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A Blue-Green Divide? Elite and Mass Partisan Dynamics in Taiwan

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A Blue-Green Divide?
Elite and Mass Partisan Dynamics in Taiwan

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
University of New Orleans
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Political Science

by

Hung-Chung Wang

B.A. National Chung Cheng University, 2000
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August 2010

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Abstract

This dissertation aims to investigate the bases of partisan differentiation and degree of polarization since Taiwan's 2000 presidential election. By employing American concepts and theories of partisan polarization, I analyze Taiwan's party politics at both the elite and mass levels. At the elite level, I examine whether inter-party antagonism has become more intense in Taiwan's legislature and what types of issues contribute most to party conflict since 2000. At the mass level, I examine public perceptions of the parties, analyze whether any political issues divide the Taiwanese public along partisan lines, and explore the social and demographic bases of partisan divisions.

The findings suggest that political elites became polarized along partisan lines after 2000, as observed in roll-call voting behavior in the Legislative Yuan. This resulted from the formation of a divided government and the confrontation of two party coalitions after the 2000 presidential election.

Furthermore, this polarization is mainly due to the opposite positions of the two party coalitions on the issue of the relationship with China. The pan-blue party coalition favors reunification and closer interaction with China, whereas its counterpart, the pan-green party coalition, favors Taiwanese independence and limited interaction with China. The issues of social reform vs. stability, social welfare vs. lower taxes, and environmental protection vs. economic development are less polarizing and less consistently divisive than the issue of Taiwan's relations with China.

Partisan polarization is less evident among ordinary citizens than among political elites. The only issue dividing Taiwanese significantly is the China relationship issue (independence or

unification with China). In addition, demographic factors may lead to partisan division among citizens. Nevertheless, this polarization is more moderate than that of political elites because the number of partisan independents is high and has not decreased significantly.

In short, partisan polarization in Taiwan is not as intense as some political scientists claim. Taiwan's partisan polarization at the mass level is closer to the concept of "sorting", referring to the process of people gradually affiliating with the party that best reflects their policy preferences, even if those preferences are more moderate than extreme.

Keywords: Political Party, Partisan Polarization, Political Issues, Voting Behavior, Taiwan

Chapter 1

Introduction

Taiwan's emerging democracy has transitioned from one-party authoritarianism to multi-party competition in recent decades. The many parties have formed two competing party coalitions, known as pan-blue and pan-green. As these coalitions solidify their policy platforms and establish their respective bases of support among the electorate, drawing on theoretical frameworks from American politics will shed light on the study of partisan identification and polarization in Taiwan.

This dissertation aims to investigate the bases of partisan differentiation and degree of polarization since the 2000 presidential election. I analyze Taiwan's party politics at both the elite and mass levels. At the elite level, I examine whether inter-party antagonism has become more intense in Taiwan's legislature and what types of issues contribute most to party conflict since 2000. At mass level, I examine public perceptions of the parties, analyze whether any political issues divide the Taiwanese public along partisan lines, and explore the social and demographic bases of partisan divisions.

Since this dissertation focuses on Taiwan's partisan polarization and employs the U.S. concept of polarization, I introduce the definition of political party and the development of the study of polarization in the United States first in this chapter.¹ Secondly, I explain the reasons for analyzing partisan change in Taiwan and present the questions I answer in the next chapters. Finally, I briefly introduce the contents of Chapters 2 through 6.

¹ More details about the development of the study of U.S. partisan polarization are introduced in Chapter 2.

Political Parties and Partisan Polarization

The Definition of Political Parties

Taiwan's first true opposition party was founded in 1986, which means that the history of party competition in Taiwan is quite short compared to that of Western democracies. Kenneth Janda (1980: 5) defined a political party as "an organization that pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government positions," implying a system of competition that determines the placement of individuals as representatives in the political system. Anthony Downs (1957: 25) also emphasizes the role of competition within the party system when he defines a political party as, "a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election." These definitions point out that political parties compete with one another and do not seek to undermine the legitimacy of the regime.

As we know, due to the difficulty of implementing direct democracy, representative politics becomes a necessary means for democratic government. As Janda claims, the major function and goal of political parties is to help citizens elect representatives to government positions. Hence, political parties become an indispensable part of democracy. Furthermore, Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond (2001) indicate that a political party has seven major functions, one of which is societal representation.² Jean Charlot (1989) also claims that parties form to secure social interest, bidding for the support of certain social groups and speaking for these groups in the political arena. Since political parties represent the interests of diverse social groups, confrontations among political parties are inevitable. Inter-party competition thus is central to this study.

² In addition to societal representation, political parties' functions include candidate nomination, electoral mobilization, issue structuring, interest aggregation, forming and sustaining government, and social integration (Gunther and Diamond, 2001: 7-8).

The Study of U.S. Partisan Polarization

Many political scientists have approached the study of party competition in the United States by explaining whether and how the U.S. public has become increasingly polarized in their partisanship on some important social and political issues since the 1980s. The discussion became more relevant after George W. Bush took office when scholars expressed increasing concern about the problems caused by fierce partisan conflict and growing social divisions.

A major reason why many U.S. political scientists focus on the study of political polarization in recent years is due to its potential effects. According to some research, partisan polarization results in policy gridlock (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006; Brady, Ferejohn, and Harbridge, 2008). Moreover, polarization can alienate and exclude ordinary citizens from politics, leading to distrust of government (Galston and Nivola, 2006). On the other hand, some scholars argue that polarized politics not only leads to negative effects but also to positive ones. High partisan polarization indicates that parties have well-defined positions on public policy, which in turn may lead to higher accountability of government performance (Galston and Nivola, 2006). Thus, citizens are more likely to be able to identify and vote for the party that most closely reflects their views on certain issues (Brooks and Geer, 2008). Finally, polarized politics benefits public engagement (Hetherington, 2008). Hetherington argues that more polarized political parties might raise people's concern about politics and therefore raise the likelihood they will become involved in politics.

In sum, partisan polarization has become an important issue in the United States. As a newly democratic country, Taiwan may encounter the same phenomenon since the beginning of this century as well. Hence, the U.S. political polarization research may offer inspiration for the study of Taiwan.

Why Taiwan?

Why do I choose Taiwan as the objective of this dissertation? First, Taiwan's party politics in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries offers a recent look into the development of a multi-party system and the evolution of partisan polarization over an observable period for which public opinion data also are available. Secondly, party realignment into two major coalitions after the 2000 Taiwanese presidential election facilitates the study of partisan polarization, making it more comparable to the U.S. political system and hence making the application of theories developed from U.S. political parties more relevant. As a result, Taiwan's political environment after its 2000 presidential election makes it a fascinating laboratory for studying the evolution of party differentiation and polarization.

In this research, I explore whether Taiwan's political elites became more polarized after President Chen Shui-bian took office in 2000 and after Lee Tung-hui departed from the KMT.

Brief Background of Partisan Polarization In Taiwan

After lifting 39-year-old martial law in 1987, Taiwan moved from authoritarianism toward representative democracy. A major result of this transition was the evolution of the party system, shifting from a one-party system to a multi-party system. However, the long-term ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), did not fall out of power with the collapse of the authoritarian regime. Instead, the KMT still controlled the government until 2000. However, the KMT's influence weakened because some KMT politicians departed from their party to found new parties, including the major opposition party. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gradually increased in size and influence.

After the 2000 presidential victory of the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan experienced its first turnover of party control of the executive. The KMT lost its dominant position, with the resulting development of divided government. Moreover, two party camps, the “pan-blue” camp and the “pan-green” camp, were formed because of former-President Lee Tung-hui’s departure from the KMT and the DPP’s presidential victory. Today the pan-blue and the pan-green camps, led by the KMT and the DPP respectively, have distinct positions on a variety of issues, in particular the re-establishment of relations with China. The formation of two party coalitions has resulted in fiercer partisan conflict.

Some scholars argued that the confrontation between party coalitions intensified after Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election (Wu, 2001; Yang, 2001). As a result the political attitudes of Taiwanese public also have become more polarized along party lines. These scholars worried that an increasingly polarized political atmosphere would harm social stability. Among the debates of Taiwan’s polarized politics, regional divergence in party identification attracts the most scholarly attention.

Some scholars of Taiwan describe “Southern politics” as the distinctive political attitudes among southern Taiwanese, especially their relatively strong support for the DPP (Hsu, 2000; Keng and Chen, 2003). Although other scholars questioned this assertion, it highlights that the fact Taiwan’s political party system and Taiwanese political attitudes are different today than they were prior to the 2000 presidential election.

According to Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal (2006), divided government, since World War II, and polarization often coincide. Accordingly, the first divided government in Taiwan is expected to lead political elites to differentiate themselves more clearly from each other.

In short, the political environment after Taiwan's 2000 presidential election created an excellent environment promoting a higher degree of partisan polarization. The concepts and methods for measuring U.S. partisan polarization can make a contribution to the study of Taiwan's case. In this dissertation I employ some concepts and measures which are used for measuring polarization in the United States and bring some factors which are important for Taiwan's politics into my research. This combination will be more useful for measuring whether and how partisan polarization takes place in Taiwan.

To study party politics in Taiwan, I need to construct a proper theoretical framework appropriate to that country. The U.S. polarization literature can be very helpful in putting Taiwan's partisan development in theoretical perspective. Some may wonder whether the U.S. theoretical framework can be applied to the study of Taiwan, since Taiwan and the United States have different constitutional designs, party systems, social structures and historical precedents. U.S. scholarship on partisan polarization offers insight for scholars who attempt to deal with polarized politics in other countries.

Questions

By employing theoretical framework and measures of the study of polarization in U.S. politics, I explore partisan change in Taiwan after its 2000 presidential election. The questions I raise in this research include:

1. Did Taiwan's politics become more polarized after its 2000 presidential election?
2. If polarization does exist, does it merely take place among political elites or does it occur among ordinary citizens as well?
3. What issues divide the Taiwanese people?

4. On which issues do partisans hold opposite positions?

5. What types of citizens are more likely to be extreme or to be more moderate?

The research focuses on partisan polarization during the period that President Chen was in office--from 2000 to 2008. My central thesis is that political elites became polarized along partisan lines after 2000, as observed in roll-call voting behavior in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's Congress. This resulted from former President Lee Tung- Hui's departure from the Kuomintang (KMT) and the DPP's victory in Taiwan's 2000 presidential election, leading to the formation of a divided government and the confrontation of two party coalitions.

However, partisan polarization is not so clear among ordinary citizens. The only issue significantly dividing Taiwanese people is the China relationship issue (Taiwanese independence or unification with China). In addition, region, ethnicity, and national identity do lead to partisan division among Taiwanese citizens. Nevertheless, this polarization is more moderate than if is among political elites because the number of partisan independents remains high. In short, partisan polarization in Taiwan is not as intense as some political scientists claim. Partisan change in Taiwan in recent years is closer to the concept of "sorting," referring to the process of people gradually affiliating with the party that best reflects their policy preferences, even if those preferences are more moderate than extreme.

Content Outline

To answer the questions posed above, I develop a theoretical and empirical framework for the case of Taiwan. The dissertation chapters that follow cover the introduction of previous theoretical and empirical research on political polarization, research design, empirical analysis, and a comprehensive discussion of the study of partisan polarization in Taiwan since the 2000 presidential election.

In Chapter 2, I first review the comparative parties literature. I then review the U.S. literature dealing with political polarization, introducing the research over the extent of polarization in the United States and how it influences the functioning of U.S. politics. After reviewing these literatures, I briefly introduce the evolution of politics in modern Taiwan, especially the current political environment which may nurture polarization.

In the subsequent three chapters I conduct empirical analyses of partisan polarization both among Taiwan's politicians and among its ordinary citizens. In Chapter 3, I analyze whether polarization among political elites in Taiwan has increased from 2000 to 2008. I also examine the significance of various issue areas as bases for partisan differentiation. I focus on legislative behavior in Taiwan's Congress, using roll-call votes in the Legislative Yuan as the main source of data. By analyzing roll-call votes, I can observe whether Taiwan's lawmakers have become more polarized after the first party turnover in 2000.

Starting with Chapter 4, I shift the focus from elites toward ordinary citizens. In this chapter I examine which issues divide the Taiwanese public and whether these divisions increase over time. The issues that I analyze include Taiwanese independence vs. re-unification with China, reform vs. stability, environmental protection vs. economic development, and social welfare vs. lower taxes. By taking advantage of public opinion survey data, I investigate ordinary citizens' positions on these issues and how these issues influence people's voting decisions.

The goal of Chapter 5 is to investigate the demographic basis of partisan polarization in Taiwan, deciphering the geographic factors and personal characteristics that affect people's partisanship and the changes in the influence of those factors over time. I use

public opinion surveys in this chapter to examine the relations between partisanship and the demographic variables.

In Chapter 6, I conclude with a summary of my findings, including a discussion of polarization vs. moderation in Taiwanese attitudes, as well as a summary of results and a discussion of the significance and implications of this research for partisanship and electoral competition in a newly democratic state such as Taiwan.

Chapter 2

Literature Review and Brief Introduction of Taiwan's Politics

Partisan development in Taiwan, reflecting the unique political dynamics of that country, may still be examined through the lens of party development in the United States and elsewhere. In this chapter, I begin by reviewing the previous research dealing with (1) the development of party systems in emerging democracies, and (2) the evolution and development of political polarization in the United States. I then briefly introduce the politics of modern Taiwan and how the studies of polarization in the United States contribute to this research. I also examine how the differences in political institutions and the environment in Taiwan differ from those of the United States, compelling researchers, such as myself, to adapt research methods and frameworks on polarization to the particular circumstances in Taiwan. Lastly I introduce the important political issues in Taiwan and discuss the relations among Taiwan's regions and partisan dominance in each region, which I analyze in more depth in chapters 4 and 5.

Political Parties and Social Cleavage

As Charlot (1989: 353) claims, political parties are formed not just to promote policy issues, but also to secure social interests. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) also point out that parties are political expressions of social cleavages. According to their research, the four cleavages that provided the basis of the emergence of European party systems include: center vs. periphery, state vs. church, agrarian vs. industrial interests, and employers vs. workers, triggered by national revolutions and the Industrial Revolution. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that the party systems froze around the social cleavages that were dominant in the 1920s.

Ronald Inglehart (1990) challenges this freezing hypothesis and claims that new cleavages emerged in the postwar industrialized West. He argues that the emergence of the affluent society and the growth of mass media and education after World War II led the new generation toward a different value system from the previous generation. These cultural differences resulted in people focusing less on material things and more on the quality of life. Issues, such as environmental protection, peace and women's rights, emerged and formed the basis for new social cleavages, such as that between materialists and post-materialists.

Nevertheless, the research cited above focused on the relationship between parties and social cleavages in established democracies, especially in Western Europe. Whether parties in newly democratic countries divide similarly along policy or ideological lines remains to be addressed.

Ian McAllister and Stephen White (2007) shift their focus to the social cleavages that existed in emerging democracies during political party system formation. Their results indicate that the social cleavages in the newly democratic countries resembled those in established democracies. Religion and class cleavages predominate both in the emerging and established democracies.³ However, McAllister and White's study found that political parties in the emerging democracies tend to be less effective in representing social cleavages than their counterparts in the established democracies (McAllister and White, 2007).

Moreover, Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal also demonstrate that the advanced industrial democracies exhibit greater levels of party system institutionalization than do newly emerging democracies by displaying greater stability in interparty competition and

³ McAllister and White's research only focuses on newly established democracies, which are the post-communist countries in east Europe. Those in Latin America, Asia, and other areas were not included.

stronger party roots in society. Mainwaring and Torcal conclude that weak institutionalization has negative consequences for electoral accountability (2005).

Extending this line of research to Taiwan, which is considered part of the third wave of democratization, Yun-han Chu demonstrates that the traditional class cleavage in structuring partisan issues and partisan identification was absent in Taiwan. Rather, the principal cleavages in Taiwan have related to the issues of national identity, political reform, and cross-Strait relations⁴ (Chu, 2001, Sheng and Chen, 2003). According to the research cited above, the formation of political parties is strongly related to social cleavages. As conflict along these lines extends to more issues, politics can become increasingly polarized. The issue of polarization extends across continents; many U.S. scholars have focused on this subject. Their findings can be very useful references for an examination of political polarization in Taiwan.

Partisan Polarization in the United States

The definition of partisan polarization

The ideological distance between the Democratic and the Republican parties has been steadily increasing since the 1970s (Brady and Han, 2006). This surge in party polarization in the United States has attracted scholarly attention in recent years (Kimball and Gross, 2004). Before discussing the implications and significance of polarization in the United States, I must first clearly define polarization. Polarization refers to “the extent of disagreement between parties and unity within parties” (DiMaggio, John Evans, and Bryson, 1996; see also Brandy and Han, 2006: 120-121).

⁴ Taiwan and China are separated by the Taiwan Strait. Hence, scholars and media frequently use “cross-Strait relations” for the relationship between Taiwan and China.

Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal (2006) offer a brief definition of polarization with regard to ideology: Polarization is, in short, a separation of politics into liberal and conservative camps. McCarty and his coauthors indicate further that there are two complementary facets to polarization in the United States. First, ideologically moderate Members of Congress are vanishing. Second, the two political parties have moved rather apart in terms of ideology (i.e. the ideological distance between their platforms has grown). Polarization occurs as conservatives and liberals have become almost perfectly synonymous with Republicans and Democrats respectively (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006:3). In other words, the difference between the two parties is more congruent with the difference between conservative and liberal ideology than in previous time periods.

In fact, polarization in U.S. politics is not a new phenomenon. Brady and Han (2006) point out that there are two major periods of polarization in U.S. history: the first is the turn of 20th century in which The United States experienced the transition from an agricultural society to a modern industrialized society; the other is the Great Depression of the 1930s. Both of these periods experienced political crises that divided the two parties. Moreover, the current polarization is more similar to the period at the turn of the 20th century.

The Sources of Partisan Polarization

After discussing the definition of political polarization, people might ask why U.S. politics has become polarized. Scholars offer different explanations for the surge of political polarization. Gary C. Jacobson (2008) claims that the sources of partisan polarization include changes in the political attitudes of citizens, in the policy issues addressed by government, and in the way citizens sort themselves into parties based on their attitudes, specific events, political battles and so on.⁵

⁵ I only list some of the sources of partisan polarization given by Jacobson. For the full list, see his book (2008:

Focusing on regional and socioeconomic factors, McCarty et al (2006) indicate that the major source of polarization was when Republicans moved to the right. As the replacement of moderate Democrats by conservative Republicans in the South continues, Northern Democrats appear increasingly liberal by contrast, polarizing the parties.

Furthermore, according to Earl Black and Merle Black (2007), the Northeast and the Pacific Coast have become the strongholds of the Democratic Party; whereas the Republican Party has established strongholds in the South and the Mountain/Plains, while the Midwest remains a swing region. They point out that over the past 50 years, white Americans, overall, increasingly favor the Republican more than the Democratic Party, and conservative whites are now solidly Republican. Black and Black (2007) contend that Reagan's presidency attracted most conservative U.S. citizens to the Republican party, bringing white Southerners into the GOP. Reagan's platforms, such as tax cuts, reduction of government spending, and emphasis on traditional values, served as a turning point to realign conservatives, which changed some areas into GOP-strongholds, where the party previously had been uncompetitive, specifically the South.

McCarty et al. point out the importance of income inequality on partisan polarization. High income Americans are more likely to identify with and vote for the Republican Party, whereas low income Americans tend to side with the Democrats as the South has evolved in recent decades from a dominant-party system to a competitive two-party system. This income effect has increased more sharply in the South than in the North, (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006).

Cultural factors may contribute to polarization. The debate over the "culture war" has received considerable scholarly attention in recent years. The culture war refers to the

contention that moral and religious issues, such as abortion and homosexuality, have replaced class economic issues as the primary basis of conflict in U.S. politics (Hunter, 1991).

The scholars of the cultural school claim that moral and religious issues divide the nation. Paul DiMaggio, John Evans, and Bethany Bryson find that even though there is little evidence that the United States has experienced large scale polarization on other social issues since the 1970s, people's attitudes toward abortion have become more polarized (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996; see also Evans, Bryson, and DiMaggio, 2001).

When it comes to the development of religiosity as a political cleavage in the United States, some scholars point out that the religious restructuring of partisan division is seen in the movement of secular individuals, religious moderates and those with no religious affiliation into the Democratic Party and the counter push of orthodox believers and traditionalists into the GOP (Ladd, 1993, 1997; Layman and Carmines, 1997). In addition, religion and moral values are important voting cues in the elections (Dionne, 2006).

Other scholars call into question the importance of religion and moral issues as causes of political polarization. Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope (2006) reveal that scholars greatly exaggerated the argument that the U.S. population polarized around moral and religious issues. For example, they argue that the claim that the country is polarized on the issue of abortion is false. E.J. Dionne Jr. agrees that religion and moral values do continue to be important, but they are overemphasized by many observers (Dionne, 2006).

According to the discussion above, scholars have not reached a consensus on how cultural factors influence polarization in U.S. politics. The debates over this issue likely will continue. Moreover, some scholars consider the media as a leading factor in partisan polarization (Mutz, 2006). Jacobson (2006) argues that increasingly fragmented and

ideologically diverse sources of news contribute to the two parties' supporters maintaining distinct views of reality. The research finding of Steven Kull and his associates confirms Jacobson's argument (Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis, 2003). Their research focuses on the relationship between media and people's misperception of the Iraq War, revealing that news sources had a significant effect on misperceptions of the war. For example, frequent watchers of Fox news were the most misinformed on the Iraq War.⁶

Other scholars question the media's effect on polarization. Thomas Rosenstiel (2006) and Gregg Easterbrook (2006) argue that the media do not encourage polarization. Several factors prevent media from becoming more partisan and ideological such as advertising, geography, politics, and the fact that consumers no longer relying on single sources for their primary media consumption (Rosenstiel 2006: 250-51). Therefore, the debate continues and the media's effect on political polarization should be studied further.

Redistricting may help explain the increasing polarization in the U.S. Congress. Redistricting creates politically homogeneous districts that are dominated by one of these political parties. The lack of competition in districts eventually leads to ideologically extreme House members representing the district. Fiorina and his coauthors claim partisan gerrymandering is the main cause leading to increasing number of safe districts in the House of Representatives. In other words, increasing polarization in Congress is largely due to redistricting (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2006).

However, Many other scholars oppose their argument about redistricting (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005; Mann, 2006; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006; Ono, 2005). For example, Ono argues that redistricting actually has done little to cause

⁶ Kull and his colleagues employed three perception questions to test to what extent people misperceive the reality of the Iraq War. The questions include: "clear evidence that Saddam Hussien was working closely with al Qaeda has been found," "weapon of mass destruction have been found in Iraq," and "world public opinion favored the United States going to war with Iraq" (Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis, 2003).

polarization. Abramowitz and Saunders (2005: 19) also suggest that the increasing geographic polarization does not result from redistricting but rather from fundamental changes in U.S. society and politics such as internal migration, immigration, and ideological realignment within the electorate. Most importantly, redistricting cannot account for the growing party polarization in the Senate (Theriault, 2008).

Having introduced the sources of partisan polarization, I shift the focus to the impact of polarization on the political process and public policy.

The Influence of Polarization

As for the influence of polarization on politics, Brady and Han offer an interesting point of view:

There is a certain irony underlying all of the debate about polarization because the primary function of political parties is, by definition, to organize differences between factions in the political system... In some sense, political parties exist in order to be polarized [Brady and Han, 2006: 120].

The main function of parties is to offer different policy choices for ordinary citizens. However, what would happen if the choices offered by parties are too polarized? According to some research, there is a positive relationship between partisan polarization and gridlock in public policy (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006; Brady, Ferejohn, and Harbridge, 2008).

Brady and his colleagues contend that polarization results in some forms of policy gridlock (Brady, Ferejohn, and Harbridge, 2008). They further indicate, however, that

Although we find evidence of gridlock in some policy areas as polarization increases, we also find that there are pork barrel policy areas in which there is no apparent relationship, and thus relatively large budgetary changes occur both under low and high polarization (2008: 199).

Thus, while polarization certainly increases the potential for policy gridlock, its effect is not absolute (Brady, Ferejohn, and Harbridge, 2008: 204).

This polarization-induced gridlock also leads to some problems: public policy would not be able to adjust for changing economic and demographic circumstances; the Congress could become relatively less powerful than other government branches;⁷ courts and regulatory agencies could become more likely to pursue their policy goals since their action is less likely to be checked by the Congress (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006).

Polarization may potentially increase citizen distrust of government. Partisan polarization tends to alienate and exclude ordinary citizens (Galston and Nivola, 2006). Once politicians become more extreme and when citizens feel they are distant from politicians, they tend to distrust what politicians do in Washington D.C. John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Thiess-Morse's research (2002) confirmed the positive relationship between political polarization and public distrust.

Although polarization does have several drawbacks for democratic politics, not all observers hold pessimistic views of it; some scholars believe partisan polarization still has some advantages. Galston and Nivola (2006) indicate that the U.S. party system was criticized for a lack of responsibility for a long time. Since polarization causes parties to become more coherent and disciplined, they thus have no excuse to avoid responsibility for their policy. In other words, this partisan polarization may lead to higher accountability of government performance.

For citizens, polarization can assist them to "vote correctly." When the political elite's ideology and policy positions become clearer and more distinguishable from one another, it is easier for ordinary citizens, especially for the moderately and less politically aware, to figure out if they prefer the option offered by one party over the alternative (Brooks and

⁷ The reason why Congress could become relatively less powerful than other government branches if polarization is extreme is because the president, instead of pursuing their goals through the Congress, would more likely issue executive orders. Congress's power thus declines relatively (Howell, 2003; Lewis, 2003).

Geer, 2008). Thus, voters are more likely to identify with and vote for the party closest to them in ideology and policy positions.

Furthermore, one study found that partisan polarization also benefits public engagement in politics (Hetherington, 2008). According to this argument, more polarized parties raise people's concern about politics and thus make them more likely to be interested and involved in politics. Hetherington (2008) points out that elite polarization has stimulated participation at the mass level. Most importantly, he showed that not only those who were liberal and conservative had higher participation than they did before; independents also were more engaged in the period of polarization.

Partisan polarization also seems to stimulate more attention to issues in political campaigns. It is a reasonable hypothesis that when political parties become more polarized on their issues, negativity and attacks in campaigns should focus less on candidates' personal traits and more on issue positions. According to Geer (2006, cited from Brooks and Geer, 2008: 37), issue-based negativity in the presidential election has increased since the 1960s whereas personal trait-based negativity has not. In other words, instead of criticizing opponents' personal traits, candidates become more likely to attack opponents' issue positions and records under the condition of party polarization (Brooks and Geer, 2008).

In sum, according to previous research, even if party polarization has several detrimental effects on politics, it is not necessarily bad for the polity overall. Polarization does have certain advantages and these advantages may be the solutions to an irresponsible party system (Brooks and Geer, 2008).

Controversy over Polarization: The Debate Between Polarization and Sorting

Polarization among the general public may not reflect the extent of polarization among political elites. Philip E. Converse (1964) emphasized the difference in ideology

between political elites and ordinary citizens. Converse argues that ordinary citizens, unlike political elites who think ideologically, do not have a highly organized constrained belief system. They rarely rely on abstract concepts, such as liberal/conservative terminology, to assist them to make decisions and form opinions when they consider political affairs. Among citizens, well-educated people of high socioeconomic status are expected to be more likely to have constrained belief systems. Research finds that well-educated Democrats and Republicans are more polarized in policy choices than other groups since the late 1960s (Everett Carl Ladd, Jr. and Charles D. Hadley, 1973).

In general, political scientists agree that the U.S. Congress and the White House have become more ideologically polarized than they were a few decades ago (Fleisher and Bond, 2000; Galston and Nivola, 2006; Poole, 2008). This leads to some other important questions. Have ordinary citizens also become more polarized politically? How polarized are they? Are they as polarized as political elites?

These questions lead to the biggest debate of partisan polarization, and scholars have not reached a consensus yet. Some scholars think that ordinary citizens also have become more polarized (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; Fleisher and Bond, 2001; Hetherington, 2001; Layman and Carsey, 2002; Kimball and Gross, 2004; Balz, 2005; Abramowitz, 2006a; Campbell, 2006; Wilson, 2006; Jacobson, 2008), while others claim that polarization only exists among political elites (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996; Evans, Bryson, and DiMaggio, 2001; Evans, 2003; Klinkner, 2004; Klinkner and Hapanowicz, 2005; Levendusky, 2005; Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2006; Brady and Han, 2006; Galston and Nivola, 2006; Brady, Ferejohn, and Harbridge, 2008). Scholars who believe the public to be more polarized find that the public is not as polarized as elites. However, they indicate that people with strong partisanship have become increasingly polarized over the past three decades (Poole, 2008).

Furthermore, scholars who believe the masses also are polarized still suggest that the increasing party polarization in the United States is an elite-driven development (Kimball and Gross, 2004). Elite polarization has clarified the increased ideological differences between the Republican and Democratic Parties. This clarification helps citizens choose a party identification more easily based on their policy preferences and this has led to a resurgence of partisanship in the public (Hetherington, 2001; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005). In short, by following the lead of elites, ordinary citizens also become more polarized accordingly.

However, this argument is challenged by scholars who argue that polarization only occurs among elites. According to these scholars, the overall ideological balance of the public has not changed much over the past three decades (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996; Evans, Bryson, and DiMaggio, 2001; Klinkner, 2004; Brady and Han, 2006; Galston, Nivola, 2006; Brady, Ferejohn, Harbridge, 2008).⁸

Fiorina and others claim that a disconnect exists between the U.S. people and those who purport to represent them (Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006a). While ordinary people have not become more ideologically polarized, their choices have become more polarized. Citizens have no other choice than to choose between the polarized options. Therefore, when the public perceives that elites are becoming more polarized, they line up on the same side of ideological spectrum as their party's elites (Levendusky, 2005; Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006a). However, Fiorina and other scholars argue that the scholars who then claim people are increasingly polarized misinterpret this phenomenon (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2006).

⁸ Only certain scholars acknowledge that the population's attitudes toward abortion had been polarizing (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996; Evans, Bryson, and DiMaggio, 2001). However, this argument is not a consensus for scholars opposing polarization among ordinary citizens. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2006) disagree with their assertion.

Therefore, instead of using “polarization,” Fiorina and his coauthors present the concept of “sorting” to explain the current partisan division among the public. In their words, sorting implies that “those who affiliate with a party are more likely to affiliate with the party which has the closest ideological position” to them (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2006). The concept of polarization, according to Fiorina and Levendusky, suggests that ordinary citizens have been pushed from the moderate position toward both ends of the ideological spectrum. As the public becomes polarized, the middle ground vanishes (Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006a).

Sorting creates a different ideological pattern where two polar camps exist but the middle ground remains, because the majority of the public still occupies it. According to Fiorina and Levendusky (2006a), this is the real case today. The concept of sorting highlights the important distinction between polarization among the elite from that among the general public. Besides, according to Levendusky’s finding, sorting is done better by those who are informed. In other words, the more informed people are, the more likely their partisanship matches their ideology and issue positions (Levendusky, 2005).

Since scholars of this school find little evidence of polarization among the population, why might we perceive there to be more polarization than there actually exists? Evans (2003) offers two potential answers for the question. He suggests that the polarization of political parties and a crystallization of the meaning of liberal and conservative are two major causes leading us to perceive today’s increasing polarization among the general public.⁹

In sum, scholars of the elite-only polarization school argue that there is a gulf between the observed stable distribution of public opinion and the perceived polarization

⁹ In Evans’s previous article coauthored with DiMaggio and Bryson, Evans and his colleagues listed twelve causes resulting in the perception of more polarization (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996: 740-41). He narrowed them down to two major suspects in later work.

among ordinary citizens. For these scholars, the public has not become extreme in ideology in current years. Rather, partisan polarization only occurs among political elites.

Contradiction of Sorting

The concept of sorting offers a reasonable explanation for non-polarized politics in the United States. However, scholars like Jacobson (2006) attack these assertions because they see evidence of a polarized public. For instance, Jacobson claims that if polarization only takes place among political elites and most ordinary citizens remain moderate, the distance between citizens' self-identified ideological location and that of each party and its candidate should get larger over time. According to his research, this distance is small and it has not increased.

Abramowitz (2006b) also argues that Fiorina and Levendusky's conclusion is not correct. He first mentions that sorting is not a process separate from polarization. Ordinary partisans are more divided than in the past and the sharpest division is found among the politically engaged partisans. Moreover, echoing Abramowitz, James E. Campbell's research shows that moderate citizens constitute a political minority among voters and that increased polarization results from a growing conservative electorate and also a slightly increasing liberal electorate (Campbell, 2006).

Finally, Abramowitz criticizes Fiorina and Levendusky's attempt to separate sorting from polarization as their misunderstanding of the role political parties play in a democratic political system. The reason why the two major parties are more polarized, according to Abramowitz, is because they appease their supporters, who have become more polarized than they were a few decades ago. The polarization between the two parties results from the responsiveness of the parties to the sharper division in the electorate (Abramowitz, 2006b).

In sum, in the debate between polarization and sorting, both sides hold their own viewpoints. Some political scientists argue that ideology has already become a critical factor influencing the U.S. politics. Both political elites and ordinary citizens have become more ideologically polarized. However, other scholars contend that only politicians have become ideologically polarized while ordinary citizens have not. Many people remain moderate in their views; the middle ground does not vanish, and polarization in this view is just a myth. It seems that consensus will not be reached in a short time.

Polarization vs. Divided Government

Before we end the discussion of partisan polarization in U.S. politics, the relationship between polarization and a related concept—divided government—should not be ignored. Divided government implies split-party control of the legislative and executive branch, whereas polarization refers to ideological partisan division. While one should not confuse these two distinct concepts, divided government may be a catalyst of polarization. McCarty et al. (2006) indicate divided government and strong congressional power contribute to polarization in the political system.

In terms of policy, previous research found that the Congress is more likely to pass the president's legislation under unified government, whereas disagreement takes place more often under divided government (Sinclair, 2000). McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) also agree with Sinclair and suggest that gridlock is greatest when the government is divided as well as polarized. Unfortunately, according to McCarty and his coauthors, polarization has occurred more often in an era of increasing frequency of divided government.

Most scholars agree that divided government with high levels of polarization negatively affects democratic politics. However, Barbara Sinclair (2008) suggests that the main function of Congress is to check and balance executive power. Unified government

with partisan polarization limits the extent to which Congress performs its expected function because the majority party in Congress is too unlikely to challenge the president. Therefore, according to Sinclair (2008), divided government accompanied by high degrees of polarization does not harm democratic politics; the legislature, under divided government, serves its purpose as a check on executive power.

In sum, even though scholars of different schools of thought have not reached consensus on certain issues in the research on partisan polarization in the United States, the study of polarization has been fruitful in recent years. The study of the U.S. polarized politics inspires me to employ the research framework on the case of Taiwan since its first party turnover in 2000. Although the constitutional designs, party systems, and social structures of the United States and Taiwan are not identical, the concepts and methods for measuring partisan polarization in the United States can make a contribution to the study of Taiwan's case. Therefore, I briefly introduce the political development of modern Taiwan in the next section and discuss how I apply the U.S. research structure to study Taiwan's politics.

Brief Introduction of Politics in Taiwan

After China ceded the island of Formosa to Japan in 1895, Japan continued to occupy Taiwan for 50 years. China then took over the island again after the end of World War II, and it became an asylum for people on the losing side of China's civil war. The Chinese Nationalist Party, also known as Kuomintang (KMT), retreated to Taiwan in 1949 after losing to the Communist Party of China (CPC). Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT chairman, exercised authoritarian rule over the island from 1949 until his death in the mid-1970s.

Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son, succeeded his father as leader of the KMT, and he was elected Taiwan's President as well, continuing to dominate political power in Taiwan. During the period of the two President Chiangs, the Taiwanese only had limited

political rights and the government did not allow its legitimacy to be challenged. However, unlike Chiang Kai-shek, who did not allow any form of political opposition, his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, tolerated some degree of opposition. He gradually embarked on political reform and democratization (Wu, 1997).

In the 1970s, Taiwan suffered diplomatic setbacks, including the United Nations' 1971 decision to recognize the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China and expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek, as well as the United States' decision to break diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979. This hurt the legitimacy of the KMT government, compelling the ruling party to respond to people's demand for political reforms (I-chou, Liu, 2004). The Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, which were not elected since the KMT's retreat to Taiwan in 1949 were opened to limited popular election, giving non-KMT politicians a chance to be elected into national representative bodies (Chu, 2001).

In the meantime, Taiwan also experienced a huge social change. Rapid industrialization, increasing economic development and higher level of education led the Taiwanese not merely to focus on their wealth, but also to begin requesting more extensive political rights. Unable to resist people's demand for greater political participation, the KMT eventually lifted the 39-year-old martial law on July 15, 1987. It also revised the existing law governing political association and press censorship. From that moment, individuals were allowed to found new political parties and to privately own mass media. Meanwhile, the ban of any type of interaction with China during the period of two President Chiangs was lifted as well.¹⁰ The Taiwanese people, especially Mainlanders who had exiled themselves to Taiwan with the KMT, were thus permitted to visit their relatives in China. This was the first cross-strait interaction since China's civil war.¹¹

¹⁰ In the 1970s, the Chiang administration's China policy was, "Three No Policies: no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise."

¹¹ Taiwan has four ethnic groups: Taiwanese-Minnan, Taiwanese-Hakka, Aborigine, and Mainlanders. Mainlanders are those who retreated from China with the KMT after China's civil war in 1949. They were not born in Taiwan and most Mainlanders still had family or relatives in China at that time. Conversely, other ethnic groups were born in Taiwan and reside in Taiwan for a longer time. Few of them still have family or relatives in China. Therefore, lifting the ban of interaction with China is more important for Mainlanders than other ethnic

These reforms represented Taiwan's first steps toward democratization. Hung-mao, Tien (1989) emphasizes two major political developments that occurred during Taiwan's democratization in the late 1980s. The first development was the transition of the political system from an authoritarian one-party system to a dominant-party system of mixed representation. The second major political development was the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's first true opposition party, on September 28, 1986. These two critical steps led to a more competitive multiparty system.

When it comes to one-party states, scholars often compare Taiwan with Mexico because of similarities in their processes of democratization.¹² First, Taiwan and Mexico are newly industrialized countries and both experienced rapid economic growth under the leadership of nondemocratic single-party regimes in the past decades. Moreover, these two countries are the members of the third wave of democratization, starting their democratization since the 1970s and 1980s respectively. According to Samuel P. Huntington (1991), Taiwan and Mexico had gone through the same process of democratization, which he called "transformation," referring to reform led by political elites of the ruling party.¹³ Finally, the ruling parties of Taiwan and Mexico in their authoritarian periods, the KMT and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), respectively, continued their dominance after the regimes democratized.

groups.

¹² Some people may claim that South Korea also had a similar process of democratization with Taiwan and Mexico. However, according to Huntington (1991), South Korea's former regime was not only a one-party regime but also a military regime. Moreover, the democratization of South Korea was promoted by the cooperation of ruling and opposition political elites which Huntington calls "transplacement." Since South Korea's regime type and the category of democratization were quite different from Taiwan and Mexico, Korea may not be an appropriate case to be included in the discussion of democratization of Taiwan and Mexico.

¹³ Huntington (1991) indicated that there are three types of process of democratization: transformation, transplacement, replacement, and replacement. Transplacement refers to the reform resulting from the cooperation between the ruling party and opposition party. Replacement refers to the change led by the position party and nondemocratic government was overturned.

However, despite the similarities between Taiwan and Mexico on their path to democratization, major differences exist between the two countries. First, the turning points triggering democratization in the two countries are different. In Taiwan, the diplomatic crisis, which resulted in the decline of the legitimacy of the KMT government in the 1970s, was the critical reason leading to the expansion of political participation. In Mexico, people's anger at the ruling party's failure to deal with economic crises, as well as a long tradition of rigged elections were the main factors leading to democratization. Secondly, just as factors promoting democratization are different, so are the ruling parties' strategies.

In Taiwan, as noted earlier, the diplomatic setback in the 1970s was the first step that led Taiwan to begin its process of democratization. Moreover, political power, especially in the central government, was monopolized by Mainlanders, people who retreated with the KMT regime from China. Other ethnic groups born in Taiwan demanded more participation for a long time. In order to pacify these ethnic groups, the KMT recruited some local political elites from these various groups into the central government. This was also the first step of political localization in Taiwan (Chu, 2001).¹⁴

Mexico's economic development in the 1960s was the most outstanding among the Latin American countries, legitimizing the authoritarian regime. However, an economic crisis and unfair elections in the 1980s aroused public indignation. The ruling party had to promise fairness and transparency in elections to ensure people's continuing support (Chou, 1995). In sum, Mexico's democratization in the 1980s may be compared with Taiwan's case due to their similarities, though one should use caution due to the different social and political factors that led the two states to implement democracy.

¹⁴ Political localization in the 1970s, promoted by Chiang Ching-Kuo, refers to government's recruitment of officials who were born in Taiwan. It was not identical to the localization movement, also called "Taiwanization", promoted by Lee Tung-hui. Lee's localization is introduced in a later section.

Similar to Mexico, Taiwan's multiparty democracy evolved from a period of authoritarian rule, in this case beginning in the late 1980s. Chiang Ching-kuo died soon after he lifted martial law and ended the ban on any type of interaction with China, the ban on the establishment of new political parties, and censorship of mass media. His vice president, Lee Tung-hui, succeeded him as the eighth president and the first national leader who was born in Taiwan. Lee held the presidency for 12 years and continued to promote democratization in Taiwan. The most important achievements of Lee's presidency were direct elections of the president and of the representatives to Taiwan's congress, the Legislative Yuan.

Lee promoted Taiwanization, also known as the localization movement, emphasizing the importance of the unique culture of Taiwan rather than solely viewing Taiwan as a part of China. This contrasts to the China-oriented ideology during the period of the two President Chiangs. Localization is a Taiwanese movement that focuses on the significance of teaching and understanding Taiwanese history, culture, language and so on. KMT partisans who believe Taiwan should have more active interaction with China strongly criticize Lee's Taiwanization movement and his conservative stance on relations with China. Some of these partisans departed the KMT to found other political parties, such as the New Party (NP), which advocates a pro-China stance.

At the same time, the major opposition party, the DPP, became much stronger. The DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, won the 2000 presidential election and became the first non-KMT president, representing the first transfer of power in Taiwan's history. Chen faced divided government as his party did not obtain a majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan, which still was controlled by the KMT and adherent parties.¹⁵

¹⁵ Chen's victory was due to the KMT's division. Chen only obtained 39.3% of votes and the two candidates from the KMT, James Chu-yu Soong and Lien Chan, won 36.8% and 23.1% of votes respectively.

Meanwhile, Lee left the KMT after the 2000 presidential election and helped his followers create a new party, Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) that emphasized the importance of Taiwanization. This party joined the pro-Taiwan camp led by the DPP. At the same time, the KMT, taken over by pro-China partisans after Lee's departure, formed an alliance with other political parties sharing the same ideology, such as the NP and the People First Party (PFP), founded by James Soong. The two camps, the "pan-blue" camp and the "pan-green" camp, were thus formed under Taiwan's multi-party system.¹⁶ In short, the "pan-blue" camp, led by the KMT, favors reunification and more active interaction with China, while opposing Taiwanization. The "pan-green" camp, led by the DPP, favors Taiwanese independence, Taiwanization, and advocates limited interaction with China. The main parties grew more polarized in their positions after Lee's departure from the KMT and thus, scholars expect the disagreements between the political elites of the two camps to grow.

The DPP government suffered from the confrontation between the two party coalitions in the legislative Yuan. Moreover, even though President Chen promised that he would boost Taiwan's economy, he did not find any good means to deal with the economic recession throughout his two terms, causing great unrest among ordinary citizens. Most importantly, Chen, his family, and subordinates were involved in several scandals, resulting in citizen distrust of Chen and the DPP government. These factors contributed to the landslide victory of Ying-jeou Ma, the KMT's presidential candidate, over the DPP's candidate, Frank Hsieh, marking the second power transfer in democratic Taiwan. The life of the DPP's first period of rule only lasted eight years.

The 2008 Taiwanese presidential election resulted in the KMT returning to power. Nevertheless, this result did not change the structure of the two party coalitions and no

¹⁶ Blue is the color of the KMT's badge and flag, whereas green is that of the DPP's.

minor party within either of the two coalitions switched to the opposite coalition. Hence, I still use the structure of the two party coalitions to analyze partisan polarization in Taiwan.

The Differences between U.S. and Taiwan Politics

After reviewing the research on political polarization in the United States and Taiwan's politics, one may question whether the research framework of political polarization in the United States should be employed to study polarization in Taiwan. Actually, due to the institutional differences, I recognize that some important factors influencing political polarization in the United States cannot be extended to Taiwan's case. For example, redistricting, which is considered as one important factor leading to polarization in the U.S. Congress, does not apply to Taiwan. Instead of employing a single-member district plurality system, Taiwan uses multi-member district single non-transferable vote (SNTV) for the Legislative Yuan election.¹⁷ Redistricting is not used in Taiwan, hence it is not a cause political polarization there.¹⁸

In addition, due to different social structures, left-right or liberal-conservative ideological terminology also may not be a meaningful and useful tool to measure Taiwanese political polarization.¹⁹ However, these differences do not eliminate the merit of applying research on polarization in U.S. politics toward understanding Taiwan's case.

Since traditional ideological terminology (i.e. the left-right or conservative-liberal dimension) is not applicable to Taiwan, I shift the focus to "issues." Actually, an individual's

¹⁷ Starting with the election of the seventh Legislative Yuan in 2008, Taiwan also employs single member district plurality system for its legislators' election.

¹⁸ Rather than dealing with the change of the boundary of a district, redistricting in Taiwan only dealt with the change of number of legislators elected in a district according to the change in population of a district.

¹⁹ According to Chen (2003), some Taiwanese respondents know certain ideological terminologies, such as left-right, and are able to locate themselves on the left-right ideological spectrum. However, he also recognizes that he is not sure that whether Taiwanese respondents do understand what these ideological terminologies refer to and whether these ideological terminologies, which Taiwanese use in his survey, are identical to those long used in the West. Hence, until we confirm that Taiwanese people do understand the content of traditional ideological terminologies, they are not suitable for measuring Taiwanese people's political behavior.

position on ideological terminology may also be judged by his/her position on certain issues, such as abortion, gun control and so on. Hence, it is reasonable and practical to use issue positions to replace ideology when working on a country in which traditional liberal – conservative ideological terminology has little relevance since people do not think in those terms. Therefore, instead of focusing on the ideology *per se*, I use issue positions as a proxy for measuring the polarization of elites and ordinary citizens. Moreover, since Ideology is not suitable for the study of Taiwan, I employ DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson’s definition of political polarization which refers to “the extent of disagreement between parties and unity within parties.”

As a result, I emphasize the extent of disagreement between parties and the unity within them. I include certain factors that may be suitable to detect polarization universally, such as legislative behavior, issue positions, and geographic and demographic differences, in order to examine partisan polarization in Taiwan.

Issues and Political Parties in Taiwan

Since the focus of Taiwan’s partisan polarization emanates from issues rather than traditional conceptions of ideology, I must introduce certain important issues that are especially salient in Taiwanese politics. The issues that many scholars of Taiwan argue may drive political cleavages and partisan formation include: Taiwan independence vs. reunification with China, political reform vs. social stability, environmental protection vs. economic development, and social welfare spending vs. lower taxes.

Independence vs. Reunification

Undoubtedly, how to deal with the relationship with China always has been the most important issue for the island. The debate over whether Taiwan should declare itself a newly

independent country or unify with China in the future intensified after the DPP added a “Taiwan independence clause” into its charter in 1991.

The pan-blue camp, led by the KMT, emphasizes the importance of a “one China policy”²⁰ and advocates closer interaction with China due to historical ties between the two. The party’s advocacy is based on nurturing or establishing three direct links with China: business, postal delivery, and communication. On the other hand, the pan-green camp, led by the DPP, argues that Taiwan should continue to have limited interaction with China owing to China’s threat to use armed force if Taiwan declares itself a new, independent country. The pan-green partisans fear that excessive Taiwanese investment in China may lead to economic recession and unemployment in Taiwan.

Since the two party coalitions have clear and distinct stances and political elites’ opinion has a large impact on public opinion (Zaller, 1992), I expect that their partisans in the general public should fall in line with the parties’ leadership and thus should become more polarized on this issue.

Political Reform vs. Social Stability

In transitioning from an authoritarian to a democratic polity, Taiwan has undergone a huge and rapid social and political change since the mid-1980s (Sheng, 2005). People began to demand political reforms for more rights. Protests and demonstrations in favor of large scale reform had a profound impact on the social order. Finding the proper balance between promoting large scale reform and maintaining social stability has become an important issue.

²⁰ The KMT’s one China policy is different from People Republic of China’s (PRC’s) one China policy. PRC’s One China policy is “there is only one China in the world, which is People Republic of China.” The KMT’s one China Policy is “one China, with each side having its own interpretation.” Although the KMT and PRCs’ one China policy are not totally identical, both of them signify that Taiwan is one part of China, which are opposite to the pan- green camp’s position on this issue.

Usually, an opposition party, such as the DPP before 2000, is more likely to have a reputation for promoting reform since it does not need to confront fiscal and other problems that the ruling party must consider. On the other hand, the ruling party tends to keep the status quo as long as the current political system works in its favor. The KMT, a long-term ruling party, emphasized the importance of maintaining social stability and clearly defined its position on this issue. However, since the KMT lost power after 2000, its leaders' advocacy for social stability and the status quo has begun to give way to advocacy for political reform. I examine whether or not citizens' opinions on the issue have followed their party leadership.

Social Welfare vs. Lower Taxes and Environmental Protection vs. Economic Development

Promoting economic development versus environmental protection and whether or not to increase taxes to further social welfare are two debates frequently appearing in Taiwan's public opinion surveys. For a developing country, economic growth is one of the most important missions for the government. As such the KMT emphasized it, as the ruling party at that time. However, as Taiwan's economy grew, some people began to realize the importance of environmental protection.

The opposition party, the DPP, always stood in favor of supporting environmental organizations to oppose the KMT's pro-business policies. Once the DPP controlled the government, however, it quickly realized that it is difficult to ignore the influence of business, and thus it continued KMT's policy of supporting economic development at the expense of the environment. The DPP made some compromises that have led some citizens and members of environmental organizations to rebel against the party leadership.²¹

²¹ The most famous case was the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant. The DPP opposed the plant alongside environmental organizations before it took office. As it became the ruling party after the 2000 presidential election, its prime minister of the Executive Yuan, Chang Chun- hsiung, declared he would cease

By the same token, the DPP was considered more progressive than the KMT and also more attentive to social welfare policy before it took power. In fact, the two major parties each have their issue ownership on social welfare. The KMT used to focus only on welfare for “civil servants-military officers, government employees, and educational personnel,” whereas the DPP emphasizes overall welfare for ordinary citizens such as “pensions for senior farmers” and “pensions for senior citizens.” The senior citizen pension issue, for example, was first proposed by the DDP as its main policy in the 1993 city mayor/ county magistrate election.²² However, when the KMT realized that social welfare can serve as a tool to attract votes, it began to advocate for general social welfare programs as well. Consequently, as the two parties have alternated in power and in opposition, their positions on environmental protection and social welfare have become increasingly unstable, offering little guidance for their partisans in the general public.

In sum, among these issues, it seems that elites and citizens are more likely to be divided by the independence vs. reunification issue as this cleavage remains strong and consistent. The reform vs. stability issue may still divide partisans as well; however, it is less divisive than relations with China. As for the issues of environmental protection vs. economic development and social welfare spending vs. lower taxes, elites and partisans may differ in their positions on them, but these issues are not influential or stable enough to divide Taiwanese people along party lines.

the construction of the plant on October 27, 2000. However, this decision provoked the opposition parties, which proposed a recall election of President Chen in the Legislative Yuan and asked the Control Yuan to initiate an impeachment of the Executive Yuan immediately. Eventually, the prime minister had no choice but to continue to build the plant.

²² A pension policy was first introduced in Taipei city when Chen Shui-bian was the mayor. It became a nationwide and monthly benefit when Chen was the president in 2002.

Region and Partisan affiliations

In addition to issue areas, the relationship between region and partisan support is also a key point of this research. Regional differences in Taiwanese political behavior have attracted scholars' attention in recent years. Some scholars describe "Southern politics" as the distinctive political attitudes among southern Taiwanese, especially their relatively strong support for the DPP (Hsu, 2000, Keng and Chen, 2003). However, this assertion is questioned by scholars of another school of thought, who claim that southern Taiwan is not a party stronghold (Hong, 2003; Wang, 2009).

During the early period of the KMT's retreat to Taiwan, the Chiang Kai-shek regime envisioned Taiwan as a temporary refuge and planned to return to mainland China as soon as possible. Hence, Chiang was unconcerned with the balance of area development of the island. The KMT thus focused its resources in its temporary headquarters, Taipei, which is today's capital city and has been the biggest city in northern Taiwan since the period of Japanese occupation.

The uneven resource distribution has not been altered even since Chiang Ching-kuo took office. As a result of uneven distribution of resources and government policies, different areas have different levels of industrial development. Roughly speaking, the main types of industry in Northern Taiwan are the service business industries, whereas agriculture, traditional industry (e.g. textiles), and heavy industry dominated in Southern Taiwan.

The uneven concentration of resources did not elicit people's strong opposition under the authoritarian regime. However, the situation worsened after democratization in the mid-1980s. During the Lee Administration (1986-2000), the KMT government's industrial policy focused on the development of high-tech industry, such as Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). Rapid economic growth in the North, led by the booming

development of high-tech industry, resulted in the neglect of traditional industry in the South.

Traditional industries, especially labor intensive industry, had no choice but to move to other countries offering cheaper labor, such as China or Vietnam, and thus people engaging in these industries lost their jobs, most of whom live in Southern Taiwan. Keng and Chen (2003) indicate that the economy of southern Taiwan was hurt by economic interaction with China and thus tends to help sustain support for the DPP due to its advocacy of limited economic interaction with China.

Moreover, due to uneven distribution of resources, many young Southerners moved to the North, looking for better jobs and education. Therefore, unemployment, loss of population, and an aging population became severe challenges for local governments in Southern Taiwan. The neglect of the development of the Southern areas thus resulted in certain Southerners' resentment of the KMT regime. The Chen Administration took advantage of this long-term resentment, redistributing certain national resources to the South, such as holding certain national festivals and activities in the region, increasing government spending in Southern cities and counties, constructing a branch of National Palace Museum in Chiayi County, and so on. Moreover, President Chen was born and grew up in a Southern county, making certain Southerners feel closer to the DPP. Hsu, by observing the changing of number of loyal voters, contends that the DPP wins more votes in the South than in other areas (Hsu, 2000). Hence, it seems that region has become an important factor influencing party affiliation in Taiwan. This research will examine whether geographic factors make an impact on individuals' party affiliation.

Conclusion

To sum up, partisan polarization has become an important issue, attracting the attention of many U.S. political scientists in recent years. Researchers try to analyze this issue from diverse perspectives. Although scholars of different schools of thought have not reached a consensus on some issues of polarized politics, such as whether ordinary citizens also become more polarized, their research has already yielded fruitful achievements on the study of partisan polarization and this result is very useful for scholars who attempt to deal with polarized politics in other countries.

Therefore, I employ research frameworks, concepts, and methods which are used in the case of the United States for Taiwan's politics. However, due to differences in constitutional design, party systems, and social structure between the United States and Taiwan, I do not totally adopt U.S. concepts and measures of partisan polarization. Instead, I use some generalized ideas for measuring polarized politics, and I bring other factors, which may not be important in the United States but in Taiwan, into my research. This combination will be more useful for measuring whether and how partisan polarization takes place in Taiwan. I present the results in the following chapters.

Chapter 3

Party Polarization in the Legislative Yuan

The Evolution of the Legislative Yuan

Dr. Sun Yat-san, the founding father of the Republic of China (ROC) and the Kuomintang (KMT), established three representative institutions at the national level: the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan. Among the three representative bodies, only the Legislative Yuan acts like a parliament in Western democracies (Tien, 1989).²³

In 1947, ROC began to implement its constitution and the First Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China was established in 1948. A total of 760 members (see Table 3.1) were elected from every province of China, except Taiwan, because Taiwan was a territory of Japan at that time. The lawmakers of the First Legislative Yuan then retreated to Taiwan with the KMT, which was defeated by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in China's 1949 civil war. The KMT government, under martial law, did not hold new elections for the Legislative Yuan until 1992 because the KMT claimed that the central government would return to mainland China soon.

From 1948 to 1992, the Taiwanese people could not replace these permanent representatives of the legislative body through periodical elections, rather the legislators had unlimited terms. During this period, the KMT government only held supplementary

²³ The National Assembly was established as a constitutional convention and electoral college. Its mission included: the establishment and amendment of a constitution, election and recall of president and vice president, and review of constitutional amendments proposed by the Legislative Yuan. The National Assembly gradually lost its functions, such as election of president which was replaced by direct popular election in 2000, and was abolished in 2005. The Control Yuan was established for monitoring the governments and officers. It acts like the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the United States and its main functions included: acceptance of people's petitions, and investigation and impeachment of governments and officers' violation of law. The Legislative Yuan, among the three national representative institutions, is the only institution established to write and pass legislation.

elections to respond to people's strong demand for more political participation after 1980, due to Taiwan's diplomatic setback in the 1970s when the United States broke off diplomatic relations.²⁴

Table 3.1 Term and Seat of the Legislative Yuan (1948-2012)

Term	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Seventh
Year	1948-92	1992-95	1995-98	1998-2001	2001-04	2004-08	2008-2012
Seats	760 ^a	161	164	225	225	225	113

Source: the Legislative Yuan's Website.

^a. There were 760 members of the First Legislative Yuan. However, only around 380 members came to Taiwan with the KMT after China's civil war in 1949.

Table 3.2 presents the parties' seat and vote shares in the Legislative Yuan. According to Table 3.2, the KMT was the biggest winner. The KMT won around 80% of the seats and 60-70% of votes in the supplementary elections. The permanent representatives plus supplementary lawmakers helped the KMT dominate the legislative process without negotiation with the opposition legislators. Because the government prohibited the establishment of new political parties, anti-KMT politicians could not establish a new party. Thus they formed a loose anti-KMT coalition "*Tanwai*" (literally "outside the KMT"). This coalition was viewed as the predecessor of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its main aim and function was to promote anti-KMT candidates in elections (Tien, 1989; Chu, 2001). However, as Table 3.2 demonstrates, *Tanwai* and the DPP, due to lack of resources, could only obtain 10% to 20% of the seats in supplementary elections even though the DPP's vote shares increased term by term significantly. These seats were not enough for them to negotiate and influence legislation or prevent the KMT legislators from passing their bills.

²⁴ Supplementary elections were held every three years from 1969 to 1989. During this period, the KMT government only cancelled this type of election once, in 1978. Supplementary elections, initially, were held to choose substitutes for the permanent representatives who could not execute their legislative duty for physical or other reasons. Then the elections were held not only for replacing permanent representatives but also for responding to people's demand for more political power, due to the diplomatic setback in the 1970s, by increasing the numbers of legislators.

The opposition lawmakers thus sometimes used violent actions against the KMT in the Legislative Yuan.

Table 3.2 Political Parties' Seat and Vote Share in the Legislative Yuan Elections (1972-2008)

Term	Year	Seats	KMT Seat N (%) Vote (%)	DPP	New Party (NP)	People First Party (PFP)	Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)	Others
First	1972	36	30(83.3%) (73.1%)					6(16.7) (26.9)
First	1975	37	30(81.1%) (77.6)					7(18.9) (22.4)
First	1980	70	56(80.0%) (71.9)	8(11.4) ^a (13.0)				6(8.6) (15.1)
First	1983	71	62(87.2%) (69.4)	6(8.5) ^a (18.9)				3(4.3) (11.7)
First	1986	73	59(80.8%) (66.7)	12(16.4%) (24.6)				2(2.8) (9.7)
First	1989	101	72(71.3%) (59.2)	21(20.8%) (29.9)				8(7.9) (10.9)
Second	1992	161	94(58.4%) (53.0)	51(31.7%) (31.4)				16(9.9) (15.6)
Third	1995	164	85(51.8%) (46.1)	54(32.9%) (33.2)	21(12.8%) (13.0)			4(2.5) (7.7)
Fourth	1998	225	123(54.7%) (46.4)	70(31.3%) (29.6)	11(4.9%) (7.1)			21(9.3) (16.9)
Fifth	2001	225	68(30.2%) (28.6)	87(38.7%) (33.4)	1(0.004) (2.6)	46(20.4%) (18.6)	13(5.7%) (7.8)	10(4.4%) (9.0)
Sixth	2004	225	79(35.1%) (32.8)	89(39.6%) (35.7)	1(0.004) (.12)	34(15.1%) (13.9)	12(5.3%) (7.8)	10(4.4%) (9.7)
Seventh	2008	113	81(71.3%) (53.5)	27(23.9%) (38.7)	0(0.00) (.00)	1(0.09) (.02)	0(0.00) (1.0)	4(3.5) (6.7)

Source: the Central Election Commission of the Ministry of the Interior, Republic of China.

^a The DPP was established in 1986. Hence the seats the DPP won in 1980 and 1983 in this table were the seats that DPP's predecessor "Tanwai" won.

However, supplementary elections in the 1980s did not soothe people's anger over and criticism of the illegitimacy and imbalance of representation in the Legislative Yuan. Moreover, the legislative branch, at that time, was just a rubber stamp for the legitimization of the Executive Yuan's policies. People continued strongly to demand a complete reelection of the legislature. The "permanent representatives" eventually retired in 1991 and the

Second Legislative Yuan was elected in the next year. This was another important step in Taiwan's democratization.

Despite the transition to democracy, the party that ruled during Taiwan's authoritarian period continued its domination after the transition. The KMT still won a majority of seats in the elections to the Third and Fourth Legislative Yuan in the 1990s, and it controlled the legislative process. However, the KMT's advantage in the legislative process was not as significant as it was before the retirement of permanent representatives because the DPP increased their seats in these two elections significantly. The DPP had around 30% of the seats in the Legislative Yuan in the 1990s. Although the DPP did not have enough seats to pass its bills alone, it was able to impede the legislative process by proposing bills and amendments. This strategy worked when the KMT could not control its lawmakers or when the KMT rushed to pass certain bills (Sheng, 2008).

The 2001 Legislative Yuan election was a particularly important one, because the KMT had lost Taiwan's 2000 presidential election. The legislative branch became the KMT's most important platform for exerting its political influence. As rats desert a sinking ship, many KMT lawmakers transferred to the PFP after the 2000 presidential election, fearing for the KMT's future. The DPP became the largest political party after the 2001 Legislative Yuan election. However, although the DPP's seats increased after the election, no party had won a majority of seats. This was the first time that the KMT became the minority party in the Legislative Yuan election. Nevertheless, the KMT and its partner, the PFP, formed a party coalition and still controlled a majority of seats. On the other side, the DPP allied with the TSU, forming the pan-green camp, sharing 44% of the seats in the Legislative Yuan. The division of seats between the majority and minority groups had never been so close. Moreover, the two party coalitions have distinct positions on certain policies, especially the

China relations issue. Therefore, I expect that the antagonism between the two party coalitions has increased. In the following sections I examine whether Taiwan's politicians have become more polarized in terms of their legislative behavior.

Data, Variables, and Hypotheses

Data Sources

As mentioned above, the main goal of this chapter is to examine the sources of partisan opposition and internal cohesion in the pan-blue and the pan-green coalitions. In order to assess the behavior of the political elite, I examine voting behavior in the Legislative Yuan for evidence of polarization.

Roll-call voting records for the Legislative Yuan and public opinion survey data serve as my two important data sources. The Legislative Yuan Research Center at Soochow University and the Legislative Yuan journal, which is published periodically, have collected roll-call voting records. I sort all roll-call votes and convert these measures to "party votes" and "party antagonism" variables in order to evaluate the degree of polarization. These measures will give us a complete picture of the level of polarization in the legislature. I display annual party vote percentages graphically and average party antagonism scores to demonstrate trends in party polarization among political elites prior to and during the period of the Chen Administration that began in 2000.

Variables

A "party vote" refers to a roll-call vote in which a majority of members of one party vote against a majority of the opposition party, and frequently it is used as a measure of party polarization in the United States (Hurley, 1990; Fleisher and Bond, 2000; Hawang and Chen, 2006). In this research, roll-call votes that are party votes will be coded as "1," whereas non-party votes will be coded as "0."

The "party antagonism" score measures the level of partisanship in individual roll-call

votes that are party votes. It is calculated by averaging the percentage of each party's majority vote on each side of the issue. For example, if 60% of one party votes yea and 80% of the other party votes nay, the party antagonism score is .70. Thus, the higher the score, the greater is the party antagonism.²⁵

These two variables will be created to measure the political elite's partisan voting behavior in the legislature during the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan (1996-2008).²⁶ The floor votes during this period are divided into several issue areas: China relations, social welfare, the economy, environmental protection, political reform,²⁷ political competition and particularized benefits (PCPB),²⁸ and other issues.

I calculate these measures separately for each type of issue, term by term, in order to study trends in party antagonism by issue area. I graph the annual percentages of party votes and mean party antagonism scores for each issue area. I expect to see, during the period of the Chen Administration, a steady increase in the percentage of party votes and in the mean antagonism score, manifesting the increasing partisan polarization among political elites. I then examine the effects that issue areas had on party antagonism using standard OLS regression.

²⁵ Party antagonism = $(Pa + Pb)/2$, where Pa is the percent of party a that voted yes and Pb is the percent of party b that voted yea.

²⁶ Taiwan's legislature, from the Second to the Sixth Legislative Yuan, had three-year terms and members were elected from multi-member districts with single non-transferable vote (SNTV) until the election of the Seventh Legislative Yuan in 2009, which employed single member district system and extended the term to four years. Moreover, the Legislative Yuan and the president, who is re-elected every four years, have different electoral cycles. Even when the Legislative Yuan and the president would be elected in the same year, the elections would not be arranged on the same date.

²⁷ The issue of "political reform" refers to the bills that are related to the reform of governmental institutions.

²⁸ The bills categorized in this issue area include certain politicized cases, such as officials' appointments, amendments to the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act, the bill demanding that the KMT return the properties it gained illegally during the period of authoritarian regime, and so on. Moreover, this issue area also includes some pork barrel bills providing benefits to certain groups, which may be the loyal supporters of a given party, such as the bill which increases the retirement pension of military personnel or civil servants. This type of issue may not be directly related to parties' issue positions but highly related to party competition and I expect this type of issue would lead to a higher level of party conflict.

In short, at the aggregate level of analysis, I use each roll-call vote in the Legislative Yuan from 1996 to 2008 as the unit of analysis. I employ two different dependent variables: (1) a dichotomous party vote variable, and (2) the party antagonism score. I include the issue areas used as the independent variables in the model. They include China relations, political reform, social welfare, environmental protection, the economy, political competition and particularized benefits, and other issues. Other issues comprise the reference group.

The two party camps, as noted earlier, have clearly different positions on the issue of China relations. The pan-blue camp advocates closer interaction with China, whereas the pan-green camp tends to advocate limited interaction with China. Hence, this conflict is highly partisan.

Moreover, as mentioned above, the KMT favors social stability, whereas the DPP is pro-reform. Their different positions on this issue also are supposed to reflect partisan legislative behavior. Furthermore, party conflict over political competition and particularized benefits is expected to be intense since parties use these benefits to gain support and consolidate their power.

As for economic, social welfare, environmental protection, and other issue areas, the party antagonism should be lower than that for China relations, reform, and political competition and particularized benefits because of the clear differentiation in the parties' positions. First, economic issues, environmental protection issues and social welfare issues are more likely to be related to constituents' needs. Hence, for reelection purposes, legislators may not necessarily follow their parties' guidance. Secondly, unlike the China relations issue and the reform issue, these issues are not related to the parties' central principles. Political parties are less likely to discipline legislators for not following their guidance on economic, environmental, and social welfare issues.

Hypotheses

Based on the discussions above, I propose the following hypotheses:

H3-1: Party votes are significantly more likely on roll calls dealing with China relations, political reform, political competition, and particularized benefits than on roll calls dealing with economic policy, social welfare, environmental protection, or other issues.

H3-2: Party antagonism tends to be higher on roll-call votes dealing with China relations, political reform, political competition, and particularized benefits than on roll-call votes dealing with economic policy, social welfare, environmental protection, and other issues.

Party Votes from the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan (1996-2008)

Figure 3.1 presents the percentage of party votes among all roll-call votes from the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan. The percentage of party votes in the Third Legislative Yuan was 67.5%, meaning that majorities in the two major parties disagreed with each other in two out of three roll-call votes in the Third Legislative Yuan. The KMT and the DPP frequently took opposing positions. This percentage approaches the highest percentage of party votes in the U.S. House of Representatives during the past half century.²⁹ Thus party conflict in Taiwan's legislature occurs far more frequently than in the U.S. Congress.

Party votes dropped to their nadir in the Fourth Legislative Yuan, when the mean percentage of party votes was only 49.1%. The relatively low percentage of party votes in this session resulted from a party realignment taking place around Taiwan's 2000 presidential election. First, the departure of James Song to run for the presidency and to form the People First Party (PFP) later in 2000 led to many KMT lawmakers following him

²⁹ Richard Fleisher, Jon R. Bond, and John E. Owens (2007) record the percentage of party votes in the U.S. House from the 83th to the 108th Congress (1953-2004) and find that party votes climbed to a high point in the 104th Congress (1995-1996). Nearly two-thirds of House votes are party votes in that Congress.

and switching their party membership. Moreover, some KMT politicians who supported Lee's Taiwanization also left the KMT to found the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which later became a member of the pan-green camp. Thus it can be seen that Taiwan experienced a party realignment during the period of the 2000 presidential election. For this reason, the party conflict in the Fourth Legislative Yuan was not as intense as it was in other Legislative Yuans because some lawmakers switched their partisanship from one party to another. The percentage of party votes after the first party turnover increased to 58.6%, showing that party conflict began to expand after the realignment.

Party votes rebounded in the Fifth Legislative Yuan. Three-fourths of roll-call votes were party votes. Party voting reached its zenith in the Sixth Legislative Yuan. Nine out of ten votes in that Legislative Yuan were party votes, as the two major parties voted against each other in nearly all cases. In short, observing party votes as a percentage of all roll call votes demonstrates that party conflict in the Legislative Yuan has become more common since the 2000 presidential election.




Figure 3.1 Party Votes in the 3rd to the 6th Legislative Yuan(1996-2008).

Source: calculated by the author

* Party turnover took place on May 20, 2000

**the mean percentage of party vote in 4th Legislative Yuan is 49.1%

Turning from the two major parties to the broader coalitions, Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of party votes among roll-call votes for the two coalitions (hereafter "coalition vote") in the Legislative Yuan from 1996 to 2008. It presents a tendency very similar to the party voting of the two major parties. In fact, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that coalition majorities opposed each other on an even greater percentage of votes than did the major party majorities after Taiwan's 2000 presidential election (the Fourth Legislative Yuan following the party turnover, and the Fifth and Sixth Legislative Yuans). Thus the adherent members of the two party coalitions demonstrated even higher party coherence than did their leaders, the KMT and the DPP. A possible explanation for this phenomenon may be that small parties tend to have higher party discipline because their members are more likely to rely on party resources to campaign for office. Hence, more lawmakers in the minor adherent parties tend to stand with their colleagues in roll-call voting.




Figure 3.2 Coalition Votes in the 3rd to the 6th Legislative Yuan(1996-2008).

Source: calculated by the author

* Party turnover took place on May 20, 2000

**the mean percentage of coalition vote in 4th Legislative Yuan is 50.3%

After looking at the overall trend in party votes from the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan, I present party votes by issues in Table 3.3. According to Table 3.3, the China relations issue was not the issue producing the highest percentage of party votes between 1996 and 2008. Nor was the political reform issue the most contentious issue when focusing on the mean percentage of roll-call votes. On the contrary, social welfare and environmental issues, surprisingly, were the issues that resulted in more party conflicts than any other issues in the Legislative Yuan. The highest percentage of party votes on these two issues appeared in the Third Legislative Yuan. The KMT and the DPP, in the Sixth Legislative Yuan, did not vote against each other as often as they did in the Third Legislative Yuan on these two issues.

Party votes constituted about three-fourths of the roll-call votes on political competition, particularized benefits, and economic issues, close to the mean percentage of party votes for all issues. Nevertheless, the proportion of party votes on political competition, particularized benefits, and economic issues in the Sixth Legislative Yuan climbed to a high point, meaning that the roll-call votes on these two issues have become the new battleground in the Legislative Yuan. The mean percentage of party votes on “other issues” is lowest of all at 61.5%. However, even though the proportion of party votes on the China relations issue, reform issue, and political competition and particularized benefits issue were not the highest as I expected, the mean percentage of party votes topped 60% in all issue categories, reflecting that the KMT and the DPP voted against each other frequently. Moreover, the percentage of party votes in the Sixth Legislative Yuan topped 75% in all issue categories, reflecting that party conflict, regardless of issue, was quite common in the Legislative Yuan.

Table 3.3 Party Votes by Issue Area in the 3rd to the 6th Legislative Yuan (1996-2008)

Issue Type		Term					Mean %	N
		Third % (N)	Fourth (Before Party turnover)	Fourth (After Party turnover)	Fifth	Sixth		
CR*	<i>Non-PV</i>	17.4(4)	None	0.0(1)	80.0(12)	18.8(3)	34.5	19
	<i>PV**</i>	82.6(19)	None	100.0(1)	20.0(3)	81.2(13)	65.5	36
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(23)	None	100.0(1)	100.0(15)	100.0(16)	100.0	55
RF	<i>Non-PV</i>	51.8(43)	11.1(1)	13.0(3)	19.2(14)	20.8(10)	30.0	71
	<i>PV</i>	48.2(40)	88.9(8)	87.0(20)	80.8(59)	79.2(38)	70.0	165
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(83)	100.0 (9)	100.0(23)	100.0(73)	100.0(48)	100.0	236
SW	<i>Non-PV</i>	10.0(1)	0.0(0)	66.7(2)	27.3(6)	25.0(1)	23.8	10
	<i>PV</i>	90.0(9)	100.0(3)	33.3(1)	72.7(16)	75.0(3)	76.2	32
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(10)	100.0 (3)	100.0(3)	100.0(22)	100.0 (4)	100.0	42
EP	<i>Non-PV</i>	0.0(0)	8.3(1)	0.0(0)	6.7(2)	22.2(2)	5.3	5
	<i>PV</i>	100.0(22)	91.7(11)	100.0(3)	93.3(28)	77.8(7)	94.7	71
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(22)	100.0(12)	100.0(3)	100(30)	100.0(9)	100.0	76
EC	<i>Non-PV</i>	24.1(14)	7.7(1)	42.9(9)	32.9(24)	5.0(2)	24.4	50
	<i>PV</i>	75.9(44)	92.3(12)	57.1(12)	67.1(49)	95.0(38)	75.6	156
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(58)	100.0(13)	100.0(21)	100(73)	100.0(40)	100.0	206
PCPB	<i>Non-PV</i>	17.0(23)	71.7(33)	73.3(11)	21.0(25)	6.5(6)	24.0	98
	<i>PV</i>	83.0(112)	28.3(13)	26.7(4)	79.0 (94)	93.5(87)	76.0	310
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(135)	100.0(46)	100.0(15)	100.0(119)	100.0(93)	100.0	408
Others	<i>Non-PV</i>	40.5(113)	62.1(87)	48.5(16)	23.3(28)	5.6(4)	38.5	248
	<i>PV</i>	59.5(166)	37.9(53)	51.5(17)	76.7(92)	94.4(68)	61.5	396
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(279)	100.0(140)	100.0(33)	100.0(120)	100.0(72)	100.0	644
All Issues	<i>Non-PV</i>	32.5(198)	55.6(123)	41.4(41)	24.6(111)	9.9(28)	30.1	501
	<i>PV</i>	67.5(412)	44.4(37.9)	58.6(58)	75.4(341)	90.1(254)	69.9	1165
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(610)	100.0(223)	100.0(99)	100.0(452)	100.0(282)	100.0	1666

* CR: China Relations; RF: Reform; SW: Social Welfare; EP: Environmental Protection; EC: Economy; PCPB: Political Competition and particularized Benefits.

** PV: Party Vote.

Table 3.4 demonstrates coalition votes by issue area from the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan. The proportion of coalition votes on social welfare issues and environmental issues was higher than for the rest of them. Political competition and particularized benefits and economic issues are in the middle while the proportion of coalition votes on the China-relations and reform issues only exceed that of the reference category. Coalition voting by issue area nearly paralleled that of party voting, topping 60% in all but the reference category and reflecting the fact that the pan-blue and the pan-green coalitions often disagreed with each other. Furthermore, the percentage of coalition votes over all issues in the Sixth Legislative Yuan was higher than 75%, reflecting that two coalitions stood on opposite sides of every issue area.

Although the results of Table 3.3 and 3.4 do not support Hypothesis 3-1, hypothesizing that party votes are significantly more likely on roll calls dealing with China relations, political reform, and political competition and particularized benefits, they demonstrate that party conflict in the Legislative Yuan is more intense and widespread across issues than expected.

Table 3.4 Coalition Votes by Issue Area in the 3rd to the 6th Legislative Yuan (1996-2008)

Issue Type		Term					Mean %	N
		Third % (N)	Fourth (Before Party turnover)	Fourth (After Party turnover)	Fifth	Sixth		
CR*	<i>Non-PV</i>	26.1(6)	None	0.0(0)	80.0(12)	18.8(3)	38.2	21
	<i>PV**</i>	73.9(17)	None	100.0(1)	20.0(3)	81.2(13)	61.8	34
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(23)	None	100.0(1)	100.0(15)	100.0(16)	100.0	55
RF	<i>Non-PV</i>	42.2(35)	11.1(1)	13.0(3)	16.4(12)	18.8(9)	25.4	60
	<i>PV</i>	57.8(48)	88.9(8)	87.0(20)	83.6(61)	81.2(39)	74.6	176
	<i>Total</i>	100(83)	100.0 (9)	100.0(23)	100.0(73)	100.0(48)	100.0	236
SW	<i>Non-PV</i>	10.0(1)	0.0(0)	33.3(1)	27.3(6)	25.0(1)	21.4	9
	<i>PV</i>	90.0(9)	100.0(3)	66.7(2)	72.7(16)	75.0(3)	78.6	33
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(10)	100.0 (3)	100.0(3)	100.0(22)	100.0(4)	100.0	42
EP	<i>Non-PV</i>	0.0(0)	8.3(1)	0.0(0)	6.7(2)	22.2(2)	6.6	5
	<i>PV</i>	100.0(22)	91.7(11)	100.0(3)	93.3(28)	77.8(7)	93.4	71
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(22)	100.0(12)	100.0(3)	100.0(30)	100.0(9)	100.0	76
EC	<i>Non-PV</i>	37.9(22)	7.7(1)	28.6(6)	30.1(22)	5.0(2)	25.9	53
	<i>PV</i>	62.1(36)	92.3(12)	71.4(15)	69.9(51)	95.0(38)	74.1	152
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(58)	100.0(13)	100.0(21)	100.0(73)	100.0(40)	100.0	205
PCPB	<i>Non-PV</i>	14.8(20)	71.7(33)	66.7(10)	20.2(24)	6.5(6)	22.8	93
	<i>PV</i>	85.2(115)	28.3(13)	33.3(5)	79.8(95)	93.5(87)	77.2	315
	<i>Total</i>	100(135)	100.0(46)	100.0(15)	100.0(119)	100.0(93)	100.0	408
Others	<i>Non-PV</i>	44.4(124)	62.9(88)	48.5(16)	23.3(28)	5.6(4)	40.4	260
	<i>PV</i>	55.6(155)	37.1(52)	51.5(17)	76.7(92)	94.4(68)	59.6	384
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(279)	100.0(140)	100.0(33)	100.0(120)	100.0(72)	100.0	644
All Issues	<i>Non-PV</i>	34.1(208)	55.6(124)	36.4(36)	23.5(106)	9.6(27)	30.1	501
	<i>PV</i>	65.9(402)	44.4(99)	63.6(63)	76.5(346)	90.4(255)	69.9	1165
	<i>Total</i>	100.0(610)	100.0(223)	100.0(99)	100.0(452)	100.0(282)	100.0	1666

* CR: China Relations; RF: Reform; SW: Social Welfare; EP: Environmental Protection; EC: Economy; PCPB: Political Competition and particularized Benefits.

** PV: Party Vote.

A Brief Analysis of Parties' Positions on Four Important Issues

The foregoing analysis tells us which issues have divided the party coalitions most in the Third to the Sixth legislative Yuan. However, it does not tell us which position each coalition took. In this section I take a closer look at how the two coalitions are aligned on each side of four major issue areas: China relations, political reform, social welfare, and environmental protection.

In most roll-call votes dealing with the China-relations issue from 1996 to 2008, the pan-blue parties voted for promoting a closer relationship with China, whereas the pan-green parties took the opposite position. However, the proportion of party votes for the China-relations issue, in the Fifth Legislative Yuan, dropped to 18.8%, a historical low. The reason for this decline is that a majority (10 out of 16) of roll-call votes on the China-relations issue in the Fifth Legislative Yuan dealt with articles 17, 18, 21, 23 and 28 of the *Act Governing Relations Between Peoples Of The Taiwan Area And The Mainland Area*. These articles deal with civil liberties, labor rights, and the acquisition of Taiwanese national ID cards, for Chinese people who come to Taiwan to live with their Taiwanese spouses. The articles have deep implications for the lives both Taiwanese and Chinese citizens who are married to each other. The TSU lawmakers, in October, 2003, added amendments to these articles that placed more rigid restrictions on the rights of Chinese people with Taiwanese spouses.

The Taiwanese government imposed greater restrictions on the rights of spouses from China than on international spouses from elsewhere in an attempt to prevent immigration by fake marriage.³⁰ Hence, these articles are also related to the issues of

³⁰ Chinese spouses are eligible to have Taiwanese national ID cards if they stay in Taiwan for eight years while other international spouses may obtain Taiwanese national ID cards after just four years. The Legislative Yuan

human rights and discrimination. As a result, not only the pan-blue lawmakers but also most DPP lawmakers opposed the TSU's amendments on these articles.

Aside from these roll-call votes, the pan-blue and pan-green camps take opposite positions on the China relations issue. The former supports a closer relationship with China, whereas the latter advocates Taiwan maintaining a limited relationship with China.

The pan-blue and the pan-green coalitions frequently took opposite positions on roll-call votes dealing with political reform. In general, the DPP (the pan-green camp) is more supportive of political reform, whereas the pan-blue camp, led by the long-term ruling party, KMT, has tended to oppose political reform. However, roll-call votes on the reform issue were less likely to divide the parties and their coalitions in the Third Legislative Yuan. Looking at individual roll-call votes for that session, many non-party votes were roll-call votes dealing with amendments on *The Organization Act of Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission* and *the Temporary Act on the Functions and Organization of the Taiwan Province Government*.

Members of the two major parties still took opposite positions on the former act when they voted. But while 80% of the DPP lawmakers were present to vote, attendance of the KMT legislators was less than 50%. Roll-call votes on this act could have been party votes if the KMT's legislative whips had mobilized their colleagues to vote. Obviously, the KMT did not consider this act to be very important. As for *the Temporary Act on the Functions and Organization of the Taiwan Province Government*, the two major parties reached a consensus on this bill before the beginning of the session. The act was passed smoothly without any antagonism between the two major parties.

passed an amendment to the *Act Governing Relations Between Peoples Of The Taiwan Area And The Mainland Area* in June 2009 shortening the time that Chinese spouses must wait for Taiwanese national ID cards from eight years to six years.

However, the power transition after the 2000 presidential election led the political parties to change their positions on the reform issue to some extent. The most important case is the Referendum Act passed in the Fifth Legislative Yuan in November 2003. The first version of Referendum Act was proposed by DPP lawmakers in 1993 and was voted down by the majority party, the KMT. The KMT opposed this bill for a long time. Nevertheless, in order to avoid the DPP's criticism of not giving ordinary citizens more political power during the period of the 2004 presidential election, the KMT and its partners, the PFP, eventually proposed their version of the *Referendum Act*. Although the pan-blue camp imposed several conditions in their version of Referendum Act, making any referendum very difficult to pass, the KMT, at least, moved their position from anti-reform to pro-reform on this bill.³¹ Conversely, the DPP used to support referendum without any limitation. However, due to pressures from the international community, especially from China and the United States, the DPP lawmakers compromised, withdrawing their original draft and accepting the pan-blue camp's draft of the *Referendum Act*.³² In final passage votes on the *Referendum Act*, the two major parties did compromise on their previous positions. Party turnover had resulted in the political parties significantly altering their positions on the reform issue.

The two major parties also took opposite positions on the social welfare issue. In general, the DPP tended to be supportive of overall welfare for ordinary citizens. However, the political parties sometimes cooperated with each other on social welfare issue since social welfare can serve as a tool to attract votes. Roll-call votes on the *Labor Pension Act* in

³¹ The limitations of the pan-blue camp's version of *Referendum Act* include: "for a proposal of referendum, the number of proposers shall be no less than 5/1000 of the total electors in the latest election of President and Vice President," "After receiving a proposal of referendum, the Review Commission could reject it if the commission considers it does not meet the relevant provisions," and so on. All limitations proposed by the pan-blue camp were for making the referendum very difficult to pass.

³² China was concerned that this act would be used by certain Taiwanese politicians as a means to promote Taiwanese independence.

the Fifth Legislative Yuan in June 2004 illustrates this cooperation since both party camps supported this bill.³³ Therefore, the social welfare issue has not polarized Taiwan's political parties at the extremes--pro-social welfare and anti-social welfare—but rather each party supports and opposes certain social welfare provisions, each preferring its own favorite programs.

Environmental issues, like social welfare, have been sporadically divisive rather than polarizing in the Legislative Yuan. On most roll-call votes dealing with the environment, the KMT and the DPP took opposite positions. The most famous case was the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant. The KMT and the DPP were on opposite sides on all 26 roll-call votes dealing with the issue of the fourth nuclear power plant. The KMT always tried to convince the Taiwanese people that the nuclear power plant was necessary for economic development, especially given that Taiwan lacks natural resources, while reassuring the public that nuclear power is clean and safe. Conversely, the DPP strongly and consistently opposed this plant in the name of environmental protection. The two major parties remained steadfast on all 26 roll-call votes.

Because the two major parties voted consistently against each other on this issue, environmental protection looked like a critical issue dividing Taiwan's political parties. Their coalition partners have been less consistent, however. NP, a member of the pan-blue camp, stood with the pan-green leaders, the DPP, on roll-call votes dealing with the fourth nuclear power plant before the party turnover in 2000. However, NP lawmakers and other pan-blue parties demanded that the DPP government take responsibility for the cost of ceasing the construction of that plant in October 2001 and demanded that the Control Yuan initiate

³³ Among the parties in the pan-green camp, the TSU did not share the same position with the DPP because the TSU proposed some amendments on this bill which other parties opposed. Nevertheless, the TSU still supported this bill.

impeachment proceedings against of the DPP prime minister of the Executive Yuan, Chang Chun-hsiung. On the other side, some politicians of the TSU voted to support the construction of the plant when they were KMT lawmakers. However, after switching to the TSU, they aligned with the DPP at the nuclear plant issue. As a result, of NP and TSU participation, the two coalitions' positions on environmental issues have become less distinguishable following the 2000 presidential election. Apparently, Taiwanese political coalitions are not built and solidified on the issues of social welfare and environmental protection.

Ho (2006: 222-229) supports the argument that political parties changed their positions on the environmental issue after the 2000 presidential election, explaining that the DPP government, in an effort to save Taiwan from economic depression in the beginning of this century, initiated some construction, opening the party to attacks by environmental groups, which previously had supported the DPP. The KMT also changed its position. As mentioned, the KMT generally supports nuclear power plants. However, the party also supported the move of nuclear waste from Lanyu Island when the residents of Lanyu demanded that the DPP government close the nuclear waste deposit site near their living area, an issue that was President Chen's campaign commitment. The KMT supported the construction of nuclear power plants while opposing the nuclear waste deposit site. The KMT lawmakers acted for the sake of opposition rather than for ideology. Environmental protection is just one of means and excuses to persecute the DPP government.

Party Antagonism from the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan (1996-2008)

Party voting in the Legislative Yuan, as we have seen, became increasingly frequent after Taiwan's 2000 presidential election. Next I examine whether internal cohesion within each party coalition increased. "Party votes" can show how often conflict between the

political parties occurs during roll-call votes. However, it cannot tell us to what extent the two parties (or the two party coalitions) are internally cohesive. Therefore, I employ the party antagonism score as another measure of party conflict in the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan. As noted earlier, the party antagonism score is calculated by averaging the percentage of each party's vote on opposite sides of party votes. Figure 3.3 presents the mean party antagonism score on party votes from the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan.

The mean party antagonism score in the Third Legislative Yuan was .8399, which was the lowest of the sessions from 1996 to 2008. However, the score indicates that an average of 83.99% of the KMT and the DPP lawmakers voted against each other even at the lowest point. Moreover, even though party realignment occurred during the Fourth Legislative Yuan, the mean party antagonism score of that session, .8529, still outpaced that of the Third Legislative Yuan, demonstrating an overall increase in party polarization. Furthermore, according to Figure 3.3, party antagonism scores have increased gradually, and the score of the Sixth Legislative Yuan reached .9423, showing that more than 90% of the KMT and the DPP lawmakers, on average, shared a political position with other members of their party and voted against each other on party votes. This extremely high score demonstrates that the polarization between the KMT and the DPP in the Legislative Yuan has become more intense since Taiwan's 2000 presidential election.




Figure 3.3 Party Antagonism Scores in the 3rd to the 6th Legislative Yuan(1996-2008).

Source: calculated by the author

* Party turnover took place on May 20, 2000

**the mean coalition antagonism score in the 4th Legislative Yuan is .8529

Figure 3.4 demonstrates the party antagonism score on coalition votes for the two party coalitions (hereafter “coalition antagonism score”). Similar to the dynamics of party antagonism, coalition antagonism scores rose gradually since the Third Legislative Yuan (.7784) and reached a high point in the Sixth Legislative Yuan (.9262), indicating that the conflict between the two coalitions has increased during this period.




Figure 3.4 Coalition Antagonism Scores in the 3rd to the 6th Legislative Yuan(1996-2008).

Source: calculated by the author

* Party turnover took place on May 20, 2000

**the mean party antagonism score in the 4th Legislative Yuan is .8271

After observing the overall trend of party antagonism scores from the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan, I present party antagonism scores by issue areas in Table 3.5. The table demonstrates a clear tendency: party antagonism scores for all issues, except the environmental issue and “other issue” areas, have increased term after term. Mean party antagonism scores for all issue areas exceeded .8000, indicating that 80% or more of the KMT and the DPP legislators stood with their colleagues and voted against the opposing party. Thus partisan polarization, regardless of the issue, in the Legislative Yuan has intensified.

Focusing on scores across issue areas, the China relations issue, among all issues, surprisingly obtained the lowest mean party antagonism score. The low mean score for the China relations issue was due to its low scores in the Third and Fourth Legislative Yuan. The potential explanation for this result is that some KMT legislators who tend to support limited interaction with China remained in the KMT prior to party realignment, leading to lower party cohesion on roll-call voting on this issue. After party realignment, around the 2000 presidential election, the scores for the China-relations issue increased dramatically. Moreover, the party antagonism score for the China relations issue in the Sixth Legislative Yuan rose higher than for issues such as reform, social welfare, and the environmental protection, indicating that party conflict on this issue has increased more than on other important issues.

As expected, party antagonism scores on the issues of reform and on political competition and particularized benefits are higher than on other issues. Nearly 90% of the lawmakers in the two major parties stood with their colleagues and voted against the opposition party on these two issues, indicating that party coherence on reform and political competition and particularized benefits is extremely high. The mean party antagonism score

on the social welfare, environmental protection, and economic issues fall in the middle.

However, the mean party antagonism scores for each of the seven issue areas were 80% or higher, indicating intense party antagonism on all issues.

Table 3. 5 Party Antagonism Score by Issues in the 3rd to the 6th Legislative Yuan (1996-2008)

Issue Type/Term	Third % (N)	Fourth (Before Party turnover)	Fourth (After Party turnover)	Fifth	Sixth	Mean
China Relations	.7750	None	.7957	.8226	.9425	.8340
Reform	.8644	.8205	.8958	.9037	.9279	.8926
Social Welfare	.7770	.8956	.7824	.9034	.9213	.8673
Environment	.8182	.8632	.8862	.8647	.8467	.8494
Economy	.7725	.8617	.7869	.9065	.9346	.8595
PCPB	.8553	.8631	.8684	.8952	.9545	.8931
Others	.8553	.8676	.7882	.8932	.9500	.8829
Overall	.8399	.8929	.8357	.8950	.9423	.8801

Table 3.6 presents coalition antagonism scores by issue area from the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan. Similar to the party antagonism scores, coalition antagonism scores on all issues, except for social welfare and environmental protection issues, have increased term after term. Moreover, the mean coalition antagonism score on environmental protection issues became the lowest among all issues. Some smaller parties bucked the coalition line on environmental protection, lowering the antagonism score. For example, the NP, a member of the pan-blue camp, often took the same stance on the DPP on roll-call votes dealing with the environment. Hence, the mean coalition antagonism score for environmental issues was lower than for the remaining issues.

Table 3. 6 Coalition Antagonism Score by Issues in the 3rd to the 6th Legislative Yuan (1996-2008)

Issue Type/Term	Third % (N)	Fourth (Before Party turnover)	Fourth (After Party turnover)	Fifth	Sixth	Mean
China Relations	.7399	None	.7993	.8404	.9125	.8230
Reform	.7642	.7912	.8939	.9065	.9104	.8614
Social Welfare	.7400	.8888	.5338	.9087	.8881	.8209
Environment	.7607	.8411	.8865	.8868	.8367	.8338
Economy	.7543	.8341	.7171	.8981	.9112	.8332
PCPB	.7923	.8364	.8503	.8943	.9454	.8681
Others	.7871	.8445	.7965	.9026	.9324	.8637
Overall	.7784	.8388	.8088	.8988	.9262	.8533

I extend the analysis with OLS regression to explore which issue areas contribute significantly to party antagonism score between the KMT and the DPP. The “other issues” category is the reference group in this analysis, and it is left out of the equation. Table 3.7 shows that no one issue contributed disproportionately to party antagonism. This finding contradicted my expectations that China relations, political reform, and political competition and particularized benefits would be the most divisive issues. In fact, votes on China relations were negatively associated with party antagonism in the Third and Fifth Legislative Yuan, as were social welfare in the Third Legislative Yuan, environmental issues in the Fifth Legislative Yuan, and political reform in the Sixth legislative Yuan. These counter-hypothetical findings may be attributed, first, to the generally high degree of partisanship in roll-call voting across all issues, including those in the “other issues” reference group, and second, to the occasional idiosyncratic results of a single session such as the series of votes on Taiwanese-Chinese marriages described earlier in the chapter.³⁴

³⁴ For understanding the difference among issue types, I use F-test for measuring the difference of party (coalition) antagonism scores of issue types. The results can be seen in Appendix A.

Table 3.7 OLS Regression Analyses for Party Antagonism Score by Issues in the 3rd to the 6th Legislative Yuan (1996-2008)

	3rd	4th	5th	6th
Issue (Others=0)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
China Relations	-.080** (.028)	-.053 (.062)	-.071* (.033)	-.007 (.014)
Reform	.009 (.021)	.026 (.014)	.011 (.009)	-.022* (.009)
Social Welfare	-.078* (.040)	.019 (.032)	.010 (.015)	-.029 (.027)
Environment	-.037 (.026)	.020 (.018)	-.028* (.012)	-.103*** (.018)
Economy	-.083 (.020)	-.024 (.015)	.013 (.010)	-.015 (.009)
Symbolic	2.912 (.014)	.016 (.017)	.002 (.008)	.005 (.007)
Constant	.855*** (.009)	.848*** (.007)	.893*** (.006)	.950*** (.006)
N	412	158	341	254
F	5.111***	1.900	2.824*	7.401***
Adjusted R ²	.057	.070	.048	.152

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

The results are similar when analyzing coalition antagonism, as can be seen in Table 3.8. Once again, none of the issue areas stood out as contributing disproportionately to coalition antagonism, and the three issue areas hypothesized to be the most divisive—China relations, political reform, and political competition and particularized benefits—were not significantly more divisive.

Table 3.8 OLS Regression Analyses for Coalition Antagonism Score by Issues in the 3rd to the 6th Legislative Yuan (1996-2008)

	3rd	4th	5th	6th
Issue (Others=0)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
China Relations	-.047 (.029)	-.033 (.099)	-.062 (.036)	-.020 (.015)
Reform	-.023 (.019)	.032 (.022)	.004 (.010)	-.022* (.010)
Social Welfare	-.047 (.039)	-.086 (.045)	.006 (.016)	-.044 (.028)
Environment	-.026 (.026)	.018 (.029)	-.016 (.013)	-.096*** (.019)
Economy	-.033 (.021)	-.064** (.022)	-.004 (.011)	-.021* (.010)
Symbolic	.005 (.014)	.008 (.026)	-.008 (.009)	.013 (.008)
Constant	.787*** (.009)	.833*** (.012)	.903* (.006)	.932*** (.006)
N	402	162	346	255
F	1.398	3.069**	1.028	8.338***
Adjusted R ²	.006	.106	.018	.168

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Conclusion

The mean proportion of party and coalition votes has increased dramatically. Ninety percent of roll-call votes in the Sixth Legislative Yuan were party votes and party coalition votes, reflecting the general antagonism between the two major parties and between the pan-green and pan-blue coalitions. In addition, mean party and coalition antagonism scores have increased term by term, demonstrating that the confrontation between the two major parties and between the two party coalitions in the Legislative Yuan has become more intense.

Divisions between the two major parties—the KMT and the DPP—and between the two party coalitions—the pan-blue and pan-green coalitions—do not appear to be linked to any particular issue areas. This is especially true of the Fifth and Sixth Legislative Yuan, those

following the political transition after 2000. A comparison of mean party and coalition voting across the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan shows no consistent difference among issue areas; the same goes for comparisons of party and coalition antagonism scores across issue areas. Nor does OLS regression analysis of party and coalition antagonism scores across issue areas demonstrate that China relations or any other issue area contributes disproportionately to divisions between the parties and between coalitions.

The polarization of political parties and party coalitions, whether measured by the percentage of votes dividing majorities against each other or by party/coalition antagonism scores, has increased term after term. Contrary to expectations, this increased polarization has not been concentrated in the areas of China relations, political reform, and political competition and particularized benefits. Instead, political party and party coalition divisions have intensified across the board. Therefore, even though the empirical results contradict issue-specific hypotheses, I still conclude that pan-blue and pan-green legislators in the Taiwanese legislative Yuan have become increasingly polarized in their voting behavior.

Chapter 4

Issues and Partisan Polarization in Taiwanese Public

Does partisanship affect public attitudes on important issues? Starting with Chapter 4, the focus shifts from political elites to ordinary citizens. Chapter 4 examines which issues divide the Taiwanese public and whether these divisions have increased over time.

Parties are political expressions of social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Moshe Maor (1997:19) indicates that “cleavages are often conceived of as issues, policy differences or political identifications related to certain long-standing conflicts in a particular society.” Party Ideologies and issue positions reflect these cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Inglehart (1990) present five important social cleavages in western Europe: center vs. periphery, state vs. church, agrarian vs. industrial interests, employers vs. workers, and materialists vs. post-materialists (see Chapter 2). Maor (1997) links these cleavages with issues and party types as shown in Table 4.1:

Table 4.1 Cleavages, Time, Issues, and Political Parties

Cleavage	Time	Issue	Party
Center vs. Periphery	16-17th Centuries	National vs. supra national religion; national language vs. Latin	Ethnically and linguistically based parties
State vs. Church	National Revolutions, 1789 and after	Secular vs. religious control of mass media	Religious parties
Agrarian vs. industrial Interests	Industrial Revolution, 19th century	Tariff levels for agriculture products; control vs. freedom for industrial enterprise	Agrarian parties; Conservative and Liberal parties
Employers vs. Workers	The Russian Revolution, 1917-19	Integration into national polity vs. commitment to international revolutionary movement	Socialist and Communist parties
Materialists vs. Post Materialists	The Silent Revolution, 1970 and after	Environmental quality vs. economic growth	Green/Ecology parties

Source: cited from Maor (1997:23) and reorganized by the author

The types of political parties that emerge are linked to basic social cleavages and the issues that become salient as a result of those divisions. In the United States, for

example, the Republican Party represents such conservative principles as free-market capitalism, social order, and a strong national defense, while the Democratic Party represents such liberal principles as government regulation of the private sector and a more active welfare state (Nie, Verba, Petrocik, 1979; Brooks and Brandy, 1999).

However, due to different cultures and social structures, the issues leading to partisan division in Western Europe and the United States may not have the same impact on the emerging democracies. Mainwaring and Torcal (2005:2) indicate that party roots in the emerging democracies are not as strong as in the established democracies. Most importantly, the social cleavages leading to the formation of party systems in the emerging democracies are quite diverse.

According to McAllister and White (2007), some post-communist democracies share some identical party roots, religion and class, with the established democracies while political parties in these emerging democracies are less effective in representing social cleavages than their counterparts in the established democracies. However, the post-communist democracies included in their research are all European countries.³⁵ They have shared the same cultural and social bases with the established democracies in Western Europe for a long time and party roots are more likely to develop from these similar cultural and social bases. Hence, the cases of those post-communist democracies cannot represent all emerging democracies, especially democracies in Asia and other areas.

Dalton, Chu, and Shin (2008) indicate that East Asian party systems tend to be more pragmatic than programmatic. The traditional ideology, left and right, is underdeveloped in most of East Asian democracies. East Asian party systems are quite

³⁵ The post-communist democracies included in McAllister and White's research include: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine (McAllister and White, 2007).

diverse due to very different historical conditions. Competition between political parties is often based on diverse issues rather than on steady social class or religion factors. Take Taiwan and South Korea for example: social cleavages leading to party competition are national identity and regionalism. Hence, it is difficult to develop a generalization of party systems and party cleavage in East Asian countries (Dalton, Chu, and Shin, 2008:2).

As a result, it is not appropriate to use the same factors to measure the evolution of party system and party polarization in different countries. Since the purpose of this research is to examine partisan polarization in Taiwan, I use important issues which are often used by Taiwanese political scientists, to test the effects of issue cleavages on partisan polarization in Taiwan. The issues that may be related to political cleavage and partisan formation in Taiwan include: Taiwan independence vs. reunification with China, political reform vs. social stability, environmental protection vs. economic development, and social welfare vs. lower taxes.

The main target of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between Taiwanese people's issue positions and partisanship. In fact, Sheng (2007) and Lin (2008) also use these four issues to examine how issue positions affect their partisanship. However, both Sheng and Lin only include survey data until 2004 in their research. One of important contributions of this dissertation is to employ the latest public opinion survey (TEDS 2008P).

Moreover, although our analyses use four identical political issues, the most important difference between this dissertation and Lina and Sheng's research is that Sheng and Lin only present all respondents' self-placement and their perceptions of political parties' positions on the four issues, The readers cannot know the relationship between party identification and respondents' self-placement and their perceptions of political parties' positions on the four issues. Instead, I go further to analyze different party camp

identifiers' personal positions and their perceptions of political parties' issue positions, offering readers more information about the complex relationships between people's partisan affiliations and their attitudes on major issues.

In short, in this research, these four issues are used to examine whether the Taiwanese people are divided by these issues and whether partisans hold opposing positions on these issues.

Four Selected Issues

Independence vs. Reunification

How to deal with the relationship with China is the most important issue for Taiwan, and it leads to the biggest debate and conflict among Taiwan's political parties in recent decades. As noted earlier, the pan-blue camp, composed of the Kuomintang (KMT) and its allies, advocates closer interaction between Taiwan and China and reunification with China in the future. Conversely, the pan-green camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), argues that it is necessary to limit interaction with China owing to China's threat to use armed force if Taiwan declares itself a new, independent country.

Sheng (2007) argues that party identification is the main factor explaining the Taiwanese people's position on the independence/reunification issue. Moreover, according to Chung-chu Lin (2008), citizens' positions on the independence/reunification issue have had the greatest impact on the outcome of Taiwan's elections. Therefore, since the two party coalitions have clear and distinct stances and since political parties have a huge impact on people's voting decisions, I expect that partisanship among the general public falls in line with the leadership of the political parties and thus it has become polarized on this issue. I also expect China relations to continue strongly affecting people's vote choice.

Political Reform vs. Social Stability

As a newly emerging democracy, one which just experienced democratization in recent decades, Taiwan has undergone a huge and rapid social and political change. This change has spawned debates on the island over whether pursuing large-scale reform has an overly negative impact on society that is ruinous to social stability. Striking a balance between promoting large scale reform and maintaining social stability thus has become another important issue distinguishing Taiwan's political parties.

As a long-term opposition party, the DPP is more likely to have a reputation for promoting reform. Conversely, the ruling party tends to support the status quo as long as the current political system works in its favor. Hence, the KMT has a strong pro-stability position on this issue. Lin (2008) indicates that the reform/stability issue is the second most influential factor affecting people's voting decisions. Sheng (2008) also notes that there is a positive relationship between people's reform/stability issue positions and their party identification. Taiwanese who tend to be pro-reform are more likely to identify with the DPP over other parties.

However, when the DPP held office from 2000 to 2008, they have moved their solid pro-reform position to the middle ground more or less (see Chapter 3). On the other hand, the KMT had begun to advocate political reform after having lost the 2000 presidential election. In this chapter, I examine whether Taiwanese are still divided by this issue and whether this issue continues to affect Taiwanese voting behavior.

Social Welfare vs. Lower Taxes and Environmental Protection vs. Economic Development

Finding a balance between promoting environmental protection and maintaining economic development is a very important issue for a developing country. The long-term ruling party, the KMT, was strongly pro-economy on this issue since economic development

is the top priority for the government of a developing country. Conversely, the DPP tended to advocate more strongly for environmental protection than did the KMT. However, a power transition may lead political parties to change issue positions, especially for the ruling party. Hence, DPP leaders may need to compromise their environmentalism.

Furthermore, by the same token, the DPP was considered more progressive than the KMT, and it also was more attentive to social welfare policy before it took power. However, as the KMT realized that social welfare can serve as a tool to attract votes, it began to advocate for general social welfare programs as well. According to Sheng (2007), the social welfare issue, compared with the independence/reunification and reform/stability issues, has relatively little impact on Taiwanese people's party identification. The environment/economy issue has a limited impact as well. In sum, political party positions on social welfare and environmental issues may become more unstable and offer little guidance for their partisans since the 2000 power transition.

Since these four issues are considered to be important political issues in Taiwan and since the major parties have different positions on these issues, people's positions on them are likely to be affected by party elites. In this chapter, I use public opinion survey data to analyze whether the position of the Taiwanese people on these issues have become more polarized. Moreover, I also examine whether their party identification affects their issue positions when I control for key variables and whether their issue positions affect their political behavior.

Data, Variables, and Hypotheses

Data Sources

For measuring polarization among ordinary citizens, I use a diverse assortment of public opinion surveys from two main sources (see Appendix C). One of the main sources of

public opinion data is Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS). It is a continuous large-scale survey research project supported by the National Science Council of the Executive Yuan, which began to release national survey data to the public in 2001. However, since these surveys only have been released since 2001 and therefore may not cover all periods needed for this project, I also take advantage of other sources of survey data, including studies conducted by the Election Study Center (ESC), National Chengchi University. ESC has conducted surveys dating back to the mid-1990s. The main public surveys employed in this research are listed in Appendix C.

These survey data include variables which are useful for the research in this chapter, such as party identification, people's positions on the four important issues cited in this chapter, and several demographic variables. I use these variables to examine whether the Taiwanese people's issue attitudes divide them along partisan lines.

Finally, while the party antagonism between the two party coalitions is the key focus of this research, a single party dominates both the pan-green and the pan-blue camps. Some surveys conducted before 2000 did not include questions about minor parties which did not yet exist or had very few identifiers. Hence, the analysis sometimes uses the KMT and the DPP to represent the pan-blue and the pan-green camps, respectively.

Ordinary citizens' positions on these issues are the dependent variables in this chapter and can be found in public opinion surveys. The wordings of questions on the four issues in the public opinion surveys are presented in Appendix D.³⁶

How do we define issue polarization? Tsai and his coauthors argue that there are two criteria for measuring citizen polarization on issues (Tsai, Hsu, and Hwang, 2007). First, Issue

³⁶ Independence /unification, reform/stability, and social welfare issue are included in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2008 surveys. Environment/economy is included in 1998, 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2008 surveys.

polarization may occur when parties have long-term, clear, and opposing positions on that issue. Secondly, an individual's position on that issue must influence his (her) vote choice. Here I employ their criteria to distinguish what issues lead to political polarization. In short, a polarized issue is an issue on which political parties have an explicit stance and an individual's position on this issue is decisive to his vote choice.

To demonstrate which issues most divide the Taiwanese people, public opinion survey data are employed. Respondents were asked to locate their position on four issues on a 0-10 scale.³⁷ Respondents' party identification is the main independent variable, and their own reported positions on these four issues are the dependent variables. ESC and TEDS' survey data provide the information for the analysis. By taking advantage of these public opinion polls, the breakdown of people's issue positions by their partisanship and their perception of the major parties' positions on these issues are presented by graph or table first to see whether a polarized or unified trend is evident after several years of multiparty democracy. My expectation is that partisan conflict over China relations has increased, while partisan conflict on the other issues has declined.

Secondly, OLS regression is employed to examine whether party ID is a significant factor influencing people's attitudes on these four issues when controlling for their education, gender, age, region, ethnicity, and national identity.

³⁷ For the independence/reunification issue, 0 represents one extreme of declaring independence immediately and 10 represents the other extreme of beginning reunification negotiation as soon as possible. For the reform/ stability issue, 0 represents one extreme of large-scale reform and 10 represents the other extreme of maintenance of social stability. For the environment/ economy issue, 0 represents one extreme of emphasizing environmental protection and 10 represents the other extreme of emphasizing economic development. For the social welfare issue, 0 represents one extreme of maintaining social welfare at the status quo and 10 represents the other extreme of actively promoting social welfare expansion.

Variables

The dependent variables in this chapter are people's attitudes toward independence vs. reunification, reform vs. stability, social welfare, and environmental protection, survey by survey; the importance of these issues was introduced earlier. The independent variables include: party ID, education, gender, age, region, ethnicity, and national identity.

Party identification is always one of the most important factors in research on political behavior. Analyzing the relationship between political parties and the four issues, Sheng (2007) indicates that people's party preferences strongly influence their issue positions. Respondents who prefer the KMT tend to support reunification with China significantly. These respondents, compared with those who prefer the DPP, are also more likely to support social stability rather than large scale reform. Moreover, the KMT partisans tend to emphasize economic development over environmental protection. However, these respondents place less importance on social welfare (Sheng, 2007). Chen-hua Yu and Chia-hung Tsai's work, which focuses on policy preferences, also confirms Sheng's result. They find that KMT partisans are less likely to support spending on elder welfare. However, there is no difference between the KMT and the DPP supporters on spending on labor welfare (Yu and Tsai, 2007).

I expect that party identification continues to have a strong impact on people's issue positions. KMT partisans are more likely to support reunification with China, social stability, and economic development, while DPP supporters tend to more pro-Taiwan independence, pro-large scale reform, and pro-environmental protection. On social welfare issues, however, the difference between the two major parties is likely to be small or insignificant because each party focuses on different groups' welfare.

According to Sheng (2007), Taiwanese with higher education are more likely to be pro-reform on the reform/stability issue. Moreover, well-educated Taiwanese also tend to support environmental protection on environment/economy issue. Yu and Tsai (2007) verify this result, indicating that better educated people are more likely to support spending on environmental protection. On the other hand, they find no significant relationship between education and attitudes toward the independence/reunification and social welfare/lower taxes issues. My own analysis generally supports these results, as we shall see.

Generally speaking, female voters are considered more likely to care about social welfare than are male voters. Yu and Tsai (2007) find that female Taiwanese are more likely to support spending on labor welfare and environmental protection. On the other hand, quite different from U.S. female citizens, who are more likely to be liberal on certain issues, female Taiwanese tend to be more conservative. On reform/stability issues, female Taiwanese are more pro-stability than are male voters (Sheng, 2007).

I expect that women, as targets of gender discrimination and subject to different gender socialization than men, are more likely to favor social welfare expansion as well as environmental protection. Hence, we may see a gender gap on these two issues. As for independence/reunification, I expect that there is no significant gender division on this issue.

Yu and Tsai (2007) point out that elder Taiwanese are more likely to support spending on elder welfare. However, Sheng's work demonstrates that young Taiwanese are more likely to support generalized social welfare. Moreover, compared to citizens who are over 60 years old, younger Taiwanese are more likely to be pro-reunification, and pro-environmental protection (Sheng, 2007). Sheng's study demonstrates, surprisingly, that young Taiwanese do not tend to be pro-reform on the reform /stability issue. My analysis supports this result, finding little age influence on reform/stability attitudes.

Previous research rarely deals with the relationship between region and issue positions in Taiwan. In Yu and Tsai's work, there is no significant regional difference on attitude toward labor welfare spending and elder welfare (Yu and Tsai, 2007). This result contradicts the expectation that Southerners are more likely to support labor welfare and elder welfare spending since southern areas have higher working-class and elderly populations.

A reasonable explanation for Yu and Tsai's result is that working-class and elderly people tend to have lower incomes and thus do not support social welfare because welfare spending may lead to increased taxes that they may not be able to afford. Hence, following this logic, I expect that people from southern areas are more likely to favor economic development over environmental protection.

Taiwan has four ethnic groups: Taiwanese- Minnan, Taiwanese- Hakka, Mainlanders, and Aborigine. Taiwanese-Minnan is the majority ethnic group; 73% of Taiwan's residents belong to this group. Mainlanders are those who evacuated to Taiwan with the KMT after the China Civil War in 1949 and their descendants. During the period of the two President Chiangs, most of the central governmental officials were selected from this group. Hence, even though only 13% of Taiwan's residents are Mainlanders, this group's political influence is bigger than the size of its population. Taiwanese- Hakka and Aborigine are two minority groups, which comprise 12% and 2% of the population respectively.³⁸ Among these ethnicity groups, the Mainlanders tend to have stronger group consciousness and are much more likely to be pro-reunification with China since they or their ancestors were from China.

³⁸ Due to its small numbers within public opinion survey samples, Aborigines are not included in the analyses in this project.

National Identity is also an important factor influencing Taiwanese political behavior. It refers to how the residents in Taiwan define themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both. National Identity is different from ethnicity and should not be confused. Ethnicity is a physical characteristic, whereas national identity is a psychological affiliation. This identity is strongly related to individuals' position on the independence/unification issue. People who identify themselves as Chinese are more likely to support reunification with China, whereas respondents call themselves as Taiwanese are more likely to be pro-Taiwan independence.

Hypotheses

Zaller (1992) demonstrates that political elites' opinions have a strong impact on public opinion, especially for those who are strong partisans. Since the two major parties have their own positions on the four selected issues, it is reasonable to hypothesize that ordinary citizens' issue positions are influenced by their party ID, as below:

H4-1: Pan-blue partisans are more likely to favor reunification with China than the pan-green supporters, who tend to favor Taiwan independence.

H4-2: Pan-blue partisans are more likely to emphasize the importance of social stability, whereas individuals who identify with the pan-green coalition are more likely to advocate reform.

H4-3: There is no significant difference on the social welfare issue between the two camp's supporters due to both of the parties emphasizing the importance of social welfare while they focus on different groups.

H4-4: Pan-blue partisans are more likely to emphasize the importance of economic development, whereas pan-green supporters tend to favor environmental protection more.

Binary logit and multinomial logit analysis are used for analyzing the influence of individuals' issue positions on their vote choices, consistent with the definition of polarization among voters

In this part, the dependent variable is respondents' vote choice and their issue positions on the four issues become the independent variables.³⁹ Party ID, education, gender, age, region, ethnicity, and national identity are also included in the model as control variables.

The issue of Taiwanese independence vs. reunification with China, I hypothesize, has become the most important issue influencing ordinary citizens' voting decisions. Other issue positions are less likely to influence their votes. The reason for this assertion is tied to Taiwan's first party turnover in the beginning of this century. As the analyses in Chapter 3 show, the long-term ruling party, the KMT, and its opposition party, the DPP, switched some of their issue positions after the 2000 presidential election. It is understandable that a political party, especially for a former opposition party becoming a ruling party, would change its positions on some important issues. It is much easier to support reform over stability, and environmental protection over development, when the party is in opposition and not faced with the political realities of governing. As a result, these issues do not divide the parties consistently. In sum, while different parties' supporters may retain distinguishable positions on reform vs. stability, environment vs. economy, and social welfare issues, the differences have become smaller and their positions on these issues have become unimportant considerations when they cast their votes. The relationship with China

³⁹ The type of logit model used for this section depends on the type of vote choice. Binary logit model is used when only two major parties' (camps') candidates run for the position, and vote choice is coded as the DPP (the pan green camp) candidate= 1; the KMT (the pan blue camp) candidate= 0. Multinomial logit model is used if the third party's candidate also is involved in the competition, and vote choice is coded as the DPP (the pan green camp) candidate= 1; the KMT (the pan blue camp) candidate= 2; others= 0.

has become the only political issue explicitly separating the Taiwanese along party lines and influencing their votes.

H4-5: The independence/reunification issue is the only issue significantly affecting respondents' vote choice. Respondents who support reunification with China are more likely to vote for the KMT (the pan-blue camp) candidates; whereas those who support Taiwan Independence tend to vote for the DPP (the pan-green camp) candidates.

People's Perceptions of the Parties' Positions on Four Issues

Chapter 3 presented partisan divisions on major issues in the legislative Yuan. This chapter presents Taiwanese people's perceptions of the parties' positions on those issues, examining them for accuracy and stability over time.

Figure 4.1 shows the Taiwanese public's perception of the parties' positions on the independence/reunification issue. Higher scores indicate a preference for reunification with China. Apparently, in respondents' eyes, Taiwan's political parties are divided by the independence/reunification issue. Respondents categorize the KMT, the New Party (NP) and the People First party (PFP) as pro-reunification parties, whereas the DPP and the TSU are pro-independence parties. Among the pro-reunification parties, the NP is considered as most in favor of reunification. On the other hand, even though most TSU politicians were once KMT partisans, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), in respondents' eyes, is slightly more pro-independence than the DPP, which was the first party officially to endorse Taiwanese independence. Most importantly, according to figure 4.1, the distance between the KMT and the DPP on this issue has increased since 2000, reflecting the public's perceptions that the two major parties' positions on independence/reunification have become more polarized.

The KMT has become more pro-reunification while the DPP has become more pro-Taiwan independence in voters' eyes.




Figure 4.1 Mean Score of Respondents' Perception of Parties' Position on the Independence/Unification Issue (1994-2008)

"0" - declaring Taiwan independence immediately

"10" - beginning reunification negotiation as soon as possible.

Figure 4.2 demonstrates Taiwanese perceptions of the parties' position on the reform/stability issue. Higher scores indicate a preference for maintaining social stability over large-scale reform. Respondents perceive the pan-blue parties as more pro-stability than the pan-green parties. Among the pro-stability parties, the KMT is considered as the party which emphasizes most the importance of social stability. On the other hand, the DPP is considered to be strongly pro-reform, as does its follower, the TSU. People believe that the two party coalitions have clear positions on the reform/stability issue and that this issue divides the two party coalitions. However, the perceived difference between the KMT and the DPP's positions on this issue has become narrowed, which may reflect the shift of the two major parties' positions in power. Hence, whether this distance will increase or further decrease needs to be examined in further research.




Figure 4.2 Mean Score of Respondents' Perception of Parties' Position on the Reform/Stability Issue (1994-2008)

"0"- large-scale reform

"10"- maintenance of social stability

Compared with the independence/reunification and reform/stability issues, the Taiwanese do not perceive a significant gap between the pan-blue parties' and the pan-green parties' positions on the social welfare/lower taxes issue. According to Figure 4.3, the DPP is considered to be the party most favorable toward social welfare. However, other parties are also perceived as favoring social welfare expansion over lower taxes, and the KMT even replace the DPP as most pro-welfare party in the 2008 survey. Therefore, in Taiwanese eyes, social welfare does not seem to be an issue that distinguishes Taiwan's political parties, and parties have not become polarized on this issue.




Figure 4.3 Means Score of Respondents' Perception of Parties' Position on the Social Welfare/Lower Taxes Issue (1994-2008)

"0" - maintenance of social welfare at the status quo or lower taxes.

"10" - social welfare expansion

Figure 4.4 shows how the Taiwanese view the political parties on the environment/economy issue. Not surprisingly, the KMT is considered to be the strongest advocate of economic development. On the other hand, the DPP and the NP, a member of the pan-blue camp, are viewed as the parties most concerned about environmental protection. However, the figure shows that all parties are seen as favoring economic development over environmental protection. Moreover, the distance between the two major parties' perceived positions on this issue has narrowed over time, indicating that the Taiwanese do not consider the environment/economy issue as one that distinguishes the two party camps, and the parties have not become polarized on this issue.




Figure 4.4 Mean Score of Respondents' Perception of Parties' Position on the Environment/Economy Issue (1998-2008)

"0"- environmental protection

"10"- economic development

Party Identifications vs. Issue Positions

After examining Taiwanese people's perceptions of the parties' positions on major issues, I shift the focus to respondents' own positions on the same issue relative to those of the parties. I examine the relationships between the Taiwanese people's party identification and their issue positions, analyzing whether the Taiwanese public is divided on these four issues along partisan lines. Moreover, in this section, I also examine whether pan-blue identifiers tend to perceive themselves as close to the KMT and far from the DPP, and vice versa on these issues.⁴⁰

Figure 4.5 first presents how people's party identification affects their positions on the independence/reunification issue. Regardless of their partisan affiliation, Taiwanese people locate themselves in the middle ground between the two major parties. In Figure 4.5a, Pan-blue partisans' position is pro-reunification with China on this issue. They have not



⁴⁰ As mentioned earlier, the pan-blue camp and pan-green camp were formed after the 2001 Legislative Yuan election. Therefore, the terms, pan-blue camp and pan-green camp, in this dissertation before 2001 refer to the main parties within the two coalitions, KMT and DPP.

changed their positions much and their position is very close to the KMT's position.

Furthermore, they perceive that the distance between the KMT and the DPP has increased somewhat since 2000.

According to Figure 4.5b, partisan independents locate themselves in the middle on the independence/reunification issue while they have moved toward the pro-independence side slightly since 2000. As for the distance between independents' position and their perceptions of two major parties' position on this issue, they have kept the same distance from the DPP, perceiving a slight shift of the DPP toward the pro-independence position. However, in their perception, the KMT has become a more pro-reunification party since 2000, moving farther from independents' position on this issue.

Pan-green identifiers, in Figure 4.5c, tend to support Taiwan declaring itself as a newly independent country. Their position on this issue is very close to that of the DPP and both pan-green identifiers' self-placement and their perception of the DPP's position on this issue have moved toward the pro-independence side since 2000. Most importantly, pan-green partisans perceive that the KMT has become increasingly favorable toward reunification and increasingly distant from the pro-independence position of pan-green party leaders and supporters. Moreover, the distance between pan-blue partisans and pan-green identifiers on this issue also has become larger as pan-blue partisans have not changed their positions much whereas pan-green identifiers have moved toward the pro-independence side.






Figure 4.5 Partisans' Perceptions of the KMT and the DPPs' Positions and Personal Position on Independen/Reunification Issue


"0" - declaring Taiwan independence immediately.

"10" - beginning reunification negotiation as soon as possible.

On the reform/stability issue, interestingly, the Taiwanese locate themselves at a more extreme position than both of the two major parties regardless of their partisan affiliation. According to Figure 4.6a to 4.6c, ordinary Taiwanese, regardless of their partisan affiliation, tend to be more favorable toward social stability, and more skeptical of reform, than their perceptions of either the KMT or the DPP. Among partisans, pan-blue identifiers are the most extreme in their preference for social stability. Independents' positions on this issue are very close to those of the KMT supporters. Pan-green identifiers are relatively more open to reform, yet even pan-green identifiers display a preference for social stability; further, their positions on this issue have grown closer to those of the pan-blue supporters and independents over time.

In Taiwanese people's perceptions, also regardless of their partisan attachment, the KMT is a pro-social stability party whereas the DPP supports large-scale reform. However, the Taiwanese public perceives that the KMT has moved toward the pro-reform side whereas the DPP has moved toward the pro-stability side.

In sum, ordinary Taiwanese, regardless of their party identification, perceive themselves as close to the KMT on this issue. However, the perceived distance between the KMT and the DPP narrowed in 2008. Moreover, since the DPP is considered to be a pro-reform party while its identifiers are pro-stability, this issue appears to be an unimportant factor in determining people's party attachments.






Figure 4.6 Partisans' Perceptions of the KMT and the DPPs' Positions and Personal Position on Reform/Stability Issue

"0" - large-scale reform.

"10" - maintenance of social stability.


Figure 4.7 displays the partisans' positions and perceptions of the two major parties' positions on the issue of social welfare/ lower taxes. Pan-blue supporters, pan-green identifiers, and independents view the DPP as a long-term pro-social welfare party, although somewhat less so after 2001. As for the KMT, pan-blue supporters, pan-green identifiers, and independents perceive that it has become more pro-social welfare over time. Most interesting, Figure 4.7 illustrates the lack of clear and consistent partisan positions on the tradeoff between higher levels of social welfare and lower taxes. While DPP partisans and independents generally perceive the DPP to be more favorable toward social welfare than the KMT, KMT identifiers view their own party as being more pro-social welfare than the DPP in 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2008. Further, all three groups perceive almost no difference between the two major parties' positions on social welfare vs. lower taxes in 2008.

As for partisans' personal positions on this issue, Figure 4.7 shows that there is little differentiation among the three groups. Respondents' positions on social welfare issue fluctuate dramatically over time. The swings reflect differences in question wording (see

appendix D). In the 1998 and 2001 surveys, the respondents are asked to locate themselves on a spectrum between expanding social welfare and maintaining the status quo, without any mention of tax increases. In those years, respondents display a strong preference for social welfare expansion. However, when the survey questions of 2000, 2004, and 2008 present a tradeoff, noting that promoting social welfare will lead to tax increases, the support for welfare drops to a more moderate position.

Generally speaking, the case of the social welfare issue is similar to the reform/stability issue. Taiwanese people, regardless of their partisan attachment, tend to favor government expansion of social welfare. They even see themselves as more extreme than the DPP, which is considered as a pro-social welfare party, on this issue.

Therefore, if we focus on the surveys mentioning the welfare-tax tradeoff, people's positions on this issue are slightly pro-social welfare even if welfare expansion may lead to taxes increases. In no year, however, does party identification affect people's social welfare positions. Pan-blue supporters, pan-green identifiers, and independents stand nearly at the same positions on this issue.






Figure 4.7 Partisans' Perceptions of the KMT and the DPPs' Position and Personal Position on Social welfare/Lower Taxes Issue
 ("0" - maintainance social welfare at the status quo or lower taxes.
 "10"- active promotion of social wlefare.



Figure 4.8 shows how Taiwanese people's party identification influences their opinions and perceptions of the major parties' positions on environmental protection. Regardless of partisanship, respondents are more favorable toward economic development than environmental protection. Moreover, they also perceive that both the KMT and the DPP support economic development over environmental protection. They consider that the KMT is more pro-economic development than the DPP while the distance between two parties has become smaller over time.

Not surprisingly, pan-blue supporters tend to be more favorable toward economic development than the other groups. In Figure 4.8a, pan-blue supporters have moved closer since 2000 toward their party's perceived stance emphasizing economic development.

Conversely, both independents and pan-green partisans' positions are closer to that of the DPP than the KMT. But pan-green identifiers also support economic development over environmental protection even though the DPP, the leading party of the pan-green camp, is considered to be the pro-environment party.

As for Independents, their position on this issue is very close to the DPP identifiers. However, we can see that there is no significant differentiation of issue positions among partisans. The Taiwanese tend to support economic development over environmental protection regardless of their party identification.

In sum, both the Taiwanese people's self-placement and their perceptions of the KMT and the DPPs' positions on this issue are more favorable toward economic development than to environmental protection, indicating that a strong preference for economic development pervades the Taiwanese public and political elites. Therefore, the environment/economy issue seems not to be an issue leading to partisan polarization in Taiwan.






Figure 4.8 Partisans' Perceptions of the KMT and the DPPs' Position and Personal Position on Environment/Economy Issue

"0" - environmental protection.

"10" - Economic development.

Overall, pan-blue supporters tend to be pro-reunification while pan-green Identifiers are more likely to support Taiwanese independence, but supporters of both parties tend to favor social stability, social welfare, and economic development. As for partisan independents, they are also more likely to emphasize the importance of social stability, social welfare, and economic development while their position on independence/reunification is relatively neutral when compared to pan-blue and pan-green identifiers.⁴¹ As a result, the China relations issue seems to be the only issue clearly distinguishing Taiwanese partisans from each other and from partisan independents.⁴²

⁴¹ By using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), I also investigate whether the level of political knowledge makes a difference. The result shows that there is no statistically significant difference between knowledge level and issue position in most cases. The only exception is the reform/stability issue. Independents with higher political knowledge are more like to support reform than those with lower knowledge. However, the significant difference is not found in all public opinion surveys (only four out of seven). As a result, the level of political knowledge does not make a huge impact on partisan independents' issue positions.

⁴² In order to test the significance of the shifts in people's perceptions of the major political parties after the first party turnover in 2000, I apply t-tests to the differences in perceptions between 2000 and 2008. The results are displayed in Appendix B, demonstrating that people's perceptions of the major parties' positions on all four issues did indeed change significantly between 2000 and 2008.

OLS Regression Analysis of Issue Positions

After examining the relationship between Taiwanese people's party identification and their issue positions, I go further to employ OLS regression analysis to examine which factors affect their positions on these four issues. The dependent variables in each model are the respondents' positions on the independence/reunification, reform/stability, social welfare/lower taxes, and environment/economy issues. The main independent variable is the respondent's party identification and other independent variables include age, gender, education, region, ethnicity, and national identity. (See Appendix E for frequency distributions on all these variables)

Party identification is categorized into three groups: the pan-blue, the pan-green, and independents. Independents comprise the reference group. Respondents' education is categorized into 3 groups: low (junior high school and less), middle (senior high school), and high (college and more). The middle level of education comprises the reference group.⁴³ Gender is coded as a dummy variable; 1=male, 0=female. Age is coded as a continuous variable from young to old. The region variable is categorized into three groups: North, South, and other areas (include Middle and East). The "other areas" category comprises the reference group. Ethnicity is categorized into three groups: Mainlanders, Taiwanese-Minnan, and Taiwanese-Hakka. Taiwanese-Hakka comprises the reference group. Finally, national identity is categorized into three groups: Chinese, Taiwanese, and Both. Respondents whose national identity is both comprises the reference group.⁴⁴

⁴³ I also try entering education as an ordinal variable to see if that has any effect on the OLS regression analyses. The results show that there is no significant change when I take education as a categorical variable. Hence, I examine education's effect on this and later statistical analyses by taking it as a categorical effect.

⁴⁴ Some people may question that ethnicity and national identity variables are too similar to be included in a regression analysis. Actually, as noted earlier, ethnicity is a physical characteristic whereas national identity is a psychological affiliation. By examining some important indices of multicollinearity, such as variance inflation factor value, condition index, and tolerance value, I found that there is no multicollinearity between ethnicity

Table 4.2 presents OLS regression analysis of the independence/reunification issue. Taiwanese party identification appears to be the most influential factor affecting positions on independence/reunification issue; it is consistently significant across the years. Pan-blue supporters tend to be pro-reunification with China, whereas the pan-green identifiers are more likely to support Taiwan becoming a newly independent country. The result conforms to hypothesis 4-1.

Age does not have a large impact on the independence/reunification issue. It was only statistically significant in the 2001 survey, showing that the older respondents are, the more likely they are to support Taiwan independence.

Gender also does not have a large impact on the independence/reunification issue. It is only significant in the 1998 survey, in which male respondents were slightly more likely to support Taiwan independence. Education is also not a very important factor affecting people's positions on this issue, barely attaining statistical significance in the 2004 survey. The ill-educated tended to be pro-Taiwan independence in 2004.

Region affected respondents' positions on the independence/reunification issue in the 1996 and 1998 surveys. Compared with people living in other areas, southern Taiwanese were more likely to support Taiwanese independence. Ethnicity also affects people's positions on this issue although its impact is not large. Not surprisingly, Mainlanders tend to support Taiwanese reunification with China, whereas Taiwanese-Minnan are slightly more likely to be pro-Taiwan independence. Finally, the national identity factor exercises a strong impact on the independence/reunification issue, as Taiwanese who identify themselves as Chinese strongly support reunification with China. On the contrary, those who self-identify as Taiwanese are more likely to be pro-independence. Hence, the result shows that the

and national identity variables. Hence, I decided to keep both variables in the analyses.

psychological attachment, national identity, has a larger impact on independence/reunification attitudes than does the demographic characteristic, ethnicity.

Table 4.2 OLS Regression Analyses on the Independence/ Reunification Issue

Independent Variables	1994		1996		1998		2000	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	5.749 ^{***}	.356	5.273 ^{***}	.349	5.869 ^{***}	.380	6.208 ^{***}	.347
Party ID								
Blue	.493 ^{**}	.163	.527 ^{**}	.175	.887 ^{***}	.195	.239	.165
Green	-1.070 ^{***}	.211	-1.033 ^{***}	.217	-.630 ^{**}	.211	-.777 ^{***}	.166
Age	.004	.005	.003	.006	-.007	.006	-.005	.005
Gender(Male)	-.002	.139	.060	.136	-.288 [§]	.158	-.064	.134
Education								
Low	.244	.178	-.008	.178	.295	.202	.231	.176
High	-.119	.175	-.184	.175	.073	.212	.032	.171
Region								
North	-.160	.169	-.105	.185	-.187	.202	.135	.185
South	-.106	.185	-.332 [§]	.189	-.614 ^{**}	.213	.025	.179
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	.032	.291	.398	.255	.470	.316	.490 [§]	.268
Minnan	-.152	.245	-.227	.204	-.217	.236	-.394 [§]	.204
National ID								
Chinese	.492 ^{**}	.174	.763 ^{***}	.190	.432 [§]	.248	.300	.225
Taiwanese	-1.046 ^{***}	.178	-.604 ^{***}	.163	-1.027 ^{***}	.179	-1.022 ^{***}	.151
Adjusted R²	.159		.179		.162		.157	
N	985		1026		1015		979	

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 4.2 OLS Regression Analyses on the Independence/ Reunification Issue (Continued)

Independent Variables	2001		2004		2008	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	5.870 ^{***}	.278	5.814 ^{***}	.323	5.530 ^{***}	1.023
Party ID						
Blue	.605 ^{***}	.140	.747 ^{***}	.174	.729 ^{***}	.189
Green	-.806 ^{***}	.137	-.878 ^{***}	.159	-1.172 ^{***}	.204
Age	-.010 [*]	.004	-.008	.005	-.004	.028
Gender(Male)	.110	.110	.038	.133	.106	.302
Education						
Low	.009	.151	-.337 [§]	.189	-.086	.292
High	-.148	.136	-.238	.163	-.002	.172
Region						
North	.048	.135	-.061	.171	-.121	.194
South	-.190	.144	-.177	.183	-.216	.210
Ethnicity						
Mainlander	.646 ^{**}	.231	.789 ^{**}	.268	-.249	.237
Minnan	.001	.173	-.080	.192	.072	.323
National ID						
Chinese	.748 ^{***}	.206	.803 [*]	.3151	1.223 [*]	.515
Taiwanese	-.929 ^{***}	.125	-1.164 ^{***}	.151	-.943 ^{***}	.168
Adjusted R ²	.171		.236		.228	
N	1664		1030		741	

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; ^{*} $p < .05$; ^{**} $p < .01$; ^{***} $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 4.3 presents OLS regression analyses of opinions on the reform/stability Issue. Taiwanese people's party identification still plays an important role in their positions on this issue. As expected, pan-blue supporters prefer social stability over large-scale reform. On the other side, pan-green partisans tend to support large scale reform. The result conforms to hypothesis 4-2. However, as noted in figure 4.7, pan-green identifiers' position on this issue is slightly pro-stability. Hence, most pan-green identifiers still prefer social stability, but they are relatively more likely to be pro-reform than the KMT supporters.

Age also affects people's positions on the reform/stability Issue. According to table 4.3, older citizens, in general, tend to be more conservative, emphasizing the importance of social stability over reform. The only exception took place in the 2004 survey, in which older people were slightly more favorable than the young toward reform. Gender significantly affects Taiwanese opinion on this issue as well. Compared with female respondents, male Taiwanese tend to be dissatisfied with the status quo and much more supportive of large-scale reform.

Education level also has a significant relationship with reform/stability attitudes. Well-educated Taiwanese are more likely to support large-scale reform, while less educated Taiwanese tend to be more conservative, favoring social stability. Region also affected people's positions on the reform/stability Issue in the 1990s. Northern Taiwanese in the 1994 and 1998 surveys and the southerners in the 1996 survey favor reform over social stability when compared with Taiwanese living in other areas. However, region has become an insignificant factor affecting Taiwanese positions on this issue since the 2000 survey. Hence, the region effect is neither very strong nor stable on this issue.

The effect of ethnicity is very limited on this issue as well, with Mainlanders more favorable toward social stability only in 1998 and Taiwanese-Minnan somewhat more

pro-reform in 2008. National identity again demonstrates a stronger effect on reform/stability attitudes than ethnicity, with Taiwanese identifiers more likely to be dissatisfied with status quo, demanding large scale reform.

Table 4.3 OLS Regression Analyses on the Reform/Stability Issue

Independent Variables	1994		1996		1998		2000	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	7.604 ^{***}	.389	6.601 ^{***}	.345	8.318 ^{***}	.411	7.364 ^{***}	.417
Party ID								
Blue	.414 ^{**}	.172	.333 [*]	.169	.289	.207	.228	.198
Green	-1.202 ^{***}	.226	-.432 [*]	.216	-1.181 ^{***}	.227	-.693 ^{***}	.201
Age	.010 [§]	.006	.024 ^{***}	.005	.004	.007	.007	.007
Gender(Male)	-.808 ^{***}	.149	-.174	.137	-1.106 ^{***}	.172	-.882 ^{***}	-.882
Education								
Low	.275	.191	-.264	.180	.109	.222	.648 ^{**}	.648
High	-.945 ^{***}	.193	-.344 [§]	.182	-.929 ^{***}	.235	-.759 ^{***}	-.759
Region								
North	-.447 [*]	.184	-.179	.184	-.421 [§]	.217	-.020	-.020
South	-.013	.196	-.395 [*]	.185	-.201	.228	.010	.010
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	.064	.324	-.039	.260	.660 [§]	.346	.528	.528
Minnan	.086	.273	-.156	.205	-.073	.256	.189	.189
National ID								
Chinese	-.102	.189	.056	.193	-.180	.269	.433	.433
Taiwanese	-.550 ^{**}	.188	-.116	.162	-.235	.193	-.350 [§]	-.350
Adjusted R²	.145		.046		.120		.100	
N	1089		1138		1138		1037	

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; ^{*} $p < .05$; ^{**} $p < .01$; ^{***} $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 4.3 OLS Regression Analyses on the Reform/Stability Issue (Continued)

Independent Variables	2001		2004		2008	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	7.594 ^{***}	.333	8.895 ^{***}	.398	6.408 ^{***}	1.366
Party ID						
Blue	.380 [*]	.169	.536 [*]	.211	-.233	.251
Green		.164	-.794 ^{***}	.195	-.878 ^{***}	.272
	-.745 ^{***}					
Age	.005	.005	-.013 [§]	.007	.046	.037
Gender(Male)	-.745 ^{***}	.164	-.775 ^{***}	.163	.396	.406
Education						
Low	.367 [*]	.181	.198	.228	.361	.393
High		.166	-1.144 ^{***}	.202	-.825 ^{***}	.230
	-.822 ^{***}					
Region						
North	-.042	.162	.000	.209	-.251	.259
South	.055	.172	-.110	.223	-.014	.281
Ethnicity						
Mainlander	.164	.276	.391	.329	-.341	.318
Minnan	.172	.207	.121	.231	-.764 [§]	.434
National ID						
Chinese	.159	.245	-.331	.403	1.073	.671
Taiwanese	-.315 [*]	.150	-.556 ^{**}	.183	-.003	.224
Adjusted R²	.082		.096		.042	
N	1752		1084		755	

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; ^{*} $p < .05$; ^{**} $p < .01$; ^{***} $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Shifting the focus to the tradeoff between social welfare and lower taxes, table 4.4 presents OLS Regression analyses of attitudes on this issue. Party identification on the social welfare/ lower taxes issue is not as influential as it is on the independence/reunification and reform/stability issues. Pan-blue supporters tended to be less likely to support government promotion of social welfare in 1994. However, the partisan effect was reversed in 1998, when pan-green identifiers became relatively more supportive of social welfare. These results show that party identification is neither strong nor consistent in its influence on people's attitudes toward social welfare vs. lower taxes issue, thus supporting hypothesis 4-3.

Age does significantly affect people's positions on the social welfare/ lower taxes issue, especially in earlier surveys. Older Taiwanese are less likely to support social welfare, perhaps because older Taiwanese fear that the promotion of social welfare would lead to tax increases, which they may be less able to afford. Hence, older Taiwanese tend to support lower taxes rather than social welfare. The gender effect on this issue is not very strong. Taiwanese men, compared with women, tended to be less likely to support promotion of social welfare in 1998 and 2001.

The effect of education level on the social welfare/ lower taxes issue is complicated. Less educated Taiwanese, in general, are more likely to favor lower taxes. However, they were more pro-social welfare in 2001. As mentioned earlier, the wording of the social welfare question in 2001 does not mention that promotion of social welfare may lead to tax increases, which may explain the reversal, as people with less education are less likely to consider the tradeoff if it is not mentioned. On the other hand, well-educated Taiwanese were less likely to favor pro-social welfare in the 1998 and 2001 surveys. Nevertheless, they were more pro-social welfare in 2008. Roughly speaking, the influence of education on the

social welfare/lower taxes issue is inconsistent. However, Taiwanese, regardless of their education level, are more likely to favor a lower tax burden than more social welfare, as noted in figure 4.5c.

Region does not affect social welfare/ lower taxes issue positions much. Northern Taiwanese, in 2008, emphasized the importance of lower taxes, whereas the Southerners were slightly more likely to support social welfare. The effect of national identity on this issue is not also weak. Self-identified Chinese paid more attention to social welfare in 1994, whereas self-identified Taiwanese preferred lower taxes over social welfare in 2008. As for ethnicity, it has no significant impact on Taiwanese people's positions on this issue.

Table 4.4 OLS Regression Analyses on the Social Welfare/Lower Taxes Issue

Independent Variables	1994		1996		1998		2000	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	6.032 ^{***}	.361	5.170 ^{***}	.335	9.743 ^{***}	.296	5.922 ^{***}	.512
Party ID								
Blue	-.381 [*]	.160	.046	.164	.354 [*]	.149	.066	.244
Green	.242	.209	.017	.209	.195	.164	.192	.246
Age	-.020 ^{***}	.005	-.017 ^{**}	.005	-.023 ^{***}	.005	-.013	.008
Gender(Male)	-.059	.139	-.023	.133	-.248 [*]	.124	-.082	.199
Education								
Low	-.284	.177	-.360 [*]	.173	.188	.160	-.262	.262
High	-.062	.180	-.006	.174	-.632 ^{***}	.169	.381	.257
Region								
North	.168	.170	-.087	.179	.007	.157	-.033	.278
South	-.125	.181	.227	.180	.070	.164	-.203	.267
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	.174	.299	.052	.254	-.214	.249	.335	.402
Minnan	-.052	.252	.063	.198	-.258	.184	.074	.297
National ID								
Chinese	-.278	.177	.248	.185	-.007	.193	-.075	.335
Taiwanese	-.007	.174	-.003	.157	-.069	.139	.393 [§]	.222
Adjusted R²	.038		.022		.033		.009	
N	1094		1114		1089		1020	

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; ^{*} $p < .05$; ^{**} $p < .01$; ^{***} $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 4.4 OLS Regression Analyses on the Social Welfare/Lower Taxes Issue (Continued)

Independent Variables	2001		2004		2008	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	8.696 ^{***}	.244	7.220 ^{***}	.468	4.428 ^{**}	1.569
Party ID						
Blue	.140	.124	-.321	.249	.317	.288
Green	.246 [*]	.120	2.55	.231	-.256	.313
Age	-.007 [§]	.004	-.012	.008	.045	.042
Gender(Male)	-.215 [*]	.097	-.088	.193	.367	.466
Education						
Low	.332 [*]	.133	-.991 ^{***}	.269	-.069	.453
High	-.332 ^{**}	.121	-.376	.237	.764 ^{**}	.265
Region						
North	-.157	.119	.160	.248	-.647 [*]	.299
South	.033	.126	.452 [§]	.264	-.048	.323
Ethnicity						
Mainlander	.114	.203	.152	.387	-.401	.363
Minnan	.050	.152	-.180	.274	-.298	.496
National ID						
Chinese	.375 [*]	.180	.109	.217	.467	.771
Taiwanese	.071	.110	.098	.487	.253	.259
Adjusted R²	.017		.022		.010	
N	1761		1066		752	

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; ^{*} $p < .05$; ^{**} $p < .01$; ^{***} $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Finally, I present OLS regression analyses of attitudes on the environment/economy issue in pan-blue supporters strongly support economic development over environmental protection, matching the KMT leadership's position on this issue, as pan-blue coefficients are statistically significant in four out of five surveys. On the other side, pan-green coefficients are not statistically significant in any of the surveys. The result indicates that pan-green identifiers are not as pro-economic development as pan-blue supporters are; however, they still cannot be portrayed as the pro-environmental protection group.

Age affects Taiwanese people's positions on the environment/economy issue, as older Taiwanese tend to prefer economic development over environmental protection more than the young. Education has a strong impact on the environment/economy issue. Taiwanese with lower education levels are more likely to emphasize economic development. Conversely, well-educated Taiwanese consider that protecting our environment is more important than making money. As a result, according to table 4.5, education is a crucial variable affecting Taiwanese attitude on the position on environment/economy issue.

Compared with Taiwanese living in other areas, southern Taiwanese are slightly more likely to favor environmental protection. Ethnicity has a weak and inconsistent effect on the environment/economy issue. Taiwanese- Minnan were slightly more pro-environmental protection in 2000; however, they were more supportive of economic development over environmental protection in 2004. National identity also has a weak effect on people's position on this issue. Only those identifying themselves as Taiwanese tended to be pro-economic development in 2000. In short, region, ethnicity, and national identity do not have a large impact on people's position on the environment/economy issue.

Table 4.5 OLS Regression Analyses on the Environment/Economy Issue

Independent Variables	1998		2000		2001		2004	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	4.945 ^{***}	.428	4.758 ^{***}	.410	5.330 ^{***}	.321	5.112 ^{***}	.410
Party ID								
Blue	.279	.214	.456 [*]	.195	.279 [§]	.163	.713 ^{***}	.218
Green	-.015	.235	-.176	.197	-.239	.159	.079	.203
Age	.010	.007	.013 [*]	.006	.010 [*]	.005	.002	.007
Gender(Male)	.059	.176	-.172	.159	.095	.128	.014	.170
Education								
Low	.666 ^{**}	.227	-.061	.209	.366 [*]	.174	.450 [§]	.237
High	-.540 [*]	.240	-.600 ^{**}	.208	-.567 ^{***}	.160	-.411 [*]	.208
Region								
North	.088	.223	.193	.221	.020	.156	-.309	.217
South	.383	.233	.452 [§]	.213	.278 [§]	.167	-.173	.231
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	-.302	.358	-.335	.322	-.071	.267	.323	.341
Minnan	-.490 [§]	.267	-.400 [§]	.240	.306	.200	.574 [*]	.240
National ID								
Chinese	-.273	.267	.385	.270	.104	.239	.512	.419
Taiwanese	-.281	.275	.377 [*]	.177	.007	.145	.023	.191
Adjusted R²	.037		.034		.035		.027	
N	1078		1036		1747		1068	

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; ^{*} $p < .05$; ^{**} $p < .01$; ^{***} $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 4.5 OLS Regression Analyses on the Environment/Economy (Continued)

Independent Variables	2008	
	B	SE
Constant	6.864***	1.285
Party ID		
Blue	.984***	.236
Green	.271	.256
Age	-.029	.035
Gender(Male)	-.096	.366
Education		
Low	.797*	.366
High	-.563**	.216
Region		
North	-.210	.243
South	.125	.264
Ethnicity		
Mainlander	-.084	.297
Minnan	-.352	.406
National ID		
Chinese	-.554	.631
Taiwanese	-.203	.211
Adjusted R²	.032	
N	755	

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

The Impact of Issues on Vote Choice

Taiwan's political parties have developed distinct policy positions on a numbers of issues, as evident both in elite behavior and in public perceptions of the parties. As we have also seen, partisanship is strongly related to public opinion on the two major issue areas: China relations and political reform/social stability. As noted earlier, a polarized issue is an issue on which political parties have an explicit stance and an individual's position on this issue is decisive to his vote choice. Thus, the next step in the study of Taiwanese party polarization is to examine what issues affect Taiwanese people's voting decisions.

I employ multinominal and binary logit analyses for examining the relationship between issue positions and vote choice. Vote choice is the dependent variable, categorized into three groups: pan-blue candidate(s), pan-green candidate(s), and independent candidate(s). Independent candidate(s) comprises the reference group.⁴⁵ The main variables are respondents' positions on the independence/reunification, reform/stability, social welfare/lower taxes, and environment/economy issues. Respondents' age, coalition identification, gender, education, region, ethnicity, and national identity are also employed as controlled variables. Table 4.6 presents the result of multinominal and binary logit analyses.⁴⁶

Among the four issues, the independence/reunification issue is the most decisive issue affecting people's vote choice after controlling other variables. Respondents who

⁴⁵ It should be noted that vote choices analyzed in this chapter reflect respondents' self-reported voting behavior. Self-reported voting behavior in surveys is subject to bias; for example, many people feel some social pressure to report that they voted even if they did not, and votes for winning candidates tend to be overreported. However, respondents' self-reported voting behavior is the only voting information which can be collected in Taiwan; thus I employ self-reported vote choice as the dependent variable in this section.

⁴⁶ There are two equations and one limited equation in multinomial logit model:

$$\log P_{\text{pan blue candidates}} / P_{\text{independent candidates}} = a_1 + Xb_1$$

$$\log P_{\text{blue-green candidates}} / P_{\text{independent candidates}} = a_2 + Xb_2$$

$$P_{\text{pan blue candidates}} + P_{\text{blue-green candidates}} + P_{\text{independent candidates}} = 1$$

consider that Taiwan should declare itself as a newly independent country were more likely to vote for pan-green candidates in the 1996, 2000, and 2008 surveys. One thing is worth noting here. The 1996, 2000, and 2008 elections were the presidential elections.⁴⁷ The result reflects the importance of on the independence/reunification issue in the election of the national leader, which can determine the future of Taiwan and the relationship between Taiwan and China. Moreover, the independence/reunification issue was the only issue significantly affecting people's vote choice in the 2008 survey. Hence this issue becomes the only issue dividing the Taiwanese along party lines at election time.

The reform/ stability issue affected Taiwanese voting behavior in the 2000 election. The 2000 election was the presidential election leading to Taiwan's first party turnover. Taiwanese voters, eager for large-scale political reform, voted for the long-term opposition party, the DPP, expecting that true change would only come with a new party in power. Nevertheless, the issue only affected people's vote choice in that year and did not have a significant impact on vote choice in the 2008 election. Hence, even though the reform/stability issue was a quite important factor affecting people's vote choice in the transitional 2000 presidential election, the result shows that it did not have a great impact on dividing the Taiwanese public after 2000.

The social welfare/lower taxes and environment/economy issues had less of an impact on vote choice. Social welfare/lower taxes issue only affected vote choice slightly in the 1996 and 2004 elections and the environment/economy issue made a weak impact in the 2001 and 2004 election as well. These two issues thus had no significant impact on the presidential elections and only weakly influenced the Legislative Yuan elections and local chief executive election.

⁴⁷ In addition to the 1996, 2000, and 2008 elections, which are the presidential elections, the 1996 elections are the elections for governor of Taiwan province, mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung cities. The 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections are the Legislative Yuan elections.

In sum, the independence/reunification issue has become the only issue dividing Taiwanese along party lines. First, Taiwanese perceive distinct partisan positions on this issue (see figure 4.2). Secondly, the distance between the positions of different parties' supporters on this issue has become larger (see figure 4.5, panel A). Moreover, people's positions on this issue affect their vote decision. Hence, I conclude that the independence/reunification issue is the only polarized issue in Taiwanese society. This result supports hypothesis 4-5.

Table 4.6 Multinomial (Binary) Logit Analyses for Vote Choice (1994-2008)

Independent Variables	1994				1996			
	BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND		BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	56.912	1320.638	56.655	1320.638	1.168	.806	-1.658	1.375
Independence/ Reunification Reform/Stability	-.091	.685	-.154	.688	-.084	.059	-.241**	.084
Social Welfare/ Lower Taxes	.883	.673	.719	.675	.027	.053	-.083	.079
Environment/ Economy	-1.004	.675	-.953	.677	-.098 ^s	.053	.166 ^s	.090
Age	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Party ID								
Blue	-.150	.153	-.136	.153	.025*	.010	.017	.016
Green	-14.889	851.088	-17.292	851.088	-.050	.321	-4.068***	1.077
Gender (Male)	-.267	1721.732	2.249	1721.732	-.945*	.432	1.490**	.505
Education	2.997	3.131	2.963	3.142	.774***	.234	.444	.375
Low								
High	-12.509	1009.722	-12.717	1009.722	.831**	.314	.089	.519
Region	-14.949	1009.729	-15.522	1009.729	-.630*	.262	-.337	.438
North								
South	2.143	3.325	2.173	3.340	.138	.286	1.481**	.553
Ethnicity	13.587	970.047	12.522	970.047	1.155***	.331	1.565**	.560
Mainlander								
Minnan	-16.368***	3.810	-16.841***	3.821	-2.131***	.424	-.579	.877
National ID	-17.658***	.457	-17.229	.000	-.881*	.378	-.175	.614
Chinese								
Taiwanese	1.076	3.441	.528	3.463	.056	.318	.900	.692
χ²	10.296	1172.087	10.663	1172.087	.496 ^s	.292	1.257**	.410
Pseudo R²		435.627				486.356		
N		.444				.500		
		741				701		

Notes: ^s $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 4.6 Multinomial (Binary) Logit Analyses for Vote Choice (1994-2008) (Continued)

Independent Variables	1998				2000			
	BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND		BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	-.771	.673	-1.417 [§]	.730	-1.759 [*]	.792	.369	.966
Independence/ Reunification	.001	.006	.004	.007	-.046	.060	-.169 [*]	.071
Reform/Stability	.059	.036	.050	.036	.013	.049	-.193 ^{***}	.053
Social Welfare/ Lower Taxes	-.010	.018	.018	.016	.034	.037	.069	.043
Environment/ Economy	-.005	.008	-.009	.010	-.018	.044	-.049	.052
Age	.008	.010	.006	.011	.034 ^{***}	.009	.020 [§]	.011
Party ID								
Blue	1.108 ^{***}	.308	-.759 [§]	.390	.391	.260	-2.281 ^{***}	.353
Green	-.581 [§]	.342	.914 ^{**}	.335	1.686 ^{***}	.496	3.038 ^{***}	.447
Gender (Male)	-.096	.253	-.112	.272	-.363	.232	.051	.274
Education								
Low	.737 [*]	.307	.477	.326	-.238	.302	.255	.355
High	.635 [§]	.340	.538	.367	-.003 ^{***}	.276	-.071	.338
Region								
North	.595 [§]	.309	.576 [§]	.340	-.435	.310	-.344	.361
South	.025	.323	.448	.344	.281	.315	.444	.356
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	.862 [§]	.522	-1.942 [§]	1.026	-.739 [§]	.395	-1.078 [§]	.622
Minnan	.105	.342	.119	.378	.100	.320	1.101 ^{**}	.423
National ID								
Chinese	.248	.398	.598	.465	.720 ^{**}	.279	.991 ^{***}	.302
Taiwanese	.266	.275	.601 [*]	.291	-.212	.335	.007	.463
χ^2		310.687				548.334		
Pseudo R ²		.371				.544		
N		670				699		

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; ^{*} $p < .05$; ^{**} $p < .01$; ^{***} $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 4.6 Multinomial (Binary) Logit Analyses for Vote Choice (1994-2008) (Continued)

Independent Variables	2001				2004			
	BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND		BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	.850	.827	-.492	.879	1.026	1.672	1.154	1.673
Independence/ Reunification Reform/Stability	.034	.052	.026	.053	-.052	.117	-.144	.117
Social Welfare/ Lower Taxes	-.007	.043	-.021	.043	.059	.091	-.017	.089
Environment/ Economy	.005	.053	.103 [§]	.056	.077	.073	.096	.074
Age	.074 [§]	.044	.011	.046	.173 [§]	.090	.108	.089
Party ID	.018 [§]	.009	.013	.010	.019	.021	.028	.021
Blue	.765 ^{**}	.267	-.515	.315	.738	.642	-1.310 [§]	.671
Green	-.642 [*]	.304	1.517 ^{***}	.289	-1.030	.667	1.078 [§]	.627
Gender (Male)	-.551 [*]	.229	-.619 ^{***}	.238	.774	.490	.869 [§]	.493
Education								
Low	-.205	.295	.184	.309	1.093	.760	.777	.753
High	.143	.269	.332	.284	.060	.512	.236	.517
Region								
North	-.376	.262	-.123	.275	-.818	.650	-.706	.652
South	.123	.310	.679 [*]	.317	-.776	.700	-.478	.697
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	.222	.483	-.263	.563	-.344	.951	-.990	1.022
Minnan	-.596	.365	-.312	.387	-1.018	.746	-.947	.758
National ID								
Chinese	.086	.388	-.569	.474	-.139	1.210	.402	1.284
Taiwanese	.038	.266	.455 [§]	.262	-.983 [§]	.531	.409	.520
χ²			572.337				511.508	
Pseudo R²			.403				.545	
N			1109				649	

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; ^{*} $p < .05$; ^{**} $p < .01$; ^{***} $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 4.6 Multinomial (Binary) Logit Analyses for Vote Choice (1994-2008) (Continued)

2008		
Independent Variables	GREEN/BLUE	
	B	SE
Constant	.267	.875
Independence/ Reunification	-.309***	.055
Reform/Stability	.007	.041
Social Welfare/ Lower Taxes	-.043	.037
Environment/ Economy	.004	.045
Age	-.010	.011
Party ID		
Blue	-3.269***	.461
Green	3.502***	.285
Gender (Male)	.254	.244
Education		
Low	-.165	.338
High	-.827**	.314
Region		
North	.276	.319
South	-.007	.317
Ethnicity		
Mainlander	-.740	.859
Minnan	.909*	.395
National ID		
Chinese	-2.139 [§]	1.243
Taiwanese	.239	.271
-2 Log Likelihood	481.323	
R²	.603	
N	1108	

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Conclusion

Four salient policy dilemmas dominate much of Taiwanese politics today: Taiwanese independence vs. unification with China, political reform vs. social stability, economic development vs. environmental protection, and social welfare vs. lower taxes. This analysis of Taiwanese people's own preferences, perceptions of the parties' positions, and voting behavior finds that the most polarizing issue is that of relations with China; the other three are only sporadically partisan, at most, among the general public in Taiwan.

First, on the social welfare issue, the Taiwanese public does not perceive a significant divergence between the pan-blue parties and pan-green parties. Both of the party coalitions are considered to favor more social welfare over lower taxes. Respondents, regardless of their party attachments, also tend to support government expansion of social welfare. Furthermore, Taiwanese people's party identification is not significantly associated with their positions on this issue. Most importantly, this issue does not have a large impact on vote choice. Social welfare issue is thus not an issue polarizing Taiwanese along party lines.

The environment/economy issue is not a polarizing issue either. In Taiwanese eyes, all parties are seen as favoring economic development over environmental protection. Taiwanese people, regardless of their party attachments, also place themselves at a more pro-economic development position on this issue. Moreover, this issue is weakly associated with respondents' party identification and had no significant impact on vote choice. Therefore, the environment/economy issue also cannot be defined as an issue that polarizes the Taiwanese.

As for the reform vs. stability, people do believe that the party coalitions have opposing positions on this issue. The Taiwanese public perceives that the pan-blue parties tend to favor social stability while the pan-green parties support large-scale reform. However,

the perceived difference between the two major parties within the two coalitions, the KMT and the DPP, has narrowed. Although the political parties, in Taiwanese eyes, have different stances on this issue, respondents all across the partisan spectrum place themselves at a more pro-social stability position; thus the issue is not particularly divisive. Statistical analyses also confirm this argument. Although Taiwanese people's party identification significantly affects their positions on the reform/stability issue, this issue only had an impact on voting behavior in the 2000 presidential election and did not divide the Taiwanese people after 2000. Hence, the reform/stability issue still cannot be defined as polarizing issue.

Finally, the independence/reunification issue displays a critical impact on Taiwanese party politics. First, Taiwanese people categorize the pan-blue parties as pro-reunification parties, whereas the pan-green parties are seen as pro-independence parties. The distance between the KMT and the DPP on this issue has increased since 2000, showing that Taiwanese political parties remain divided by the independence/reunification issue. Respondents place themselves in the middle between the two major parties on this issue. However, I find a significant difference between the two party coalition supporters on the independence/reunification issue. Pan-blue partisans strongly support reunification with China, whereas pan-green identifiers tend to support Taiwan declaring itself as a newly independent country. Moreover, in OLS regression analyses, people's party identification is strongly associated with their positions on this issue. Most importantly, the independence/reunification issue has a very significant impact on vote choice. Hence, this issue significantly divides the Taiwanese public along party lines.

In sum, among the four important issues, the independence/reunification issue is the only clearly polarizing issue. It is also the only issue on which both political elites and

ordinary citizens' positions have continued to diverge. The independence/reunification issue apparently has become the most critical index to distinguish Taiwan's political parties. As China continues to contend that Taiwan is one of its provinces, this issue will still play a very important role in influencing Taiwanese people's partisan affiliations and political behavior.

Chapter 5

How Are Taiwanese People Divided Along Partisan Lines?

Undoubtedly, party identification is one of the most influential factors affecting people's political behavior. Early development of the concept of party identification in *the American Voter* (1960) was based on social psychology. Angus Campbell and his colleagues deal with partisanship as an affective orientation, employing reference group theory to suggest that people identify with a party just as they identify with social or religion groups. Partisanship is thus conceived as a psychological identification. It is a self-classification and self-identity with a party rather than a formal party membership or long-term voting record supporting a given party (Campbell et al., 1960: 121-123).

Moreover, Campbell et al., (1996: 147) claim that most U.S. citizens have an attachment with one party or the other. Party identification serves as a guide to people's political behavior. One of the most important functions performed by political parties is to influence people's vote choice. Party identification, compared with other factors such as issues and candidates, is considered as a long-term factor affecting voting behavior. Although some scholars argue that the influence of party identification on voting behavior declined, especially in the 1970s, they do not disagree that party identification is still one of the most important factors affecting people's voting decision (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1979; Bartels, 2000).

Since party identification is widely held through the U.S. electorate and has huge impact on people's political attitudes and behavior, it is one of critical concepts in the study of U.S. political behavior.

The change and continuity of Taiwanese's party Identification

One important question that needs to be answered first is whether the U.S. concept of party identification can be used in the study of other countries' party systems. Some scholars employ this concept in studying party systems of some Western democratic countries, finding it to be quite consistently useful for studying voting behavior in other countries as well (Campbell and Valence, 1966; Schickler and Green, 1997).

Can the concept of party identification be used in studying Taiwanese people's political behavior and Taiwan's political parties? As a newly democratic country, the histories of party competition and the development of party identification are short. Although the Kuomintang (KMT) was established in 1919 and moved to Taiwan after World War II, party competition was not allowed during the period of authoritarian rule (1949-1987) due to the KMT government's prohibition against establishing new parties. Taiwan's first real opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was formed on September 28, 1986 and this was the beginning of Taiwan's party competition.

Under the authoritarian one-party system, it may have been difficult for voters to form party attachments since the KMT for so long had been the only real political party in Taiwan.⁴⁸ However, empirical studies show that Taiwanese people's party identification is significantly related to their political attitudes and voting behavior (Chen, 2000; Shiao, 2009; Yu, 2002). Hence, even though the development of party identification in Taiwan does not have a long history, it still serves as a useful variable for measuring Taiwanese political behavior.

⁴⁸ In addition to the KMT, Taiwan had other parties, such as the Chinese Youth Party and the China Democratic Socialist party, during the period of authoritarian rule. However, these parties did not have much political influence and were not able to challenge the KMT's governance. The KMT even offered these parties financial support. Hence, the KMT was the only real party during the period of authoritarian rule.

The Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University in Taiwan has traced changes in Taiwanese people's party identification in surveys from 1992 to 2009. The results are presented in Appendix F. According to Appendix F, most Taiwanese people did not have any party identification in the early 1990s. Around 60% of respondents defined themselves as independents or chose not to answer this survey question. One-third of respondents were KMT partisans and only a few respondents supported the DPP. In my opinion, there are two reasons leading to this result. First, the KMT was the only real political party for a long time. It was difficult for Taiwanese people to form party attachments since they lived in an environment lacking party competition. In addition, the DPP was just founded in the late 1980s and news coverage controlled by the KMT was very unfriendly to the DPP at that time. Secondly, under the authoritarian regime, people could get in trouble if they discuss political affairs, especially criticizing the ruling party, with others. Hence, people still were not likely to display their political attitudes or party preferences so soon after the end of the authoritarian regime.

The proportion of independents decreased over time, hovering around 40% for most of the time, showing that many respondents do not define themselves as partisans of any party or do not show their partisan preference in public. KMT partisans are around 30% to 35%. However, KMT identification dropped to its nadir (14.5%) after the KMT lost the 2000 presidential elections. This was due to the departure of some KMT political elites to form a new political party, the People First Party (PFP). Not surprisingly, the PFP identification increased dramatically and even outpaced KMT identification after 2000.

The proportion of people identifying as DPP supporters increased over time after the early 1990s and remained around 20% to 25%. It climbed to a high point during President Chen's first term (2000-2004) then dropped to 17.2% in June 2006. This was the nadir of the

DPP's supporting rate after it took office in May 2000. The drop in DPP identification came after President Chen and his family were involved in scandals and pan-blue legislators launched an effort to recall President Chen in the Legislative Yuan. Although the recall was not passed in the legislative Yuan and President Chen apologized for undue behavior, people already had lost their trust in the DPP government. In sum, the DPP lost many supporters after President Chen's second term.

Other parties gained very little support among the Taiwanese public, as can be seen in Appendix F. The New Party's (NP) support did exceed 10% in 1996. However, this party mainly focused on urban areas and the northern region, never achieving nationwide appeal. The PFP was briefly a major political party and PFP identification had outpaced that of the KMT after the 2000 presidential election. However, in a constitutional amendment in 2005, the National Assembly decided to employ a single-member district with dual ballot system for replacing the original multimember district with single nontransferable vote system for Legislative Yuan elections. Minor parties rarely thrive under this electoral system because of the great difficulty in winning legislative seats. Hence, numerous minor parties' politicians decided to return to the two major parties, especially the KMT. Many PFP lawmakers of returned to the KMT after 2005. The departure of legislators led to the decline of PFP identification over time as the party's political influence also declined.

Figure 5.1 tracks Taiwanese party coalition identification overtime, from 1994-2008. The proportion of pan-blue (KMT, NP, and PFP) partisans nearly always outpaces that of pan-green (DPP, Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)) identifiers. However, the margin has become quite small since the beginning of this century. According to Figure 5.1, Taiwanese are almost evenly divided into three groups, pan-blue partisans, pan-green partisans, and partisan independents, since 2004.




Figure 5.1 Coalition Identification 1994-2008

Source: Election Study Center (ESC), NCCU and Taiwan Elections Democratization Study (TEDS)

Another index to measure parties' political influence and to what extent Taiwanese support these parties is vote share in the Legislative Yuan elections. Figure 5.2 demonstrates Taiwan's political parties and two party coalitions' vote share from the Third to the Seventh Legislative Yuans (1995-2008). In Figure 5.2A, the percentage of vote share of the KMT and the DPP in the legislative Yuan elections are around 10% more than their identification showed in Appendix F. This was major parties' advantage. According to the theory of strategic voting, some voters hesitate to vote for a candidate who is highly unlikely to win the election even if that candidate is their favorite. Hence, they may vote for their second favorite candidate who is more likely to win the election even the candidate is just their second favorite candidate (Downs, 1957: 48-50). Under this condition, people are more likely to vote for the major party candidates.

Moreover, according to Figure 5.2a, the KMT won the most votes three times and the DPP did so two times, in these five Legislative Yuan elections, demonstrating that electoral competition between the two parties was quite intense. The highest vote share for any third

party is the PFP's 18.6% in the Fifth Legislative Yuan elections (2001). In sum, the two major parties are still the voters' favorites.

Furthermore, the average proportion of partisan independent is around 40% (see Appendix F). However, the vote share of the independent candidates was rarely more than 10%. This phenomenon is further evidence of strategic voting for candidates who are likely to win the election. Another explanation for this is that there are many partisans who tend to define themselves as independents even though they may have very consistent voting patterns and partisan support.

Actually, Independents can be divided into two types: pure independents and independent leaners. The former are those who do not have a party affiliation; the latter are those identifying themselves as independents, but still supporting a party. Moreover, leaners' party identifications and electoral support are sometimes even stronger than those of weak partisans. Observing vote choice in U.S. presidential elections, Bruce E. Keith and his colleagues find that independent leaners are generally more loyal to their party than weak partisans. Conversely, pure independents' voting patterns are volatile, seldom guided by a party affiliation. In short, pure independents and independent leaners are different, leaners are partisan, not neutral (Keith et al., 1992). In this study the independent leaners are coded as partisans; the "independent" category contains only pure independents.

Figure 5.2b presents the two party coalitions' vote share from the Third to the Seventh Legislative Yuan elections. The pan-blue coalition, in these five elections, always won more votes than did pan-green coalition. However, the winning margins after 2001 were not as large as those in 1995 and 1998, reflecting the intensity of the electoral competition between the two party coalitions after 2000.




Figure 5.2 Vote Share in the Legislative Yuan Elections (1995-2008)

Source: the Central Election Committee (CEC), Taiwan

As we can see, party competition for Taiwanese people's attachment and electoral support has become more intense. This may result from the parties' more distinct positions on some important political issues (discussed in Chapter 4). Another indicator of party divergence is the public's evaluation of the job performance of their president. Figure 5.3 demonstrates President Chen's job approval by party identification from 2000 to 2008.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ TVBS Poll did not often include other parties' supporters' job approval of President Chen in its surveys. Hence, figure 5.3 only presents the opinions of KMT supporters, DPP supporters, and partisan independents.

Chen won quite high approval, not only from DPP supporters but also from independents and KMT partisans, in the beginning of his first term. However, Chen's high approval among KMT partisans decreased dramatically in a very short time, and his approval among partisan independents dropped substantially as well.

DPP supporters maintain the highest level of approval for President Chen, but with several ups and downs. Their average approval rate is a very high 70%, but that approval rate dropped precipitously in his second term, especially after the Chen family scandals of 2005. Mean approval rate for Chen among KMT partisans dropped from 23% (Chen's first term) to 5% (second term), and those among Independents dropped from 39% to 18%. Clearly, KMT partisans and independents were highly dissatisfied with Chen's job performance.

Conversely, although DPP supporters' approval also dropped, from 79% to 56%, a majority of DPP supporters remained satisfied with Chen's job performance throughout most of his second term; thus DPP supporters still trusted and supported Chen, despite the scandals. Hence, as seen in Figure 5.3, partisans of the two major parties became quite polarized in their evaluations of President Chen's performance between 2000 and 2008. President Chen was thus a divider, not a uniter, when he took office.




Figure 5.3 Approval of Chen Shui-bian's Job Performance, 2000-2008, by Party ID

Source: TVBS Poll

Debate over Polarized Politics in Taiwan

The post-2000 period of multiparty democracy in Taiwan has been characterized by increasingly intense competition between the pan-blue and pan-green party coalitions, as we have seen in the data on partisan identification from Taiwan's Central Election Committee. Nevertheless, the foregoing data show only a general picture of Taiwanese party identification and voting patterns. Questions remain about whether Taiwanese people have changed their party (coalition) identification in recent years, what types of citizens are more likely to be pan-blue (or pan-green) partisans, and what groups of Taiwanese are divided along partisan lines.

Whether the Taiwanese have become more polarized along partisan lines has become one of the important debates in the study of Taiwanese politics. Some scholars argue that the confrontation among political parties has become more intense since Taiwan's 2000 presidential election and the Taiwanese public's political attitudes also have become more polarized along partisan lines. They express concern that an increasingly

polarized politics may harm social stability (Wu, 2001; Yang, 2001).

However, scholars of another school of thought disagree with their argument. Emile C.J. Sheng (2007) claims that according to the information from public opinion surveys, Taiwan is a moderate society rather than a polarized society. Wang (2009) analyzes the contents of two major newspapers, finding that some terms, such as political antagonism and polarization, were used much more frequently after 2000. Wang argues that the mass media tend to describe Taiwan's politics and ordinary citizens' political behavior as more extreme than they actually are. Hence Taiwan's politics is not as polarized as reported in the media.⁵⁰

Among the issues of polarized politics in Taiwan, the debate over regional differences in Taiwanese political behavior has received considerable scholarly attention in recent years. Some scholars describe "Southern politics" as the distinctive political attitudes among southern Taiwanese, especially their relatively strong support for the DPP (Hsu, 2000, Keng and Chen, 2003). Hsu, by observing the changing number of loyal voters, contends that more people vote for DPP candidates in the South than in other areas (Hsu, 2000). Wen-Chun Chen and Chi-cheng Huang (2003) also argue that the North has become the pan-blue camp's stronghold, whereas the South has become the pan- green camp's stronghold, examining the two party coalitions' vote shares by county in both areas. Moreover, Keng and Chen (2003) look at this question from an economic perspective, contending that the economy of southern Taiwan was hurt by economic interaction with

⁵⁰ One thing is worth noting. There are four major newspapers, the *China Times* and the *United Daily News*, the *Liberty Times*, and the *Apple Daily*, in Taiwan today. Due to the lack of database of the *Liberty Times*, and the *Apple Daily*, Wang (2000) only analyzes the contents of the *China Times* and the *United Daily News*. However, the *China Times* and the *United Daily News* are considered as pro-pan-blue media (Lo, Wang, and Ho, 2007). Hence, their news reports may have some coverage bias, describing Taiwan's politics, the DPP's governance, becoming more polarized and party antagonism becoming more intense, which were the results that citizens did not like to see.

China and thus southerners tend to support the DPP due to its advocacy of limited economic interaction.

However, their arguments about regional difference are questioned by other scholars. Hong (2003) argues that “southern politics” does not exist because the pan-green camp has rarely won a majority of votes in southern cities or counties in the Legislative Yuan elections. Hence, even though the pan-green camp tends to win more votes in the southern areas than in the North since 2000, the South can not be defined as a pan-green stronghold. Wang’s study also shows that southern voters do not support the pan-green camp as much as people thought (Wang, 2009). Furthermore, Wu and Hsu (2003) focus on regional differences in party identification, finding that southerners, compared to Taiwanese living in the North, are more likely to define themselves as KMT supporters. Apparently, Taiwanese scholars have not reached a consensus yet and the debate over this issue will likely continue.

Thus the important debate continues over whether the Taiwanese people have become more polarized along partisan lines. The goal of this chapter is to answer the question. Using public opinion survey data, I examine the demographic basis of partisan polarization in Taiwan, examining the geographic factors and personal characteristics that affect people’s partisanship and the changes in those factors’ influence over time. In the next section, I introduce my hypotheses about Taiwanese party identification and the data and variables included in the analyses.

Data, Variables, and Hypotheses

Data Sources

For measuring whether and how Taiwanese are divided along partisan lines, I use public opinion survey data to examine the relationship between Taiwanese people’s party identification and demographic and geographic factors. I employ the identical public opinion

survey data employed in Chapter 4, which are conducted by Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) and the Election Study Center (ESC), National Chengchi University. The surveys are listed in Appendix C.

The TVBS Poll, a television station opinion survey, will serve as an additional source. The poll can demonstrate the change in approval ratings of President Chen during his presidency from 2000 to 2008. In addition, the aggregate electoral statistics from the election data base of the Central Election Commission (CEC) are also very useful for this project, especially regarding the geographic perspective. Although CEC's data do not include voter registration data by party, the long-term records of vote share by party in each district are still helpful for examining whether an area has become a party stronghold.

Variables

The dependent variable of this chapter is respondents' identification with pan-blue parties, pan-green parties, or partisan independence. The independent variables include: education, income, gender, age, region, ethnicity, national identity, media exposure, and political knowledge.

The effect of education on the strength of partisan identification is mixed in studies of U.S. politics, sometimes depending on whether the "independent" category includes leaners (Paul R. Abramson, 1983; Keith et al., 1992). However, according to Tien-lien Chuang's study of Taiwan's partisan independents, Taiwanese citizens with better education are more likely to be partisans, whereas those who are less-educated tend to be independents (Chuang, 2001). Chuang's result may reflect the likelihood that people with less education are more indifferent to political affairs since they tend to have fewer sources of information. Scholars also argue that people with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to support vested interests. Hence, Taiwanese respondents with higher education

levels tend to support the long-term ruling party, the KMT (pan-blue camp), whereas the less-educated are more likely to support the DPP (pan-green camp) (Chuang, 2001; Wu and Hsu, 2003).

By the same token, since people with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to support vested interests, affluent Taiwanese citizens are more likely to be KMT (pan-blue camp) partisans, whereas Taiwanese people with lower family income, tend to support the DPP (pan-green camp).

In many countries there is a gender gap in party identification, with women more likely than men to support liberal or social democratic parties. In the U.S., for example, men are more likely than women to support the Republican Party. In addition, traditionally lower levels of political efficacy among women were linked to higher rates of partisan independence. However, a recent study demonstrates that the gender disparity in political efficacy is small (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001). Empirical studies of Taiwanese people's party identification show that Taiwanese women are more likely than men to be partisan independents. Furthermore, Taiwanese men, compared to women, are more likely to be DPP supporters (Chuang, 2001; Wu and Hsu, 2003; Ye, 1994). Nevertheless, Wu and Hsu (2003) also point out that there is no significant gender gap among the KMT and the PFP partisans. Therefore, the effect of gender on party identification is still worth examining.

People's life-cycle also affects their party identification. Young voters tend to know less about politics and are less interested in political affairs. Hence, they are less likely to have strong party affiliations. Conversely, older people tend to be more conservative than the young. They are more likely to be involved in politics and know much about political affairs, showing stronger party identification than the young (Achen, 1992). Previous research shows that young Taiwanese tend to identify with the DPP, while their elders are

more likely to support the KMT (Wu and Hsu, 2003). However, since the first party turnover took place after the 2000 presidential election, the relationship between age and party affiliation needs to be examined.

As mentioned earlier, southern Taiwanese are considered by certain scholars to be different from Taiwanese in other regions in terms of party affiliation. Hsu (2000) claims that the southern Taiwanese, compared to Taiwanese living in other areas, have higher partisan loyalty. Moreover, the DPP tends to win more votes in the south than other areas. However, Wu and Hsu's study presents an opposing result, showing that southerners, compared to northern Taiwanese, are more likely to support the KMT (Wu and Hsu, 2003). Therefore, whether region affects people's party identification needs to be examined with more recent public opinion survey data.

Ethnicity is a quite important factor affecting Taiwanese political behavior historically. Generally speaking, the DPP's main supporters are Taiwanese- Minnan, whereas the KMT has broader support from all four groups, especially Mainlanders but even including a substantial minority of Taiwanese-Minnan. Whether the intensity of ethnic groups' party affiliations have changed since 2000 is worth observing.

As noted earlier, national Identity refers to how the residents in Taiwan define themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both, and this identity is strongly related to individuals' positions on the independence/unification issue. Hence, respondents who define themselves as Taiwanese tend to be DPP supporters, whereas those whose national identity is Chinese are more likely to be KMT supporters (Wu and Hsu, 2003). Whether the national identity gap in party identification has increased is one of the key questions in the next section of this chapter.

Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter (1996: 9) define political knowledge as “the range of factual information about politics that is sorted in long-term memory.” Citizens with higher levels of political knowledge are more consistently involved in political affairs. Hence, those who are better informed tend to be partisans while those with low political knowledge are more likely to be independents (Delli carpini and Keeter, 1996; Keith et al., 1992).

Previous studies of Taiwanese citizens’ political behavior confirm this argument; Taiwanese with lower levels of political knowledge tend to be partisan independents (Wu and Hsu, 2003). Moreover, Chuang’s study finds that supporters of the DPP (the major party in the pan-green camp) have higher levels of political knowledge than do supporters of the KMT (the major party in the pan-blue camp) (Chuang, 2001). However, in Chuang’s study, supporters of the NP (in the pan-blue camp) have the highest level of political knowledge. These effects may cancel each other out, and the effect of knowledge on Taiwanese people’s party identification needs to be examined.

Media exposure, in this study, refers to the frequency that citizens read newspapers each day. Some scholars indicate that media exposure has a huge impact on Taiwanese’s political knowledge, as Taiwanese with higher level of media exposure tend to possess higher level of political knowledge (Lin, 2005; Wang, 2007). Hence, by the same token, people with higher levels of media exposure are more likely to support certain parties while those with lower levels of media exposure are more likely to be partisan independents. Chuang (2001) confirms this argument, claiming that partisan independents have lower level of media exposure than do partisans. Wang (2009) also indicates media exposure has large impact on party identification. Taiwanese with high media exposure are more likely to be partisans, either pan-blue or pan-green.

In short, the public opinion surveys listed in Appendix C are also employed as the source of data in this chapter and each respondent is the unit of analysis. The dependent variable is respondents' self-reported party identification and the independent variables include: region, age, gender, education, income, ethnicity, national identity, media exposure, and political knowledge. The dynamics of relations between party identification and the independent variables are presented by graph first. Furthermore, because party identification is a categorical variable (pan-green, pan-blue, and independent), multinomial logit is employed for examining how regional and demographic factors influence party identification.

Hypotheses

Among these variables, I hypothesize that partisan divisions based on region, education, income, ethnicity, and national identity have become larger. In contrast, partisan divisions based on age, gender, media exposure, and political knowledge, while significant, are not expected to expand during the same time period.

Regarding socioeconomic status, I hypothesize that respondents with higher income and better education tend to be more blue since the DPP government's policy of limited interaction with China, often blamed for leading to economic recession, hurt these people the most.

H5-1: Respondents of higher socioeconomic status are more likely than their lower-status counterparts to affiliate with the pan-blue coalition.

Individuals from southern Taiwan are hypothesized to be more green due to the DPP's China policy and redistribution of resources, whereas northern citizens are more likely to be KMT supporters.

H5-2: Voters in northern Taiwan are more likely than southerners to affiliate with the pan-blue coalition, while southerners are more likely to affiliate with the pan-green camp.

I also hypothesize that Mainlanders and individuals identifying as Chinese, due to their long term psychological affiliation with China, tend to be more blue since the DPP government could not maintain a friendly relationship with China when it took office. Conversely, respondents who define themselves as Taiwanese are more likely to support the pan-green camp.

H5-3: Respondents whose ethnicity is Mainlander are more likely to affiliate with the pan-blue coalition.

H5-4: Individuals identifying as Chinese are more likely to affiliate with the pan-blue coalition. In contrast, respondents who define themselves as Taiwanese are more likely to support the pan-green camp.

Gender, age, media exposure, and political knowledge are each examined in their relationships with Taiwanese people's party attachments and they are included as control variables in the multivariate analyses.


I also assume that the number of independents has remained constant due to their antipathy towards party antagonism between two camps. Taiwan's society has not split into two opposing camps and the middle ground has not vanished. In other words, the process of partisan change which Taiwanese society has experienced in the beginning of this decade is more similar to "sorting", defined by Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2006).

H5-5: Regardless of changes in partisan divisions overtime, the proportion of partisan independents does not decrease, but remains constant. Hence, the process of partisan change which Taiwanese society has experienced in the beginning of this decade is more similar to "sorting".

Social and Demographic Partisan Divisions over Time

Socioeconomic Status

Figure 5.4 presents the relationship between Taiwanese people's coalition identification and their education level. Respondents' education is categorized into three groups: low (junior high school, elementary school, and illiteracy), middle (senior high school), and high (college and graduate school). Most Taiwanese citizens with lower education levels tend to identify as independents and, since 2001, are more likely to support the pan-greens than the pan-blues. Those in the middle are evenly divided into pan-blue supporters, pan-green supporters, and independents. College-educated Taiwanese people are consistently more likely to define themselves as pan-blue partisans. Generally speaking, there is a positive relationship between education level and partisanship, and among partisans, higher education levels are associated with pan-blue coalition support.






Figure 5.4 Coalition ID by Education

Figure 5.5 shows the relationship between coalition identification and Taiwanese people's family income. The income variable is categorized into three groups: low (the lowest 25%), middle (between the lowest 25% and highest 25%), and high (the top 25%). Low-income respondents are the most likely to define themselves as independents. Middle-class and affluent respondents have a similar pattern of coalition identification: They are more likely to be pan-blue partisans and less likely to be independents. Therefore, summarizing the results by education and income, Taiwanese people of higher socioeconomic status are more likely to be partisans, and especially pan-blue parties, whereas those of low socioeconomic status tend to be independents.






Figure 5.5 Coalition ID by Income

Gender

The gender effect on Taiwanese people's party identification is presented in figure 5.6. Taiwanese men do not significantly favor the pan-blue camp, pan-green camp, or independents; they are nearly equally divided by these three groups after 2001. A plurality of Taiwanese women were partisan independents from 2001 to 2004, but by 2008 there were slightly more pan-blue supporters than independents, and both outnumbered pan-green partisans among women.




Figure 5.6 Coalition ID by Gender

Age

Figure 5.7 presents the relationship between Taiwanese people's coalition identification and their age. Respondents' age is categorized into three groups: young

(20-29), middle-aged (30-49), and old (50 and older). Young Taiwanese people do not have a consistent pattern of coalition identification. The result confirms that the youth are less likely to have strong party affiliation. Looking at 2008 only, young Taiwanese people are more likely to identify as pan-blue partisans than as pan-green partisans. Their lack of support for the DPP, the party emphasizing political reform, may reflect the DPP leadership scandals that drove the youth away from the pan-green coalition.

The pattern among middle-aged Taiwanese respondents is similar to that of the young by 2008, with pan-blue supporters slightly outnumbering pan-green supporters, but their pan-blue support has been steadier over time. Partisan independents comprise around 30% both the young and the middle-aged.

Older Taiwanese citizens are more likely to be partisan independents after 2000, despite previous research showing them to be the most partisan and the most loyal pan-blue partisans in earlier years. Gradually their partisanship rebounded, to the point that older Taiwanese peoples' identification is nearly evenly split among the three groups.

In sum, there seems to be no clear relationship between respondents' age and their coalition identification. Age may not be a factor dividing Taiwanese people along partisan lines.




Figure 5.7 Coalition ID by Age

Region


The region variable is categorized into three groups: the North, the South, and other areas (includes the central and eastern parts). Region shows a clearer connection with

coalition identification. According to figure 5.8, northerners are more likely to be pan-blue partisans. Furthermore, the margin between pan-blue and pan-green has become larger, showing that the North has become bluer.

Conversely, southerners display the opposite pattern. The proportion of southern Taiwanese identifying themselves as pan-green partisans has increased over time, indicating that the South has become greener.

Taiwanese living in other areas tend to define themselves as independents. However, pan-blue identification has rebounded since 2000 and outpaced independent identification in 2008. Moreover, the margin between pan-blue and pan-green identifications in 2008 was the largest since 2000, reflecting that Taiwanese living in other areas also have become bluer.

In sum, southerners are different; they are more likely to be pan-green partisans while northerners and Taiwanese living in other areas tend to be pan-blue partisans.






Figure 5.8 Coalition ID by Region

Ethnicity


Taiwanese people's ethnicity also displays an explicit relationship with party identification. According to figure 5.9, Mainlanders are extremely loyal to the pan-blue camp. Most Mainlanders define themselves as pan-blue partisans consistently across time and only few of them identify as pan-green supporters.

Taiwanese-Minna, the majority group in Taiwan, display a complicated pattern of coalition identification. Many Taiwanese-Minna define themselves as independents, especially in 2000 and 2001. However, the proportion of pan-green identifiers has increased over time, and pan-blue identification has rebounded since 2000. Taiwanese-Minnas' party

identification is equally divided into pan-blue supporters, pan-green supporters, and independents; thus the majority ethnic group, Taiwanese-Minnan, is very diverse coalition in its identification.

Taiwanese-Hakka are more likely to be partisan independents. However, many Taiwanese-Hakka define themselves as pan-blue partisans, who outpaced the partisan independents in 2008. Both pan-blue partisans and independents consistently outnumber pan-green supporters among the Taiwanese-Hakka.

In sum, each ethnic group has its own pattern of coalition identification. Mainlanders strongly support pan-blue parties and few are pan-green supporters. Taiwanese-Hakka tend to be partisan independents with a recent surge in pan-blue support. As for the majority ethnic group, the Taiwanese-Minnan, their coalition identification is equally divided among pan-blue partisans, pan-green partisans, and independents.







Figure 5.9 Coalition ID by Ethnicity


National Identity

National identity plays an important role in Taiwan's politics. Figure 5.10 demonstrates how Taiwanese people's national identification affects their coalition identification. Respondents whose national identity is "Chinese" are more likely to support pan-blue camp, which advocates closer relations with China, and this identification has increased over time since 2000. Only a few of them support the pan-green camp, which insists on limited interaction with China. Hence, their national identification conforms to the political parties' issue positions.

Taiwanese who claim they are both Chinese and Taiwanese are also more likely to be pan-blue partisans as well. However, the pan-blue identification of Taiwanese with dual national identities is not as strong as that of Taiwanese citizens with Chinese identity. Conversely, dual-identity Taiwanese people are more independent and pan-green than those with Chinese identity.

Finally, respondents whose national identity is Taiwanese they tend to support the pan-green camp, which advocates Taiwanization. Not surprisingly, they less likely to identify as pan-blue partisans.

In sum, national identity also demonstrates an explicit connection with coalition identification. Taiwanese with Chinese identity are strong pan-blue partisans, those with dual identity tend to be weak pan-blue partisans, and those who call themselves Taiwanese are the main supporters of the pan-green camp.






Figure 5.10 Coalition ID by National Identity

Political Knowledge


The political knowledge variable is categorized into three groups: high, medium, and low.⁵¹ Figure 5.11 presents the relationship between Taiwanese people's coalition identification and their political knowledge. Taiwanese with the lowest levels of political knowledge are the least partisan; most are independents. This result conforms to previous

⁵¹ As in the American National Election Studies (ANES), in the ESC and TEDS public opinion surveys, respondents are asked three to five questions to measure their political knowledge. The questions include: Who is the current Taiwanese Prime Minister? Who is the current U.S. President? Who is the current President of the People's Republic of China? Who is the current chairman of the DPP? What government institution does judicial review in Taiwan? How many years is a Legislator's term? and so on. I recode the questions and conduct an index of political knowledge divided into three groups: low, medium, and high.

study (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Keith et al., 1992, Wu and Hsu, 2003).

Taiwanese people with moderate political knowledge have no clear pattern of coalition identification; their identification is nearly equally divided among pan-blue and pan-green partisanship and independence after 2004. Taiwanese people with the highest level of political knowledge are the most partisan, especially after 2001. Moreover, they are more likely to be pan-blue partisans than pan-green partisans.

In short, respondents' political knowledge shows an explicit connection with coalition identification: the lower the level of knowledge, the greater the partisan independence, and the higher the level of knowledge, the stronger the partisanship.






Figure 5.11 Coalition ID by Political Knowledge

Media Exposure

To measure media exposure, in the ESC and TEDS public opinion surveys, respondents are asked: how much time do you spend daily reading election-related news in the newspaper during the campaign? I categorize this variable into three levels: low (30 minutes or less), medium (31 minutes to 60 minutes), and high (60 minutes or more).⁵²

According to Figure 5.12, respondents with lower level of media exposure tended to be partisan independents. However, pan-blue identification rebounded and outpaced


⁵² The ESC's 2000 public opinion survey does not include this question. Hence, citizens' media exposure in 2000 is not included in this research.

partisan independence in 2008, and many of these respondents support the pan-green camp as well. Hence, there is no an explicit pattern of coalition identification for respondents with lower levels of media exposure.

Taiwanese people with medium levels of exposure to political news are consistently more likely to be pan-blue partisans, while many also are pan-green partisans. They are less likely to identity as independents; however, their partisan independence has increased over time. By 2008 they are closely divided among pan-blue and pan-green supporters and independents.

Those who read the most about politics and elections tend to be partisans, especially pan-blue partisans. However, panel c also shows many remain that there are still independent (25.9% in 2008), and the gap between partisanship and independence has narrowed over time.

In short, Taiwanese with lower level of media exposure are more likely to be partisan independents, whereas those who have middle and higher level of media exposure tend to be partisans. However, the margin of the difference in identification of the three partisan groups has become smaller, regardless of level of media exposure.






Figure 5.12 Coalition ID by Media Exposure

Summarizing the results depicted in Figures 5.4 to 5.12, I conclude that partisan independence is most common among Taiwanese people who are less-educated, lower-income, female, older, living in the central and eastern parts of the country, Taiwanese-Hakka, with less likely to be knowledgeable and to follow politics in the news. Citizens with high socioeconomic status, Mainlander ethnicity, Chinese or dual national identity, living in the North and/or having higher levels of knowledge and media exposure are the most likely to identify as pan-blue partisans. Finally, respondents who are living in South or self-identity as Taiwanese are more likely to be pan-green partisans.

Thus, Taiwanese people's partisan divisions are related to a variety of social and demographic factors examined separately in bivariate relationships. In the next section, I employ multinomial logit regression to analyze whether these social, demographic, and geographic variables affect Taiwanese people's party identification when controlling for other variables.

Multinomial Logit Analyses of Party Identification

Partisanship and partisan independence among the Taiwanese public are associated with a variety of individual characteristics which are included in the multivariate analyses for several years between 1994 and 2008. Coalition identification, the dependent variable, is categorized into three groups: pan-blue partisans, pan-green partisans, and partisan independents. Partisan independents comprise the reference group.⁵³

The independent variables include: education, income, gender, age, region, ethnicity, national identity, media exposure, and political knowledge. Respondents' education is categorized into three groups: low (junior high school, elementary school, and illiteracy), middle (senior high school), and high (college and graduate school). The middle level of education comprises the reference group. Income is coded as a continuous variable from poor to rich. Age is coded as a continuous variable from young to old. Gender is coded as a dummy variable; 1=male, 0=female. Region is categorized into three groups: North, South, and other areas (include the middle and eastern areas); other areas comprise the reference group. Ethnicity is categorized into three groups: Mainlanders, Taiwanese-Minnan, and Taiwanese-Hakka. Taiwanese-Hakka comprises the reference group. National identity is

⁵³ I also tried using pan-blue identifiers and pan-green identifiers as reference groups in the multinomial logit model. The results show that using different reference groups does not change the result much; it only changes the presentation of the results. Since the main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the partisan division between pan-blue and pan-green camps, it is more appropriate to use partisan independents as the reference group.

categorized into three groups: Chinese, Taiwanese, and both. Respondents claiming dual national identity comprise the reference group. Both media exposure and political knowledge are categorized into three groups: high, middle, and low. Respondents with middle levels of media exposure and political knowledge comprise the reference groups.

Table 5.1 presents the result of multinomial logit analyses of Taiwanese party identification from 1994 to 2008. According to model 1 in table 5.1, region has an inconsistent effect on Taiwanese people's coalition identification. People living in the northern areas were less likely to support the pan-blue camp in 1996, but they were more likely to define themselves as pan-blue partisans in 2000 and 2004 and as pan-green partisans in 2001 and 2008. Southerners also were less likely to support the pan-blue camp in 1996, and they were more likely to be pan-green partisans in 1998 and 2008, as expected. Thus there is no consistent regional division in partisanship. For example, both northerners and southerners were less pan-blue in 1994 and more pan-green in 2008. In short, northerners have a more complicated pattern of coalition identification than do southerners, who tend to support the pan-green camp.

In general, individuals in northern Taiwan are more likely than southerners to affiliate with the pan-blue coalition and southerners are more likely to affiliate with the pan-green camp when we focus on pan-blue and pan-green identification, supporting hypothesis 5-2. However, many people in both regions identify themselves as independents; the proportion of independents outpaces that of pan-blue partisans in the South and outpaces that of pan-green partisans in the North and other areas (the middle and eastern areas). Hence, once the proportion of independents is also taken into account, region's effect on Taiwanese partisanship is less significant.

Ethnicity has a large impact on Taiwanese people's coalition identification in each survey, as expected. Mainlanders tend to support the pan-blue camp and are less likely to be pan-green partisans. Conversely, Taiwanese-Minnan tend to support the pan-green camp and are less likely to be pan-blue partisans. Clearly, ethnicity divides Taiwanese people along partisan lines, supporting hypothesis 5-3. There are still more independents than partisans among the Taiwanese-Minnan and Taiwanese-Hakka, however.

National identity also shows a strong effect on party identification and it may be the most influential factor affecting Taiwanese people's coalition identification. Individuals identifying as Chinese significantly affiliate with the pan-blue camp and are less likely to be pan-green partisans. Conversely, those who identify as Taiwanese strongly support the pan-green camp and reject the pan-blue coalition. The only exception is that Taiwanese identity, in 1998, is positively associated with both pan-green and pan-blue partisanship. The reasonable explanation for this result is that the 1996 survey was conducted for the 1996 presidential election. Lee Tung- Hui, the current KMT chairman and president at that time, won the election by a large margin, with 54% of the vote, while the DPP candidate, Peng Ming-min, won only 21.1%. This was the lowest vote share that DPP candidates ever won in presidential elections. Apparently, many DPP supporters voted for Lee because he is the first president who was born in Taiwan and he promoted Taiwanization after taking office. Hence, some respondents with Taiwanese identity might have linked their vote choice (Lee, Ten-hui) with Lee's party identification (pan-blue camp), leading Taiwanese identifiers to split between the pan-green and the pan blue camps. Aside from 1996, national identification plays a quite critical role in Taiwanese partisan division, conforming to the expectation in hypothesis 5-4.

Nevertheless, the partisan polarization by national identity is somewhat attenuated by the large number of partisan independents. Although the proportion of independents among all three national identity groups decreased after 2000, it remains relatively high at around 30% of self-identified Chinese, self-identified Taiwanese, and people with dual identities.

Education level is not a very critical factor affecting party identification. It is only significant in 2001 and 2008, when less-educated Taiwanese people were less likely to be pan-blue partisans. High education levels are not associated with either coalition or partisan independence.

Family Income, on the other hand, significantly affects Taiwanese people's coalition identification in all surveys. The more income respondents earn, the more likely they affiliate with both the pan-blue and pan-green camps. Affluent Taiwanese citizens thus tend to be partisans. Income, therefore, does not divide the Taiwanese into different party coalitions; instead, it divides them into partisans and independents.

In short, Taiwanese people of higher socioeconomic status tend to support the pan-blue camp, and those of lower socioeconomic status tend to favor the pan-green camp, when we focus on affiliation with the two coalitions. These results support hypothesis 5-1. However, the major effect of socioeconomic status is on partisanship vs. independence, with higher status Taiwanese tending to identify with one or another coalition, especially the pan-blue, while lower-status Taiwanese are more likely to profess independence.

Gender is a significant influence on partisanship in some years. In general, Taiwanese men tend to define themselves as pan-green partisans and are less likely to support the pan-blue camp.

Older people are more likely to affiliate with the pan-blue camp and less likely to be pan-green partisans prior to 2001, conforming to earlier studies. However, after 2001 age is no longer significant, aside from the tendency for older people to affiliate with the pan-blue camp in 2008. This decline in the influence of age may reflect the power transition after 2000 that led the former party of reform to become the party of social stability.

As for media exposure, Taiwanese with lower levels of exposure were less likely to be pan-blue partisans in 1994, 1998, and 2004. They were also less likely to support the pan-green camp in 1994 and 2004. Citizens with higher levels of media exposure were less blue and more green in 2000, otherwise, higher media exposure has no significant effects. In short, respondents with the lowest levels of media exposure are also less likely to affiliate with either coalition.

Finally, the effect of political knowledge is similar to that of media exposure. Higher levels of knowledge have little or no effect on partisanship; low levels of knowledge are associated with partisan independence and a rejection of both party camps.

In sum, the year-by-year multinomial logit analyses show that individuals' socioeconomic status, region, ethnicity, and national identity affect their party affiliation largely as hypothesized, whereas gender, media exposure, and political knowledge have little or no impact on partisan divisions, and age declined in significance after 2000.

I expanded this model to include respondents' issue positions on the four issue areas featured in Chapter 4 (see model 2 in Table 5.1). The results discussed above change very little when respondents' issue positions are included as control variables. As for the effect of issue position on party identification, the independence/reunification issue shows the biggest influence on respondents' party identification. Taiwanese people supporting Taiwan independence tend to affiliate with the pan-green camp continually. However, in 1996 and

1998, respondents supporting Taiwanese independence also support the pan-blue camp, showing that position on independence/reunification does not strongly link to people's party affiliation until 2001. From 2001 onward, respondents supporting Taiwanese independence are more likely to be pan-green identifiers. On the contrary, those who claim Taiwan should reunify with China are more likely to support the pan-blue camp. This result confirms that Taiwanese people are more likely to affiliate with the party whose issue position is closer to theirs.

The reform/stability issue also affects Taiwanese public's party identification while its impact is not as large as independence/reunification issue. Taiwanese people emphasizing the importance of social stability are more likely to be pan-blue supporters whereas those who support large scale reform tend to be pan-green partisans.

The impacts of the social welfare/lower taxes and environment/economy issue on people's party affiliation are neither stable nor strong. People advocating social welfare expansion are more likely to be pan-blue partisans in 1994 and 1998 while supporting the pan-green camp in 2001. Those who favor lower taxes tend to be pan-blue identifiers in 2004. The results demonstrate that respondents' positions on social welfare vs. lower taxes are only weakly related to party affiliation. As for the environmental protection/economic development issue, respondents supporting environmental protection are surprisingly more likely to be pan-blue partisans in 1998. Nevertheless, from 2000 onward, Taiwanese people emphasizing the importance of economic development tend to support the pan-blue camp. Furthermore, there is no significant link between people's positions on the environment/economic growth tradeoff and their affiliation with the pan-green camp in the analyses. In short, this issue does not have much impact on the Taiwanese public's partisanship.

Table 5.1 Multinomial Logit Analyses for Party ID (1994-2008)

Independent Variables	1994							
	Model 1				Model 2			
	BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND		BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	-.070	.671	.238	.889	-1.980*	.921	2.487*	1.194
Age	.028***	.008	-.040***	.012	.020*	.009	-.044**	.015
Gender (Male)	-.138	.192	.660	.254	-.117	.233	.587 ^s	.307
Income	.161*	.073	.112**	.092	.139	.087	.174	.111
Education								
Low	-.144	.246	.217	.309	-.151	.296	.366	.368
High	.348	.249	-.004	.319	.293	.282	-.199	.370
Region								
North	-.691**	.242	.196	.314	-.634*	.286	.188	.364
South	-.688**	.251	-.502	.335	-.622*	.282	-.663	.406
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	.793 ^s	.420	-2.121*	.902	.961 ^s	.492	-2.344*	1.027
Minnan	-.092	.349	.068	.440	-.129	.407	-.097	.490
National ID								
Chinese	.467 ^s	.240	-.061	.381	.356	.286	.289	.431
Taiwanese	-.481*	.230	1.381***	.269	-.326	.279	1.099***	.329
Media Exposure								
Low	-.457 ^s	.250	-.713*	.306	-.385	.285	-.611 ^s	.357
High	-.269	.335	-.076	.394	-.134	.375	.039	.459
Poli. Knowledge								
Low	-.479	.247	-.579 ^s	.346	-.587 ^s	.330	-.016	.434
High	-.354	.229	-.085	.292	-.178	.264	-.430	.346
Issue Position								
I/R					.100 ^s	.053	-.264***	.071
R/S					.108*	.046	-.160**	.055
S/T					.173***	.052	.034	.069
E/E					--	--	--	--
χ^2			248.146				251.260	
Pseudo R ²			.273				.346	
N			778				768	

Notes: ^s $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

I/R: independence/Reunification; R/S: Reform/Stability; S/T: Social Welfare/Lower Taxes; E/E: Environmental Protection/Economic Development.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 5.1 Multinomial Logit Analyses for Party ID (1994-2008) (Continued)

1996								
Independent Variables	Model 1				Model 2			
	BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND		BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	-.189	.637	-1.963 [*]	.805	-.107	.643	-1.703 [*]	.818
Age	.020 [*]	.008	.001	.010	.024 ^{**}	.008	.007	.011
Gender (Male)	-.098	.200	-.111	.249	-.102	.202	-.107	.252
Income	.159 [*]	.067	.155 [§]	.082	.143 [*]	.067	.112	.083
Education								
Low	-.114	.252	-.376	.317	-.089	.255	-.352	.322
High	.028	.262	.161	.320	.054	.263	.208	.323
Region								
North	-.346	.276	.122	.348	-.402	.281	.002	.354
South	-.242	.273	.122	.342	-.252	.277	.094	.349
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	.391	.369	-.758	.611	.380	.371	-.782	.613
Minnan	-.548 [§]	.291	.478	.386	-.557 [§]	.292	.480	.389
National ID								
Chinese	.724 [*]	.285	.869 [*]	.396	.719 [*]	.286	.928 [*]	.399
Taiwanese	.465 [*]	.229	1.977 ^{***}	.271	.470 [*]	.232	1.968 ^{***}	.274
Media Exposure								
Low	.192	.268	-.179	.323	.209	.269	-.095	.326
High	.286	.356	-.375	.450	.282	.359	-.327	.455
Poli. Knowledge								
Low	-.258	.305	-.153	.398	-.166	.313	.117	.410
High	-.066	.225	-.485 [§]	.277	-.095	.227	.468 [§]	.280
Issue Position								
I/R					-.006 [§]	.003	-.018 ^{**}	.006
R/S					.007	.006	-.004	.009
S/T					.008	.005	-.005	.008
E/E					--	--	--	--
χ²	176.574				195.041			
Pseudo R²	.194				.212			
N	819				811			

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; ^{*} $p < .05$; ^{**} $p < .01$; ^{***} $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

I/R: independence/Reunification; R/S: Reform/Stability; S/T: Social Welfare/Lower Taxes; E/E: Environmental Protection/Economic Development.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 5.1 Multinomial Logit Analyses for Party ID (1994-2008) (Continued)

Independent Variables	1998							
	Model 1				Model 2			
	BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND		BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	-.416	.494	-2.140***	.585	-.569	.505	-2.088***	.598
Age	.015*	.007	-.019*	.008	.025***	.007	-.008	.008
Gender (Male)	-.440*	.182	.074	.203	-.470*	.187	-.006	.208
Income	.234***	.064	.313***	.069	.207**	.066	.278***	.071
Education								
Low	-.270	.229	.269	1.148	-.174	.234	.384	.255
High	.144	.237	.233	.259	.217	.239	.315	.260
Region								
North	.116	.209	.350	.245	.213	.215	.392	.249
South	.044	.218	.469 ^S	.249	.112	.223	.495 ^S	.254
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	1.747***	.347	.208	.512	1.647***	.355	.140	.514
Minnan	.403 ^S	.230	.841**	.292	.143 ^S	.238	.867**	.294
National ID								
Chinese	.732**	.262	.335	.349	.632*	.267	.280	.352
Taiwanese	-.277*	.183	.963***	.202	-.294	.188	.913***	.205
Media Exposure								
Low	-.579*	.275	-.144	.300	-.564*	.278	-.136	.303
High	-.218	.409	.483	.429	-.217	.415	.457	.434
Poli. Knowledge								
Low	-1.355***	.283	-1.273***	.400	-1.079***	.303	-.848*	.422
High	-.326 ^S	.189	.583**	.210	-.458*	.194	.436*	.216
Issue Position								
I/R					-.009**	.003	-.019***	.005
R/S					.000	.005	-.017	.011
S/T					.011 ^S	.007	.009	.011
E/E					-.022***	.006	-.010	.007
χ^2			328.887				328.260	
Pseudo R ²			.278				.318	
N			1008				1008	

Notes: ^S $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

I/R: independence/Reunification; R/S: Reform/Stability; S/T: Social Welfare/Lower Taxes; E/E: Environmental Protection/Economic Development.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 5.1 Multinomial Logit Analyses for Party ID (1994-2008) (Continued)

Independent Variables	2000							
	Model 1				Model 2			
	BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND		BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	-1.186**	.461	-1.274**	.473	-2.360***	.670	.394	.704
Age	.014*	.006	.003	.007	.022**	.007	.003	.008
Gender (Male)	-.480**	.175	-.103	.174	-.594**	.194	-.299	.198
Income	.131*	.058	.027	.058	.097	.062	-.025	.064
Education								
Low	-.068	.226	.110	.222	-.140	.249	.199	.247
High	.090	.211	.349	.221	.150	.223	.259	.239
Region								
North	.438*	.222	.327	.225	.475 [§]	.247	.376	.141
South	.074	.222	.299	.211	.056	.243	.148	.534
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	.314	.297	-.736	.469	.122	.334	-.751	.517
Minnan	-.509*	.236	.374	.265	-.511 [§]	.271	.338	.304
National ID								
Chinese	.085	.240	-.553	.367	.115	.177	-.389	.413
Taiwanese	-.581**	.186	.956***	.172	-.388 [§]	.211	.954***	.197
Media Exposure								
Low	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
High	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Poli. Knowledge								
Low	-.768*	.379	-1.128***	.327	-.270	.537	-.521	.464
High	.659**	.212	.037	.197	.756**	.240	-.019	.227
Issue Position								
I/R					.059	.046	-.187***	.048
R/S					.038	.036	-.069*	.035
S/T					.014	.029	.005	.031
E/E					.065 [§]	.035	.000	.038
χ^2	242.841				259.523			
Pseudo R ²	.212				.265			
N	1020				842			

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

I/R: independence/Reunification; R/S: Reform/Stability; S/T: Social Welfare/Lower Taxes; E/E: Environmental Protection/Economic Development.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 5.1 Multinomial Logit Analyses for Party ID (1994-2008) (Continued)

Independent Variables	2001							
	Model 1				Model 2			
	BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND		BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	.033	.436	-.567	.446	-1.989**	.651	-.012	.656
Age	.003	.006	-.017	.006	.002	.007	-.019**	.007
Gender (Male)	-.077	.150	.400**	.147	-.051	.167	.328*	.164
Income	.094***	.028	.066	.028	.098***	.030	.087**	.031
Education								
Low	-.536**	.204	.028	.119	-.603**	.224	.068	.220
High	-.237	.189	-.154	.197	-.217	.202	-.264	.212
Region								
North	.106	.176	.416*	.178	.165	.192	.544**	.197
South	-.261	.191	.229	.182	-.275	.210	.256	.205
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	.932***	.281	-1.066*	.458	1.116***	.315	-.818	.502
Minnan	-.119	.220	.490*	.238	-.081	.239	.498 ^s	.257
National ID								
Chinese	.120	.243	-.339	.335	-.070	.267	-.143	.355
Taiwanese	-.660***	.175	1.042***	.150	-.452*	.197	.926***	.170
Media Exposure								
Low	-.331	.237	-.371	.237	-.385	.263	-.469 ^s	.263
High	.003	.349	.110	.352	-.017	.383	.068	.386
Pol. Knowledge								
Low	-.862**	.288	-.951***	.251	-.839*	.363	-.701*	.308
High	.318 ^s	.164	.271	.165	.450*	.179	.290	.181
Issue Position								
I/R					.145***	.038	-.182***	.038
R/S					.058 ^s	.032	-.069*	.030
S/T					.048	.039	.121**	.039
E/E					.051	.031	-.011	.031
χ^2			449.867				506.200	
Pseudo R ²			.279				.343	
N			1375				1207	

Notes: ^s $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

I/R: independence/Reunification; R/S: Reform/Stability; S/T: Social Welfare/Lower Taxes; E/E: Environmental Protection/Economic Development.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 5.1 Multinomial Logit Analyses for Party ID (1994-2008) (Continued)

Independent Variables	2004							
	Model 1				Model 2			
	BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND		BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	-.269	.494	-.263	.487	-2.110**	.790	.911	.735
Age	-.012	.008	-.010	.008	-.002	.009	-.002	.009
Gender (Male)	.224 [§]	.196	.224	.191	-.302	.220	-.264	.212
Income	.125***	.036	.077*	.035	.119**	.040	.061	.038
Education								
Low	.294	.272	.103	.265	.214	.307	-.048	.294
High	-.151	.233	-.339	.233	.027	.254	-.401	.250
Region								
North	.479*	.239	.008	.234	.606*	.259	.051	.252
South	-.018	.260	.099	.237	.079	.291	.291	.264
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	.999**	.357	-.329	.458	.743 [§]	.389	-.345	.482
Minnan	.143	.256	.495 [§]	.261	.120	.284	.498 [§]	.285
National ID								
Chinese	-.180	.395	-.980	.606	.384	.514	-.257	.692
Taiwanese	-1.279***	.212	.819***	.191	-1.215***	.238	.612**	.214
Media Exposure								
Low	-.815***	.311	-.693***	.307	-.588*	.230	-.606**	.222
High	.575 [§]	.207	.618*	.203	.634 [§]	.340	.357	.333
Poli. Knowledge								
Low	-.444	.293	-.657*	.268	-.495	.349	-.681*	.325
High	.402 [§]	.233	.275	.231	.585*	.260	.179	.253
Issue Position								
I/R					.156**	.054	-.166***	.049
R/S					.122**	.044	-.055	.038
S/T					-.060 [§]	.035	-.019	.034
E/E					.120**	.039	.054	.037
χ²	317.829				381.077			
Pseudo R²	.298				.375			
N	898				810			

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

I/R: independence/Reunification; R/S: Reform/Stability; S/T: Social Welfare/Lower Taxes; E/E: Environmental Protection/Economic Development.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Table 5.1 Multinomial Logit Analyses for Party ID (1994-2008) (Continued)

Independent Variables	2008							
	Model 1				Model 2			
	BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND		BLUE/IND		GREEN/IND	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	-.167	.429	-2.232***	.464	-1.602**	.599	-.386	.640
Age	.010 ^S	.006	.001	.006	.011 ^S	.006	.001	.007
Gender (Male)	-.180	.144	.339**	.150	-.282 ^S	.155	.315 ^S	.166
Income	.071**	.027	.079**	.029	.078**	.029	.081*	.032
Education								
Low	-.962***	.204	.022	.208	-.819***	.218	.061	.229
High	.110	.176	.255	.199	.109	.188	.222	.214
Region								
North	.046	.174	.445*	.193	.173	.187	.532*	.214
South	-.267	.191	.786***	.194	-.202	.207	.749***	.213
Ethnicity								
Mainlander	1.115***	.287	-1.303*	.524	1.103***	.315	-1.068 ^S	.549
Minnan	.198	.216	.365	.232	.198	.235	.412	.261
National ID								
Chinese	.445	.321	-.710	.634	.224	.355	-.474	.659
Taiwanese	-.783***	.148	1.336***	.168	-.606***	.163	1.002***	.188
Media Exposure								
Low	.148	.220	-.025	.228	.124	.232	-.027	.246
High	.268	.339	.201	.359	.230	.359	-.026	.395
Poli. Knowledge								
Low	.046	.174	.445*	.193	-.433*	.203	-.280	.210
High	-.267	.191	.786***	.194	.213	.191	.330	.209
Issue Position								
I/R					.166***	.037	-.241***	.037
R/S					-.004	.028	-.077**	.028
S/T					.000	.024	-.032	.025
E/E					.084**	.029	.006	.030
χ^2			525.491				609.713	
Pseudo R ²			.308				.378	
N			1428				1285	

Notes: ^S $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

I/R: independence/Reunification; R/S: Reform/Stability; S/T: Social Welfare/Lower Taxes; E/E: Environmental Protection/Economic Development.

Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Have the Taiwanese People Become More Polarized?

The foregoing analyses demonstrate the bases of partisan division in Taiwan.

However, can I thus make a statement that the Taiwanese have become more polarized? Not necessarily, because focusing only on pan-blue and pan-green partisans ignores the consistently large number of independents.

According to Fiorina and Levendusky (2006a), polarization occurs when ordinary citizens have been pushed from the middle toward both ends. That is, as the public becomes polarized, the middle ground vanishes. The foregoing analyses show that there are still many Taiwanese people defining themselves as partisan independents rather than identifying as partisans of the two party coalitions. Therefore, Taiwanese people have not become more polarized along partisan lines.

In fact, the real case of Taiwan's partisan change today is closer to the concept of sorting. According to Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2006), sorting refers to the increased tendency to affiliate with a party based on issues or policy positions. Under partisan sorting, the middle ground remains. Therefore, according to empirical study, Taiwanese people's socioeconomic status, region, ethnicity, and national identity lead to larger party divisions than do other variables. Nevertheless, the proportion of independents does not vanish or decrease dramatically. In most cases, the proportion of independents regardless of socioeconomic status, region, ethnicity, and national identity exceeds one-third after 2000 (see table 5.2), confirming that independents have not vanished. In other words, rather than partisan polarization, the process of partisan change in which Taiwan society has experienced in the beginning of this decade is more similar to sorting. This result conforms to hypothesis 5.5.

Table 5.2 The Mean Percentage of Independents (2000-2008)

Education			Income			Region		
Low	Middle	High	Low	Middle	High	North	South	Others
46.68(%)	34.83	29.23	43.18	30.58	23.90	33.28	41.10	41.23
Ethnicity			National Identity					
Mainlanders	Taiwanese-Minnan	Taiwanese-Hakka	Chinese	Both	Taiwanese			
26.20	39.00	39.13	35.93	36.80	36.63			

Source: calculated by the author

Partisan sorting is also evident in Taiwanese people's positions on the issue of Taiwanese independence vs. reunification with China, found to be the only issue dividing Taiwanese people along partisan lines in Chapter 4. Figure 5.13 presents the relationship between coalition identification and respondents' positions on the independence/reunification issue. Respondents who support Taiwan declaring itself as a newly independent country are more likely to support the pan-green camp, whereas those who believe Taiwan should reunify with China tend to affiliate with the pan-blue camp. Pro-independence Taiwanese have become increasingly green while pro-reunification Taiwanese have become increasingly blue since 2000. At the same time, however, the proportion of independents on both sides has not diminished.⁵⁴

Therefore, according to figure 5.13, partisan sorting, not polarization, explains the association between party identification and positions on the independence/reunification issue.

⁵⁴ Then mean proportions of partisan independents among the pro-independence and the pro-reunification respondents after 2000 are 24.7 and 27.5 respectively.






Figure 5.13 Coalition ID by the Independence/Reunification Issue

The sorting process is further illustrated in data collaborated by the Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chenchi University, tracking Taiwanese people's positions on the Taiwanese independence/China reunification issue from 1994 to 2009, as can be seen in Appendix G. Appendix G demonstrates that although the proportion of Taiwanese people advocating Taiwanese independence has increased from 10% to 20%, the proportion of respondents favoring of reunification with China has decreased from 20% to 10%. Most Taiwanese people, during this period, have not moved to the two extremes. Conversely, more Taiwanese people advocate maintaining the status quo. As a result, the Taiwanese public has not become polarized on the most important issue for Taiwanese society.

This partisan sorting is partly due to the party realignment taking place after the 2000 presidential election. In the past, the KMT was the only real political party that Taiwanese could affiliate with in the period of authoritarian rule. After the democratization in the late 1980s, Taiwanese began to learn more about party politics and had more options. In this process of learning, they started to understand parties' position and affiliate with the party whose positions reflected their own. The 2000 presidential election then promoted more explicit party positions, especially on the China relations issue, for voters. Political parties which promoted closer interactions with China established the pan-blue coalition, whereas the parties which favored Taiwanization founded the pan-green camp. Moreover, the former President Lee Tung-hui's departure from the KMT to the pan-green camp increased voters' awareness of the two party coalitions' issue positions and served as a cue for partisan alignment. In sum, Taiwan's political environment after the 2000 presidential election provided an opportunity for Taiwanese people to sort their partisan support. However, many ordinary citizens remain partisan independents. Hence, Taiwanese people have not become more partisan polarized since the 2000 presidential election.

Conclusion

The advent of multiparty democracy in Taiwan has been accompanied by partisan divisions along regional, ethnic, and national identity lines, as hypothesized. People who live in the North, Mainlanders, and Chinese identity tend to support the pan-blue camp, whereas those who live in South, Taiwanese-Minnan, and Taiwanese identity tend to support the pan-green camp. The hypothesized relationship between partisanship and socioeconomic status is not as strong or consistent as expected, but middle- and upper-class Taiwanese are more likely to be partisans, especially pan-blue partisans, than are the more independent lower-status Taiwanese.

In general, however, the consistently large number of partisan independents largely overshadows partisan divisions. Moreover, most Taiwanese respondents advocate maintaining the status quo in Taiwan's relations with China, rather than taking more extreme stands in favor of either total independence or closer integration. Thus the Taiwanese public has not become polarized on even the most important political issue in Taiwanese society.

Since Taiwanese people have not become polarized in their party affiliations and issue positions, Taiwan's politics is not as polarized as some scholars argue. Instead, Taiwan is a moderate society with few people standing at opposite extremes. In sum, party competition between politicians of the two party coalitions may be quite intense, but the Taiwanese public is not as polarized as their representatives.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Summary

This dissertation attempts to examine an important question: whether Taiwan's politics has become more partisan polarized after the 2000 presidential election. I examine this question from two perspectives: political elites and ordinary citizens. For political elites, I test whether the frequency and intensity of party conflict have increased in terms of legislators' voting behavior in the Legislative Yuan. For ordinary citizens, I examine whether the Taiwanese public is divided by some political issues along party lines. Moreover, I also test the social-demographic basis of partisan polarization in Taiwan, examining the geographic factors and personal characteristics that affect people's partisanship and the changes in those factors' influence over time. I briefly summarize the research findings below.

Partisan Polarization among Political Elites

First, looking at political elites, I employ party and coalition votes, and party and coalition antagonism scores, to measure to what extent Taiwan's political elites oppose each other in terms of legislative behavior, focusing on roll call votes from the Third to the Sixth legislative Yuan, 1996-2008. The empirical analyses show that the frequency of party votes, pitting party majorities against each other, has increased dramatically. Nine out of ten roll call votes were party votes in the Sixth Legislative Yuan. Coalition votes also have increased dramatically, their proportion of party votes even exceeding that of party votes, showing that the minor members of the two party coalitions have higher party coherence than did their coalition leaders, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

Furthermore, then mean party antagonism and coalition antagonism scores have increased term by term. The party antagonism score in the Sixth Legislative Yuan was .9262, indicating that an average of 92.62% of the KMT and the DPP lawmakers voted against each other. Coalition antagonism scores of each Legislative Yuan outpaced party antagonism scores, reflecting a higher degree of coherence among individual legislators in the adherent parties of the two party coalitions than among lawmakers in the KMT and the DPP.

I further analyze party and coalition votes, and party and coalition antagonism scores, by different political issue areas. Surprisingly, the China relations and political reform issues were not the most divisive issues in the Legislative Yuan in terms of either party voting or party antagonism scores. Nor did these two issues contribute significantly to party antagonism in regression analyses that included a variety of issues. However, this does not mean that relations with China and political reform are not divisive issues; instead, all issue areas led to high party and coalition votes, and high party and coalition antagonism scores, in the Third to the Sixth Legislative Yuan. Rather than demonstrating interparty conflict and intraparty unity around a few key issues as I hypothesized, the two major parties, and the pan-blue and pan-green coalitions containing them, developed opposing voting patterns across a wide array of issues. As a result, even though the empirical results do not completely support the hypotheses, they demonstrate that political parties and politicians in the Legislative Yuan have become polarized in the era of multiparty competition.

Partisan Polarization and Issue Attitudes among Ordinary Citizens

Turning to the general public, I first examine whether any issues have divided Taiwanese along party lines. Four issue areas tend to dominate public debate, according to previous research. The issues include: Taiwan independence vs. reunification with China,

large-scale reform vs. social stability, social welfare vs. lower taxes, and environmental protection vs. economic development.

Examining people's perceptions of political parties' issue positions, I find that Taiwanese do believe the political parties take different positions on certain issues, especially on the independence/reunification issue. The pan-blue parties are considered to be pro-reunification with China, pro-social stability, pro-economic development, and moderately pro-social welfare though to a lesser extent than the pan-green parties. Conversely, the pan-green parties are considered to be pro-Taiwan independence, pro-large scale reform, pro-social welfare, and slightly pro-economic development. Thus the two party coalitions are most distinguishable on the independence/reunification and the reform/stability issues, and increasingly so on the independence/reunification issue.

Self-placement on the issues among the Taiwanese public differs from their perceptions of the parties. Ordinary citizens locate themselves in the middle ground between the two major parties at a nearly equal distance between them on the independence/reunification issue. On the reform/stability issue, they place themselves at a more pro-social stability position than the KMT and the DPP. Taiwanese people also express strong support for social welfare. However, when presented with a tradeoff between welfare and lower taxes, they move to a more moderate position. In addition, the Taiwanese public tends to favor economic development over environmental protection. The political elites, regardless of partisanship, and the Taiwanese public concur that saving Taiwan from economic depression should take precedence.

Even partisans do not necessarily agree with their parties' perceived positions. Most pan-green supporters do not favor large-scale reform and environmental protection over stability and economic development even though the DPP is considered to be a pro-reform

and relatively pro-environmental protection party. Polarization's effect on public opinion (Zaller, 1992) is only supported on the independence/reunification issue.

Using OLS regression analyses to analyze the relationship between whether Taiwanese people's party identification and their positions on the four selected issues reveals that party identification appears to be the most influential factor affecting positions on the independence/reunification issue. Party identification also is related to people's positions on the reform/stability issue while weakly related at best to positions on the social welfare/lower taxes and environment/economy issues. In short, multivariate analysis shows that pan-blue partisans are more likely to emphasize the importance of reunification with China, social stability, and economic development. Conversely, pan-green supporters tend to favor Taiwan Independence, and are more likely to support large scale reform.

The independence/reunification issue is also the most decisive issue determining Taiwanese people's vote choice. Although the reform/stability issue significantly affected people's voting behavior in the 2000 presidential election, it does not have a large impact on vote choice since 2000. Neither the social welfare/lower taxes issue nor the environment/economy issues has a significant impact on Taiwanese people's vote choice.

Summarizing these results issues by issue, I conclude that the tradeoff between social welfare and lower taxes, and the tradeoff between economic development and environmental protection, do not divide Taiwanese people do not perceive significant gaps between the parties or coalitions on these two issues. The pan-blue and pan-green partisans do not place themselves in opposite positions on the social welfare and environment/economy issues. Moreover, Taiwanese people's party identification does not affect their positions on these two issues. Most importantly, social welfare and environment/economy issues have little or no impact on people's electoral decisions. Hence,

social welfare, environmental protection and economic development are not issues that polarize Taiwanese people along party lines.

As for the reform/stability issue, the pan-blue camp is considered to be pro-stability while the pan-green camp is pro-reform. However, the distance between the two party camps on this issue has narrowed since 2000. Furthermore, large majorities of Taiwanese, regardless of their party attachments, favor social stability over large-scale reform.

Regression analysis reveals that pan-blue supporters are even more likely to prefer social stability while pan-green partisans are more likely to support large-scale reform.

Nevertheless, the difference is only relative, since most supporters of both coalitions favor stability over reform. Furthermore, the reform/stability issue only affected people's vote choice in 2000. Therefore, the importance of the reform/stability issue on Taiwanese people's political behavior has declined in significance. This issue also cannot be defined as a polarizing issue.

The China relations issue is the most divisive issue along partisan lines. First, people perceive that the two party coalitions have distinguishable positions on this issue. The pan-blue camp supports reunification with China, whereas the pan-green camp favors Taiwanese independence. Political elites' positions have a positive relationship with their partisans' positions on this issue. Pan-blue partisans are more likely to be pro-reunification while pan-green identifiers tend to support Taiwanese independence. This result is also confirmed by OLS regression analyses when other variables are controlled. Most importantly, people's positions on this issue significantly affect their vote choice. Respondents who support Taiwan independence are more likely to vote for pan-green candidates in the 1996, 2000, and 2008 presidential elections. Hence, independence/reunification is the only polarizing issue dividing Taiwanese people along party line.

Demographic Bases of Partisan Polarization among Ordinary Citizens

Having examined the issues dividing the Taiwanese public along party lines, I shift the focus to the demographic bases of partisanship in Taiwan. The demographic factors examined in this section include age, gender, education, income, region, ethnicity, and national identity. Effects of media exposure and political knowledge on partisanship are also analyzed.

By examining the dynamics of the relationship between demographic factors and respondents' partisan affiliations, I find that Taiwanese people who are less-educated, lower-income, female, older, living in the central and eastern parts of the country, and Taiwanese-Hakka, as well as those with lower levels of political knowledge and media exposure, are more likely to be partisan independents. Citizens who are well-educated, middle- and high- income, living in the North, Mainlander, holding Chinese or dual national identities, and professing higher levels of political knowledge and media exposure are more likely to identify as pan-blue partisans. Finally, respondents who live in the South and who identify as Taiwanese are more likely to be pan-green partisans.

Multinomial logit regression analysis largely confirms these findings. The empirical results show that Taiwanese people with higher socioeconomic status (education and income) tend to support the pan-blue camp. Those with lower socioeconomic status support the pan-green camp more than the pan-blue, but they are most likely to be partisan independents.

Region is significant, as Individuals in northern Taiwan are more likely than southerners to affiliate with the pan-blue coalition and southerners are more likely to affiliate with the pan- green camp when focusing only on pan-blue and pan-green identification. However, many individuals across the regions are partisan independents,

outnumbering pan-blue partisans in the South and pan-green partisans in the North and elsewhere. Hence, once the proportion of independents is also taken into account, region's effect on Taiwanese partisanship declines in significance.

Ethnic Mainlanders are more likely to affiliate with the pan-blue coalition, even when other variables held constant. Moreover, Mainlanders have become increasingly pan-blue, while the proportion of pan-green identifiers and independents has declined since 2000. Taiwanese-Minnan are more pan-green than pan-blue but, like Taiwanese-Hakka, they have mostly maintained partisan independences since 2000. Hence, Mainlanders are the only ethnic group whose partisanship has become stronger.

National identity has a major impact on individuals' coalition identification. Respondents identifying as Chinese and those with dual identity are more likely to affiliate with the pan-blue camp, whereas respondents who define themselves as Taiwanese are more likely to support the pan-green camp. This relationship is also confirmed in multinomial logit analyses. Moreover, the gap between pan-blue and pan-green identification among the three national identity groups has increased since 2000. Nevertheless, the effect of national identity is diluted when independents are taken into account, as roughly 30% of each group maintains partisan independence since 2000.

Gender does not have a significant effect on diving coalition identification. Taiwanese men are somewhat more likely than women to support the pan-green camp, but both women and men are roughly equally divided among pan-blue and pan-green partisanship and partisan independence.

Nor does age divide the Taiwanese along partisan lines. Older people are more likely to be pan-blue partisans and less likely to support the pan-green camp. However, that gap has narrowed and independence has increased since 2000. As a result, Taiwanese of all ages

are almost equally divided into pan-blue supporters, pan-green supporters, and independents.

Media exposure and political knowledge divide Taiwanese people along partisan lines in another way. Individuals with lower levels of media exposure and political knowledge are less likely to be partisans, whereas those who with higher level of media exposure and political knowledge tend to be partisans, but there is no significant difference among those partisans between pan-blue and pan-green supporters.

To sum up, Taiwanese people's identification with the pan-blue or pan-green coalition is significantly related to their socioeconomic status, region, ethnicity, and national identity; whereas gender, age, media exposure, and political knowledge do not make an impact on coalition identification.

However, the empirical results demonstrate that many Taiwanese people still define themselves as partisan independents. Ordinary citizens have not been pushed from the middle position toward both ends; therefore, Taiwanese people did not become more polarized along partisan lines. Instead, Taiwan's partisan change in recent years is closer to the concept of "sorting", a process by which partisans gravitate over time toward the party that most closely reflects their policy preferences. Under partisan sorting, the middle ground remains, and partisan identification reflects attitudinal differences that are moderate rather than extreme.

Hence, I conclude that Taiwan's political elites have become more polarized along party lines. The increasing number of party votes and higher party antagonism scores show that party conflict in the Legislative Yuan has become more intense. On the other hand, the Taiwanese public is less sharply aligned according to their policy preferences, except for the independence/reunification issue. People who support Taiwanese independence are more

likely to be pan-green partisans, whereas those who believe Taiwan should reunify with China tend to be pan-blue supporters.

Nor has partisan conflict come to divide the Taiwanese along demographic lines since the 2000 presidential election. Instead, the process of partisan change in Taiwanese society follows the sorting process, following elite partisan alignment while retaining more moderate views and a large degree of partisan independence.

Limitations and Suggestions

One contribution of this dissertation is the use of current U.S. political science concepts and theories to analyze Taiwan's party politics. Furthermore, instead of only focusing on a single perspective, I examine partisan changes at both the elite and mass levels. The empirical analysis broadens and updates previous research finding that Taiwan's political elites have become more polarized since the 2000 presidential election, while ordinary citizens increasingly differentiate between the two party camps even as they maintain a large degree of partisan independence. Hopefully this research expands our knowledge of 21st- century Taiwanese politics while inspiring other scholars to probe further.

Although this research contributes to the study of Taiwan's partisan polarization, some limitations should be noted. First, a lack of individual-level roll-call data for Taiwanese legislators limits the type of analyses that can be performed, including calculating of DW-Nominate Scores (Poole, and Rosenthal, 2001). At any rate, social and cultural differences preclude the study of ideology in the western sense of the concept.

Secondly, the history of public opinion surveys in Taiwan is not as long and well-established as that of the United States. Pollsters continue to test different types of questions for measuring Taiwanese attitudes. Hence, longitudinal analysis is more often limited by changes in issue questions and question wording. Further research may benefit from greater consistency overtime.

Moreover, the causal relationship between people's party identification and issue position is another limitation of this research. Do people form their issue positions based on the positions of political party which they affiliate with? Or do people's issue positions affect their party preference? The cause and effect in the relationship of party preference and issue position are not confirmed.

In this research, I follow Sheng's method, assuming that people's party identification affects their issue position (Sheng, 2007). Sheng's research also deals with the relationship between party identification and issue position (Sheng, 2007). In order to investigate the reciprocal relationship between issue positions and party preferences, she uses a two-stage least square regression to estimate the effect of the party identification on people's issue positions. The result shows that party preferences do affect the formation of people's issue position.

However, even the method I use is confirmed by Sheng's empirical research, I also recognize that it needs a further research to find out the direction of relationship between people's party identification and issue position.

Finally, as mentioned, the first real opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was established in 1986, reflecting Taiwan's short-term party competition to date. It remains to be seen whether the current party coalitions will become long-term forces in Taiwanese politics. But this study provides a sound baseline for analyzing partisan politics in the future.

Implications for Further Research

By employing U.S. concepts and theories of partisan polarization, I find that party antagonism among Taiwan's political elites has become more intense while the Taiwanese

public is not as polarized as some people claim (see, for example, Chen and Hwang, 2003; Hsu, 2000). Future research on Taiwanese politics may address these lingering questions:

Will party conflict in the Legislative Yuan become more intense in the future?

Starting with the 2008 legislative Yuan election, Taiwan adopted a system of single-member districts with two votes.⁵⁵ Following Maurice Duvergers' (1954:217) claim that the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system, I anticipate that each of the two party coalitions will gradually merge into a single party. Furthermore, the intraparty unity within, and interparty conflict between, the two parties is likely to expand.

Since the trends in party voting and party antagonism presented in Chapter 3 already show that Taiwan's political elites are increasingly polarized along party lines, party conflict in the Legislative Yuan is likely to become more intense. The main reason is that the DPP, which favored reform and environmental protection before it took office in 2000-2008, lost the 2008 presidential election. As a result, it no longer must confront fiscal and other problems that the ruling party must consider. The DPP can be a pro-reform and pro-environmental protection party again. Conversely, the KMT, having returned to office after 2008, can also return to its advocacy for social stability and economic development. Hence, I anticipate that the two major parties will be less likely to negotiate and cooperate on the reform/stability and environment/economy issues. They are also less likely to work together on the China relations issue, the most distinguishable divergence between the KMT and the DPP. Social welfare may become the only issue on which the two major parties

⁵⁵ In Taiwan's new electoral system for the Legislative Yuan election in 2008, voters have two votes, one for a candidate from the geographic constituency and the other for the party representative by party list. The 34 seats for party representative are allocated proportionally to the parties that win 5% or more of the party-ticket vote. However, in 2008 Legislative Yuan election, the KMT and the DPP were the only two parties, being able to win at least 5% of party tickets and win the seats of party representative. This phenomenon reflects that even though Taiwan has more than two political parties, the type of party competition in Taiwan after 2008 is close to that of two-party system.

cooperate in the Legislative Yuan since social welfare often serves as a tool to attract voters. As a result, I predict that party antagonism in the Legislative Yuan will become more intense in the future as the two major parties abandon the middle and return to their original issue positions.

Will the divisions over the China relations issue become deeper among ordinary citizens in the future?

As noted, the China relations issue is the most salient issue dividing the Taiwanese public. Taiwan has expanded interactions with China, especially in the economic realm, since the KMT returned to office after 2008. However, the closer relationship with China is like a double-edged sword, benefiting some people while hurting others. For example, Taiwanese businessmen benefit from closer interaction with China because they can move their headquarters and factories to China for a bigger market, lower operation costs, and cheaper labor while Taiwanese blue-collar labors thus lose their jobs.

As a result, the answer to this question depends on whether Taiwan's government initiates effective policies to remedy the losses to people hurt by closer interaction with China. If Taiwan's government can assist these people, the conflict over the China relations issue may be contained. Otherwise, the conflict over China relations will become the most irresolvable problem in Taiwan's society.

Does Polarization matter for Taiwan?

It is difficult to predict whether public disagreements over Taiwan's relations with China will evolve into more extreme partisan divisions over a variety of issues. However, does it matter whether people move to the extremes and the middle ground vanishes?

In my opinion, polarization does matter for Taiwan. Should the Taiwanese public become more polarized, party elites could find even further reasons to work for partisan

benefit rather than the general good. According to the theory of *conditional party government* (Aldrich and Rohde, 2000), members of the U.S Congress yield more power to party leaders to enact partisan agendas when interparty conflict and interparty unity increase. Fleisher and Bond (2000:190) contend that “the greater polarization of the parties has increased the leaders’ propensity to use their resources and powers to enact legislation containing more of the majority party’s preferences and fewer of the minority party’s.” When government governs only on some people’s behalf, social conflict could expand to the point of endangering Taiwan’s fledgling democracy.

Thus, the study of party politics in Taiwan carries important normative as well as empirical implications. As Taiwan continues on the road toward democratic consolidation, elites and public alike will be best served by a party system characterized by stability and differentiation without excessive polarization.

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Appendix A.1: F Test for Party Antagonism Score by Issues

3rd Term	CR	RF	SW	EP	EC	PCPB	Others
CR	--	12.679 ^{***}	.028	4.709 [*]	8.938 ^{**}	9.875 ^{**}	4.278 [*]
RF	12.679 ^{***}	--	7.970 ^{**}	9.83	6.062 [*]	.082	1.528
SW	.028	7.970 ^{**}	--	3.138	4.452 [*]	5.247 [*]	2.152
EP	4.709 [*]	9.83	3.138	--	5.016 [*]	.630	1.708
EC	8.938 ^{**}	6.062 [*]	4.452 [*]	5.016 [*]	--	15.166 ^{***}	1.330
PCPB	9.875 ^{**}	.082	5.247 [*]	.630	15.166 ^{***}	--	4.811 [*]
Others	4.278 [*]	1.528	2.152	1.708	1.330	4.811 [*]	--
4th Term	CR	RF	SW	EP	EC	PCPB	Others
CR	--	none	none	none	none	none	none
RF	none	--	1.806	6.894 [*]	5.990 [*]	2.496	6.015 [*]
SW	none	1.806	--	.060	.002	.213	.022
EP	none	6.894 [*]	.060	--	.233	1.220	.470
EC	none	5.990 [*]	.002	.233	--	.483	.058
PCPB	none	2.496	.213	1.220	.483	--	.248
Others	none	6.015 [*]	.022	.470	.058	.248	--
5th Term	CR	RF	SW	EP	EC	PCPB	Others
CR	--	2.104	6.738 [*]	1.427	2.147	3.796	.695
RF	2.104	--	.002	2.614	5.175 [*]	1.014	.704
SW	6.738 [*]	.002	--	2.533	4.863 [*]	.518	.213
EP	1.427	2.614	2.533	--	.026	2.224	.373
EC	2.147	5.175 [*]	4.863 [*]	.026	--	4.733 [*]	.850
PCPB	3.796	1.014	.518	2.224	4.733 [*]	--	.072
Others	.695	.704	.213	.373	.850	.072	--
6th Term	CR	RF	SW	EP	EC	PCPB	Others
CR	--	2.030	.756	66.515 ^{***}	.694	2.613	2.524
RF	2.030	--	.701	3.446	4.488 [*]	6.646 [*]	4.667 [*]
SW	.756	.701	--	20.682 ^{**}	1.560	2.158	1.864
EP	66.515 ^{***}	3.446	20.682 ^{**}	--	114.969 ^{***}	114.969 ^{***}	77.394 ^{***}
EC	.694	4.488 [*]	1.560	114.969 ^{***}	--	1.859	2.186
PCPB	2.613	6.646 [*]	2.158	105.232 ^{***}	1.859	--	.127
Others	2.524	4.667 [*]	1.864	77.394 ^{***}	2.186	.127	--

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

Appendix A.2: F Test for Coalition Antagonism Score by Issues

3rd Term	CR	RF	SW	EP	EC	PCPB	Others
CR	--	18.521 ^{***}	.084	.010	3.809	4.880 [*]	1.798
RF	18.521 ^{***}	--	12.594 ^{***}	22.790 ^{***}	1.741	.641	.049
SW	.084	12.594 ^{***}	--	.043	2.236	3.219	1.113
EP	.010	22.790 ^{***}	.043	--	5.040 [*]	6.592 [*]	2.425
EC	3.809	1.741	2.236	5.040 [*]	--	4.594 [*]	.862
PCPB	4.880 [*]	.641	3.219	6.592 [*]	4.594 [*]	--	.753
Others	1.798	.049	1.113	2.425	.862	.753	--
4th Term	CR	RF	SW	EP	EC	PCPB	Others
CR	--	none	none	none	none	none	none
RF	none	--	15.572 ^{***}	6.894 [*]	.627	.943	6.969 [*]
SW	none	15.572 ^{***}	--	11.764 ^{**}	2.347	11.801 ^{**}	36.501 ^{***}
EP	none	6.894 [*]	11.764 ^{**}	--	1.579	2.377	.313
EC	none	.627	2.347	1.579	--	.821	5.377 [*]
PCPB	none	.943	11.801 ^{**}	2.377	.821	--	1.503
Others	none	6.969 [*]	36.501 ^{***}	.313	5.377 [*]	1.503	--
5th Term	CR	RF	SW	EP	EC	PCPB	Others
CR	--	.605	2.016	.033	.001	.136	.456
RF	.605	--	.005	3.024	7.802 ^{**}	.190	3.357
SW	2.016	.005	--	3.183	6.195 [*]	.084	2.723
EP	.033	3.024	3.183	--	.302	.699	1.091
EC	.001	7.802 ^{**}	6.195 [*]	.302	--	2.248	4.689 [*]
PCPB	.136	.190	.084	.699	2.248	--	.516
Others	.456	3.357	2.723	1.091	4.689 [*]	.516	--
6th Term	CR	RF	SW	EP	EC	PCPB	Others
CR	--	2.037	.756	66.515 ^{***}	.694	2.613	2.524
RF	2.037	--	.707	3.590	4.487 [*]	6.606	4.632 [*]
SW	.756	.707	--	20.682 ^{**}	1.560	2.158	1.864
EP	66.515 ^{***}	3.590	20.682 ^{**}	--	114.969 ^{***}	105.232 ^{***}	77.394 ^{***}
EC	.694	4.487 [*]	1.560	114.969 ^{***}	--	1.859	2.186
PCPB	2.613	6.606	2.158	105.232 ^{***}	1.859	--	.127
Others	2.524	4.632 [*]	1.864	77.394 ^{***}	2.186	.127	--

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

**Appendix B: T-test for Respondents' Perception of the KMT and the DPPs'
Position on Four Selected Issues**

	Year	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	t-value
Perception of the KMT's Position on I/R Issue	2000	868	6.37	1.91	-12.766 ^{***}
	2008	1597	7.44	2.11	
Perception of the DPP's Position on I/R Issue	2000	914	3.13	2.07	11.383 ^{***}
	2008	1608	2.16	2.02	
Perception of the KMT's Position on R/S Issue	2000	900	7.03	2.36	8.879 ^{***}
	2008	1481	6.07	2.81	
Perception of the DPP's Position on R/S Issue	2000	895	4.42	2.53	-2.593 ^{**}
	2008	1460	4.71	2.70	
Perception of the KMT's Position on S/T Issue	2000	867	4.84	2.58	-7.042 ^{***}
	2008	1447	5.63	2.69	
Perception of the DPP's Position on S/T Issue	2000	855	6.46	2.16	10.417 ^{***}
	2008	1456	5.42	2.52	
Perception of the KMT's Position on E/E Issue	2000	882	7.17	1.85	4.530 ^{***}
	2008	1466	6.80	2.10	
Perception of the DPP's Position on E/E Issue	2000	836	5.147	2.10	-2.894 ^{**}
	2008	1461	5.44	2.31	

Notes: [§] $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $P < .001$: level of significance for two-tailed test.

I/R: independence/Reunification; R/S: Reform/Stability; S/T: Social Welfare/Lower Taxes; E/E: Environmental Protection/Economic Development.

Source: Data 2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Appendix C. Public Opinion Survey List

Date	Survey Name	Project Director	Sample
July 1995	A Study of Voting Behavior and Political Democratization in Taiwan : the 1994 Election for Taiwan Provincial Governor and City Mayors	Dr. Yih-yan Chen (Dept. of Political Science, National Chengchi University)	1704
July 1996	An Interdisciplinary Study of Voting Behavior in the 1996 Presidential Election	Dr. John F.S. Hsieh (Dept. of Political Science, National Chengchi University)	1396
July 1999	Constituency Environment and Electoral Behavior : An inter-disciplinary Study on the Legislation Election of 1998	Dr. I-chou Liu (Dept. of Political Science, National Chengchi University)	1207
July 2001	An Interdisciplinary Studies of Voting Behavior in the Presidential Election in 2000	Dr. Yih-yan Chen (Dept. of Political Science, National Chengchi University)	1181
August 2002	"The 2001 Legislative Yuan Election Survey" (TEDS 2001)	Dr. Chi Huang (Dept. of Political Science, National Chung-Cheng University)	2022
August 2005	"TEDS 2004L: the Legislative Yuan Election Survey" (TEDS2004L)	Dr. I-chou Liu (Dept. of Political Science, National Chengchi University)	1258
January 2009	"TEDS 2008P: the Presidential Election Survey" (TEDS2008P)	Dr. Ching-hsin Yu (Election Study Center, National Chengchi University)	1905

Appendix D. Survey Questions

Party ID:

What political party do you prefer?

Age:

What year were you born in?

Education:

What is your education level?

Gender

Based on respondents' gender (male or female).

Region

Based on the area that the city or county which respondents live in is located.

Income

How much money do you and your family earn per month?

Ethnicity

Based on the ethnic group which respondent's father belongs to (Taiwanese Min-nan, Taiwanese Hakka, Mainlander, or Aborigine).

National identity

In Taiwan, some people think they are Taiwanese. There are also some people who think they are Chinese. Do you think you are a Taiwanese, Chinese, or both Taiwanese and Chinese?

Political Knowledge

Respondents are asked the following questions:

1. who is the current prime minister? 2. Who is the current U.S. president? 3. Who is the current chairman of the DPP? 4. How many years is a Legislator's term? 5. What government institution does judicial review in Taiwan? (in 1994 survey)

1. who is the current governor of Taiwan province? 2. Who is the current U.S. president? 3. Who is the current chairman of the DPP? 4. How many years is a Legislator's term? 5. What government institution does judicial review in Taiwan? (in 1996 survey)

1. who is the current vice president? 2. Who is the current U.S. president? 3. Who is the current chairman of the DPP? 4. How many years is a city mayor's (county magistrate's) term? (in 1998 survey)

1. who is the current vice president? 2. Who is the current U.S. president? 3. Who is the current President of the People's Republic of China? 4. How many years is a city mayor's (county magistrate's) term? 5. What government institution does judicial review in Taiwan? (in 2000 survey)

1. who is the current vice president? 2. Who is the current U.S. president? 3. Who is the current chairman of the DPP? 4. How many years is a city mayor's (county magistrate's) term? (in 1998 survey)

1. who is the current vice president? 2. Who is the current President of the People's Republic of China? 3. Who is the current U.S. president? 4. How many years is a Legislator's term? 5. What government institution does judicial review in Taiwan? (in 2001 survey)

1. who is the current vice president? 2. Who is the current President of the People's Republic of China? 3. Who is the current U.S. president? 4. How many years is a Legislator's term? 5. What government institution does judicial review in Taiwan? (in 2004 survey)

1. Who is the current U.S. president? 2. who is the current prime minister? 3. What government institution does judicial review in Taiwan? (in 2008survey)

Media Contact

How much time do you spend daily reading election-related news in the newspaper during the campaign?

Unification vs. Independence Issue

In our society people often talk about the question of Taiwan independence from unification with China. Some people say that Taiwan should declare independence right away. Other People say that Taiwan and China should unify right away. Yet other people have opinions between these two positions. On this card, the position that Taiwan should immediately declare independence is at 0 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the position that Taiwan should immediately unify with the mainland is at 10. About where on this scale does you own view lie? According to your understanding, where on this scale does the position of the KMT, the DPP, (the NP, the PFP, the TSU) lie?

Reform vs. Stability Issue

Concerning democracy and the rule of law, some people think that the most important thing is that everyone should have adequate freedom. This is still worthwhile even if seeking freedom means sacrificing some social stability. Other people believe that stability is the most important thing and that seeing freedom should not be allowed to harm social stability. On this card, the position that freedom is the most important thing is at 0 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the position that social stability is most important is at 10. About where on this

scale does your own view lie? According to your understanding, where on this scale does the position of the KMT, the DPP, (the NP, the PFP, the TSU) lie? (in 1996 survey)

Looking at Taiwan's overall development, some people believe that large scale reform is the most important thing, even if it means sacrificing some social stability. Other people believe that stability is the most important and that reform should not be allowed to affect social stability. On this card, the position that large- scale reform is the most important thing is at 0 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the position that social stability is most important is at 10. About where on this scale does your own view lie? According to your understanding, where on this scale does the position of the KMT, the DPP, (the NP, the PFP, the TSU) lie? (in 1994, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2008 survey)

Social Welfare Issue

Form A:

Regarding the question of socioeconomic issue, some people believe that we should promote social welfare, even though this may slow down the economic development. Other people believe that economic development is most important goal and the social welfare may slow down. Yet other people have opinions between these two positions. On this card, the position that promoting social welfare is at 0 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the position that emphasizing economic development is most important is at 10. About where on this scale does your own view lie? About where on this scale does your own view lie? According to your understanding, where on this scale does the position of the KMT, the DPP, (the NP, the PFP, the TSU) lie? (in 1994 and 1996 survey)

Form B:

Regarding the question of social welfare, some people believe that people should take care of themselves; the government should not get involved too much. Other people believe that the government should promote social welfare, even though it will lead to tax increases. On this card, the position that maintaining the current system is the most important thing is at 0 and a scale from 0 to 10, and the position that promoting social welfare is most important is at 10. About where on this scale does your own view lie? About where on this scale does your own view lie? According to your understanding, where on this scale does the position of the KMT, the DPP, (the NP, the PFP, the TSU) lie? (in 1998, and 2001 survey)

Form C

Regarding the question of social welfare, some people believe that the government should merely maintain the current system in order not to increase people's taxes. Other people believe that the government should promote social welfare, even though it will lead to tax

increases. On this card, the position that maintaining the current system is the most important thing is at 0 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the position that promoting social welfare is most important is at 10. About where on this scale does your own view lie? About where on this scale does your own view lie? According to your understanding, where on this scale does the position of the KMT, the DPP, (the NP, the PFP, the TSU) lie? (in 2000, 2004, and 2008 survey)

Environment vs. Economy Issue


Regarding the question of economic development versus environmental protection, some people in society emphasize environmental protection while others emphasize economic development. On this card, the position that emphasizes environmental protection is at 0 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the position that emphasizes economic development is at 10. About where on this card does your own view lie? According to your understanding, where on this scale does the position of the KMT, the DPP, (the NP, the PFP, the TSU) lie? (in 1998, 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2008 survey)

Appendix E. Frequency Distribution on All Variables

Variables	1994	1996	1998	2000	2001	2004	2008
Age							
Young	27.5(%)	25.9	23.1	20.6	24.4	23.2	21.3
Middle	44.4	45.9	46.5	47.9	44.5	44.2	43.2
Old	28.1	28.2	30.4	31.5	31.3	32.7	35.5
Gender							
Male	51.6	51.4	50.6	51.3	50.0	50.4	50
Female	48.4	48.6	49.4	48.7	50.0	49.6	50
Education							
Low	47.0	48.1	49.4	44.8	40.4	37.6	34.8
Middle	26.4	27.6	28.8	29.1	28.9	30.1	29.8
High	26.7	24.3	21.8	26.1	30.7	32.2	35.4
Income							
Low	22.2	21.0	39.3	42.5	41.2	30.2	43.0
Middle	61.4	60.8	47.0	43.2	31.2	44.5	41.5
High	16.4	18.2	13.7	14.2	27.6	25.2	15.8
Region							
North	42.8	41.6	43.0	38.3	40.4	41.9	44.5
South	29.8	35.4	33.2	39.7	30.2	32.2	31.9
Others	27.4	23.0	23.8	21.5	29.4	25.8	23.6
Ethnicity							
Mainlander	15.3	12.3	12.1	10.8	11.6	10.6	11.4
Taiwanese-Minnan	75.2	74.0	73.7	75.3	76.4	73.3	76.8
Taiwanese-Hakka	9.6	13.7	14.2	13.8	12.0	16.1	11.8
National Identity							
Chinese	23.2	17.5	13.7	11.3	8.8	4.8	5.0
Both	48.7	47.6	42.5	45.7	53.4	45.9	40.7
Taiwanese	28.0	34.9	43.9	43.0	37.8	49.3	54.3
Media Exposure							
Low	70.6	73.9	79.9	N/A	81.4	44.8	82.8
Middle	12.6	11.5	8.7	N/A	7.9	39.7	11.1
High	16.8	14.5	11.4	N/A	10.7	15.5	6.1
Poli. Knowledge							
Low	28.5	17.0	10.7	10.3	14.2	18.0	23.5
Middle	30.7	32.3	47.2	24.8	44.8	58.4	22.7
High	40.8	50.7	42.1	64.9	41.0	23.6	53.8


Source: Data 1994-2000 are from Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University, and data of 2001, 2004, 2008 are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)

Appendix F. Changes in the Party Identification of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992-2009.12)



Source: the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Appendix G. Changes in the Taiwan Independence vs. Reunification with China issue position of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1994.12 -2009.12)



Source: the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Vita

Hung-chung Wang was born on 26 August 1976, in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. In 2000, he obtained his B.A. degree from National Chung Cheng University (in Taiwan) with the major of Chinese Literature. In June 2003, he completed his M.A. program in the department of Political Science at National Chengchi University (in Taiwan). In August 2005, Hung-chung matriculated to the University of New Orleans, where he currently completed his Ph.D. degree.