Press.

Snell, Kelsey. 2018. "Senate Hearing for Supreme Court Nominee Gets a Controversial Start." *National Public Radio*. September 4.

Snyder, James M. Jr. and Tim Groseclose 2000. "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 2:193-211.

Staff Writers. 2012. “Fewer moderates in new Congress.” *USA Today* 25 November. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/11/25/congress-fewer-moderates/1725187/

Stein, Kate. 2015. “Timeline: The Life and Career of Scott Walker.” *Wisconsin State Journal*. July 19.

Steinhauer, Jennifer. 2015. "Sex Trafficking Bill, Ensnared by Politics, is Left in Limbo by a Senate Vote." *The New York Times.* March 17.

Stimson, James A., Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert S. Erikson. "Dynamic Representation." *The American Political Science Review* 89(3): 543-565.

Stonecash, Jeffrey M. and Mack D. Mariani 2000. “Republican Gains in the House in the 1994 Elections: Class Polarization in American Politics.” *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 1:93-113.

Taylor, Paul, and D’vera Cohn. 2012. “A Milestone En Route to a Majority Minority Nation.” Pew Research Center.

Taylor, Paul, Mark Hugo Lopez, Jessica Hamar Martínez, and Gabriel Velasco. 2012. “When Labels Don’t Fit: Hispanics and Their Views of Identity.” Pew Research Center.

Tesler, Michael. 2016. “Economic Anxiety Isn’t Driving Racial Resentment. Racial Resentment is Driving Economic Anxiety.” *The Washington Post.*

Theriault, Sean M. 2003. “The Case of the Vanishing Moderates: Party Polarization in the Modern Congress.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association.

Time Staff. 2015. “Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech.” *Time.*

The United States Census Bureau. 2010. “Decennial Census of Population and Housing.”

The United States Census Bureau. 2014. “American Fact Finder.”

The United States Census Bureau. 2018. “Foreign Born Datasets.”

The United States Census Bureau. 2018. “Nativity of the Population, for Regions, Divisions, and States: 1850 to 2000.”

The United States House of Representatives, “Directory of Representatives.” www.house.gov/representatives accessed March 1, 2012.

Valentino, Nicholas A., and David O. Sears. "Old Times are Not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 672-688.

Voorheis, John. 2014. *State and Metropolitan Area Income Inequality in the United States: Trends and Determinants, 1968-2012*, Working Paper.

Voss, Stephen, and David Lublin. 2001. "Black Incumbents, White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections." *American Politics Research* 29: 141-82.

Voss, D. Stephen, and Penny Miller. "Following a false trail: The hunt for white backlash in Kentucky's 1996 desegregation vote." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (2001): 62-80.

Wasem, Ruth Ellen. 2013. "U.S. Immigration Policy: Chart Book of Key Trends." Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Washington Post Staff. 2015. "Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid." *Washington Post.* June 16.

Wattenberg, Martin P. 1986. *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1984.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Weesie, Jeroen. 1999. "Seemingly Unrelated Estimation and the Cluster-adjusted Sandwich Estimator." *Stata Technical Bulletin* 52:34–47.

White, Halbert. 1982. "Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models." *Econometrica* 50:1–25.

Wilson, Jill H. and Nicole Prchal Svajlenka. 2014. "Immigrants Continue to Disperse, With Fasted Growth in the Suburbs." *Brookings.*

Wilson, Reid. 2015. "Republicans in State Governments Plan Juggernaut of Conservative Legislation." The Washington Post. January 2.

Wilson, Thomas C. 2001. "Americans' Views on Immigration Policy: Testing the Role of Threatened Group Interests." *Sociological Perspectives* 44, no. 4 (2001): 485-501.

Wolbrecht, Christina 2000. *The Politics of Women's Rights.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2009. *Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach.* Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning.

Worth, Robert. 2012. "Seeing Red: The Effect of Increased Immigration on White Social and Racial Attitudes." Unpublished manuscript.

Wright, Gerald C., Jr., Robert S. Erikson and John P. McIver. 1987. “Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American States.” American Journal of Political Science 31(4): 980-1001.

Yglesias, Matthew. 2017. “Trump Won by Running as a Moderate.” *Vox.* July 11.

Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vita

The author was born in Long Beach, Mississippi. He earned a Bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Southern Mississippi in 2009, and a Master's degree in International Relations from the City College of New York in 2011. He joined the University of New Orleans political science graduate program in 2011. He likes to think that his band, The Annunciators, sounds like the Rolling Stones if they were from Mississippi…and less talented.