Church Reunification: Pope Urban II’s Papal Policy Towards the Christian East and Its Demise

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Church Reunification:
Pope Urban II’s Papal Policy Towards the Christian East and Its Demise

An Honors Thesis
Presented to
the Department of History
of the University of New Orleans

In Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
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by
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Abstract

The relations between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church have long been studied over the years in academia. Much focus has been placed upon the Fourth Crusade as the final act that brought the schism of 1054 into full development between the two churches. However, it was during the First Crusade that the Roman Catholic Church made its first concrete efforts to repair relations with the Eastern Orthodox Church. Yet such efforts were eventually twisted to suit the purposes of some of the crusading lords, and thus becoming arguably the largest blow to church reunification because it lead to the permanent formation of an anti-Greek attitude in Latin Europe.

Keywords: church reunification, First Crusade, Pope Urban II, Prince Bohemond of Taranto, Count Raymond IV of Toulouse, Christian relations
Introduction

Nearly one thousand years ago, a string of events were kicked off that would change the course of history: the Crusades. For centuries, the Crusades have fascinated the minds of Europeans, and its descendant colonial nations – ranging from being romanticized by fanatics of Christianity or colonialism, to being demonized by the misunderstanding eyes of the modern world. Since September 11, 2001, most of the historians have focused on the Christian-Muslim aspect of the Crusades. This has continued a recent scarcity of academic discussion of the inter-Christian relations during this time period: works on such that only come across once every three decades or more. Over fifty years have passed since prominent historian Sir Steven Runciman devoted considerable work to the relations of the Latin Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church. Bernard Hamilton focused on the local Latin churches in Jerusalem and Antioch during the time of the Crusader states in the Levant from a Latin point of view in 1980. And Christopher MacEvitt focused on the Latin Church’s relations with primarily the Oriental Orthodox Church and Nestorians in his work of 2008. Sir Steven Runciman’s work on Catholic-Orthodox relations is not only somewhat dated, but also biased to some degree, since he himself was a Byzantine historian by trade. Bernard Hamilton, and Christopher MacEvitt’s works, while enlightening on how the Latin Church associated with other Christians on a local level, are very reflective of overall policy that came from the Bishop of Rome, the pope.

What separates this brief work from that of previous historians is that it focuses on the formation and changes of papal policy in regards to the Eastern Orthodox Church during the First Crusade, exclusively. Contrary to popular belief, the First Crusade was not so much a war against Islam, but rather a war waged by the Roman Catholic Church in order to gain the good

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1 Oriental Orthodox are not to be confused with Eastern Orthodox. The Oriental Orthodox follow only the first three ecumenical councils, which help define Christian doctrine. The Eastern Orthodox follow the first eight ecumenical councils. Nestorians were Christians that only accepted the first two ecumenical councils.
will of the Byzantine Empire and subsequently the Eastern Orthodox Church through its military aid. Pope Urban II sought to use the good will established by such a venture to help bring about church reunification between the two recently separated churches. While the core ideas discussed within this work concerning Pope Urban II, his pro-Byzantine policy, and his seeking for church reunification are not entirely new, I have presented them in a much more refined manner that I feel resolves the conflicting evidence that past historians such as Runciman, Christopher Tyerman, and others have encountered.
The Road to Schism and Pope Gregory VII

In order to help understand the aspect of inter-church relations during the Crusades, the church history before the Crusades must be explained briefly. During the two centuries leading up to the crusades, the Latin Church had experience severe corruption at the hands of secular authorities. In an effort to reform itself, power was vested in the pope rather than the local lord, as had been traditional up to that point when it came to church affairs. The Cluniacs, a group of reformists within the Church, pushed this new and radical idea beginning in the 10th Century AD. This idea of centralizing church power around the Bishop of Rome would soon translate into a universal claim of authority over all of the churches that abided by the seven ecumenical councils, the Latin Church, of course, and the Eastern Orthodox Church. This claim was by no means a new one, for it had been voiced numerous times by past popes. However, Rome was never in a strong enough position to assert its claims then. By the time the Gregorian Reform Movement, the culmination of the Cluniacs’ efforts, came about the papacy in Rome was beginning to reform itself and forge a new identity. The reformers took up on the idea that the Bishop of Rome did not merely have primacy over the universal church, but rather had a judicial supremacy as well. This issue would be forced in the mid-eleventh century over the filioque clause, an addition to the Nicene Creed which added that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son in addition to the Father. In short the pope claimed he had the authority to add to the creed alone based on the theological premise of papal supremacy. The eastern patriarchs of the Eastern Orthodox Church rejected the addition as possibly heretical. Even if it was not, it would require

2 Steven Runciman, *The Eastern Schism: A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches During the XIth and XIIth Centuries* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 28-29. The Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church both disagree as to what the eighth ecumenical council was, so they only have seven councils in common.
4 Runciman, *The Eastern Schism*, 29
an ecumenical council to legally add to it, which would implicitly deny Rome’s supremacy claims. Many felt the addition violated normal Triadology to which the Eastern Orthodox Church had ascribed to prior to this addition to the creed. Their understanding was that traits were to either be exclusive to one person of the Holy Trinity, or be universal among the three. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were all God and thus all-knowing and all-present. The Father has fatherhood. The Son has begottenness. And the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. To have the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son would mean that two persons of the Trinity share a trait, but not the third. In the minds of the Eastern theologians this intrinsically implied that the Holy Spirit was inferior to the Father and the Son which was tantamount to a grave heresy. Thus in 1054 AD the Church of Rome, and the Church of Constantinople (New Rome) both excommunicated one another thus creating the Great Schism: the divide between the present-day Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church.

In this chaotic context, Pope Gregory VII inherited the papal throne in 1073. Shortly after taking power, Pope Gregory VII announced in 1074 a plan to aid the Byzantine Empire in its wars against the Saracens, and at the same time personally preside over a universal council in Constantinople to resolve the issues between the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches.\(^5\) The plan included the pope himself leading a large army of Normans against the Saracens along side the Byzantines.\(^6\) The Muslims in the east were not an immediate threat to the West. In fact, if there was to be any Muslim threat to the West it would have been from the Iberian Peninsula as in the days of Charles Martel.\(^7\) So it is surprising that Pope Gregory VII would have announced such a venture for the sake of protecting his fellow Christians so far abroad when those under his

\(^5\) Saracens was a common term used during the time period, and typically referred to Muslims in general.
\(^7\) Charles Martel was a Frankish military leader who defeated the Umayyad Caliphate’s attempted invasion of Western Europe at the Battle of Poitiers in the early 8\(^{th}\) Century A.D.
patriarchal domain were under Muslim rule on the Iberian Peninsula. The true reasoning for Pope Gregory VII’s planned proto-Crusade was the reassertion of papal prestige in the Christian East, and to take advantage of that in order to assert papal supremacy at a universal or ecumenical council in Constantinople.⁸

Pope Urban II's Call and Ambitions

It stands to reason that Pope Urban II, who came after Pope Gregory VII and was close to him, had much the same in mind when it came to his call for the First Crusade in 1095 AD.9

Before issuing his famous proclamation in the Fall of 1095 at the Council of Clermont in France, Pope Urban II made extensive trips throughout Southern France. It is certain that Pope Urban II had already met with Count Raymond IV of Toulouse and Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy.10 These two figures would be the cornerstones and torchbearers of Pope Urban II’s ideas for church reunification concerning the Eastern Orthodox Church which I will further explain later on.

On November 27, 1095 Pope Urban II gave his speech that called for the First Crusade at Clermont, France. There is no surviving copy of the actual speech. All that we have today are six sources that paraphrased the speech to some extent. Three of these six sources are based in large part on the *Gesta Francorum et Aliorvm Hierosolimitanorm* (The Deeds of the Franks and the Other Pilgrims to Jerusalem) which was written by an anonymous author.11 All of the accounts associated with the *Gesta Francorum* mention Jerusalem repeatedly as a central issue for the First Crusade. The anonymous author was almost certainly not present at the Council as he did not come into the crusading picture until Bohemond of Taranto recruited him in Apulia in 1096. Most of the sources which refer to the anonymous *Gesta Francorum* were written years afterwards. Robert the Monk, who did base his account of the speech to some degree on the anonymous chronicle, was possibly present at the Council. However, even if he was, he did not write his chronicle of the speech until nearly twenty-five years later.12 Therefore, his account is

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9 Tyerman, *God’s War*, 49-50
10 Ibid, 63
not one-hundred percent reliable. The other two sources, Guibert of Nogent and Balderic of Dol, also based their accounts in large part on the *Gesta Francorum*. Guibert of Nogent, like Robert the Monk, may have also been present at the Council of Clermont, but he wrote his account of the pope’s speech much earlier. However, Guibert himself takes liberty with the pope’s speech stating that he writes “not word for word, but according to what he meant.” Guibert blatantly discredits himself when it comes to an accurate recounting of the pope’s speech.

The other two sources for Pope Urban II’s speech are a letter written by the pope himself in December of 1095 to the leaders in Flanders, and Fulcher of Chartres’ account in his *History of the Expedition to Jerusalem*. The former is not exactly written for the purpose of recounting Pope Urban II’s speech; however, it is reflective of the issues going on in Urban’s mind:

> “Your brotherhood, we believe, has long since learned from many accounts that a barbaric fury has deplorably afflicted and laid waste the churches of God in the regions of the Orient. More than this, blasphemous to say, it has even grasped in intolerable servitude its churches and the Holy City of Christ, glorified by His passion and resurrection. Grieving with pious concern at this calamity, we visited the regions of Gaul and devoted ourselves largely to urging the princes of the land and their subjects to free the churches of the East.”

Indeed this letter does refer to Jerusalem as the “Holy City of Christ,” however; clearly this was mentioned in the context of the distressed Christian churches in the east. It was not presented as a

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central goal. Fulcher of Chartres’ was most certainly at the Council of Clermont in 1095, and does recount the pope’s speech. It does not mention Jerusalem specifically at all. Of all of the sources of Pope Urban II’s speech, these two are perhaps the most reliable and accurate. Neither of these sources ever mentions Jerusalem in a context of its own, if at all. They mention the Christians of the east and their plight, but none of them advocate the reconquest of Jerusalem for Christendom as a central goal.

All of this points to one thing, for Pope Urban II Jerusalem was a secondary concern. His main concern was to help the Christians in the East, gain their favor, and use that to his advantage at an ecumenical council in Constantinople which he would preside over – the same dream that Pope Gregory VII had before him. The references to Jerusalem as a central goal in the other sources are not accurate. If anything they are examples of “mission creep” – a term that describes how the original mission of a task is expanded due to either distractions or the fulfillment of the original goal. In the case of the First Crusade, it was due to distractions. If anything, the idea of Jerusalem being an end goal is something that was implanted, but it was most certainly not implanted by Pope Urban II.

The idea of Jerusalem being of secondary concern to Pope Urban II has by recent scholarship been debunked. Such a judgment however is hasty. Riley-Smith describes mountains of evidence concerning Pope Urban II’s tour that suggest Jerusalem being a prime goal from the start. However, this begs the question, if Jerusalem were a primary goal then why did Count Raymond delay departing for Jerusalem after the fall of Antioch later during the crusade? The answer was because the capture of Jerusalem was conditional. Count Raymond’s struggle, which will be illustrated later, for establishing friendly relations with eastern Christians, took primacy over the capture of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the lure of Jerusalem made an excellent recruiting

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tool for crusaders, which explains the few mentions of Jerusalem in the sources Riley-Smith speaks of. If anything, this new mountain of evidence has allowed for the enhancement and refinement of the theory that establishing friendly relations with the Christian East was the primary goal.

In order to gain a greater understanding of what exactly was going on inside the mind of Pope Urban II, two figures must be thoroughly examined: Count Raymond IV of Toulouse and Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy, who would become the papal legate and spiritual leader of the First Crusade. As mentioned before, both of these individuals had already met with Pope Urban II during his tour of Southern France before the Council of Clermont. The pope almost certainly had discussed his plans for the First Crusade with them on that occasion. Furthermore, these two men traveled together throughout the First Crusade all the way up to Antioch where Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy died.  

These two men should be treated as extensions of Pope Urban II and his goals to a great degree.

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March through the Balkans

There were five secular Western leaders of the First Crusade. They were Duke Godfrey of Boulogne, the aforementioned Count Raymond IV of Toulouse, Count Stephen II of Blois, Robert of Flanders and Prince Bohemond of Taranto. There were other leaders such as Godfrey’s brother, Baldwin, and Bohemond’s nephew, Tancred, during the crusade, but these four were the most prominent of the secular Western leaders. Bohemond’s anti-Byzantine policy, driven mostly by his greed for land and bitterness over his defeat by the Byzantines in a different war years earlier, would eventually come into conflict with Count Raymond, who favored Pope Urban II’s pro-Byzantine policy, at Antioch. The journey to the east would take these leaders through the Balkans, much of which belonged to the Byzantine Empire.

In early December of 1095, Count Raymond responded to Pope Urban II’s call for the First Crusade. This was within less than a week of the call to arms. Therefore, Pope Urban II

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must have discussed his plans previously with Count Raymond for word could not have possibly reached him fast enough, further confirming the count’s closeness to the pope. When the count first moved through the Balkans, as the three other leaders had done to meet at Constantinople, he came into conflict with Byzantine forces following Emperor Alexius I’s orders in late 1096. This conflict is largely attributable to the conditions in which Count Raymond found himself in. When Emperor Alexius I asked for military aid from the West, he did not expect such a large host of men. As a consequence, the Byzantine Empire was not logistically prepared to supply the Western armies with basic necessities. Therefore conflict between Count Raymond and Emperor Alexius I, even though they were allies in theory, was inevitable, and it should be treated as an anomaly in the overall narrative that the count attempted to befriend the Byzantines.

When Count Raymond arrived at Constantinople, the emperor attempted to have the count take an oath of fealty to him. All of the other major Crusading leaders had already done so. Instead, the count agreed to an oath of friendship with the emperor, as was customary for those in Southern France. The oath included the terms of returning whatever territory once belonged to the Byzantine Empire. Raymond d’Aguilers, the chronicler of Count Raymond, cites that the count grudgingly came to terms with the emperor. This was reasonable as anyone who was attacked would be justifiably angry to some extent; especially if they perceived themselves to be blameless, as was the case with the count according to Raymond d’Aguilers. The oath of friendship was genuine as Count Raymond’s future actions would prove. Furthermore, Princess

21 Raymond d’Aguilers, Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Hierusalem, 18
23 Raymond d’Aguilers, Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Hierusalem, 24
24 Comnena, The Alexiad, 261
25 Raymond d’Aguilers, Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Hierusalem, 24
Anna Comnena, daughter of Emperor Alexius I, recorded years later her father’s meeting with the count:

“Isangeles [Count Raymond IV of Toulouse] he [Alexius I] liked especially because of his superior wisdom and genuine sincerity and purity of life, also because he recognized that he valued truth above everything; for he ‘shone’ amidst all the Latins ‘as the sun amidst the stars of heaven.’”\(^{26}\)

It has been suggested that Count Raymond was not as saintly, or honorable as past historians have suggested. Instead, they suggest that he was merely pragmatic in the way of his operation. Tyerman asserts that as the lone Provençal leader of the First Crusade, Raymond felt isolated and needed any sort of ally that he might find in which case was the emperor. Tyerman puts a lot of stock in the idea that the language langue d’oc, a southern dialect of French, was cause for some sort of natural tension between Count Raymond and the other Crusading leaders who were Norman.\(^{27}\) This theory is implausible, and seems better suited for a time period where nationalism actually existed – post-Napoleonic Europe. Besides, if Count Raymond truly wanted immediate allies for the sake of material gain, considering by this point they were heading to the Levant, it would have been better to choose one of his fellow crusading leaders who would have been closer physically than the far away Emperor Alexius I. Count Raymond may have gained some sort of pragmatic advantage out of befriending the emperor, and being the only leader of the First Crusade to actually keep his oath. However, that was only a net-benefit, not a goal for the sake of material gain as some have suggested.

\(^{26}\) Comnena, *The Alexiad*, 267

\(^{27}\) Tyerman, *God’s War*, 94; 148
The Holy Lance at Antioch

Some also might have trouble believing that both Bishop Adhemar and Count Raymond should be treated as extensions of Pope Urban II based upon their conflicting decisions concerning the Holy Lance found at Antioch. This should not be so. At the beginning of June of 1098 the First Crusaders had taken the city of Antioch, which had been under siege for months. After taking the city, Kerbogha, the atabeg of Mosul, arrived with a relief army just days after its fall. He then began to besiege the crusaders within the city walls that they had just taken. It is against this backdrop that the Holy Lance comes into play. A peasant from Count Raymond’s camp by the name of Peter Bartholomew announced before the count and Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy that Saint Andrew had appeared to him and revealed the location of the Holy Lance. Bishop Adhemar considered the story fraudulent while the count believed the story to be true.

How was it that the two men who were essentially extensions of the pope himself disagreed on such a critical issue? The reason is simple. The real Holy Lance was located at Constantinople, and the bishop probably remembered it. Constantinople’s claim to the Holy Lance goes back centuries. For the Orthodox Christians, who had suffered much during the Iconoclasm for the sake of holy relics at the hands of Iconophiles, to say that their Holy Lance, which they had been venerating for centuries was not the actual Holy Lance, would have been highly insulting. Having the papal legate admit this would be the same as having Pope Urban II himself admit the legitimacy of the lance. While this might not have frustrated the political

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28 Raymond d’Aguilers, *Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem*, 47-50
29 Ibid, 49
30 Raymond d’Aguilers, *Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem*, 51-54
31 Ibid, 54
33 The Iconoclasm occurred in the Byzantine Empire where those who venerated icons were persecuted as idolaters beginning in the early portion of the 8th Century A.D. Many had died for the sake of icons, and the controversy was finally resolved in favor of icons in the early part of the 9th Century A.D.
leader Emperor Alexius I, it would have no doubt greatly upset the Patriarch of Constantinople. Having a religious leader endorse a religious relic is much more serious than having a political leader such as Count Raymond endorse a religious relic. If Bishop Adhemar recognized the lance then it would have ran counter to building church dialogue.

Count Raymond’s reasons for giving credence to the idea of the lance at Antioch being the actual Holy Lance were just as practical as the bishop’s rejecting it. The count had realized the grim situation the First Crusaders were facing. They had just finished the long siege at Antioch and had taken the city, only to become besieged by Kerbogha. They were tired, and the situation was desperate. Finding such a holy relic would have been advantageous in the case for troop morale. And that is precisely the effect it had.\footnote{Fulcher of Chartres, \textit{A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem: 1095-1127}, trans. Frances Rita Ryan (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1969), 110} It is not entirely out of the question that Count Raymond endorsed the lance for the sake of boosting troop morale. Furthermore, the common soldier in Count Raymond’s camp seemed to believe it based upon its use during the rout of Kerbogha.\footnote{Ibid, 110} After the siege of Antioch was over and the First Crusaders triumphed, Peter continued to make revelations from Count Raymond’s camp.\footnote{Runciman, \textit{A History of the Crusades: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem}, 209} Eventually those few who did not believe it to begin with challenged the validity of the lance because they regarded Peter’s revelations as nothing more than a political tool engineered by Count Raymond to maintain control over the army, which was wanting to march to Jerusalem. But the count insisted on waiting for Emperor Alexius I to arrive at Antioch.\footnote{Ibid, 226} Judging by Raymond’s actions and his use of the lance as a political tool, and by the suspicions of his contemporaries, it is very much likely that Raymond was merely making a cynical political maneuver when it came to endorsing the
lance found at Antioch. He used it for the sake of troop morale, and later to delay leaving Antioch for Jerusalem.
The Possession of Antioch

After the two sieges of Antioch were over, Raymond and Bohemond of Taranto, a rival crusading leader who always despised Emperor Alexius I and eastern Christians, feuded over Antioch. The count attempted to hold the city for the emperor until he arrived himself to take possession as Antioch was agreed to revert back to Byzantine control in Constantinople. But Bohemond was able to expel Raymond’s troops from the city while the count was besieging Arqah.\(^{38}\) Raymond attempted to make a case for the emperor and the return of the city by reminding the rest of the Crusaders of their oaths taken back at Constantinople. His pleas, however, fell on deaf ears.\(^{39}\) The people replied that because the emperor did not fulfill his word to help them at Antioch, then the oath had already been broken.\(^{40}\) It should be remembered that Count Raymond had consistently endorsed a pro-Byzantine policy at Antioch, something that Bohemond of Taranto constantly campaigned against. He was willing to make sacrifices that ran counter to his political well being among the other Crusading leaders. It has been suggested that Raymond attempted to make himself lord of Antioch as a Byzantine vassal, but this idea hardly makes sense. First, it is doubtful that the emperor would have installed a foreigner as governor to such a historic Byzantine city. Secondly, there is no clear evidence at this point of the Crusade that Raymond sought to carve out his own state in the east. It must be remembered that Raymond was very old, and the richest of the crusading leaders. He was not in any need of more land. If Raymond was truly greedy for land, it would have been far more advantageous to have waged war back home in France.

\(^{38}\) Raymond d’Aguilers, *Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem*, 105-106
\(^{39}\) Ibid, 106
\(^{40}\) Ibid, 106
There is also a contradictory account, traditionally disregarded by most historians, against Count Raymond concerning the siege and possession of Antioch. Albert of Aachen asserts that prior to the fall of Antioch to the Crusaders, Bohemond had taken Duke Godfrey, Robert of

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41 Runciman, *A History of the Crusades: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 220
Flanders, and Count Raymond aside to share a secret as to how to take the city. Bohemond had found a traitor on the inside of Antioch who had agreed to help Bohemond to take the city. Bohemond said that he had promised this traitor wealth to the end of his days. In order to foot the cost, as well as being the one who found this traitor, he asserted that the city of Antioch be handed over to him. The three other Crusading leaders universally agreed to this with rejoice. Count Raymond was adamantly opposed to this later on, so why did he agree to it to begin with? The answer lay in the fact that Kerbogha was just within a few days march from relieving Antioch. The Crusaders would have been caught between a rock and a hard place if they failed to take the city before the arrival of a Turkish relief force. While Duke Godfrey’s and Robert of Flanders’ promises to Bohemond may have been genuine, Count Raymond’s was likely not. He foresaw that arguing about the possession of Antioch would delay the siege, and thereby risk the annihilation of the First Crusade. Another reason could be that he feared that if he did not agree to it, Bohemond would have left the Crusade, and returned to Europe when they needed him most. After all, Count Stephen of Blois, one of the Crusading leaders, had just left the siege of Antioch for home in Europe along with four thousand of his men. In any case, Count Raymond’s assent to Bohemond’s possession of Antioch prior to the fall of the city is moot.

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43 Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 271; 273
44 Ibid, 273
45 Ibid, 269
46 Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 267; 269
Bishop Adhemar’s Ecclesiastical Efforts

During the time when Count Raymond was leading the army, and leading the political end of the spectrum of Pope Urban II’s plan, Papal Legate Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy was cooperating and associating quite often with bishops of the Eastern Orthodox Church. On October 18, 1097 as the Crusaders were outside the walls of Antioch besieging it, both Bishop Adhemar and Orthodox Patriarch Symeon II of Jerusalem, who was in exile at Cyprus from his see at the time, sent a joint letter to fellow Christians up north beyond the realm of the Byzantine Empire. The papal legate and the Patriarch of Jerusalem were imploring the Christians of the West to send aid to the armies of the First Crusade, and arrive by next year’s Easter. Considering that the Patriarch of Jerusalem was in exile at the time at Cyprus, it is very much telling that the papal legate would delay sending a letter to the West by consulting with Symeon II first. Bishop Adhemar sought to make the whole Crusade a cooperative affair between the Latin Christians and the Eastern Orthodox Christians. As long as cooperation was shown publicly and operationally (although it began to break down operationally at Antioch), then the First Crusade would be a success in improving church relations. Furthermore, in late January of 1098 the Patriarch Symeon II of Jerusalem sent another letter, which Bishop Adhemar most likely agreed to, to the West imploring that his fellow Christians in the West come to the First Crusade’s aid. Bishop Adhemar is notably not named in this letter, although it is speculated that he had some part in it. Nevertheless, it is notable that Patriarch Symeon II takes a leading role composing the letter. There are several mentions of eastern saints by the names of George, Theodore, and

47 Patriarch Symeon of Jerusalem and Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy to all the faithful of the northern regions, 18 October 1097, in Letters from the East: Crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12th and 13th Centuries, trans. Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2010), 17-18
48 Patriarch Symeon of Jerusalem and other bishops to the Western Church, late January 1098, in Letters from the East: Crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12th and 13th Centuries, trans. Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2010), 21-22
Demetrius thus adding to the strong eastern flavor, and confirming his dominant role in the letter. He ends the letter with:

“If those who have made the vow [of the crusade] do not fulfill it by coming, I, the apostolic patriarch, and the bishops and all the Order of the orthodox, excommunicate them and expel them from the communion of the Church.”

This is very telling of the cooperation between the clergy of the Latin Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church. While the patriarch mentions the Latin and Greek bishops in general, he speaks on their behalf. The Orthodox understanding of church government is very simple: the affairs of one church are not the affairs of the church afar. In other words, the Patriarch of Jerusalem does not attempt to interfere with the affairs of the Patriarch of Alexandria and so forth. For the Patriarch of Jerusalem to threaten excommunication against members of the Latin Church, whose leader was Pope Urban II, was an exceptionally rare threat. Indeed, the papal legate was implied in the letter with the mention of the Latin bishops in general; however, lacking the names of any of these Latin bishops and pairing it with such a powerful threat is revealing to the coordination between the two churches. Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy saw to it that a strong level of coordination was achieved between the Latin Church and the Eastern Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

On a side note, Runciman asserted that the second letter sent by Patriarch Symeon II calls into question as to what the papal legate was preaching on Pope Urban II’s behalf, considering the fact that the letter flies straight in the face of papal supremacy. However, Bishop Adhemar’s mission was not to settle the question of papal supremacy, but merely to establish cooperation and relations between the East and West. To this end the letter seems to fulfill just that. Solving

49 Patriarch Symeon of Jerusalem and other bishops to the Western Church, late January 1098, in Letters from the East: Crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12th and 13th Centuries, trans. Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2010), 21-22
the question of papal supremacy would have required an ecumenical council, which Pope Urban II may have been planning in light of Pope Gregory VII’s plans for a proto-Crusade nearly twenty years earlier. The second letter by Patriarch Symeon II did far more good than harm for the cause of church unity, and as far as Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy was concerned, that was all that mattered. Papal supremacy could wait till later to be resolved.

Bishop Adhemar courted Patriarch John VII of Antioch, he was also known as John the Oxite. During the initial siege of Antioch, the Turkish governor of the city, Yaghi-Siyan, suspected many of his Christian subjects and their loyalty to him. As a consequence of this, the governor had the patriarch hung in a cage over the city walls. After the city fell to the Crusaders, they reinstalled John the Oxite to his patriarchal throne. Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy would soon die on August 1, 1098. Thus the undisputed spiritual leader of the First Crusade and one of the few men who intimately knew Pope Urban II’s ambitions passed away. This left Count Raymond with nearly no allies, and the only leader left in the First Crusade who knew of the pope’s ambitions.

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50 Runciman, A History of the Crusades: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 184
51 Ibid, 196
52 Gesta Francorvm et Aliorvm Hierosolimitanorvm, trans. and ed. Rosalind Hill (New York: Thomas and Sons LTD, 1962), 74
The Letter from Antioch and the Publicanorum

With the death of Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy the secular leaders of the First Crusade wrote a letter to Pope Urban II on September 11, 1098. While the letter includes all of the names of the crusade’s leaders, the main author seems to have been Bohemond alone. In the letter, they ask that the pope come to Antioch himself. Furthermore, the letter states:

“Although we have triumphed over the Turks and the pagans we cannot do the same with the Greek, Armenian, Syrian and Jacobite heretics. We ask you again and again, our dearest father, as father and leader to come to this place of your fatherhood, and as vicar of St Peter to sit on his throne and have us as your obedient sons in all legitimate actions, eradicating and destroying all types of heresy with your authority and our valour…We, your sons, who obey you in everything, most pious father, you should separate from the unjust emperor [Alexius I] who has never fulfilled the many promises he has made to us. In fact, he has hindered and harmed us in every way at his disposal.”

It is at this point during the First Crusade, that Pope Urban II’s goals for establishing good relations with the Eastern Orthodox Church began to fall apart. Although the pope’s response is lost to history, it is doubtful that it at all changed his policy considering Count Raymond’s future actions. Furthermore, it is interesting as to how Bohemond refers to the Greek Orthodox Christians as heretics. It is probable that he only used the term to denigrate the Greeks.

of Antioch. An alternate theory is that he was referring to Greek-speaking Paulicians. Paulicians were Christian heretics that adhered to a cosmologic dualism theology. They borrowed many of their ideas from Manichaeism. According to the *Gesta Francorvm* written by the anonymous author who resided in Bohemond’s camp, there were Paulicians in the surrounding area of Antioch. However, the exact word used for the term Paulician in the text is “Publicanorum”, and is only interpreted as meaning Paulicians by modern scholars. Albert of Aachen, who based some of his work on the *Gesta Francorvm*, also refers to “Publicanorum”, but seems to refer to them as a race of people from Africa or Arabia. In Classical Latin the term would directly translate into “publican”, which in Roman times were public contractors.

Furthermore, it is doubtful that any Paulicians would have been present near Antioch at the time. In 975 Emperor John Tzimisces of the Byzantine Empire forcefully relocated as many Paulicians as possible to Thrace for fear that they would side with the Muslims in the borderlands. This would include relocation from Antioch. Also, the Paulicians relocated to the Balkans were encountered by the crusaders in their march to the East during the First Crusade. The documentation for Paulicians being in the Balkans is much more certain considering their relocation a near century before. However, the account about the encounter recorded in the *Gesta Francorvm* the word “hereticorum” is used which means “heretics.” This begs the question: if Paulicians were at both the Balkans and Antioch, why were two different words used to label

55 Runciman, *The Eastern Schism*, 86-87
57 Comnena, *The Alexiad*, 384. Manichaeism was a religion separate from Christianity that began in the 3rd Century A.D. that believed in a dualistic theology concerning the origins of good and evil. Many people during the classical and medieval periods in Europe mistakenly labeled Christian heresies as Manichaeism, an entirely separate religion.
58 *Gesta Francorvm et Aliorvm Hierosolimitanorvm*, 26
59 Ibid, 20
60 Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 456-457
63 Ibid, 45
64 *Gesta Francorvm et Aliorvm Hierosolimitanorvm*, 8
them in the exact same account? It does not make sense. This can mean only one thing: the “publicanorum” and the “hereticorum” were not the same people, but different. Clearly the “publicanorum” were not Paulicians.

Even if the *Gesta Francorum* actually refers to the Paulicians as “Publicanorum”, it is doubtful that Bohemond would have referred to them as Greeks. Greek is an exceptionally large term to use when in reference to a small militant group of heretical Christians; especially when for at least half of the Crusade thus far Bohemond had been allied with the Greeks of the Byzantine Empire. Furthermore, at the end of the letter, Bohemond demonizes Emperor Alexius I, a Greek. Prior to the First Crusade, Bohemond had invaded the Balkans, which belonged to Emperor Alexius I, and he ultimately was defeated.  

So it would be no surprise if Bohemond used the term heretic in a derogatory fashion against the Eastern Orthodox Greeks of Antioch. He hated the Greeks because they had thwarted his plans in the Balkans, and because of the lack of Byzantine aid at Antioch.

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65 Comnena, *The Alexiad*, 37
Why, however, would the other Crusading leaders, such as Count Raymond, allow Bohemond to write such an anti-Greek/anti-Eastern Orthodox letter in his name then? Duke Godfrey and Robert of Flanders had no objection because they felt a similar way as Bohemond when it came to the Byzantine Greeks. They supported Bohemond’s claim to Antioch which was taken without the aid of the Byzantines. As for Count Raymond, the only plausible explanations were either that he never reviewed the contents of the letter, or he found the narrative too petty to quarrel over.

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68 Raymond d’Aguilers, Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem, 75
Count Raymond’s Failure at Antioch

There is some suggestion that Count Raymond tried to reassert his authority after the loss of Bishop Adhemar. After the fall of Albara to Raymond’s forces, the people of his camp demanded that there be a bishop consecrated for the city. Raymond answered these requests and nominated Peter of Narbonne. Interestingly enough, instead of requesting that the nomination be confirmed by the pope in Rome, Raymond had his nominee confirmed by Patriarch John VII of Antioch. This is interesting considering that since 1054 the two churches had formally split apart. For the sake of reconciliation, this split was hardly treated as definite until, which is why Pope Gregory VII and Pope Urban II both sought rapprochement with the East and gloss over the fact that the schism ever even occurred. To have had a Latin consecrated as a bishop by an eastern patriarch was quite radical. The reasoning for this event was two fold. First, Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy was dead, and thus Raymond was in need of some allies, and the Patriarch of Antioch would have made a prestigious ally. Emperor Alexius I had yet to cross Anatolia into the Levant to aid the Crusaders for their final push, and time was not on Raymond’s side to wait. His partial possession of Antioch was frustrating Bohemond of Taranto’s ambitions to gain full control of the city for himself. Also, Bohemond and Raymond were both delaying the march to Jerusalem. Furthermore, Peter Bartholomew had been prophesying that Saint Andrew had been demanding that the army move on to Jerusalem for quite some time. Therefore, Raymond needed a way to secure his small hold at Antioch, and march on Jerusalem at the same time. And what better way to help secure Antioch than to

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69 Raymond d’Aguilers, *Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem*, 73
70 *Gesta Francorum et Aliorvm Hierosolimitanorvm*, 74-75 and Raymond d’Aguilers, *Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem*, 73
72 Fulcher of Chartres, *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem*, 112
73 Runciman, *A History of the Crusades: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 212
establish relations with the bishop of that city, Patriarch John VII of Antioch, by submitting a Latin clergyman to Greek ecclesiastical rule; thus implicitly acknowledging the patriarch’s rights.

This was not a move that would pay off though for Count Raymond. As mentioned beforehand, Bohemond of Taranto would eventually expel Raymond’s forces from the city of Antioch entirely. Raymond had indeed expected that Peter of Narbonne carry out secular duties to help him administrate his possessions as shown when he left a garrison at Albara later during his tenure to accompany the count and lead troops in the army.  

74 This was typical of Western rulers to expect that their bishops not only carry out ecclesiastical duties, but secular duties as well.  

75 It is likely by this friendly overture, and hopes of good graces from Patriarch John VII of Antioch, that Count Raymond hoped that the patriarch would exercise some sort of the same political and secular support for him to help maintain his hold on Antioch. However, Eastern Orthodox bishops were never trained for such secular administration.  

76 Antioch, had until recent years, been a Byzantine possession, and the functions and mingling between the church and state in the Byzantine Empire were far different from those that went on in the Latin West.  

74 Raymond d’Aguilers, _Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem_, 73, 85  
75 Bernard Hamilton, _The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church_ (London: Variorum Publications LTD, 1980), 10  
76 Hamilton, _The Latin Church in the Crusader States_, 10  
77 Harry J. Magoulias, _Byzantine Christianity: Emperor, Church and the West_ (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1970), 13-16
Count Raymond’s Failure at Jerusalem

Jerusalem fell to the First Crusaders in mid-July of 1099. After its fall, the other leaders of the Crusade encouraged Count Raymond to be crowned King of Jerusalem. Instead of taking the offer, he refused on the grounds that he was not comfortable with it. Since his refusal, they instead elected Duke Godfrey as Protector of the Holy Sepulchre thus establishing the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Immediately after taking power, Duke Godfrey demanded that Count Raymond hand over control of the Tower of David in Jerusalem to him. Count Raymond refused, and Duke Godfrey dropped the issue. Count Raymond then handed over control of the tower to the Bishop of Albara, Peter of Narbonne. Subsequently, Duke Godfrey, through the display of arms in the bishop’s office, forced Bishop Peter to surrender the tower to him.

This leaves many questions to be asked. Why would Count Raymond refuse the crown of Jerusalem, and then subsequently attempt to maintain control over a portion of the city himself? It seems rather contradictory. However, upon further investigation, this was a very similar episode of what happened between Bohemond and Count Raymond on the issue of Antioch. While the leaders of the Crusade resided at Constantinople, they had all sworn an oath that whatever territory they had conquered which once belonged to the Byzantine Empire, they would return to the Byzantine Empire. That included Jerusalem, which the Byzantine Empire lost in 638 to Caliph Omar. Further proof that Count Raymond backed this idea can be cited when he attempted to have the Crusaders wait for Emperor Alexius I to arrive at Antioch, and to hand it

78 Fulcher of Chartres, A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 119-122
79 Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 238
80 Raymond d’Aguilers, Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem, 129
81 Ibid., pp. 129-130
82 Raymond d’Aguilers, Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem, 130
83 Comnen, The Alexiad, 261
84 Runciman, A History of the Crusades: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 3
back over to him. He stated that “all cities will lay down their arms, and Alexius may possess or destroy them as he wishes.”

So why then did the count not simply accept the title of king, and then hand the city over to Emperor Alexius I later on? The answer also goes back to Antioch. Bohemond was now Prince of Antioch, and hostile to the Byzantine Empire. Emperor Alexius I could not have possibly been expected to exercise control over Jerusalem with the hostile Principality of Antioch threatening lines of communication. Besides, Antioch had been under Byzantine control within Emperor Alexius I’s lifetime, and as such was likely more important than Jerusalem. Furthermore, when the Crusaders had taken the city of Jerusalem, they had taken it from the Fatimad Caliphate of Egypt. Count Raymond was likely concerned that the Egyptians would send an army to take back the city, and without support from the Byzantine Empire due to the obstruction of the Principality of Antioch, decided that he did not want to assume full responsibility for the territory. Also, if he had assumed power it may have been that the other lords, with nothing significant tying them to the area and their pilgrimage complete, would have returned home; a concern that he shared back during the debate of the possession of Antioch.

By giving the other lords, especially Duke Godfrey, incentives to stay as well as holding onto the Tower of David, Count Raymond was merely attempting to manage his priorities, and hedge his bets in order to achieve his goal of establishing friendly relations with the Byzantine Empire. Holding onto the Tower of David was Count Raymond’s compromise to help exert some control over the affairs of the city until Emperor Alexius I arrived without assuming the full responsibility of a kingdom.

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85 Raymond d’Aguilers, Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem, 105-106
87 Raymond d’Aguilers, Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem, 105-106
Count Raymond and Prince Bohemond After the Crusade

With the fall of Jerusalem, the First Crusade ended. Count Raymond stayed in the newly established Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem for a while, and took part in the battle against the Egyptians at Ascalon. After further frustration with Duke Godfrey on numerous occasions, Count Raymond left Palestine. He arrived at the Byzantine city of Lattakieh, where he was granted governance over the city. There, he governed for a while along side imperial representatives from Constantinople, and later set sail to Constantinople.

After arriving at Constantinople, Count Raymond participated in the Crusade of 1101 serving Emperor Alexius I, which would end in failure. He then obtained permission to leave Emperor Alexius I and to return to the Levant. There he laid siege to Tortosa, and captured it. Afterwards, he began to lay siege to the city of Tripoli, and requested that Emperor Alexius I send him aid. Emperor Alexius I likely favored having an allied state to the south of the hostile Principality of Antioch. Before the city could be taken, Count Raymond IV of Toulouse died.

Meanwhile, Count Raymond’s rival, Bohemond, began to solidify his rule in Antioch when he deposed John the Oxite, and forced him into exile. He replaced him with the Latin bishop Bernard of Valence. He then set out with an army against the Turks to further secure his new principality only to be captured by Malik Ghazi the Danishmend. His nephew Tancred

88 Raymond d’Aguilers, Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem, 133-135
89 Runciman, A History of the Crusades: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 246-247
90 Ibid, 249, 264
92 Ibid, 25
93 Fulcher of Chartres, A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 166
94 Comnena, The Alexiad, 287
95 Fulcher of Chartres, A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 194
96 Ibid, 265
97 Ibid, 266
assumed regency at Antioch, and continued his uncle’s anti-Byzantine policy. Bohemond would be ransomed years later and return to power in 1103.

Bohemond met a much more shameful fate, but not before he could permanently turn the Latin West against the Byzantine Empire. In the autumn of 1104, Bohemond returned to Europe to acquire reinforcements to take to the east. He left his nephew, Tancred, in charge at Antioch. There he met with Pope Paschal II, Urban II’s successor, and convinced him of a very negative picture of Alexius I and the Byzantine Empire. Bohemond stressed that the newly established Latin states in the East could not survive as long as Byzantium stood in their way. Mission creep had now definitively subverted the crusading idea, changing it from a means of Christian aid to a means of territorial control of the Levant. Bohemond would remain in Latin Europe until 1107 when instead of returning to the Levant with his reinforcements, he invaded the Byzantine Empire in the Balkans as he had done decades earlier. He had done so with the aid of Pope Paschal II, who had his papal legate, Bruno, preach a holy war against the Byzantine Empire. Once again, he was crushed by Alexius I and forced to sign a treaty subjecting Antioch as a vassal state to the Byzantine Empire. However, the treaty was moot. Bohemond retired to Latin Europe, never to return to Antioch, and Tancred refused to obey the terms of the treaty. Bohemond would pass away quietly in 1111.

99 Ibid, 31
100 Runciman, *A History of the Crusades: The Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 38
102 Ibid, 38-39
103 Ibid, 40-41
104 Ibid, 41
Conclusion

With the death of Count Raymond IV of Toulouse, the last man of the Triumvirate for rapprochement with the Eastern Orthodox from the Latin Church was dead. Before Bohemond met his death too some years later, he gained the ear of Pope Paschal II and thereby he firmly implanted anti-Byzantine ideas in the hearts and minds of Latin Europe. Bohemond’s designs would live on in his nephew Tancred, who assumed full governance of the Principality of Antioch, and continued to be aggressive against the Byzantine Empire. Pope Paschal II eagerly adopted the anti-Greek position espoused by Bohemond and Tancred, thus officially overturning previous papal policy. 105 This reversal of papal policy had tossed away any good will vis-à-vis the Eastern Orthodox Church established by both Pope Gregory VII and Pope Urban II. In fact, this established an anti-Greek attitude endorsed by the papacy which would inspire Saint Bernard of Clairvaux to give speeches all across Europe blaming the losses of subsequent crusades on the Byzantine Empire. His words made anti-Greek attitudes nearly irreversible, and thus would set the stage for one of the most tragic events in history: the Fourth Crusade and the sack of Constantinople.

The First Crusade began as an operation with the primary objective to save Eastern Orthodoxy, and to help lead to a reunion in Christendom through the establishment of friendly relations. However, events at Antioch and Jerusalem in the latter years of the First Crusade dictated the creation of a new narrative, that of an anti-Greek attitude. Furthermore, these events led to mission creep in the Crusading idea that Gregory VII and Urban II had both fostered. Instead of being a means of establishing Christian unity between the Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church as originally intended, it was consumed by its secondary goal of the capture of Jerusalem. As a consequence, the crusading idea morphed from a means of

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assistance for brothers of the faith in the East to a means of territorial conquest of the Holy Lands at Antioch and Jerusalem. Although the objective of reclaiming Antioch and Jerusalem did not necessarily preclude the objective of reunification, it was ultimately during the process of reclaiming these two cities that the priority of reunification was abandoned. This later would manifest itself when Bohemond invaded the Byzantine possessions of the Balkans with Paschal’s endorsement, a clear reversal of papal policy and a damning blow to reunification.
Works Cited


APPROVAL SHEET

This is to certify that Michael Anthony Lovell has successfully completed his Senior Honors Thesis, entitled:

Church Reunification: Pope Urban II's Papal Policy towards the Christian East and Its Demise

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