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Advocacy Coalition Formation, Mobilization, Sustainment, and Fragmentation: A Case Study of the New Orleans Federal Alliance (NOFA) and the Federal City Project

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Advocacy Coalition Formation, Mobilization, Sustainment, and Fragmentation:
A Case Study of the New Orleans Federal Alliance (NOFA)
And the Federal City Project

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
University of New Orleans
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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In
Urban Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

U.S. military bases and installations represent trillions of dollars of capital investment towards the nation's defense infrastructure. The Department of Defense, in its response to the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, sought to reorganize and optimize this basing infrastructure to meet the emerging threats of the 21st century. A series of nationwide Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) efforts were chartered by Congress to facilitate this task, identifying hundreds of obsolete or unneeded military installations. During the last BRAC effort in 2005, the Naval Support Activity New Orleans was targeted for closure, with its U.S. Navy and Marine Corps tenants to be reassigned elsewhere. In response to this threat, a group of retired military and civilian elites formed a non-profit entity known as the New Orleans Federal Alliance (NOFA), chartered to lobby the BRAC Commission to salvage the West Bank portion of the NSA from closure and establish a new mixed use, public-private Federal City complex in its stead. The purpose of this study was to examine the life cycle of NOFA and its partners in the context of the Federal City project over a ten year period. Interviews of key personnel involved with this coalition revealed remarkable insight into the characteristics associated with its formation, mobilization, sustainment, and fragmentation. The data illustrated the delicate relationship between the military history of New Orleans and its unique culture, and how that culture influenced actor behavior through the varied governing subsystems in the region. As one would expect, local politics dominated the adverse dynamic of the coalition's solvency, heightened significantly in national visibility by the effects of Hurricane Katrina. The result was the dissolution of the NOFA-centered coalition and the failure of the Federal City project to achieve full maturity.

KEY WORDS

MILITARY

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

NEW ORLEANS

NEW ORLEANS FEDERAL ALLIANCE (NOFA)

ADVOCACY COALITIONS

URBAN POLITICS

KATRINA

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In the late 1980s, The Department of Defense (DOD) in response to the end of the Cold War, initiated a comprehensive analysis of its infrastructure in light of the impending changes to the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. To that end, a series of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) legislative initiatives were enacted challenging the Defense Department to overhaul and optimize its global basing architecture. These highly politicized BRAC efforts completely engulfed numerous branches of the federal government, most state governments, and every local municipality that had any association with a military installation, including the State of Louisiana and the City of New Orleans.

While Naval Support Activity (NSA) New Orleans, which was established in the early 1900s, had survived four previous BRAC actions (1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995), it was identified for deactivation in 2005, coinciding with the disastrous effects of Hurricane Katrina. The NSA, a 166-acre parcel located in the historic West Bank Algiers area of New Orleans and a smaller 25-acre portion straddling the Mississippi River in the Bywater area adjacent to downtown New Orleans, has supported various military functions over its century-old existence ranging from logistics staging points to major personnel and communications support centers. At the turn of the century, the NSA had been home to thousands of active duty Marines, Sailors, civilians, and contractors, providing hundreds of millions of dollars in economic impact annually to the New Orleans metropolitan region (Scott, 2002). In addition to the financial impact, the adjacent communities of the naval base (and New Orleans as a whole) developed significant cultural ties to the military as generations of New Orleanians integrated with the military through direct day-

to-day community contact - socially, educationally, and recreationally. Simply put, the military has become very much a part of New Orleans society.

In local response to the 2005 BRAC threat, a tremendous collaborative effort was initiated within the New Orleans metropolitan region with the creation of a non-profit 501 (c)(3) coalition named the New Orleans Federal Alliance (NOFA). NOFA included select high-profile, powerful New Orleans public and private political elites, in addition to several equally powerful retired high-ranking military personnel (as described in Chapter 4). NOFA's charter was solely aimed at recapitalizing the NSA land through the establishment of the New Orleans Federal City campus complex, envisioned to be a mixed-use development project that included construction of new facilities for DOD, other federal agency tenants, in addition to local private commercial ventures. In order to execute this vision, NOFA teamed with the Algiers Development District (ADD), forming the nucleus of what would become a powerful local advocacy coalition. This powerful coalition would be responsible for the successful modification to the BRAC law, preventing the complete closure to the NSA and authorizing the establishment of Federal City. Also, the coalition would be responsible for successfully acquiring the substantial State and Federal public capital to be used in the project's development.

While history is replete with examples of organized community resistance to military base closure actions, some successful but with most not, the Federal City story – and specifically that of NOFA – is uncommon and worthy of study due primarily to the unique nature of NOFA's membership, conduct, impact, and the timing commensurate with the devastation of Hurricane Katrina on the region. The confluence of three major elements occurring in New Orleans, (1) the BRAC decision to close the NSA, (2) the unique dynamic of Louisiana politics, and (3) the

effects of the most costly natural disaster in U.S. history, present an opportunity to expand the knowledge of advocacy coalition power, efficacy, and organization.

While numerous contemporary political science and organizational behavior theories may explain a piece of this dynamic, very little explanation can be easily inferred or extrapolated from this body of knowledge that describe an organization such as NOFA, created to serve as a de facto growth machine in attempting to recapitalize on a planned military base closure. But this success was in the aftermath of Katrina, the catalyst for a worldwide relief and reconstruction effort accompanying billions of dollars of aid flowing into the region. One can only wonder how effective NOFA, or the Federal City project, would have been had not Katrina created this unique combination of human sympathy and unprecedented federal resources. As Parent summarizes,

“The importance of the appeals to Washington was consistently underscored by the news media and the public, as the needs of Louisiana in the aftermath of the hurricane quickly mounted to billions of dollars. The urgency and immediacy of the situation at home caused several alliances...across party lines. The success in gaining aid from the national government became a necessary centerpiece to recovery and rebuilding” (Parent, 2006, p. 141-142).

Purpose

The goal of this research is to better understand the socio-political, economic, and cultural conditions and associated belief subsystems that enabled the formation and mobilization of the New Orleans Federal Alliance coalition in anticipation of the BRAC 2005 decision to close NSA New Orleans. Analyzing the coalition’s ideological framework and associated socio-political relationships with local, state, and federal entities will advance aspects of numerous contemporary theoretical frameworks to include Urban Regime Theory, Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), and urban Growth Machine constructs. Furthermore, the timing of Hurricane Katrina’s devastating impact to the region in August of

2005 appears to have influenced the Federal City decision, both politically and economically. This latter aspect may very well serve as an illustrative example of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) and Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA) theories, owing to the nature of the “policy window” created by the “punctuation” of the natural disaster. Additionally, the research will reveal why the apparent short-term success achieved by NOFA ultimately met with long-term challenges as the Federal City project stalled. A detailed analysis of NOFA’s dynamic will determine the primary and secondary causal factors that drove its evolution. Further, the research will reconcile these causal factors in the context of prevailing theories, the results of which advancing the latter both academically and practically.

Furthermore, it will be of value to understand how NOFA, as the base of a broader local coalition of local, powerful body of politically-savvy individuals, was able to successfully overturn a Department of the Navy decision to close the NSA. This uncommon organization and the complex chain of events that it set in motion leads to many questions, the most significant of which will be examined in this paper.

Research Questions

Creswell (2013) defines research questions as “open-ended, evolving, and non-directional” (p. 138). Further, they are intended to restate the purpose of the study, but in more specific terms – answering the questions such as how and what in order to explain the central phenomenon. Applying this definition to the research design yields the following research questions:

(1) What circumstances, conditions, or events led to the early success and subsequent failure of the Federal City project? What contributing factors led to the evolution of the coalition life cycle?

(a) What were the effects of Hurricane Katrina on the coalition and the project?

(b) What lessons can be learned from the NOFA/Federal City experience that can inform future military base closure efforts such as this?

(2) What contemporary theories (e.g., ACF, PET, NPF, GM, etc.) explain the dynamics of the coalition during the various phases of its life cycle and to what extent?

It is through the deliberate examination of this unique coalition, brought together to further a rather unprecedented land development initiative during a tumultuous time in a region devastated by natural disaster, that we can learn from the experience and further our knowledge into previously unexplored contexts such as the one illustrated in this study. The research consists of a comprehensive qualitative analysis of NOFA and its coalition partners throughout its existence over a decade, to include a detailed study of the key chronological events that enabled or facilitated its evolution. This analysis reveals numerous themes that, when synthesized, offer a plausible explanation to addressing the research questions.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Creswell (2014) offers significant guidance and recommendations for conducting literature reviews. In qualitative research, the literature helps substantiate the research problem, but fails to constrain the views of participants. Creswell suggests that a popular approach to mitigating this is to include more literature at the end of a qualitative study than at the beginning. Due to the complexity and design of my research, the literature review was extensive, with additional research conducted after the qualitative data (e.g., interviews) had been coded and analyzed. Additionally, a research map was used to ensure appropriate organization was maintained throughout the period.

The literature reviewed to date has focused on three core areas: (1) growth machine theory; (2) coalition policy theories; and (3) military base closure (BRAC) policy/actions. Each category of literature represents an essential element towards a collective understanding of the Federal City project, particularly in the context of the advocacy coalition brought together for its fulfillment. Each category will be discussed further below.

Growth Machines

In most modern capitalist societies, the commodification of land and associated improvements (e.g., buildings) enabled urban areas to serve as a principle arena for property entrepreneurs, public entities, and other civic institutions to maximize investment return through coordinated developmental ventures. Literature suggests that virtually all U.S. cities are dominated by a small, parochial elite comprised of public and private members having business and/or professional interests linked to the development and economic growth of their respective locales (Molotch, 1988). Molotch further states that these elites use their public authority and

private power as a means to stimulate local economic development to enhance/further their individual business interests. Furthermore, this dynamic essentially transitions cities into fluid instruments, or growth machines, to enhance the personal wealth of elites through the accomplishment of associated growth goals and development projects. The growth machine thesis contends that these local elite “place entrepreneurs” form a virtual political coalition that lead collective efforts to further economic activity aimed to increase the “exchange value” of local urban real estate (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Kirkpatrick and Smith (2011) describe this coalition as a forged alliance between formerly disparate groups with conflicting perspectives, but with a common goal of a pro-growth ideology that associates urban growth with community prosperity. The resiliency of the growth machine is directly tied to the resiliency of the supporting coalition that exists to exploit it. Building upon the growth machine hypothesis, Kirkpatrick and Smith (2011) also claim that a growth machine’s viability is dependent upon the ability of the growth coalition to secure an infrastructural framework that can support or sustain the desired economic and land-use growth. These scholars further contend that growth machines have become quite vulnerable or constrained in the context of looming structural fiscal deficits, chronic infrastructural decline, and extreme capital-market volatility.

Molotch (1988) further describes the nature of how growth elites manage various inherent constraints in the pursuit of their specific growth machine goals/objectives. Through the descriptive categorization of five separate constraints - geography, civic leadership, cosmopolitan capital, political entrepreneurial talent, and urban social movement - the author offers an analytical framework that reflects the dynamic integration of these constraints in the context of growth elite strategies. The resultant interplay between the constraints and strategies offers a valuable perspective related to the deterministic shaping of cities and associated

landscapes. Through his analytical framework, Molotch concludes that the capitalist productive system is hegemonic over locality, to include the growth elites that must react to the system's changing forces. Conversely however, Molotch also suggests that within the local arena it is the growth elites that are hegemonic. Through both a structural and ideological lens, the importance of locality enables growth elites to prepare the ground for capital, thereby joining local growth agendas with global systems of production (Molotch, 1979).

Kimelberg's (2011) work focuses on the belief systems and perspectives of specific individual actors *within* the growth machine, namely real estate professionals. The author's findings suggest that this particular category of development entrepreneurs view the application of power at the local level to be much "less coordinated, consensus-driven, and growth-oriented than the growth machine thesis suggests" (Kimelberg, 2011). Supporting this conclusion, she cites other evidence of the existence of significant tensions within the growth machine construct (Molotch and Logan, 1984; Molotch, 1988; Jonas and Wilson, 1999), suggesting that external observations differ quite dramatically from those captured internally. The author concludes that the real estate professionals' power base and capacity is constrained by four factors: election/re-election interests of politicians; professional interests of public sector economic development staff; governing bureaucratic policies/procedures and zoning regulations; and lastly, mobilized community groups/factions (Kimelberg, 2011). The author challenges similar qualitative research to examine the subjective perceptions of other key actors within the growth machine in order to better understand urban power distribution, at least in the context of city and community development. She also predicts that the growing body of research will lend itself to revealing the limited utility of using the growth machine as a framework for understanding processes of local economic development (Kimelberg, 2011).

Relatedly, Hill and Durand (1987) analyze growth machine propositions through an analysis of attitudes towards growth of three different elite groups: *land-based elites* (those whose business interests are directly tied to land and the value of land, such as real estate, banking, and mortgage companies); *local government elites* (elected municipal officials and selected appointed officials); and *absentee firm private sector leaders* (officials of corporations headquartered outside the area). Interestingly, the analysis revealed that while all three groups register a considerable approval for growth, each perceives a different locus of control with respect to community growth. Both the land-based elites and the local government elites each associate control by the other. The authors reaffirm the contemporary scholarly wisdom that states that there are significant constraints placed upon local government capability or capacity to control growth within their jurisdictions.

On a larger, enterprise scale, Warner (2005) states that the urban growth machine construct is relevant in the context of analyzing sustainable development projects throughout the globe. The author discusses the core characteristics of the U.S. urban growth machine and offers two analytical frameworks to be used to better understand the conditions for urban place-building and the capacities for sustainable urban place-building. Warner establishes a set of dimensions for the former framework that include: valuing of place; center of authority; key institutional realm; and dynamic tendencies. Additionally, he describes several factors for the latter framework that include: capacity of place-based communities; capacity of intermediary organizations; and state/society synergy for sustainability. Using these frameworks, Warner analyzes numerous Chilean cities in the context of examining the general features of the urban political economy and draws conclusions that illustrate the value of looking at the capacities for

sustainable place-building within the contextual framework of the conditions for urban place-building (Warner, 2005).

Additionally, the literature is replete with contemporary examples of political coalitions forming and serving as either proponents – or opponents - of urban growth machine efforts. For instance, Gendron and Domhoff describe the evolution of urban power in the California city of Santa Cruz over a period of several decades. The authors present data that shows how the dominance of the Santa Cruz local growth coalition sustained decades of resistance until the liberal progressive coalition gained community power and began to challenge the hegemony of the former regime. Furthermore, through a study of the inner dynamics of the progressive coalition, the authors explain how powerful a coalition can become if a shared ideological framework can be created and mobilized through an activist participatory venue. The authors conclude that the progressive coalition not only changed the entire political power landscape of the city from that of the former pro-growth regime, but have been able to successfully hold on to the power base through repeated attacks.

Stephen McGovern (2003, 2009), in two separate papers, offers two perspectives of urban power applied to development projects in Indianapolis and Philadelphia. In his analysis of Indianapolis, the author analyzes the impact of Indianapolis mayor Stephen Goldsmith's ideology in shaping the political consciousness of prominent actors associated with community development and the revitalization of numerous distressed neighborhoods. McGovern shows how Goldsmith advocated a populist ideology based on limited government and citizen empowerment. He reveals, however, an extensive deployment of public power and resources along with efforts to empower neighborhood organizations. This emergent populist culture stimulated a nascent progressive consciousness in the minds of a growing number of community

leaders and city officials. McGovern shows that an activist government, along with an empowered citizenry, is a viable approach to community redevelopment. However, he also warns that empowering people without supplying sufficient public resources and authority leads to (at best) modest expectations and outcomes. McGovern's second work, an analysis of a redevelopment effort of Philadelphia's historic waterfront area, reveals critical characteristics of regime formation, dissolution, and reconstruction. In the multi-year debates and controversy associated with the decision on how to redevelop the Phillie waterfront area, McGovern provides a valuable lens through which an examination of the dynamics of regime change can occur. The author concludes that regime theory "largely overlooks or explicitly downplays the role of ideas, values, beliefs, and political culture in explaining the creation and durability of governing coalitions", advancing the theory with that regard.

Harvey Molotch's "city as a growth machine" thesis remains one of the most influential approaches to the analysis of urban politics and local economic development in the United States. However, as the nature and context of urban politics have evolved over the past several decades since the theories' inception, many scholars have continued to advance the theory by applying it to various settings and related dynamics, both inside and outside the U.S., thereby revealing both its' further value in addition to its' limitations. As Molotch states, "The growth machine idea makes a substantive argument about the empirical substance of U.S. urban regimes. It asserts that virtually every city (and state) government is a growth machine and long has been. It asserts that this puts localities in chronic competition with one another in ways that harm the vast majority of their citizens as well as their environments. It anticipates an ideological structure that naturalizes growth goals as a background assumption of civic life. In a social science realm where successful empirical generalizations have been few, the growth machine idea robustly and

usefully describes reality." (Jonas and Wilson, 1999, p. 249). However, within the body of literature reviewed, very little material was evidenced that described advocacy coalition formation or mobilization in relation to growth machine pursuits. Growth machines are more commonly associated with contemporary public-private partnership discussions, the relationship of which is a proposed topic for further research recommended at the conclusion of this paper.

Within the dynamics described above detailing this case, multiple contemporary theories appear to be of influence, including Stone's *Urban Regime Theory*, Molotch's *Urban Growth Machine*, Sabatier's *Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)*, McBeth's *Narrative Policy Framework (NPF)*, and *Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET)*, developed by paleontologists Eldridge and Gould.

Policy Theories

In reviewing the literature in search of applicable established theories affecting the NOFA coalition dynamic, the most prominent one exhibited appears to be the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), supported in part through Narrative Policy Frameworks (NPF). Other applicable related theories explored in the review include the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), Multiple Stream Analysis (MSA) Theory, and, from a broader perspective, Urban Regime Theory.

Developed over the past two decades, a comprehensive theoretical construct established to better understand and analyze complex policy dynamics is the Advocacy Coalition Framework and associated Advocacy Coalition Theory. As described by prominent ACF advocates, Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, and Weible (Sabatier, 2014), the ACF focuses on identifying the shared ideologies of the belief subsystems and relationships of the actors involved within a particular coalition. The literature suggests that the ACF focuses on myriad of topics from the

organizational structure and stability (or instability) of coalitions, their core actors, supporting belief systems, and overall dynamics of their formation, sustainment, and decay over the lifecycle of their existence. Within the framework of the ACF, a core focus of analysis is on policy evolution in the context of the belief systems. The ACF offers four distinct conceptual pathways to policy change: (1) external source; (2) internal events; (3) policy-oriented learning; and (4) negotiated agreement between previously warring parties. Of the four, the first pathway, external source, is very similar to a major “punctuation” in Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) in that it serves as a forcing function for a significant policy shift. The latter key factor is very much akin to the policy entrepreneurs designated with the Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA), exploiting the event-produced MSA “policy window”. These external events are also a central element and requirement of both the PET and MSA concepts and theories. These external events, such as natural or man-made disasters, increase the likelihood of major policy change but require several enabling factors such as the mobilization of advocacy coalitions, utilizing compelling narratives to garner overwhelming political support to attract attention.

One can begin to see the parallels between the ACF tenets and the formation of NOFA in response to multiple BRAC attacks culminating with the 2005 BRAC decision to close the NSA (a secondary external event). An important consideration within this synthesis of complementary theories is the direct impact Hurricane Katrina had on the coalition’s ability to garner significant public support, and, more importantly, its use in appealing to a whole new set of powerful actors (with resources) owing to the national attention received by the disaster. Figure 1 illustrates these key points and relationships as applied to the Federal City project. Furthermore, several other notable scholars are cited with work advancing the ACF to include Hank Jenkins-Smith, Daniel Nohrstedt, Christopher Weible, and Kuhika Gupta, to name but a

few. This review has examined the literature published and debated today concerning the ACF and its unending applications to today's contemporary policy issues. While numerous analyses have been conducted by scholars and academics worldwide ranging in topics from health care policies to environmental policies, very little evidence was found during this literature review applying the ACF to land use, urban (re)development, or community-oriented economic policies.

The Narrative Policy Framework, or NPF, also has a complementary supporting role to the ACF, especially in the context of associated narratives accompanying the rhetoric of the primary actors and their represented groups. Within the overarching framework of the individual advocacy coalitions, focused narratives are developed to describe the issue or problem seeking address. Although considered somewhat pejorative, the term “propaganda” comes to mind to describe these compelling narratives, although I prefer to use the phrase “strategic communication” (a core element within Department of Defense military and political strategies). To further inform the relationship, Sabatier reveals “Advocacy coalitions engage in narrative strategies in an attempt to successfully influence the public's and decision-makers' policy preferences” (Sabatier, 2014).

Within the NPF, four policy narrative core elements are used to organize and define the particular context of the issue – the policy setting or “stage”, the characters or actors (e.g., heroes, villains, and/or victims), the plot of the story, and lastly, the “moral of the story”. Additional description of the NPF include its core assumptions: social construction (i.e., the “meaning” assigned by humans to the policy); bounded relativity (i.e., the boundaries of the particular belief system); a simultaneous operation at three levels (individual/micro, group/meso, and institutional/macro); and the *homo narrans* model of the individual (i.e., how individuals absorb and process information) (Sabatier, 2014).

Additionally, NPF also has a place in a supporting role within the ACF in its ability to perform additional qualitative analysis of associated narratives accompanying the rhetoric of the primary actors and their represented groups. Sabatier, along with NPF colleagues Mark McBeth, Michael Jones, and Elizabeth Shanahan (Sabatier, 2014), define numerous policy narrative strategies which include scope of conflict, causal mechanisms, and devil/angel shift. However, while the ACF and NPF complement one another, there is also occasion whereby they limit one another. The NPF utilizes socially constructed realities rooted in belief systems to generate narratives. Consequently, these narrative realities, however, are limited to qualitative inquiry and associated data (mostly at the meso-level) which is not always synchronized with the collaborative “themes” of coalitions within a particular framework. In other words, the power of the ACF is its ability to create a powerful lobby through shared belief systems, often the result of compromise amongst members. Associated subordinate policy narratives may not play neatly into this larger framework, thereby limiting the strategic effects.

The literature also reveals numerous on-going studies relating to the ACF. For example, Peter John purports to further the ACF by reaffirming and expanding its core causal processes by synthesizing Evolutionary Theory into its tenets, thereby uncovering processes not normally observed by political scientists (John, 2003). Additionally, Kegler, Rigler, and Honeycut (2010) discuss the related Community Coalition Action Theory, describing factors and characteristics associated with coalition formation through the lenses of: history of collaboration; community politics and history; community norms and values; community demographics and economics; and lastly, physical geography. They conclude that a history of collaboration and geography greatly influenced coalition formation, while demography and economic factors influenced coalition membership. Furthermore, the influence of community politics history, and beliefs also

contributed to coalition membership (Kegler, 2010). Additionally, Jonathan Pierce examined the stability of advocacy coalitions over time and concluded that belief systems were an essential element of a coalition's stability. Further, he states that new components of policy core beliefs emerge over time, evolving the coalition in response (Pierce, 2011).

The Multiple Streams Approach, or MSA, is a popular framework that attempts to understand the dynamics of how government policies are created under ambiguous conditions. Through the identification and analysis of three core streams related to a particular paradigm – problem streams, policy streams, and politics streams – the creation of policy windows occur, enabling the opportunity for policy change on a system level through the manipulation of policy entrepreneurs. The aforementioned five structural elements constitute the interaction of the Multiple Streams Framework.

The problem stream constitutes various contemporary issues and/or conditions that policymakers and lobbyists want addressed. Examples span across the full spectrum of the political landscape, from environmental disaster recovery to inflation to budget crises. Focusing events such highly publicized events by the media (e.g., terrorist attacks, trade union strikes, etc.) serve to draw public attention to these problems. The policy stream includes the conglomeration of shared ideas, concepts, ideologies, or concerns throughout various organizational networks of proponents involved with the particular problem. This commonality bridges the disparate communities (e.g., academics, bureaucrats, politicians, technical specialists, etc.) and varies in depth and resolve depending upon the particular problem faced, both technically and temporally. The politics stream consists of three supporting elements - the national mood, individual lobbies, and individual government position transition/turnover. According to Nikolaos Zahariadis in his

essay on MSA, “of the three elements in the political stream, the combination of the national mood and turnover in government exerts the most powerful effect on agenda” (Sabatier, 34). Furthermore, and as mentioned earlier, as these first three elements converge during focusing events, policy windows are created within the particular political stream. As an example, tragic events such as an offshore oil spill or an oil rig explosion will immediately bring national attention to the petroleum exploration and development debate. Lastly, the policy entrepreneurs are poised to exploit the situation once a window is created, furthering their individual or group’s goals or objectives.

The strengths of MSA include its universal applicability and its synergistic effect of coordinating the efforts of varied organizations with common or shared beliefs towards changing system policy. The weaknesses include its reliance on (unpredictable) external focusing events in order to move forward with any specific agenda; an unraveling of the sub-element networks due to changes in the actors involved (e.g., contributing organizations, policy entrepreneurs); and unresolvable system-level problems (e.g., the gun control versus gun rights debate). Zahariadis concludes “MSA subscribes to the notion that institutions make things possible, but people make things happen” and “...institutions matter, but their importance is tempered by individuals, timing, and context” (Sabatier, 46).

Lastly, Stone (2002) introduces the term *polis*, or the embodiment of the core elements of politics writ large. In her description of her concept of policy analysis, she relates the policy elements of Goals (equity, efficiency, security, and liberty), Problems (symbols, numbers, causes, interests, and decisions), and Solutions (inducements, rules, facts, rights, and powers) to the polis, further defining the complex relationships and overall political dynamic. The polis will be of interest to this research study, owing to the nature of the politics and policies involved with

the Federal City campaign.




Figure 1. Policy theory interaction graph

This research study will determine which theoretical frameworks had the greatest impact towards the Federal City advocacy coalition; how and to what extent these theories were synthesized together; how this synthesis successfully achieved a modification to the BRAC Commission's decision to maintain the Marines (MARFORRES) aboard the former NSA; and, lastly, the impact (if any) derived from Katrina on the decision to approve the Federal City project. The resultant conclusions will advance the literature through a better intellectual understanding of the relationships between contributing theories in the context of growth machine constructs.

Base Closure Policy

Since the Federal City project was the consequence or solution to a BRAC decision, an exploration of existing literature related to the subject is essential to understanding this case. The literature review included an examination of the published works related to federal military base closure policies and associated processes. Of note, dozens of Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps official documents and guidelines were published in response to BRAC efforts that describe the extremely complex DOD global basing architecture. Furthermore, dozens of formal reports to Congress published by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) were identified and reviewed for relevance. Of note, several were highly critical of the BRAC selection process and questioned the accuracy of data reported by the services in response to BRAC closure candidacy.

Further, the GAO and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) have published dozens of reports related to BRAC. These comprehensive reports range in topics from Defense infrastructure land use by service; socioeconomic impacts; employment impacts and changes at the state and community level; base closure economic recovery, property transfer, and environmental cleanup, and periodic status updates regarding implementation of previous 1998, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005 BRAC legislation. As an example of one GAO study, the authors examined has used its land use authority in relation to BRAC; the reasons why DOD land, facilities, and land appear underutilized beyond BRAC efforts; and the current service policies and procedures in place that define responses to other federal entities requests to relocate to DOD installations beyond BRAC decisions. Many of the conclusions offered by these reports indicate a common theme of overly complicated policies and legislation that impede or restrict

inter-Departmental (Dept. of Agriculture, Dept. of Homeland Defense, etc.) land use.

Furthermore, common conclusions of BRAC analyses reveal dramatic under-forecasting of the costs of executing individual BRAC actions, and a preponderance of cost overruns related to these actions.

Beyond the GAO and CRS studies, some literature exists authored by scholars and academics that analyze base closure prior to BRAC. For instance, Catherine Hill measured the success of the redevelopment effort of the Truman Annex Naval Station in Key West, FL. After a comprehensive case study of the base closure, she offers several policy recommendations for communities impacted by closures, focusing on developing specific planning expertise within local government and creating more effective venues for public participation (Hill, 2000). Similarly, other authors offer different perspectives relating to base closures and their impact on affected communities. Ted Bradshaw suggests that purported “catastrophic” stories of communities devastated by the loss of an adjacent military installation are mostly gross exaggerations. Through a case study of the closure of Castle Air Force Base in Arwater, CA, 125 miles southeast of San Francisco, Bradshaw offers numerous mitigation strategies and actions that lessen the impact of the base closure on the local communities. Most involve the shifting of services off-base to the private sector (e.g., military retirees in the area shop at community grocery stores vice the base Commissary). Similarly, other scholars have conducted detailed studies measuring the economic effects of military base closures through analysis of nation-wide employment statistics against military base closures. Conclusions generally reveal that employment costs are primarily associated with the direct job loss attributed to military transfers out of the affected region, with little per capita income tied to base closures (Hooker and Knetter, 2001). Each of these works provides informative details related to their individual

case studies, and taken together, illustrate a common theme - each base closure scenario is different. While similarities may exist in some situations, it is difficult to draw any correlations of any type of significance without additional detailed research.

Several other scholarly works have been published over the past two decades detailing the characteristics and conduct of the BRAC process. Specifically, Sorenson (1999) describes a detailed account of the early BRAC rounds of from a policy formulation and political perspective. He offers significant insight into the details surrounding the history and conduct of the base closure dynamic through illustration of hundreds of examples of both successful and unsuccessful political BRAC defenses against attack. The author suggests three theoretical approaches to public decision making in the context of the BRAC dynamic: constituency service, bureaucratic politics, and learning over time. These three approaches serve as models to guide his study and analysis of the 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC rounds. Sorenson also suggests that the Constituency Service Model predicts that elected representatives act or make decisions to protect their individual district's interests because their constituents vote on how well their elected officials have provided benefits for them. These efforts, in the context of BRAC, take the form of active political maneuvering to delay or prevent closure, to seek possible base re-missioning, appealing for reconsideration, or challenging data used by either the military services or the BRAC Commission. He further suggests that these efforts may be limited to purely symbolic "gestures" portrayed in the face of a hopeless battle to save a targeted base for closure (Sorenson, 1999). The author also concludes from his study that members of Congress often fought quite hard to protect military bases and activities in their district, but that political "penalties" from their constituents were minimal at best for failures to prevent closures.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model refers to how organizations draw upon their own parochial goals to influence their positions on broad national issues. Sorenson suggests that, for the military, bureaucratic behavior is reflected most aptly when the services organize and plan to sustain or defend their portion of the finite defense resources. In the case of BRAC, Sorenson concluded that while there was clear evidence of bureaucratic politics behavior displayed by the services, there was also evidence to the contrary in that the services viewed base closure in the nation's best interests and did little to oppose it (albeit a significant attempt to shape it).

The Learning Over Time model, as applied to BRAC, suggests that with each successive BRAC round, lessons learned were applied to improve both the decision-making process in order to de-politicize the effort. However, Sorenson suggests that learning over time is about personal and organizational survival and growth, with the latter self-interest driving all forms of behavior.

The BRAC process was intended to alleviate the problem of the bloated infrastructure remaining from a Cold War defense posture. However, the constraints imposed upon the services by Congress through the natural constituency service model hampered the ability to appropriately shape the BRAC downsizing effort. Similarly, bureaucratic politics was in pure conflict with the constituency service in that each is shaped by different philosophies of behavior. The lessons learned by all principle actors were marked by improved tactics, strategies, and gamesmanship in the pursuit of optimal parochial goals: protection of base infrastructure by state for politicians and elimination of excess capacity and redundancy (and associated costs) for the services. Compromise and tradeoffs were the ultimate result.

Beyond Sorenson's detailed explanation of the BRAC process from a policy perspective, the literature discloses dozens of varied case studies of specific BRAC actions from other perspectives such as political governance and economic. As an example, Weber and Goddeeris

(2007) use the Fort Ord Army Base, Monterey Bay Peninsula, CA, as an illustrative example of how local adjacent cities and townships impacted by the base closure organized to form the state-sanctioned Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) to create a base re-development plan. Through creative financing involving both public sources of revenue (TIF) and private investment, numerous improvements were made to portions of the former base that includes mixed use residential development, hotels, commercial use, and recreational space. However, the authors also describe the base redevelopment challenges due to the complications arising from disposition of public land and associated transfer of property rights, especially when plagued with environmental clean-up challenges.

Summary

Reflecting upon the literature reviewed in the unique combination of separate fields of study presented, gaps reveal themselves. While scholarly work has been conducted in the varied contemporary theories discussed, little has been discovered as it relates to the realm of land redevelopment, specifically in the context of BRAC. Conversely, much literature has been published in relation to post-BRAC redevelopment projects, mostly in the form of articles and journal publications describing individual “success” stories. However, the latter topic has yet to reveal much information related to the dynamics of advocacy coalitions formed to prosecute the former. In other words, the gap revealed through this literature review is most evidenced by the lack of knowledge related to the efficacy of coalitions formed to prosecute post-BRAC land redevelopment projects, particularly in a proposed venue such as that illustrated through the New Orleans Federal City project.

Naval Support Activity New Orleans has been an integral part of the Algiers community and the New Orleans metropolitan region for close to a century, not only economically, but

culturally as well. Prior to its closure, the collaborative efforts of a great many rival political groups championed by the nonprofit, NOFA, secured the long-term solvency of the area by convincing the Secretary of the Navy to allow the Marines to stay aboard the new Federal City complex. This collaborative effort formed the framework from which the advocacy coalition in essence was born. Subsequent expansion into a PPP revealed the continued utility of the coalition, but also the trials of sustaining the coalition, whose separate belief systems began to conflict once the major victory was achieved. As mentioned earlier, this research is intended to better understand the 10-year life cycle of the advocacy coalition as it relates to the success (and failure) of the Federal City project. Gained insight into the dynamic will serve to lessen the gaps presented.

Prior to discussing the details surrounding the research design and associated data collection/analysis methodology (Chapter 4), a detailed account related to scene-setting is required to firmly establish the context of the New Orleans Federal City project. The following chapter will be devoted towards that aim.

CHAPTER 3

SETTING

Opening Vignette

Through the early morning nautical twilight, the young female Marine Staff Sergeant drives her eight-year-old Honda sedan along the erratic patchwork of potholed New Orleans West Bank roads to get to work. Having to live aboard the Naval Air Station/Joint Reserve Base at Belle Chasse was a mixed blessing for her and her young family. Despite the surprising pleasure she has experienced with the New Orleans culture and the warmth of the local population she has interacted with, she remains guarded about her situation. Fortunately for her, and for the hundreds of fellow enlisted Marines stationed in New Orleans, Belle Chasse had sufficient base housing capacity to accommodate her and her two school-aged children, ages 9 and 14. Another benefit to living aboard Belle Chasse was the relatively new Belle Chasse Academy elementary school that her youngest child currently attends. Alternatives to living on base for young servicemen and women have been less than ideal, owing to the well-documented Louisiana substandard public schools and associated issues relating to poor quality of life (e.g., crime, high car insurance rates, etc.). The base offers some relief, but is quite isolated deep inside Plaquemines Parish. The Staff Sergeant's 15-mile commute normally takes her between 25-30 minutes, depending on the time of day and her luck in hitting the 12 traffic lights between home and work. Nonetheless, she is grateful that her family lives in a safe environment, and she is equally grateful with the safety of her work environment aboard the Marine Corps Support Facility, guarded by dozens of heavily armed Marine Corps Police. In between these two points, however, causes her slight concern. As she nears the former Naval Support Activity while following General Meyers Drive, she observes the degraded neighborhoods, littered with the occasional shuttered house or business – remnants of Katrina's effect in addition to decades of owner apathy and neglect.

Approaching a stale green stop light a quarter-mile ahead, she quickly realizes that she'll be



Figure 2. Federal City entrance sign along General Meyers Blvd

forced to stop at the impending red. Over the past year, her vigilance has become second nature, and she unwittingly scans the immediate area for threats. Seeing none, her thoughts again wander to the sadness associated with the forsaken area that is surrounding her. However, viewing the seeming health of the Community College and adjacent Middle School up ahead restores her sense of optimism in the local neighborhood's struggle for restoration. Moments later she finds herself again on the move, past the collection of academic facilities, and approaching the entrance to Federal City – marked with a rather large custom brass and metal sign. A small cynical smile emerges on her

face, owing to the nature of the false expectations that the sign in actuality represents. “What a joke” she mumbles to herself, and she turns right onto the former 100-year old Navy Base, fully aware of the sights she will soon bear witness to.

As she passes the empty shell of a guard shack, immediately she can visualize the pattern of a former military base, albeit fenceless now. Resident throughout the vast green space defining the area, she observes the abandoned family housing office ahead, the abandoned 7-Day Store on the left on Constellation Drive, and further ahead, the multitude of abandoned enlisted barracks and adjacent Liberty Club. Rounding the corner onto Hebert Drive, she views the beautiful sequence of white, single-family housing, once reserved for senior military officers during the Base’s heyday, and now occupied by various federal and uniformed employees. The housing, managed in part by the Algiers Development District (ADD) and in part by Patrician Management, is aesthetically pleasing from the outside but is in a continuing state of degradation due to poor maintenance. Nonetheless, it stands in stark visual contrast to the multitude of abandoned buildings surrounding the mini-neighborhood. She wonders what it would be like to live there – in beautiful, 3000 square foot Victorian-style homes within a 5-minute walk to work. But then she is again reminded of the “ghetto” only a half dozen blocks away and is comforted by the security she is afforded back at Belle Chasse.

On the left she gauges the status of the construction of the new Ochsner outdoor pool project, initiated over a year ago. She wonders to herself how the former YMCA manages to stay in business, owing to the nature of the demographics surrounding the area. She dismisses the thought quickly, assuming that someone smarter than her made the decision to recently invest in this dying semblance of a development project. A co-worker that had been with MARFORRES for years had once mentioned to her that the original NSA base gymnasium was managed by the YMCA on behalf of ADD in anticipation of the Federal City prophesy generating thousands of potential patrons. Another expectation undelivered she was told.

Onward past the pool, she glances upwards at the ever-present symbol of the former Navy base – the 120-foot, 500,000 gallon faded red, white, and blue water tower, stenciled with large N-A-V-Y letters on its face. She understands that it hasn’t been operational in years, and wonders again why it hasn’t been torn down yet. As a proud Marine, she feels somewhat annoyed that the tower has been allowed to stand – a stark reminder to the once robust presence of the U. S. Navy in New Orleans. The same Navy, as she understands it, completely abandoned New Orleans after Katrina...while her beloved Marine Corps fought alongside New Orleans to



Figure 3. Photograph of the Navy water tower behind shuttered buildings aboard the former Naval Support Activity

rebuild the community and the city. Briefly, her chest swells with pride at the sentiment. Again, the Staff Sergeant contemplates for a moment the waste associated with the empty, unused, dilapidated structures and grounds that once defined the former bustling Naval Support Activity. Having been aboard the Command for over a year now, she understands the story about the BRAC closure of the NSA, but doesn't understand why the former base has been allowed to remain in such a state of eternal degradation since it was supposed to transition to this utopian campus-style Federal City model. She thinks to herself "surely somebody messed this one up." She feels sad as well for the local community that was led to believe that the Federal City project was supposed to bring thousands of jobs to the area and resurrect the neighborhood to a state of prosperity. "Not quite" she admits.

Continuing on her brief journey, she passes the new 1200-space, 4-story modern parking garage. What unnerves her most about this daily sight is the plethora of empty retail office and work spaces on the first floor (over 23,000 square feet), originally designed for a multitude of restaurants and shops to support the thousands of patrons working and living within Federal City. Only the corner Subway sandwich shop, a hair salon, and the Navy Federal Credit Union stand guard as the sole retail tribute to the false prophesy. A short hundred feet beyond the garage emerges the beautifully designed three-year old New Orleans Military and Maritime Academy charter school. The classic brick restored historical building serves as the secondary school to the Belle Chasse Academy feeder, offering a robust high school curriculum to its current 640+ students. The Staff Sergeant's 14-yr old son, a new freshman, has been thrilled with the school – impressed with the state-of-the-art science laboratories, maritime-related classes, and physical fitness programs. However, she, as a mother, is most comforted by the competence of the academic staff, as well as the professionalism and dedication of the integrated military leadership (all former Marine officers and SNCOs). She wishes her son well as she drops him off for the day, and cuts behind the school onto Heerman Drive, the eastern perimeter



Figure 4. The New Marine Forces Reserve Headquarters

of the Marine Corps Support Facility. Along this road she views the abandoned (and overgrown) 6-story H-100 building which housed the former Navy PX, Medical Clinic, and BEQ...yet another scene of wanton waste. She has heard stories that the building still contains the Navy furniture, to include linens and even television sets. Rounding the corner onto Opelousas and immediately into the front gate, she is met by two Military Policemen, one civilian and one Marine, who

smartly check her ID and vehicle credentials before allowing her entrance. With all in order, she clears the guard post and maneuvers carefully past the vehicular barricades. At that point the massive MARFORRES Headquarters building comes into full view, with all of its 150 million dollar magnificence in full glory. The HQ is a complete state-of-the-art, modern 411,000 square foot 4-story facility, complemented with vast continuous landscaped beds of shrubs and trees. The front of the building, she observes, reveals a manicured parade ground surrounded by a rubber running track. Dozens of her fellow Marines are already heavily engaged with their morning physical training activities. She realizes she is late and hastens her movement to the small parking area to the rear of the building. Looking past the fenceline as she parks her car, she notices the poor condition of the adjacent local housing. “Fort Apache,” she has heard time and time again in reference to the Marine Corps Support Facility – a beacon of hope in a wilderness of despair. Despite the splendor of the Headquarters building, along with all of its creature comforts and security within the fenceline, she wonders why the Marines fought so hard for the new HQ at Federal City. She imagines, however, that the view would be much different had the Federal City vision materialized as advertised. Unfortunately, for her and the rest of the military employees stationed in New Orleans, this is as good as it’s going to get. She doubts that any improvements will ever be made and that she simply has to bide her time until her tour of duty is up and she can get orders out of the area. Camp Lejeune, Cherry Point, heck, even Okinawa would be better for her family than the West Bank of New Orleans. “Military service is about sacrifice” she reminds herself as she swipes her ID to enter the building.

This brief vignette illustrates a very common sentiment felt by the majority of the military personnel stationed in New Orleans (Aquino, 2016), especially for the hundreds of enlisted personnel living in the local area dependent upon both public and military infrastructure for support. The story also is intended to frame the context of this Chapter so that the themes and findings presented from the research make sense to the reader. Of note, the quality of life issues experienced by the military here have been well documented over recent decades and remain very much in effect still today, despite numerous improvement efforts and initiatives by both civic and military leadership to abate them. What complicates the matter is that the Federal City project was supposed to alleviate the numerous quality of life stresses imposed on the local military community. And, as is evidenced through the Staff Sergeant’s personal expressions within the story, the prophesy has failed to achieve the advertised results in the context of the

commercial/retail development phase of the project. However, before an examination into what the research revealed can occur, more context must be provided relating to the Federal City project and, more importantly, to the advocacy coalition that formed to prosecute it.

The coalition, as loosely described in the Introduction section of this paper, was an exceptionally complex organization made up of numerous public, private, and non-profit groups in addition to a plethora of independent actors. This coalition displayed different characteristics and behavior throughout its life cycle, the latter of which we've broken down into four distinctive phases: formation, mobilization, sustainment, and fragmentation. This phased approach to understanding the life cycle of this advocacy coalition is modeled from the widely accepted systems approach to understanding phenomena in various fields within both the physical and social sciences. It is arguable that it is equally applicable to understanding the dynamic of our advocacy coalition. To that end, a description of the broad chronology of events from beginning to end must be made within the framework of the four phases just described (see Appendix A for a consolidate chronology). But even before that, a better description must be made of the Federal City vision in its initial scope, along with a more detailed description of the actors and stakeholders that participated. This preparatory explanation will be administrative in nature and will not offer any type of analysis, conclusion, nor judgment, and will simply lay out the facts and events as they occurred. Specific themes and findings will be fully explored in the second half of this chapter.

Military History of New Orleans

The history between the U.S. Marine Corps and the city of New Orleans has been woven together from the earliest stages of this nation's development. As it still remains today, the Mississippi River's importance as an artery of commerce and transportation has placed the

Crescent City in both the crosshairs of war from the Revolution through the Civil War and as a strategic economic gateway to the American continent. Owing to this fact, Marines and Sailors have played vital roles in the battles to control and protect the mighty river over the centuries. Subsequent to those early conflicts, the strong maritime traditions and industrial infrastructure of New Orleans continued to mark the city's importance to the naval services well into the 20th century and beyond.

Revolutionary era

In 1778, a company of Continental Marines embarked aboard the armed boat *Rattletrap* departed Fort Pitt, PA and sailed down the Ohio River enroute to New Orleans. Under the command of Captain James Willing, they were successful in weakening the British hold on the waterway through raiding British Loyalist plantations along the shore of Lake Pontchartrain (*USMC: A complete history*. Marine Corps Association, 2002) and patrolling the southern portions of the



Figure 5. Painting portraying Continental Marines ashore along Lake Pontchartrain during the late 1700s

Mississippi River and its adjacent waterways. Taking advantage of Spanish neutrality, the Marines were allowed to maintain a barracks in the city to support their temporary occupation and ongoing operations to disrupt British forces. Later, Captain Willing was replaced by Lieutenant Daniel Longstreet who continued to operate along the lower Mississippi for years and joined Spanish efforts to harass the British. Upon France's regained control of the region 20 years later and subsequent transfer of the Louisiana Purchase to the United States in 1803,

Captain Daniel Carmick was directed to take a detachment of Marines to New Orleans and establish a formal barracks there in 1806 (Kummer).

War of 1812 era

During the War of 1812, Major Carmick's Marines helped repel the British amphibious expedition against New Orleans. Under the command of Major General Andrew Jackson, one of Carmick's Lieutenants, Francois De Bellevue, and 66 Marines supported a night attack on December 23, 1814 by protecting Jackson's artillery emplaced along the Levee Road towards the British encampment. Following that battle, the Marines continued to protect the artillery emplacements along the Rodriguez Canal, which commanded the road leading into the city (Kummer). Subsequently,



Figure 6. Painting reflecting Marines repelling the British assault during the Battle for Chalmette during the War of 1812

during the ensuing days (even though the war had officially ended unbeknownst to New Orleans), the Marines aided in repelling British assaults, culminating in the infamous battle against the British 93rd Regiment Highlanders in Chalmette on January 8, 1815, whereby the British were violently beaten back, the latter suffering thousands of casualties (Hoffman). Major Carmick, who died almost two years later from wounds suffered during the battle, is currently buried at St. Louis Cemetery No. 2 in New Orleans (Purpura). Aside from the visible presence of U.S. Marines in New Orleans during the previous several decades, the actions and valor of the Marines in the defense of New Orleans against the British would become a fundamental tenet of

the bond between the Marines and the citizenry of New Orleans. In fact, a 1920 Marine Corps Gazette article pointed out that Congress designated New Orleans as the largest post in the Marine Corps during Carmick's era, naming him "Commandant of a Separate Post" (Deckert).

Civil War era

Further towards the center of New Orleans and beyond the exploits of Jackson and his Marine detachment at Chalmette, the Navy and Marine Corps began to establish a more deliberate presence shortly after the territory's transfer to the United States. However, a naval presence didn't truly emerge until 1849 when the U.S. Navy acquired property on the West Bank adjacent to the Lebeuf Plantation. With the intent of establishing a navy yard and supply depot, the Algiers site did not materialize prior to the Civil War. During the Civil War, the Confederacy created the Confederate States Marine Corps, instilling many U.S. Marines to defect to the new agency. The Crescent City was a focus for the recruiting effort owing to the large population and maritime tradition, and served as a vital source of not only manpower but supplies as well. In April of 1862, U.S. Marines served under Commodore Farragut's squadron as it forced its way up the Mississippi and past Confederate defenses at Fort Jackson and the *St. Philip* to capture New Orleans. After the battle afloat, the embarked Marines were the first Federal troops to enter the city following its surrender and, on April 29, 1862, Captain John Broom and 250 Marines secured the U.S. Customs House and raised the American flag over the city (Kummer). The Marines were again viewed as liberators.

Late Nineteenth Century

As mentioned previously, the navy yard across the river at Algiers sat largely vacant during the war, but shortly thereafter in the 1870s, the Navy anchored Monitor-class

gunboats at the site pending demilitarization and subsequent sale at auction beginning in 1880.

The undeveloped land remained dormant until the 1890s, when the expansion of dry docking and shipbuilding at Algiers began to enable the navy yard to take shape. Combined with New Orleans' extensive rail system and terminals, the navy yard matured quickly (Kummer). By




Figure 7. VFD-2 Dry Dock in operation in Algiers

1894, additional land was purchased by the Navy to further expand the naval dry dock operations. Between 1899 and 1902, two new steel floating dry docks were built for the Navy in Sparrow's Point, MD.

The first of these behemoths, YFD-2, with an 18,000 ton

lifting capacity, was towed to the Naval Station in Algiers, LA where it was kept in intermittent service for many years for the Navy until it was relocated to Pearl Harbor in 1940 (and subsequently sunk during the Japanese surprise attack on December 7, 1941). With the dry dock's arrival in New Orleans in November of 1901, the Naval Station New Orleans was officially opened following a very dramatic commissioning ceremony, presided by the then Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Deckert). Upon successful demonstration of the dry dock's operation to Congress, additional funds were appropriated shortly thereafter to allow for an expansion of the naval station downstream (Kummer).

World War I era

In April of 1917, after maintaining a policy of non-intervention since 1914, the United States became embroiled in World War I. Regiments were immediately raised including several in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Supplying these new regiments increased the duties of the district Quartermaster for the Gulf Coast area. Due to this increase in military preparation, New Orleans was in the running to be selected as an army supply depot serving the Gulf States region. As the army was being greatly enlarged during wartime, the choice of New Orleans as a depot would supply the army forming from Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas, East Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. At the time, the nearest supply depots were St. Louis, Philadelphia, and San Antonio. An additional argument made for New Orleans aside from the inherent excellent ocean, river, and rail transportation, was that the city was already a main market for most of the supplies that the army purchased. At the time, the New Orleans site was considered “one of



Figure 8. Port of Embarkation along the East Bank

the best strategic locations on the Western Continent” according to an article in *The American Architect* in 1919. Three factors contributed to this claim: (1) it is at the terminus of the navigable water courses and railroads of the Mississippi Valley and many ship lines of both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans; (2) it is secluded from military attack; and (3) it was at a location

equidistant between points of origin or raw materials and the destination of manufactured products (NPS).

By August of 1917, the army had authorized the large supply base to be built in New Orleans, which would materially supply over 30,000 troops each at Camp Bureaugard in Alexandria, LA and Camp Shelby in Hattiesburg, MS. The location of the facility was on the East Bank of the Mississippi River, east of the French Quarter and directly across the river from the recently established Algiers naval station. By the late stages of WWI, New Orleans joined Boston, Brooklyn, Charleston, and Philadelphia as one of the five main Army supply bases (NPS). New Orleans was touted as having design features used in the world's greatest ports such as multi-story warehouse units, and multiple deck connecting bridges between wharfhouses and adjacent warehouse operations. Each of the three six story buildings contained over one-half million square feet of floor space and was supported by 15 freight and 3 passenger elevators (NPS).

As it relates to the naval services, the Marine Corps' scope and end strength was greatly expanded in preparation for WWI employment, emerging well beyond their original Naval Militia heritage. On August 29, 1916, President Woodrow Wilson signed the Naval Appropriations Act into law, creating the Marine Corps Reserve, which added more than 7,000 Marines to the fight (Centennial Exhibit). Additionally, and as would become important decades later as it relates to New Orleans, the Marine Corps Reserve was further expanded on July 1, 1925 as well, following its original establishment in 1916 (PA Unit 4-1). Locally, the 310th Company of New Orleans was formed in 1925 under a provisional battalion of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (FMCR) (PA Unit 4-1). In May of 1930, the establishment of the 1st Battalion, 22d Reserve Marines (1/22) was authorized in New Orleans, forming around the nucleus of the

310th. This new battalion, which consisted of four Companies, was renamed the 10th Battalion, FMCR in 1936 as part of a restructuring effort for the entire Marine Corps Reserve (PA Unit 4-1).

World War II Era

In the years after WWI, much of the warehouse space of the New Orleans Army Supply Base was leased to private companies, and this public-private usage was touted as a viable alternative utilization of the property while not in full military service. The privatized warehouse space was used for years in the storage and distribution of various agricultural commodities to



Figure 9. Higgins boats staged on Bayou St. John

include coffee, sisal, cotton, and tobacco. Across the river, the old Naval Station reopened at the outset of World War II as a naval repair base, serving host to the 8th Naval District. While many Marines returned with the reopening of the base, it was the development of amphibious landing craft in New Orleans that played the most important role for Marine Corps history in the city during that time. During the interwar period, the Marine Corps desperately attempted to develop a viable landing craft for their amphibious capability, ultimately adopting the former Eureka bayou craft

from its creator Andrew Higgins. The famous

shallow draft, wide bow “Higgins Boat” soon became the hallmark for the Marine Corps’ amphibious operations during the Pacific island-hopping campaign of WWII, with thousands of

the LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel) produced by Higgins Industries along the canals of New Orleans and tested in Lake Pontchartrain (Kummer). Furthermore, to meet the significant manpower requirements of the war, the Marine Corps greatly expanded to a record 485,000 personnel, with the Reserves constituting 70 percent of the fighting force (Centennial Exhibit).

Additionally, with the onset of WWII, the Army Supply Base on the East Bank of the river reverted to the U.S. War Department and became a major deployment hub for servicemen and materiel heading overseas, with thousands of sailors meeting their ships there before going to war. New Orleans was one of ten principle army ports during the war, and was ranked roughly seventh in total passengers processed, from a list that included Boston, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle. For native New Orleanians of that generation, the Base was simply known as the New Orleans Port of Embarkation. From 1941 to 1945, the East Bank facility embarked 166,696 passengers and 7,240,687 tons of cargo in support of the war, which was under the control of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps.

Following the war, and of significant interest for the Marine history enthusiasts, then Colonel Lewis “Chesty” Puller, seeking a post-war regiment, was assigned the New Orleans Reserve District at the Algiers base in 1946. “Puller built his district until he had doubled the number of reservists, wangled barracks and training areas for them – and in his 2-year tour reached a peak of 6 battalions and in addition some 8,000 unattached men, a record for the country. He soon commanded a quarter of the Organized Marine Reserves in the Nation” (PA Unit 4-1). The relationship between the city of New Orleans and the Marine Corps once again strengthened.

Marine aviation was also very active in New Orleans during the war, with an aviation unit assigned to the Naval Air Station New Orleans on the shores of Lake Pontchartrain, on the site of the current University of New Orleans main campus (Kummer, Widmer). Following the




Figure 10. Map of the New Orleans Lakefront (1940s)

war, the Naval Air Station became home to Marine Fighter Squadron 143, the “Ragin’ Cajuns,” one of 24 Marine Reserve Training squadrons (Kummer). However, the significant urban expansion of New Orleans during the 1950s forced the relocation of the aviation facilities to a new air station located at Belle Chasse, LA, 15 miles to the south on the West Bank of the river.

Korean War era

During the Korean War, the majority of the Marine Corps Reserve was mobilized and deployed to theater in support of the First Marine Division, to include Marines from New Orleans. “The deployment of the Marine Reserve was pivotal to the Inchon Landing, the battles at the Chosin Reservoir, and along critical campaigns of the 38th Parallel separating North and

South Korea” (Centennial Exhibit). Additionally, during that timeframe, the 8th Marine Corps Reserve District, formerly of Pensacola, FL, relocated from the Algiers Naval Station to the U.S. Customs House in downtown New Orleans, the same site where the Marines raised the flag during the Civil War. In 1953, the Southern Recruiting Division, formerly of Dallas, TX, combined with the 8th Reserve District to form the 8th Marine Corps Reserve and Recruiting District. By 1960, 26 organized Marine reserve units from Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas with a strength of 224 officers and 3,986 enlisted men fell under the District headquartered in New Orleans (PA Unit 4-1).

In 1962, the Marine Corps Reserve reorganized both its ground and aviation units to form a division-wing team concept. From that came the reactivation of the 4th Marine Division, located in Southern California, and the creation of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing (4th MAW). 4th MAW would be joined with the Marine Air Reserve Training Command (MARTCOM), established in 1946, and located at the Glenview Naval Air Station in Glenview, IL (PA Unit 4-1). Consequently, relieved of Marine Corps Reserve responsibilities, the 8th Marine Corps Reserve and Recruiting District was redesignated in 1964 as simply the 8th Marine Corps District (Kummer).

Following the armistice which was signed on July 27, 1953 through 1955, the Army Supply Depot structures on the East Bank were still recognized as the Port of Embarkation. In 1955, however, they became known for a short time as the New Orleans Army Terminal but, in 1965, the name changed again to the New Orleans Army Base. In 1966, the Navy acquired the base from the Army and, together with the Algiers Station across the river, was renamed the Naval Support Activity (NSA) New Orleans.

Post-Vietnam era

In late 1972, the 8th Marine Corps District relocated its headquarters from the Customs House to the West Bank portion of the NSA. During the 1970s, the Marine Corps Reserve began consolidating its headquarters elements aboard the East Bank NSA facilities (i.e., the Port of Embarkation). In June of 1974, the 4th MAW/MARTCOM headquarters relocated to the NSA on the East Bank (*The Reserve Marine*). A few years later in April of 1977, the 4th Marine Division ceremonially marched the division battle colors from Camp Pendleton, CA all the way to the Crescent City as it permanently transferred the Command to the NSA, joining its sister aviation headquarters element. Two years later, 4th MAW disbanded the MARTCOM organization and mirrored its organization with the active duty Marine wings. During that era, the Navy established three major commands on the East Bank as well: Naval Reserve Force (later Navy Reserve Forces Command), Naval Air Force Reserve, and the Naval Reserve Personnel Center. Concurrent with this naval consolidation of headquarters, on July 3, 1975 the former Army depot buildings were dedicated as the F. Edward Hebert Defense Complex, named after the long-serving New Orleans congressman who was once chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and who played a key role in enabling the relocation of the Navy and Marine Corps commands to New Orleans.

Following participation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-1991, the Marine Corps reorganized its senior Fleet Marine Force commands for its active forces and consolidated all of its Reserve commands in 1992 under a single command, Marine Reserve Forces (MARRESFOR). MARRESFOR consisted of 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and the recently created 4th Force Service Support Group (FSSG). One year later, MARRESFOR was again redesignated as Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), to remain on

par with Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) and Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), all 3-star (Lieutenant General) commands. Throughout the 1990s through to the present, New Orleans has hosted MARFORRES along with its Major Subordinate Commands, providing command & control of the entire 38,000 member Marine Corps Reserve distributed throughout the nation.

Post 9/11 era

After the horrific attacks on September 11, 2001, the Marine Corps Reserve, along with the other military services within the Department of Defense, responded with significant reserve mobilizations in support of the Global War on Terrorism over the ensuing decade. Through its headquarters in New Orleans, MARFORRES coordinated and executed mass mobilizations of Reserve forces for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. To that end, over 20,000 reservists were activated in early 2003 with the majority of which deploying overseas in support of the U.S. Marine assault on Baghdad in March of that year. Following that success, MARFORRES continued to activate and deploy approximately 6000 reservists annually to Iraq as rotational forces under the operational control of U.S. Central Command (Pratt).

Hurricane Katrina

Just days after the BRAC 2005 Commission reversed its decision to realign MARFORRES to Belle Chasse, Hurricane Katrina struck its devastating blow to the region. In the days leading up to the carnage, the order was given to evacuate all military personnel from the NSA to coincide with the city's evacuation. The Marines scattered to temporary alternate headquarters in Ft. Worth, TX, Kansas City, MO, Atlanta, GA, and Albany, GA; while the Navy displaced the majority of their personnel to Norfolk, VA, and Millington, TN. On Monday, August 29, after Katrina made landfall, President Bush issued a federal declaration of

emergency, and on Tuesday, August 30, Joint Task Force-Katrina (JTF-K) was officially activated. That evening, in response to levee breaches and subsequent flooding in New Orleans, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary declared Katrina an Incident of National Significance. By Wednesday, August 31, significant DOD medical airlift operations from the affected area were underway, which included significant contributions from the U.S. Air Force, the Louisiana National Guard, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Additionally, the amphibious assault ship USS *Bataan* arrived off New Orleans, providing valuable resources and aid. On Thursday, September 1, the 82nd Airborne Division and 1st Cavalry Division were placed on alert. The 5,200 troops from these units began deploying on September 3 and arrived in the New Orleans area on September 5. By September 6, a second amphibious assault ship, the USS *Iwo Jima* and the aircraft carrier USS *Truman* had also arrived (CRS). By September 7, 2005 more than 45,000 National Guardsmen and 18,000 active duty troops were participating in the relief effort in New Orleans and along the U.S. Gulf Coast, working in partnership with the Federal

Emergency Management Agency and other federal entities. Within the JTF, in excess of 2,500 Marines were organized under Marine Force Katrina (MARFOR-K), which consisted of



Figure 11. Marine AAV in Lower Ninth Ward during Katrina response

both active and reserve elements to include portions of the 11th and 31st Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), a detachment from Marine Aircraft Group-42 out of Atlanta, GA, and a detachment of Amphibious Assault Vehicles from 4th AA Battalion out of Gulfport (see photo). MARFOR-K and the JTF operated for several weeks to aid in the response and recovery of the thousands of victims of the worst natural disaster in U.S. history (HQMC PP&O Brief).

Following the nation's response and upon declaration by the Governor of Louisiana that the region was safe to inhabit, the 1200+ Marines, Sailors, Federal employees, and their families of MARFORRES began a deliberate re-population to the New Orleans region beginning in October of 2005 through the end of the year, with hundreds of families returning to devastated homes. The 400 or so personnel of NAVRESFOR returned home during early 2006 while the entire Navy Personnel Center remained in Tennessee, never returning, owing to the BRAC decision to realign them there. The effects of Katrina have forever etched scars upon the citizens of the Southeastern Louisiana and coastal Mississippi communities, both civilian and military alike. Suffering through tragic events such as natural disasters forges bonds amongst victims – bonds that transcend social class, ethnicity, and profession. The act of rebuilding following tragic events furthers this bond, and extends it to include the community itself and the land upon which it resides. Fortunately, both the East and West Bank portions of the NSA received minimal damage, owing to the fact that they occupied relative high ground and avoided the direct impacts of flooding.

New Orleans has also been home to numerous other DOD and DHS activities beyond those described so far. Of these, Jackson Barracks, located one mile downriver from New Orleans, and the Coast Guard's regional presence, are worthy of mention.

Jackson Barracks

After the War of 1812, the U.S. Congress, realizing that coastal cities were not adequately defended, prescribed the Federal Fortifications Act in July 1832 (Geaux Guard website). This Act provided funds for the acquisition of lands and the construction of barracks to



Figure 12. Jackson Barracks (late 1800s)

house U.S. Troops. Between 1832 and 1836, the “New Orleans Barracks”, located today in the Lower Ninth Ward, was constructed to house four infantry companies. Of historical interest, Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, George B. McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart, and P. G. T.

Beauregard were all stationed at the Barracks, although not at the same time (Wikipedia).

During the Mexican–American War (1846-1848), the New Orleans Barracks was chosen as a post for transiting. In 1849, additional property was purchased expanding the Barracks north of Saint Claude Avenue to allow for the construction of a new Public Service Hospital for veterans in the country, which remained operational until 1888 when it was demolished. In 1861, as Louisiana seceded from the United States, Confederate forces took control of the Barracks and held it for less than a year until 1862 when it was liberated by Federal forces. On July 7, 1866, the barracks was renamed “Jackson Barracks” after the colonial who led the Battle of New Orleans, Andrew Jackson (MyNewOrleans.com). During World War I, the Barracks was used as a muster station for troops deploying for war from the nearby port. Following World War I, the property was declared “excess” by the Federal Government and given to the State of Louisiana. The Louisiana Adjutant General, Major General Raymond Fleming, established Jackson

Barracks as the home of the Louisiana National Guard, transforming the post from an infantry post to a Cavalry and artillery post. Shortly thereafter during the Great Depression, Louisiana Governor Huey P. Long, Jr. used his political ties in Washington, D.C. to acquire federal funding for numerous Louisiana State public works projects, one of which was an extensive renovation of Jackson Barracks. When the United States entered World War II, the Federal Government took control of the Barracks for use in support of the Army Port of Embarkation shortly upriver. At the conclusion of World War II, the barracks was returned to the State of Louisiana for use as the Louisiana National Guard Headquarters, where it has remained in service through the present.

United States Coast Guard

The Coast Guard has had a presence in the Gulf of Mexico and Midwestern regions of the United States for nearly two centuries. "In the Gulf area, the Coast Guard's history ranges from the Revenue Marine Service Cutter LOUISIANA driving the British away from the Mississippi River levee area during the War of 1812, to the Coast Guard patrolling the Gulf for German U-Boats during World War II. In the Midwest, Coast Guard history includes establishing aids to navigation in the early 1900s, as well as marine safety missions and flood response. This Midwestern region, formerly known as the Second Coast Guard District, merged with the Eighth Coast Guard District in May 1996, creating the present expansive Eighth Coast Guard District boundaries" (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dot/district8.htm>). The Eighth District, commanded by a two-star Rear Admiral, is located in New Orleans and "covers all or part of 26 states throughout the Gulf Coast and heartland of America. It stretches from the Appalachian Mountains and Chattahoochee River in the east, to the Rocky Mountains in the west, and from the border between the U.S. and Mexico and the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian

border in North Dakota. Part of the Department of Homeland Security, the men and women of the Eighth District are vital in protecting the 900 miles of coastline and 10,300 miles of inland navigable waterways located in their area of responsibility"

(<http://www.uscg.mil/d8/d8facts.asp>).

The history of the Coast Guard's presence in New Orleans begins with the establishment of the Lighthouse Service's New Orleans Depot in 1934, along what was to become the present day Industrial Canal lock. In 1939, the Lighthouse Service was integrated into the Coast Guard, and in 1949, that facility was officially designated a Coast Guard Base. On July 1, 1987, the base



Figure 13. USCG Base New Orleans HQ

was redesignated as Support Center New Orleans, and then on May 29, 1996, it became the Integrated Support Command New Orleans (ISC). In 2003, the Naval Engineering Support Unit (NESU) and Electronics Engineering Support Unit (ESU) were placed under the authority of the ISC. In August 2005, Hurricane

Katrina severely damaged the site and forced the ISC and its tenants to relocate. Two of the original buildings from the 1934 New Orleans Depot remain on the site in what was the ISC Industrial Division portion of the base. In September 2006, the ISC moved to its new base as a tenant of NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in New Orleans East and, in April 2010, occupied its new facility, renamed Base New Orleans. This 86,000 square foot, 89 million dollar facility sits on 26-acres and represents the largest single facility contract in Coast Guard history. Base New Orleans is responsible for financial, personnel, work-life, housing, industrial, facilities

engineering, and medical and dental support to the more than 900 personnel assigned to the region's various units (uscg.mil). In addition to this new facility in New Orleans East, the Coast Guard also recently constructed a 45,000 square foot new headquarters building adjacent to the Federal City site on the West Bank, housing the 300 Guardsmen of the New Orleans Sector of the Eighth District (nolafederalcity.com). This recent multi-million dollar investment by the Coast Guard into their New Orleans sites is clear testimony to their strategic view of the region's ongoing importance.

Additionally, Coast Guard Cutters have been homeported in New Orleans as well for over a century, providing protection and freedom of movement for the region's waterways for the commerce so vital to this nation's prosperity. On a community level, Cutters are still engrained in the fabric of the city today as demonstrated through the annual Carnival celebration: According to Rex historian, Dr. Stephen Hales, "Rex's identity [as the King of Carnival] is revealed to the membership in a meeting on the Saturday before Mardi Gras, with a public announcement to follow. On the Monday before Mardi Gras (commonly referred to as "Lundi Gras"), Rex arrives by Coast Guard Cutter at the foot of Poydras Street." (http://www.allaboutmardigras.com/Features/New_Orleans_Stories/krewe)

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Since 1803, the Corps of Engineers has provided the people of southern Louisiana with navigation improvements, flood control and, in recent decades, comprehensive environmental stewardship. Beginning in the early 1800s, the Corps enabled the region's enhanced flatboat and steamboat trade throughout the plentiful Mississippi River Basin. After a century of steady expansion of the region's commerce through major efforts in levee construction and associated waterway projects, the Corps assumed a far-larger role in flood control following the Great

Flood of 1927. Significant capital civil engineering projects such as the Bonnet Carre Spillway and the Morganza Floodway kept the Mississippi River on course and enabled critical protection for the millions of residents in the flood plain downriver.

(<http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/About/History.aspx>)

The dual threats of hurricane destruction and coastal erosion have become the mainstays for the Corps' efforts in recent years for Louisiana. Their current mission is to advance the Nation's interests by delivering vital engineering services for flood, hurricane and storm damage risk reduction; navigation; ecosystem stewardship; emergency operations; and



Figure 14. Bonnet Carré Spillway in operation

support to National Security (www.mvn.usace.army.mil/About/Mission). The USACE's current wide-ranging projects mitigate the challenges associated with protecting the region, facilitating navigation along the Mississippi River, and simultaneously working to protect and restore the fragile and disappearing ecosystem that houses the water resources of the region.

Regarding flood control, the greater New Orleans area faces a triple threat when it comes to sources of flood risk: the Mississippi River, rain, and hurricane storm surge. In addition to the Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System, they have implemented a number of critical flood control projects. As mentioned as an example, the Bonnet Carré Spillway, located

28 miles above New Orleans, is the southernmost floodway in the Mississippi River & Tributaries system. Located on the east bank in St. Charles Parish and constructed following the great flood of 1927, it can divert a portion of the river's floodwaters via Lake Pontchartrain into the Gulf of Mexico, thus allowing high water to bypass New Orleans and other nearby river communities.

The Corps also promotes navigation and facilitates waterborne commerce along the lower Mississippi River for America's largest-tonnage port complex. They maintain 2,800 miles of navigable waterways along the Mississippi, including 400 miles of deep-draft channel, to include 12 navigation locks serving these waterways (<http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/About>). The Corps remains a vital component in sustaining the southern Louisiana ecosystem, protecting the city of New Orleans and its residents, in addition to enabling one of the nation's most vital avenues for global commerce to continue to thrive.

As illustrated, over two centuries of direct contact between varied military forces and the local New Orleans populace have created a society with a shared heritage and integrated culture. Gaining an appreciation of the significant effects the U.S. military forces have had on the region, over the centuries and remaining today, is essential to understanding the society that has emerged in the New Orleans region. The City of New Orleans is inextricably linked to its past, to the military that has helped forge it, and that currently contributes greatly to its modernity.

The Federal City Project

The approximately 179-acre Federal City project was conceived to be a post-modern, urbanist, public/private partnership model for a new type of military installation. The intent was not to follow the historic traditional military base closure model of ceding parcels off to local government, other Federal agencies, commercial activities, or any combination thereof. To the

contrary, the advocacy coalition envisioned a completely reorganized quasi-installation which incorporated anchor federal agency tenants in a campus-style setting, completely integrated with mixed-use commercial activities and residential housing. This new commercial center was purported to reinvigorate the decaying area of Algiers through this symbiotic model that



Figure 15. Artist's rendition of the proposed Federal City town center

would provide thousands of civil and military jobs and an enormous infusion of working capital through the federal government in addition to commercial revenues. Federal City was also designed to re-connect the adjacent lower-income neighborhoods into the seamless transition into a plethora of mixed-income housing on campus. Additionally, a charter high school was planned for within Federal City for military families as a continuation for the elementary education at Belle Chasse Academy. At the heart of Federal City is the 30-acre secure compound, which hosts the brand new State of Louisiana funded \$150M, 411,000 square foot Headquarters for the Marine Forces Reserve. While branded as Marine Corps Support




Figure 16. Map describing the Federal City complex in Algiers

Facility New Orleans, the compound is actually under lease to the Algiers Development District and is available for continued development. However, the Department of the Navy still retains the ability to refuse undesired prospective tenants. The secure compound was designed to

provide space for any other federal agencies that required traditional anti-terrorism and force protection capabilities.

According to the original vision, adjacent to the secure compound was supposed to be 1,400 new homes, numerous retail activities and other support-type venues that would service the planned 10,000 person Federal City workforce in the completely redeveloped Algiers community. According to the original Master Plan developed by Duany Plater Zyberk, “Federal City offers a National Model for the future configuration and operation of small to mid-sized Department of Defense (DOD) installations...the goal of Federal City is to create state-of-the-art facilities that will attract thousands of federal and private sector workers during the next fifteen years. The construction of new facilities at Federal City will provide its tenants with energy and maintenance efficient facilities and the latest hurricane and flood protection factors and standards” (DPZ, 2010).

The project was designed to be executed in two distinct phases. Phase I included the construction of the secure compound encompassing the MARFORRES headquarters building. Owing to the BRAC law, construction needed to be complete by September 15, 2011 – the established closure date for Naval Support Activity New Orleans. The MARFORRES buildings were actually completed over two months ahead of schedule which allowed the Marines to vacate their former office spaces on the East Bank campus of the NSA before the base closed. Phase I also included four joint quality of life facilities (the fitness center, the childcare center, a hotel that could be used as transient lodging for the Marines, and an approximately 400-seat

auditorium), as well as a grocery store, a library, and the New Orleans Military and Maritime Academy (NOMMA) high school.

A second component of Phase I included the construction of numerous streets in support of the Master Plan, one of which would run along the levee reconnecting the surrounding neighborhoods with the river. The road had previously been cut off for over a hundred years due to the military base. These street improvements were designed to facilitate further development of the commercial operations to the town center. According to the Master Plan, retailers targeted for this component included a bank, multiple restaurants, a drug store, a coffee shop, and a dry cleaning facility. Construction of the residential housing units was to occur as well during this period.

Phase II was more loosely defined and was expected to commence approximately five years after the Phase I groundbreaking which occurred on Sept 30, 2008, the last possible day for the project to physically initiate before the BRAC legislative deadline. Phase II, which did not ultimately occur, was envisioned to proceed on the momentum of the Phase I commercial development aspect of the Master Plan. Phase III was even less defined and served as a marker for any remaining components of the plan yet unrealized. The entire project was projected to take 15 years to complete, or by September, 2023. As this paper will reveal, the collapse of the Federal City coalition ceased all hope of the physical realization of the original vision.

The Actors

The following several pages provide an overview of the principle agencies involved with the Federal City project, to include the role they played, and the key players that executed that role. Collectively, the group forms the advocacy coalition; the magnitude and level of

involvement varied by phase as circumstances dictated the evolving power struggle amongst the group.

New Orleans Federal Alliance (NOFA)

As mentioned, The New Orleans Federal Alliance was originally chartered by the State, specifically Governor Blanco, to develop the concept of Federal City in order to attempt to prevent the complete closure of the NSA New Orleans due to the threat of BRAC (Mize, Dempsey, Braithwaite). NOFA's early success in swaying the BRAC Commission to modify the DOD recommendation was pivotal in the context of the project moving forward. However, as the project matured well into the sustainment phase, NOFA's role shifted significantly as ADD's power and control of the coalition emerged. The NOFA Board consisted of numerous local military, civic, and private industry leaders to include Major General David Mize (USMC, Retired), First Lieutenant Bill Ryan (USMC, Retired), Councilmember Jackie Clarkson, Colonel Dell Dempsey (USMC, Retired), Mr. Bob Farnsworth, the late Mr. Ron Gardner, Ms. Norma Grace, and Ms. Carroll Suggs. NOFA's internal support staff included Mr. Louis Sandoz and Mr. Christian Brierre. Consultants secured by NOFA throughout the project's life included Marek Izydorczyk, Bill Robinson, and their legal team from Adams and Reese LLP, led by Mr. Lee Reid.

Algiers Development District (ADD)

The Algiers Development District, was initially created to coordinate the redevelopment of the 15th Ward of Orleans Parish. ADD was in a supporting role during the early phases of the project, with minimal involvement until well into the sustainment phase. However, the unplanned effects of the last-minute decision by the Governor to allow ADD to serve as the Navy Lease signatory vice NOFA thrust ADD into a significantly more visible role of

controlling the conduct of the Federal City project. The ADD Board varied in composition throughout the coalition's life cycle, but consisted of the following personnel during the early parts of the Federal City project, circa 2008: Chairman Jeff Arnold, Assessor Tom Arnold, Councilman James Carter, Senator David Heitmeier, Senator Derrick Shepherd, House Speaker James Tucker, and Rev. Arthur Wardsworth. When ADD was reestablished in 2003, Ms. Jackie Clarkson was a member of the Board. By 2011, membership had changed slightly with the addition of Mr. Tyrone Casby, Councilmember Kristin Palmer, and Judy Reese Morse. By 2015, Mr. Joe Toomy, Mr. Jim Henderson, and Mr. Paul Collins were Board members. Additional key ADD advisors included the Jones Walker law firm, led by Mr. Fred Chevalier, and Scott Zander; attorney Mr. Ken Pickering; the ADD accountant Mr. Sean Bruno; and the ADD Executive Director, Ms. Kathy Lynn Honaker. Within ADD, Jeff Arnold's role was the most profound and had the greatest impact on ADD's impact to the coalition solvency.

State and City Legislators

Louisiana State and City Legislators played a vital role in the project during the formation and mobilization phases of the coalition, but their presence waned as the project evolved to the latter stages. Key personnel that participated in the initial Federal City planning efforts include Governor Kathleen Blanco, Mayor Ray Nagin, U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu, U.S. Senator David Vitter, and U.S. Congressman William Jefferson. Follow-on participants included Governor Bobby Jindal, and Mayor Mitch Landrieu, as successors to their respective public posts. At the heart of the Federal City project was the relocation of the Marine Forces Reserve headquarters from the NSA East Bank to a new home on the former NSA West Bank property.

Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES)

The MARFORRES leadership played a vital role in the development of the new facility's design requirements, and was instrumental in negotiating with NOFA, Headquarters Marine Corps, the BRAC Program Office, and the Department of the Navy for the Lease provisions. Key representatives of the Marine Forces Reserve headquarters included Lieutenant General Jack Bergmann (USMC), Executive Director Bob Braithwaite (Colonel USMC, Retired), Colonels Russ Dumas and Bill Davis (Assistant Chief of Staff for Facilities), Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Facilities Mr. Ed Maguire (USMC Retired), Mr. Howard Myrick, and Deputy Counsel Mr. Ron Bald (USCG Retired). Key contractor personnel that supported the move to Federal City included Ms. Amy Carbonette, Ms. Leslie Thompson, and Mr. Bay Ames. Of these personnel, Col Bill Davis' contribution was invaluable.

Naval Support Activity (NSA) New Orleans

The Naval Support Activity's role was exceptionally complex during the project, owing to the fact that they were tasked, by BRAC law, to relocate current tenant units and support activities, plan for the shutdown of the base, at the same time as the developer (HRI/ECC) and their construction team (Woodward Design & Build) were aggressively executing Phase I of the Federal City project. As these traditional base activities (e.g., the Commissary, Post Exchange (PX), Housing Office, etc.) relocated to NAS/JRB Belle Chasse, the NSA leadership was responsible for continuation of services to their military family population. NSA New Orleans key stakeholders included Navy CAPT Dozier and CAPT Brian Harrison (NSA Commanding Officers), and CAPT Bill Garrett (NSA Executive Officer).

Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)

From Headquarters Marine Corps, participants primarily involved were within the Installations & Logistics (I&L) department. Specifically, the BRAC cell that was created to manage and collect the service-wide data calls for submission to the Department of the Navy's BRAC Program Management Office. HQMC I&L stakeholders included Mr. Paul Hubble, Major General Eugene E. Payne, and their contracted support, Mike Tilghman. HQMC's role during the Navy Lease negotiations was to represent the best interests of MARFORRES in the context of securing the appropriate headquarters building and ancillary facility design for the new Marine Corps Support Facility secure compound. HQMC worked daily with the MARFORRES Facility Department as the Marine Corps portion of the Federal City plan matured.

Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)

The Secretary of the Navy's Office played a minor but critical role in the Federal City project's evolution. As will be discussed later in the paper, the SECNAV himself, the Honorable Donald Winter, initiated a dialogue with the Governor of Louisiana in order to clear a negotiation roadblock regarding the Navy Lease. Within the SECNAV office, Mr. Howard Snow, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations & Facilities, was instrumental in working with HQMC, NOFA, and MARFORRES to reconcile the Lease provisions to a successful outcome.

BRAC Project Management Office (PMO)

The BRAC Project Management Office negotiated the lease with ADD, signed the lease, then negotiated and coordinated the fee simple transfer in accordance with the FY-13 NDAA. Mr. Greg Preston served as the Real Estate Contracting Officer who had the authority to enter

into the lease and the transfer. He was supported by lawyers from DASN (EI&I), Mr. Ralph Lombardo; HQMC, Mr. Steve Wenderoth; and MARFORRES. Other supporting members within the BRAC PMO included Mr. Jimmy Anderson, Mr. Bill Robinson, and Ms. Thuane Fielding.

HRI/ECC, LLC

HRI/ECC, LLC, selected as the Master Developer for the Federal City project, merged the capabilities and experience of the New Orleans developer, HRI, with ECC's recent expertise with Hurricane Katrina recovery work and federal program management experience. This partnership was anticipated to create a synergy, along with NOFA's vision and leadership, to successfully execute the Federal City development effort. Key members of HRI/ECC include Eddie Boettner, the HRI Chief Administrative Officer, Todd Riche, Ken Milvid, and Wayne Clement. The primary ECC Development Project Manager was Todd Riche. HRI/ECC's New Orleans-based general contractor for architectural design and construction was Woodward Design & Build, which included Bob Lipscomb. The assigned Louisiana state monitor was CSRS, Inc of Baton Rouge, from which Casey Anderson served as the primary quality control agent.

Louisiana Economic Development (LED)

The State of Louisiana's Economic Development Department provided the actual \$150M in funding for the Federal City project as promised by the Governor. LED ceded direct oversight of the funding execution to CSRS, but maintained overall responsibility for the money to be spent appropriately. LED expressed the desire to turn over the entire project to local administration. Key LED players included Secretary Stephen Moret and Mr. Paul Sawyer.

Joint Development Committee (JDC)

Towards the end of the coalition's life cycle, a Joint Development Committee was formed in 2013 in consequence of a Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) signed on October 10, 2012 by NOFA and ADD. The CEA was a solution to the stagnant law suits between NOFA and HRI/ECC, emanating from an impasse in the interpretation of certain financial provisions associated with the Master Lease and other legal documents. The JDC essentially subordinated NOFA's role in the context of the stalled Federal City project to one of JDC membership. The JDC consists of seven members – three appointed by ADD, 3 appointed by NOFA with one of those being approved by the Mayor of New Orleans, and one from Greater New Orleans, Inc. Original JDC membership included Jeff Arnold, Kristin Palmer, Rick Legendre, Bill Oliver, Amy Quirk, Bob Farnsworth, and Norma Grace. The following year, Ron Gardner replaced Norma Grace and, in 2015, Tyrone Casby replaced Kristin Palmer; Bill Detweiler replaced Amy Quirk; and Jackie Clarkson replaced Ron Gardner. Finally, in 2016 Gary Carter replaced Jeff Arnold and Ed Markle replaced Tyrone Casby. The JDC essentially serves as the successor to the ADD-NOFA coalition core and is the organization that currently serves as the arbiter for the New Orleans Riverside at Historic Algiers project (the successor to the failed Federal City project).

The aforementioned actors, while not all inclusive, represent the bulk of the players that effected the conduct of the prosecution of the original Federal City project in its entirety – from inception to stagnation, and ultimately to its possible rebirth and rebranding as the Riverside at Historic Algiers. With that, more information will now be presented that illustrates the coalition's phased evolution in the context of the Federal City project's execution.

Coalition Phases and Chronology of Key Events

Formation Phase (2003 – May 2005)

The formation phase, in the context of the advocacy coalition, begins in the early 2000s as several prominent local civic, business, and military leaders collaborated to develop a viable defense to the forthcoming BRAC 2005 initiative. Having survived the four previous Congressionally-mandated BRAC actions of 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, the Naval Support Activity was still quite vulnerable to closure owing to the Navy's recent strategic realignment efforts and DOD budget cuts (Cotton, Garrett). This group of leaders, championed most vocally by retired Marine MajGen David Mize, grew naturally from the traditional Mayor's Military Advisory Council, a formal organization chartered to enhance communications between the City government and local military organizations in an effort to improve the quality of life for servicemen and women stationed in the New Orleans area (Mize).

As it became apparent prior to the announcement of the initial Department of Defense BRAC Report in May of 2005 that the New Orleans NSA would be targeted for closure and its tenant organizations relocated, this loose coalition tightened significantly and became anchored with the creation of the New Orleans Federal Alliance (NOFA) in 2004 (nolafederalcity.com). The primary argument to the dissolution of the NSA was the establishment of the visionary Federal City concept in its stead. As mentioned earlier, NOFA is a 501 (c) (3) non-profit organization chartered to spearhead the Federal City development effort. The original organization of NOFA included retired senior military leaders, the State of Louisiana Economic Development Office, and numerous other private sector professionals (nolafederalcity.com). During this timeframe of preparation for BRAC defense, NOFA coordinated extensively with City and State government officials, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), the Navy's BRAC

Program Management Office (PMO), in addition to the NSA New Orleans and NAS/JRB Belle Chasse military leadership, in addition to the major tenant Commands aboard each installation (Mize, Dempsey, Braithwaite).

Additionally, during this timeframe the Algiers Development District (ADD) was reformed on July 1, 2003 to serve as a local redevelopment authority and a special taxing district for all territory within the fifteenth ward of Orleans Parish (RS 33:2740.27). On September 4, 2003, ADD was authorized as the sole entity to execute the Algiers Economic Development Fund, revenues of which were collected through the Orleans Parish Tax Increment Fund (TIF) activities (City Ordinance 021283). The formation phase ends with NOFA, the City and State government, postured to respond to a potential BRAC assault on the New Orleans NSA.

Mobilization Phase (May 13, 2005 – Sept 2005)

The mobilization phase begins with the publication and announcement of the initial DOD BRAC Report on May 13, 2005. NOFA's preparatory actions during the previous phase were subsequently put into action, which included an aggressive lobby through the State Legislators to suggest the Federal City option as a viable alternate to a complete base closure. To that end, the BRAC Commission conducted a regional hearing in New Orleans on July 22, 2005, and received testimony from the Louisiana delegates in addition to the capstone speech from General Mize regarding Federal City (BRAC testimony, 2005).

Following a comprehensive review of the proposal, the BRAC Commission modified the BRAC language during their closed deliberation on August 24, 2005 and agreed to the Federal City option, subject to certain provisions. After several weeks of Congressional and White House review, the final BRAC recommendations were approved by the President on September 15, 2005, authorizing the Federal City plan. The mobilization phase ends with this successful

adjustment to the BRAC law, as approved by the President. Within this phase, on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina imposed its will on the New Orleans region, creating epic carnage and destruction.

Sustainment Phase (Sept 2005 – Nov 2011)

The sustainment phase began shrouded in the wake of the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. The fact that the BRAC Commission reversed its decision to fully close NSA New Orleans and opt for the State-funded Federal City recapitalization project just days before Katrina was a testament to its viability. However, Katrina's impact to the project was significant, as will be explained further in the findings later in the chapter. The project stalled somewhat during the year following Katrina, as the region and its citizens struggled to rebuild. With significant national support towards the New Orleans rebuilding effort, the Federal City project was reinvigorated and quickly garnered support at all levels (e.g., community, City, State, Federal) to proceed. For the bulk of 2006 and 2007, significant efforts were made by NOFA, HQMC I&L, the DON BRAC PMO, and MARFORRES in the development of a negotiated lease agreement for Phase I of the Federal City project. During February of 2008, NOFA submitted their proposed business and lease plan to the Department of the Navy, prompting further negotiation between stakeholders as each side fought for their respective interests. During April of 2008, the Louisiana Legislative Auditor conducted a review of ADD's role in Federal City (at ADD's request) and issued an Advisory Services Report on April 23, 2008.

Concurrently, after months of standstill, the lease agreement was finally brokered following an in-person dialogue between SECNAV and the Governor of Louisiana. On September 30, 2008 the 75-year real estate lease was signed by DON and ADD, the latter acting as the assigned agent for the State of Louisiana. Of note, in April of 2008, ADD's power and

authorities were modified by the State Legislature following the audit, enabling ADD to serve as the signatory of the lease (vice NOFA which was the originally intended signatory). Additionally on September 30, 2008, the Sublease of the property was signed by ADD to NOFA, and the subsequent Master Sublease was then signed between NOFA to the developer, HRI/ECC. Of note, these lease signatory actions, and the associated groundbreaking action, occurred on the very last day of the Congressionally mandated deadline.

During March of 2009, the headquarters for the U.S. Naval Reserve Forces (NAVRESFOR) relocated to Norfolk, Virginia in accordance with the BRAC legislation. During 2009 through the summer of 2011, Phase I of the Federal City project was in full construction, with the main effort being the new secure compound which housed the new MARFORRES headquarters facility, along with the adjacent parking garage and retail spaces. Woodward Design & Build were the contractors executing the construction. During this chaotic time period of construction, the NSA leadership was heavily involved with preparing to turnover and close the base. Many existing buildings and roads needed to be demolished to make way for the new facilities.

On August 12, 2010, NOFA published its official Master Plan, developed by a multitude of contributors to include HRI/ECC and DPZ. This Master Plan retained the majority of the original Federal City visionary tenets that were promoted during the past several years of advertising campaign. Shortly thereafter, several milestones for the Parking Garage were met to include the signing of the Parking Garage Development Agreement on August 31, 2010; the Tri-Party Parking Garage Management Agreement on January 31, 2011; and the Parking Garage Use Agreement on July 14, 2011. Concurrent to the latter, the Marines vacated the East Bank facilities of the NSA and relocated to new completed MARFORRES headquarters within Federal

City during June and July of 2011. On September 15, 2011, all remaining DON property on the West Bank was released to ADD in accordance with the lease stipulations. That same day, the NSA officially closed after its 110-year military occupation.

Of later importance, on January 7, 2011 the Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provided for the authorization of a Fee Simple Transfer of the bulk of the leased land to the State of Louisiana. Of note, the secure compound, the Public Private Venture (PPV) housing on the former NSA, and the historic LeBeuf Planation Housing (a.k.a. Quarters A), were retained as U.S. Navy property. The secure compound (with the exception of the four new buildings owned by the Marine Corps) remained under lease to ADD. The PPV housing remained under lease to Patrician Management. Quarters “A” remained under the ownership of the Marine Corps.

The sustainment phase contained the majority of the legal and physical actions associated with the detailed development and execution of the initial components of the Federal City project.

Fragmentation Phase (Nov 2011 – Mar 2014)

While tensions between NOFA, ADD, and HRI/ECC had been mounting for some time over interpretation of their respective authorities related to the various agreements (official and unofficial), I argue that the fragmentation phase begins with the NOFA’s filing of a lawsuit against HRI/ECC on Nov 23, 2011 and the latter’s countersuit shortly thereafter. Following close to a year of legal battles in and out of court, the two parties settled out of court and summarily ended their relationship (Orleans Parish Civil Court No. 2011-11992). Concurrently, the relationship between ADD and NOFA continued to sour culminating with a compromised Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) between the two parties on October 10, 2012. The

CEA essentially redefined NOFA's role as the primary lead for the Federal City project and subordinated their contribution to basic membership in the newly sanctioned Joint Development Committee (JDC), established formally also on that day. As the remaining ancillary Federal City projects beyond the secure compound came to a close (e.g., NOMMA), the development stalled completely and remains that way through today.

This phase also saw the actual execution of the FY11 NDAA Fee Simple Transfer from DON to ADD on May 21, 2013, furthering ADD's control over resources. Shortly thereafter, the secure compound was formally accepted by DON on Jul 30, 2013. Finally, ADD terminated the sublease with NOFA and, by law, the sublease between NOFA and HRI/ECC on March 18, 2014.

Now that the detailed context relating to the Federal City project, its supporting advocacy coalition's principle actors, and the chronology of key events have been articulated within the phased framework of the life cycle, the research design and data collection methodology can be explained in the forthcoming chapter.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

The nature of the study purpose and associated research questions posed drove the decision to utilize the qualitative case study as the preferred design method for several reasons. According to Creswell (2013), case study research involves the detailed study of a case within a real-life setting or contemporary context. Furthermore, due to the complexity of the characteristics associated within a study of an organization such as NOFA and its partners, multiple sources of information were required within the defined (bounded) timeframe and scope. Creswell (2013) further offers that the defining features of a case study includes: (1) the analysis of a specific group, organization, or partnership; (2) at a specific place and time; (3) with the *intent* to illustrate and understand a unique intrinsic case; (4) through the collection of multiple forms of qualitative data; and (5) utilizing specific data analysis tools, to (6) produce a detailed report of findings of themes, issues, patterns, or explanations.

This method best addressed the research questions by specifically bounding the case to the formative years of NOFA and the coalition (~2003), throughout its mobilization and sustainment periods, to its ultimate denouement following the coalition's fragmentation, signed Cooperative Endeavor Agreement, and associated establishment of the replacement governance body, the Joint Development Committee, in 2013. In order to capture and understand the dynamics of the case, specific qualitative data sources were required which included in-depth interviews with key coalition actors and a multitude of federal, state, and local documents and reports.

Case Study Considerations

In this particular research design, the case study was the best methodology to use as the solution to answering the research questions, as the case study strengths outweighed its inherent limitations. Further, according to Creswell (2013, 2014) and Yin (2003), the case study offers a means of investigating complex social dynamics consisting of multiple variables of potential importance in understanding the overarching phenomenon. Because the Federal City project was anchored in a real-life situation and produced a rich and holistic account of a very unique phenomenon, this study offered insights and identified unanticipated underlying meanings that served to inform the scholarly literature.

Furthermore, according to Stake (2005), due to its strengths, the case study is considered a particularly appropriate design for applied fields of study such as education, social work, administration, and health. To that end, in the context of this case study research involving political power evolution of a coalition, the processes, problems, and programs that were examined brought about an understanding that, if accepted, could affect and perhaps even improve practice. Lastly, Yin (2003) states that “case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed...and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2003, p. 1). The “how” and “why” questions were addressed most aptly in the conduct of this research, as articulated in the latter chapters of this paper.

However, according to Creswell (2013), several intrinsic challenges also exist within qualitative case study research and development. First, the case selected may be too broad or too narrow in scope for appropriate analysis. The researcher must decide which bounded system (described within certain parameters) to study, understanding that there most likely are numerous

perspectives to select from. Second, the researcher must decide whether to study a single case or multiple cases, and know that the latter runs the risk of diluting the overall analysis. Lastly, selecting the case requires a determination of a specific rationale for the associated purposeful sampling strategy for selecting the case and for accumulating relevant information. Not having enough information to present an in-depth picture of the case jeopardizes the value of the study significantly.

Additionally, the special features of case study research that provide the rationale for its selection also present certain other limitations in its usage. Although rich, thick description and analysis of a phenomenon may be desired, a researcher may not have the time or money to devote to such an undertaking. And assuming time is available to produce a worthy case study, the product may be too lengthy, too detailed, or too involved for busy policy makers and practitioners to read and use. The amount of description, analysis, or summary material is up to the investigator. The researcher also must decide. "1. How much to make the report a story; 2. How much to compare with other cases; 3. How much to formalize generalizations or leave such generalizing to readers; 4. How much description of the researcher to include in the report; and, 5. Whether or not and how much to protect anonymity" (Stake, 2005, p. 460). Lastly, Yin (2003) points out three related critiques of the case study strategy: (1) lack of rigor on the part of the researcher, (2) provision of little foundation for scientific generalization, and (3) that they take too long and produce massive, unreadable documents and reports.

To address the weaknesses specific to this research design, the use of a data collection matrix that specifies the amount and depth of information to be collected mitigated detail gaps in knowledge. Further, specific attention was given to appropriately bounding the case in scope, place, and time. Also, the selection of a single case (e.g., the New Orleans Federal City project)

versus attempting to utilize a multiple case study design allowed for sufficient depth and relevance of data collection. Lastly, in addition to the above, tightly defining the research questions focused on producing well-supported articulated patterns or explanations significantly mitigated the weaknesses.

While other qualitative approaches such as narrative research or phenomenology could have been used to study the unique dynamics of NOFA and the Federal City project, I think that the case study's benefits greatly outweighed its risks. Reinforcing this conclusion, Zonabend (1992) also suggests that case studies are the preferred means to acquire an understanding of the views of the actors involved in a particular situation.

Qualitative Data Collection

In addressing the research questions, the collection of relevant, comprehensive, qualitative data was paramount to this study. Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) identify as least six sources of evidence in case studies that includes: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artifacts. For the purposes of this study, open source public information was available through various federal, state, city, and local government websites for acquiring substantial qualitative record data. Of these, the principle sources included the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of the Navy (DON), Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), BRAC Project Management Office (PMO) Commission, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USCOE), and various State of Louisiana, City of New Orleans, and local community agencies. Public information included investigative reports, records, minutes, archival material, photographs, video, transcripts, correspondence, and other related documentation available that was relevant to the study. Further, due to my current position as a federal civil service employee within the


Department of Defense, specifically within the U.S. Marine Corps, I had access to information and documentation not normally afforded the academic researcher.

The core of the qualitative data collected, however, was through 20 specific semi-structured personal interviews of selected key personnel from NOFA, ADD, the City of New Orleans, the State of Louisiana, and the Department of the Navy, to include several organizations within the U.S. Marine Corps. A complete listing of interviewed personnel is depicted in Appendix B (Participant Profile). The initial focus was on those personnel capable (and willing) to provide detailed information relating to NOFA, BRAC, and the Federal City project. The intended candidates were those with personal experience with both the BRAC process, specifically the decision to close the NSA; in addition to those intimately involved with the advocacy coalition (NOFA) and the Federal City campaign, from both a public and private perspective. All interviews included core interview questions, as listed in Appendix C, followed by additional questions tailored to the individual's specific role and experiences with the coalition and the Federal City project.

Other data included was the researcher's personal observations of the Federal City project in addition to the adjacent Algiers community. Although current (i.e, 2015) data collected is outside of the prescribed bounds of this case study, certain element proved useful in comparison to in-bound historical records. Similarly, historical photographs of the local Algiers community was another source of data collected. Several photographs served to underscore verbal and written descriptions, which added a depth of understanding as well as complementing critical coded data, summarized in themes and incorporated into the body of the study.

Data Organization

All data collected was appropriately labeled, categorized, and filed in a dissertation database (actually a spreadsheet but functioning as a database) created utilizing Microsoft Excel. The database served as a master index for cross-referencing all collected qualitative information. Within the file, separate tabs were created for different sources of information. The bulk of the collected data was from the interviews, with a separate tab for each respondent containing the coded data for each. A “roll-up” of all individual coded data was created to enable subsequent analysis. Figure XX below depicts a screenshot of the “BB” Tab which contains all coded data for the respondent Bob Braithwaite. This database proved exceptionally useful in collecting, categorizing, coding, and analyzing the qualitative data used in this research study.



Coding Matrix (BB)

Chronology (Phases)	
Phase A: Formation	2003 through May 2005
Phase B: Mobilization	June 2005 through Oct 2005
Phase C: Sustainment	Nov 2005 through 2010
Phase D: Fragmentation	2010 through 2013

Code (Perception of)	Pha	Theme	Perspecti	Quote	Responder	Pag	Line
BRAC	A	Narrative Shift	USMC	I also got to deal with one of the early iterations of BRAC...that's when one of the first BRACs occurred...and we were moving a lot of units around and that type of thing	BB	1	20
BRAC	A	Narrative Shift	USMC	I got to continue to be involved in BRAC because I was put in charge of moving the 5000 or so folks from the Navy Memphis that were going through "A" training up there down here...and that was three years of fun getting those people reestablished down here	BB	1	26
				I showed up the day before we evacuated for Ivan... which was an exciting reintroduction as we all scattered to the winds with no real plan that I could determine, and off we went...but			

... Theory vs Theme Theme vs Phase Themes & Codes Rollup BR&TE BB RB JC BD PD JB GP SS ...

Figure 17. Example of Coding Matrix from Coding Database

Validity

Creswell (2013) suggests eight strategies for qualitative research validity. Of these, this study focused primarily on three: triangulation through utilization of other sources of data than interviews; peer review to ensure data accuracy; and member-checking, reviewing certain data

points with participants. Multiple sources of data were used to corroborate developed themes, such as reconciling documented testimony with information captured during the information process. For example, the BRAC Commission testimony of General Mize on July 22, 2005 was compared to his transcript from his December 15, 2015 interview for validation and accuracy. Examples of other sources of data used for validation included the published minutes from the ADD (and later JDC) board meetings, excerpts from the NOFA/HRI law suit filings, and redundant published works. Additionally, the sheer number of participants (20) in the study allowed for an abundance of material for complementary and mutually supporting data for theme development.

To ensure the highest possible accuracy of captured interview data, all completed transcriptions were electronically reviewed by the respondents themselves. This additional activity allowed for not only a high degree of data precision, but also promoted trust and confidence with the respondents by providing them an opportunity to physically review their individual transcript. Furthermore, the electronic transcripts were used to construct the follow-on coding database through the cut/paste functions of the supporting software application, preventing inadvertent translation errors in copying source data. Lastly, select portions of the draft findings, analysis, and conclusion chapters were reviewed by varied colleagues for content accuracy and reliability. These colleagues have extensive knowledge of the dynamics of the Federal City case and provided verification of facts as they were presented in the paper. Further, oversight of the development of this research paper was provided by the dissertation committee, ensuring a high level of accountability of supporting material as it was used to construct the findings and conclusions.

Reliability

Additionally, Creswell's (2013, 2014) reliability checks include maintaining detailed field notes, using a high-quality medium for recording and transcribing the tape; and including the "trivial, but often crucial, pauses and overlaps" (p. 253). During the four-month interview process of this study, comprehensive handwritten notes were used to capture interview highlights and key points made by respondents. Also, all interviews were conducted utilizing a Sony ICD-PX440 Stereo IC Digital Recorder, which physically includes a USB for ease of mp3 audio file transfer to hosting computers. All interviews and their respective audio files were organized, stored, and managed in specific electronic folders for follow-on transcription. All transcriptions were conducted by a paid qualified court reporter utilizing state-of-the-art transcription tools and methods, to include multiple passes for validation of transcript accuracy. During the coding phase, relevant data was highlighted and subsequently hand-coded into the margins of each transcript for follow-on use in the construction of the coding database as mentioned previously.

Babbie (2014) also suggests several methods for ensuring reliability: (1) redundant subsamples of survey respondents to verify information; (2) replication of sampled coding by an independent agent; and (3) clarity, specificity, training, and practice. All three of Babbie's suggestions were integrated into the study. The collective attention to detail and commitment to data accuracy and reliability enabled complete confidence in the development of the paper's findings and conclusions.

Ethics

Additionally, elements of fundamental ethics were included in the study. Creswell (2013) offers several types of ethical considerations, the following of which was used in this research:

- Sought and received IRB approval.
- Gained permission from study participants and acquired signed consent forms.
- Identified a research problem that would benefit participants.
- Disclosed the purpose of the study to participants.
- Avoided deceiving and exploiting participants.
- Respected the privacy and anonymity of participants through the sealing of the paper.
- Communicated in clear, straightforward, appropriate language.

Babbie (2013) offers a similar listing of ethical standards to follow in Chapter 3 of his book. Periodic review of these key points throughout the study in addition to occasional ethics-related discussions with my dissertation committee ensured complete compliance at all times and prevented any inadvertent violations.

Role of the Researcher

As a retired U.S. Marine commissioned officer and current federal civil servant employed by the Marine Corps, my career has spanned 30 years of service, both in uniform and out. Half of this career has been spent at the Marine Forces Reserve Headquarters in New Orleans, at facilities aboard the former Naval Support Activity on the East Bank and then at the new Federal City complex. Having spent so much time in New Orleans in the employ of the military provides me an exceptional insight into the perspective of the serviceman stationed in New Orleans, but also a notable bias to the same. Arriving in the area in 2001, my presence enabled me “insider” access to the evolving dynamics of the impact of 9/11, the BRAC 2005 process, and the Federal City campaign from a ground floor perspective. Having a personal appreciation for the unique culture of New Orleans coupled with the insight of the Marine Corps ideology and related philosophies, motivated me to select the Federal City project as the topic for my dissertation research. Knowing many of the key players personally and actually living through the entire

Federal City campaign from inception to failure further drove me to want to understand what happened here, but more specifically how and why. Beyond the stated research questions, I have observed significant emotional controversy associated with the enduring nature of the Marine Corps' presence in New Orleans from the perspective of the Marines stationed here. I wanted to understand why, and, more importantly, the dynamics of the relationship between the military and the City of New Orleans from a cultural and political perspective.

Consequently, my personal experiences and knowledge of the Marine Corps required a conscious effort to remain the neutral researcher while collecting and analyzing data related to this study. I attempted to be objective wherever possible, but recognize that the validity of the findings may be slightly biased towards that of the Marine perspective. Notwithstanding that point, significant effort was applied to mitigating this bias as described earlier in this chapter.

Data Analysis

All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim and were accompanied by researcher field notes taken during the sessions and upon subsequent reflection. This data, along with all the other collected information, was coded in accordance with the prescribed coding index, developed by the researcher (as reflected in Chapter 8). Creswell (2013) describes the process of coding as “aggregating the text or visual data into smaller categories of information, seeking evidence for the code from different databases being used in the study, and then assigning a label to the code” (p. 184). Three types of codes were utilized in this study: (1) Deductive Codes—codes that are predetermined and emanate from the literature, (2) Inductive Codes—codes that emerge from the study's collected data, and (3) In Vivo Codes—a word or short phrase from the actual language found in the qualitative data record. Creswell (2014) suggests the use of a qualitative codebook, or a table that contains the indexed list of

predetermined (and emergent) codes used in the study. As mentioned previously, this coding schema is described and illustrated in the beginning of Chapter 8. As the collected data was summarily coded, themes were developed that illustrated patterns and relationships relevant to the research questions. Similarly, the resulting codes, themes, and chronology were depicted against the prevailing policy theories presented earlier to better understand any relationships (direct and indirect) of the complex dynamic of the Federal City project. The charts and graphs associated with this policy theory analysis will be presented in the latter chapters of this study. Figure XX below illustrates the policy interaction matrix utilized in this analysis.

Theory Interaction Matrix														
Theory		Theory Characteristics	Coalition Stage											
			Formation		Mobilization	Sustainment					Fragmentation			
			2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework	Acton: engaging in politics to translate their beliefs into action - Main focus is the subsystem - Focus is on how the coalition interprets and responds to events as external or internal shock				New Orleans Federal Alliance							Joint Development Committee	
MSA	Multiple Streams Analysis	- Interactions between wide group of actors in a policy community to refine solution - policy entrepreneurs searching for right time to propose solutions - Focusing events shift attention to the problem			Katrina					ADD Takeover				
NPF	Narrative Policy Framework	- Measures how narratives effect policymaking - Setting, characters, plot, and moral - Situated within the meso level of subsystems - Context important - Events treated as focusing events	"Save The Base"			"Rebuild New Orleans"							"New Orleans Riverside at Historic Algiers"	
PET	Punctuated Equilibrium Theory	- Subsystems are a source of stability, power, and policy continuity for long periods - Instability and major change born from interactions between policy subsystems and macro-political system - Unpredictable - Major events as catalysts			Katrina						Return to normal political subsystem			
GM	Urban Growth Machine	- Coalitions of land-based elites, tied to the economic possibilities of place, drive urban politics in their quest to expand the local economy and accumulate wealth - Places localities in chronic competition with one another, at their own risk				Project delays due to Katrina				Phase I Construction			Re-attempt Federal City (Phase II) to develop	

Figure 18. Theory Interaction Matrix

Coding and Theme Discussion

The below chart illustrates the code/theme distribution of the collected interview data,




Figure 19. Theme/Coding Distribution Chart

along with their respective percentages. The themes display a relatively equal distribution of coded data, with the exception of the Demonstrated Behavior theme, which shows a slight deviation from the mean of 20%, or approximately 6% more volume. Respondents spent a notable amount of time characterizing actors and their associated behavior.

For the first theme, New Orleans Governing Subsystems, the data clearly identifies “NOLA Military History”, “Culture of NOLA”, and “Local Politics” as the three most common codes present. However, only the latter code surfaced independently during the interviews, owing to the nature of the questions posed to the respondents (e.g., “can you please comment on the culture of New Orleans”). Military Quality of Life (QOL) was the second most common code (subject) present in the data beyond Local Politics.

The data categorized within the Demonstrated Behavior theme revealed an expected high volume of comment related to NOFA, General David Mize, ADD, and HRI/ECC, the primary actors within the coalition. However, what was unexpected was the high degree of discussion related to the Navy's behavior observed through the case study.

The third theme, Narrative Shift, revealed a collection of codes related to observed overarching storylines in motion during various times throughout the case study period. Of note, the Federal City Vision, Katrina, and the Navy Leaving dominated the coding volume, although Save the Base, Rebuild New Orleans, and BRAC carried significant weight. As will be discussed in the forthcoming subchapter, a sequence in narrative shift will be argued.

THEMES				
New Orleans Governing Subsystems	Demonstrated Behavior	Narrative Shift	Legal Negotiations, Conflict, and Resolution	Views of Success and Failure
<i>Numerous underlying subsystems were prevalent during the case study parameters which appeared to greatly influence both actor behavior and project outcome. They varied by phase and intensity.</i>	<i>Distinctly different individual actor/group characteristics, motivations, and actions were reported throughout the coalition's life cycle. All actor behavior can (will) be classified as a combination of four behavioral tendencies: Idealistic, Cunning, Opportunistic, and Altruistic. Certain catalysts across the phases influenced changes in behavior.</i>	<i>Throughout the phases of the coalition's life cycle, narratives appear to evolve over time; this alters the dynamics of actor behavior and the project's developmental progress.</i>	<i>Distinct legal interactions amongst select factions had profound effects upon both the coalition's solvency and the project's viability.</i>	<i>Differing perspectives of success and/or failure were observed at different levels and at different times.</i>
<u>Codes:</u> NOLA Military History (37) Culture of NOLA (35) Local Politics (30) Military QOL (19) Economics (7) Ideology (5)	<u>Codes:</u> NOFA (53) MGen David Mize (35) Navy (33) ADD (29) HRI/ECC (20) Marines (15) Governor/State (11) Mayor/City (8) Lawyers (8) JDC (6) Jeff Arnold (5) BRAC PMO (3) Jackie Clarkson (2)	<u>Codes:</u> Federal City vision (38) Navy leaving (36) Katrina (35) Save the Base (20) BRAC (20) Rebuild New Orleans (13) Master Plan (7) NOLA as a Navy Town (4)	<u>Codes:</u> Navy Lease (60) Coalition Conflict (43) NOFA vs ADD (27) Developer Selection (8) BRAC language (8) Law suits (8) Coop Endeav Agree/JDC (8) NDAA/Fee Simple Xfer (7) NOFA vs HRI (3) Master Plan (2)	<u>Codes:</u> Lessons Learned (51) Critique (46) Marine View (14) Future Risk (13) Metaphors (13) Algiers Community (9) Federal Government (7) City of New Orleans (5) Symbology (2) Developer (2)

Figure 20. Theme and Code Table

Legal Negotiations, Conflict, and Resolution highlight the Navy Lease negotiations, the BRAC testimony and language, and the conflict amongst the coalition partners – particularly

between ADD and HRI - as the primary most voluminous coded data within this theme. Lastly, Views of Success and Failure offers significant commentary related to a critique of the project and the coalition's internal dynamics. The majority of the coded data in this category presents a declaration of project failure as the most common code. Lastly, Views of Success and Failure capture significant testimonial related to overarching opinions of respondents regarding the project. The phrase Lessons Learned was used to collate specific observed takeaways that serve as prescriptive guidelines for complex projects such as this one. Significant commentary and critique was also grouped into this theme, which will be covered in the forthcoming Findings subchapters.

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS

Overview

As the reader may have inferred by now, this is a classic tale of the universal struggle over control of land and resources. As described in the previous chapter, what was discovered through research and data analysis were five principle themes, each of which will be covered individually in the following pages in the form of Findings. First, it was determined that numerous underlying subsystems were prevalent during the case study parameters which appeared to influence both actor behavior and project outcome, varying by phase and intensity. Second, it was observed that different individual actor/group characteristics, motivations, and actions were reported throughout the coalition's life cycle. All actor behavior was subsequently classified as a combination of four behavioral tendencies: Idealistic, Cunning, Opportunistic, and Altruistic. Certain catalysts across the phases influenced changes in behavior. Third, throughout the phases of the coalition's life cycle, overarching narratives appear to evolve over time; this alters the dynamics of actor behavior and the project's developmental progress. Fourth, distinct legal interactions amongst select factions had profound effects upon both the coalition's solvency and the project's viability. And lastly, differing perspectives of success and/or failure were observed at different levels and at different times.

Taken together, the five subchapters portray a complicated and emotionally charged case, rooted in history and ripe for detailed analysis. As can be inferred from the brief overview above, the findings have an inherent “flow” to them in the order in which they are presented. Consequently, the subsystems that govern New Orleans society will be explored first.

CHAPTER 5A

GOVERNING SUBSYSTEMS

Introduction

The research revealed several observations regarding New Orleans as viewed through its myriad of governing subsystems that appear to influence societal activity, particularly as it relates to the Federal City project and the coalition charged to bring it to fruition. As illustrated through the description of the city's deep history, these subsystems are found to be rooted deeply into the fabric of the city's culture, shaped by over 240 years of military integration, in peacetime and war, during periods of prosperity, through natural disasters, and their aftermath. Furthermore, the direct contact between varied military forces and the local New Orleans populace have created a society with a shared heritage and culture, but one with differing institutional values.

Military integration

The visibility and overt activity of the military in this region has ebbed and flowed throughout history; a social integration exists that has been cemented into the day-to-day functionality of certain portions of New Orleans society. Interviews with high-ranking military personnel reinforce this claim. LtGen Richard Mills, a former Marine Commander who was stationed in New Orleans, states:

“I think this assignment here is probably unique among Marine Corps flag officer assignments because I think, in regards to the city of New Orleans, so much of what you do...the personal and the professional...are intertwined” (Mills, 2015).

Additionally, a retired Marine Lt Colonel who also was stationed here for many years comments:

“I mean, the city itself, you know... it was a symbiotic relationship...that was always a point of pride. And the military contributed and was supported very positively by the people and the political class of New Orleans” (Quinton, 2015).

The visibility of the relationship between the Marines and the city of New Orleans significantly was enhanced during the early 1990s when MARRESFOR/MARFORRES was created, and Major (and then Lieutenant) General Livingston was appointed as the Commanding General.

“He [Maj Gen Livingston] always wanted to stay in New Orleans too. You know, that was his predisposition...And that basically anchored us here...at that point in time, then Marine Forces Reserve headquarters was synonymous with New Orleans. I mean, the relationship was definitely cemented and solidified” (Quinton, 2015).

LtGen Livingston, a Medal of Honor recipient from his actions during the Vietnam War, was assimilated immediately into the New Orleans social and political stratum upon his arrival – a position from which he took advantage of in securing a more visible presence for the Marines in town. His actions shaped many of the enduring relationships that are present today with the Mayor’s office, civic, and business leaders, in addition to galvanizing the retired military community in the region. In short, his national status as a recognized war hero propelled the Marine Corps’ notoriety in town to one of popularity, in contrast to the Navy’s waning (soon to be gone) presence. For example, his utilization of the Marine Forces Reserve marching band, along with other instruments of publicity such as color guards and Toys For Tots events, greatly reinforced this popularity to the citizens of New Orleans. Livingston’s successors – especially David Mize – would continue to expand on the foothold established, culminating with the Federal City saga, and beyond.

Importance of History

Numerous references to history were made by several respondents in the context of the enduring relationship between the City of New Orleans and the military. Gregg Habel, a retired Marine Colonel and current Executive Director of MARFORRES, states:

“For the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps has felt a loyalty to the city...I certainly think the Marine Corps as an institution values its history and its tradition more so than the other services. So we had a strong history here, you know, dating all the way back to the

War of 1812...the very large garrison that was stationed here. So I think there was a desire on the part of the Marine Corps to continue to honor that history, that tradition, that relationship” (Habel, 2015).

Ron Bald, a retired New Orleans U.S. Coast Guard Commander and Deputy Counsel for MARFORRES, supports this theme. He states:

“...there's so much history that people here do not want to lose, whereas in other places they want... I've seen where they want to get rid of the history” (Bald, 2015).

Furthermore, LtGens Bergman (also a former Commander of MARFORRES) and Mills offer more commentary regarding the subject:

“Well, any group who walks around in their War of 1812 costumes as often as they can goes without saying that there is a long history and a proud history of being tied to the military” (Bergman, 2015).

“I think the city has a sense of history and a sense of how the military plays into that history, and unlike most American cities it appreciates that... and I think that’s a lot of where we get the spirit of welcoming us, embracing us, and working with us because they really do appreciate it, where I really do think some of the other cities have forgotten that” (Mills, 2015).

The history of the military’s integration into the New Orleans culture has been evidenced over two centuries. With the expansion of the Marine Corps Reserve headquarters role in New Orleans along with its accompanying senior-level brass, the military’s influence and visibility was greatly enhanced over the past two decades. At a time when the Navy was “looking for the door”, the Marines were “digging in”, whether each recognized it or not at the time.

In order to better understand the relationship between the military and the region, the origins of the New Orleans culture is examined, as will be articulated in the next section. The research revealed that the local culture influenced the conduct of the coalition in the context of the project’s planning, execution, and ultimate demise.

Cultural background

Louisiana, and specifically New Orleans, has a very unique culture, formed from a multitude of sources over centuries, but based mostly upon its French ancestry. The bulk of this ancestry in southern Louisiana is a result of the migration of thousands of French settlers from an area called Acadia, in what is presently Nova Scotia. During the early 1600s, colonists from France were among the first Europeans to settle in North America. Following England's possession of Nova Scotia in 1713, many attempts to convert the French inhabitants into English subjects were made, often meeting with violent resistance. Consequently, thousands of French Acadians were deported in 1755, many of which eventually migrating to Louisiana. By the early 1800s, thousands had made their way to Louisiana, settling along the southern parishes of the Mississippi River delta and New Orleans. "These immigrants brought with them a history and view of government unlike those of the landed gentry in the northern part of the state" (Parent, 2004).

This French heritage was revealed in several interviews in the context of describing the New Orleans culture. According to SES Gregg Habel:

"Well first and foremost, the *mélange*, the mixture of people that live here...French at one point was the official language of this city and still has a place. I think that makes it more European than any other city in the U.S....the system of French laws that are here, the language, I don't think you will find any other city in the country that has as strong a language – foreign language influence. And that appeals to me" (Habel, 2015).

Colonel Bubba Deckert, a retired Marine and multi-generational descendent of New Orleans heritage, articulates his thoughts regarding the French heritage:

"New Orleans is arguably less French than it ever has been as far as blood and ethnicity and more French than it ever was in its attitude of rules are for other people. We have all the same rules that everybody else has. We just don't really follow them. And we have an unwritten concept here that doesn't work in other places. It's called...there's good corruption and bad corruption" (Deckert, 2015).

Additionally, a comparison of New Orleans to other locations was made by a gentleman of Cuban descent that developed the Master Plan for Federal City:

“New Orleans was kind of the jewel city of the Caribbean. It was a Caribbean city and it was the best of the Caribbean cities and when you compared it against the efficiency and the level of government and stuff like that with other Caribbean cities, it was near the top of the list. But it was a Caribbean city and that's how it developed initially” (Mize, 2015)

In this context, New Orleans was considered a vital node in the regional trade routes along with the other main cities of Cuba and the Caribbean during the 1800s and beyond, and as such, received (and provided) a significant diffusion from (and to) other cultures. The many characteristics that could be used to describe the New Orleans culture are all deeply rooted in the depth and breadth of its historical origins as described so far. The research validated a very interesting relationship, as the below figure illustrates through a simple tree metaphor, between a society's history, culture, subsystems, ideology, philosophy, and values/beliefs.




Figure 21. Tree Analogy

On a community level, differences within the New Orleans culture also exist not only between neighborhoods separating class and ethnic distinctions (e.g., Metairie versus Bywater,

Uptown versus Mid-City, etc.), but also on a broader level such as East Bank versus West Bank cultural differences. Bill Garrett, a retired Navy Captain who served as the NSA New Orleans Executive Officer prior to its closure (and current employee of ADD), explains this point:

“Completely different cultures on the East and West bank. Well the East bank is more driven to the City of New Orleans, French Quarter, that kind of food and music and culture and activities that you see in downtown New Orleans and the Quarter. On the West bank, you know, you’re driven to Algiers which is a much smaller community in this area, but historic Algiers has been around, you know, since the 1500s. So it’s a very old community. So centered around historic Algiers point as opposed to the Quarter which is completely different demographic. Different style of culture...” (Garrett, 2015).

Importance of Social Background

Anyone who is from New Orleans or has lived there for a substantial period of time takes for granted many of the unique social architectural “protocols” that guide much of the personal interaction and behavior. Colonel Deckert again offers his insight:

“So you’ve been in New Orleans long enough to know that you do what your family did whether you like it or not and you go to school where your father went. So my dad and his family all grew up in the 9th Ward so they went to Holy Cross. So even though I grew up out by the lake, I went to Holy Cross which is now out by my house” (Deckert, 2015).

Relatedly, Dell Dempsey, a retired Marine Colonel and former member of LED and NOFA, states her thoughts on the subject:

“If you didn’t go to Jesuit, then maybe I don’t need to help you out. I remember we were in a meeting once with some engineering outfit. They were going to put in a bid and we were meeting with them. And the guy gets in the room with Mize and me and I think Bill Ryan. And the first question out of his mouth to Dave is, so where did you go to school? And Dave goes, well I went to the Naval Academy. No, no, high school. Where did you go to high school?” (Dempsey, 2015).

Colonel Dempsey also provides a related point captured during her interview that describes social boundaries created generations ago that left their mark on the present day laydown of New Orleans:

“You can see that evidenced by the fact that the whole garden district was developed by the Americans that came later because the French Quarter wouldn’t – the old city

wouldn't have anything to do with them. And I truly, truly think that if you really look back at history that that is absolutely at the base of why everything is so closed...insulated" (Dempsey, 2015).

The complex social subsystem of New Orleans plays an important role in the local cultural dynamic, as evidenced by multiple respondents.

Legal Subsystem

Within the New Orleans culture, a dominant subsystem involves the unique application of State law, especially within the business world, as compared to the rest of the nation. Colonel Deckert, also a practicing Louisiana attorney, offers a very detailed explanation in layman's terms:

"The concept of, oh, our law is so different here. It's because of the Napoleonic code. We have about as much Napoleonic code left in Louisiana code as there is Napoleon left. But every law school outside Louisiana... every lawyer that goes to a law school outside Louisiana only knows one thing about Louisiana. They spent three years being explained a concept of law and then having the following phrase added at the end: "except in Louisiana". So they have got it engrained in their head that it's just so different. It's not. As a Louisiana lawyer, it's not" (Deckert, 2015).

Deckert further explains the process by which a legal challenge is logically resolved locally as compared to the rest of the nation and the world:

"Mentally how you get there may be different, but you get to the same place. But the mental process by which we get there is the way the rest of the world does it. It's just because France has a civil code, Spain has a civil code, Germany has a civil code, Switzerland has a civil code, and Mexico has a civil code. Everybody but the United States. So it's the United States that's the odd man out. Everybody is not like the United States. The United States is the one that's different. And New Orleans in particular, Louisiana in general, but New Orleans in particular ain't like the rest of the United States and that's why it's a little bit – foreigners have an easier time fitting into the culture often than other Americans do because of that" (Deckert, 2015).

"But you're always going to the same place within the law. It's just one group is always taught to go to the left and the other group is taught to go to the right. Nothing more than that" (Deckert, 2015).

This explanation illuminates how the legal subsystem furthers the distinctiveness of the New Orleans culture.

Business Subsystem

Relatedly, the societal mechanics of conducting business within New Orleans also appears unique. Colonel Deckert's candid explanation:

"When people from other places come down here and they try and do things – they have been successful wherever they were and they try and do things down here and they are stymied at every turn. And you hear it from folks who are new New Orleanians all the time. You can't do business in New Orleans. If you're not on the inside, you can't get anything done. And those statements are both true and false... You figure you should be able to just follow the rules, except when you come here and then you have to act more like you went to a different country" (Deckert, 2015).

"How you do stuff in New Orleans. If you want a permit, you can go down and apply or you can go and talk to the guy who is there and give him two tickets to the circus that's in town and ask him to get what you want. Is it right? You can argue that. Does it work? That's the way it kind of works" (Deckert, 2015).

Both the legal and business subsystems described above were less prominent during the interviews, but are considered foundational in understanding the primacy of the political subsystem of New Orleans – arguably at the heart of the New Orleans culture that drove coalition behavior.

Political Subsystem

The research revealed that the political culture of New Orleans is also unique, not only to the region but to the nation as a whole. According to a local Pulitzer-prize winning journalist:

"Louisiana is our most exotic state. It is religious and roguish, a place populated by Cajuns, Creoles, Christian Conservatives, rednecks, African Americans, and the white working-class New Orleanians. While northern Louisiana is mostly Protestant and conservative, southern Louisiana, settled by French Catholics, is noted for its love of good food, good music, and good times. *Laissez les Bons Temps Rouler* – Let the Good Times Roll – is the unofficial motto. It is notably poor in the realm of political ethics" (Bridges, 2001).

Politics played a very important role in the conduct of the coalition's solvency throughout its entire existence, but especially during the mobilization and fragmentation phases. The discussion of the political subsystem will begin at the State level and develop further through the city to the coalition level.

State Politics

As Parent asserts, Louisiana, shaped by early immigration patterns, is an ideologically divided State, with the northern and central portions, which includes the capital of Baton Rouge, is culturally different than the southern portion, which includes New Orleans and the southern parishes. As he states, "North Louisiana most readily and vividly fits the standard of southern culture. From politics to food, north Louisiana seems more like a southern state than does the French coast. It is more chicken-fried steak and barbeque than jambalaya and etouffee." Conversely, "the social and cultural liberalism of south Louisiana is most visibly reflected in alcohol and gambling issues but clearly extends to racial issues as well. It is not the food or the music. It is an extremely different cultural heritage" (Parent, 56).

According to one of the respondents who happened to serve in a key post within the State's Economic Development department:

"I think at the state level, this is a state divided against itself...north Louisiana hates south Louisiana. Everybody in the north cannot stand New Orleans, but everybody knows New Orleans is feeder for the rest of the state. So that's a big problem when it comes to Baton Rouge politics. And you can see it when you go to these committee hearings and watch who testifies for what and how the money kind of flows. And I think those two things are just really, really big. And I think that at the time of Katrina, there was just so much public corruption here" (Dempsey, 2015).

New Orleans Politics

The political dynamic of New Orleans captured in the interviews can best be described as a throwback to the earlier days of urban political bosses and political machines that once dominated the business landscape. As Colonel Dempsey explains:

“Well it's a city that resists change unlike any other place I have ever been. As was witnessed by all the people that wanted to move in here and do great real-estate development projects after the storm and they couldn't make it through the bureaucracy of the city. And I think it is -- the political machine in New Orleans” (Dempsey, 2015).

Corruption

One cannot mention the phrase “New Orleans politics” in conversation without thoughts of corruption entering the equation. Unfortunately for the citizens of southern Louisiana, political corruption is not just buried in its colorful past, highlighted by the infamous stories of Huey Long, Edwin Edwards, and David Duke. Contemporary times have also born witness to the continuation of Louisiana’s politically corrupt culture, as illustrated through the indictments (and convictions) of former Mayor Ray Nagin and Representative William Jefferson. “Although the political reputation of Louisiana is certainly a reputation for corruption, corruption is only part of a much broader pattern of peculiarity. The constitutions, the governor’s office, the legislature, the courts, the voting system, and even the local governments are immersed in a common political culture that has shaped and defined them. Viewed more broadly, the political culture of Louisiana is a culture of volatility, instability, and constant competition” (Parent, 2004). Not surprisingly, the notion of corruption surfaced on numerous occasions during the interviews in the context of characterizing New Orleans politics. General David Mize offers:

“Well New Orleans is a unique city. Now not to say it doesn’t have some of the political challenges and corruptions as any other city does, but it’s a little different. And part of my characterization of New Orleans is it’s the best of the best and the worst of the worst” (Mize, 2015).

“New Orleans has some characteristics of a third-world city that most of our other American cities don’t have. That has some good things and some bad things. One of the things that I think is tremendous about New Orleans, it has a great sense of family. You know, families are close knit and stick together... But the downside of that is you get so enamored with your families that in the political and business world, you know, that’s your primary. So you’ll take your family or extended family or whatnot right after corruption or whatnot. And suddenly that’s not so bad because you are just taking care of your family. And so that has offered up over the years a lot more of an acceptance of this lower level graft and corruption type thing” (Mize, 2015).

Colonel Dempsey offers additional points:

“But here’s one thing about this culture that I think is very germane to why they are corrupt: they didn’t ask to be part of the United States. They got sold into it. And when that happened – when that Louisiana Purchase happened in 1803, these people down here just circled the wagons” (Dempsey, 2015).

“The only place where there is more public corruption than in New Orleans is Washington, D.C” (Dempsey, 2015).

Patronage

The concept of patronage was also quite common a reference during the interviews, especially in the context of contemporary generally accepted local politics. Colonel Deckert attempts to clarify the dynamic and offer an explanation as to its origins:

“The neighborhoody aspect of New Orleans by default if not design creates teams. Those teams extend into political life. So always teams. And you always had your elected officials at whatever level. So it is wrong for an elected official to take a bribe and do X, Y, and Z; particularly if it’s for somebody outside the neighborhood. However, nobody thinks it’s wrong for their elected official to get them out of a speeding ticket or get the sidewalk in front of their house fixed. Everywhere else it would be, you know, you talk to the appropriate agency and the agency comes out and does it because that’s what the agency does” (Deckert, 2015).

“Here, very much more patronage...Which goes back to a European concept of having a patron or patron who looks out for the little people who you in turn vote for and do all that sort of stuff” (Deckert, 2015).

“[As an example of patronage...] I worked on the Jeff Arnold campaign. I need the sidewalk fixed in front of my house. I call Jeff Arnold, the sidewalk gets fixed in front of my house. We call that working. That’s the way it works. Other people would call the Department of Streets and then wonder why it takes six months for them to come out. The guy across the street calls some dude he knows and it’s fixed” (Deckert, 2015).

Coalition Politics

Having a better understanding now of how deep the political subsystem pervaded the qualitative data, it is of no surprise that politics was the most common topic brought up during the interviews, and by all respondents despite their differing perspectives. Politics was the one common thread throughout examination of all other contributing subsystems. Without focusing on the individual behavior of the various actors (covered in the next chapter), the following personal accounts illustrate how deeply politics were rooted in the political dynamics of the coalition. Greg Preston, the Navy PMO representative from Philadelphia, provides comment relating to the subject from his observations:

“The local politics were tremendous. Jeff Arnold and, you know, with the local government there; that played a huge role” (Preston, 2015).

Kristen Palmer, former New Orleans Councilperson, provides her opinion:

“How many politicians have you heard say it's because of them that we have Federal City? Every single one. Jackie, Jim, Jeff. I mean, just all of them” (Palmer, 2015).

“I think it is very rare that you find people in office that are visionaries that have -- you have lots of visionaries, but visionaries that have the ability to produce” (Palmer, 2015).

Eddie Boetner, the Chief Administrative Officer for HRI/ECC, also states his opinion relating to local politics in the context of the Federal City project:

“It all went sideways once the politicians got involved” (Boettner, 2015).

“In Algiers, you had politicians vying for the same vote” (Boettner, 2015).

“Elected officials couldn't get out of their own way” (Boettner, 2015).

Colonel Deckert tries to explain the political dynamic from his perspective:

“So this is a new housing development that just appeared, yet they're not my constituents; yet they are my constituents; yet they're not my constituents. They may ask me for services but yet they don't vote for me. They may ask me for services but they don't pay

taxes. You've got businesses here that you're keeping the sales taxes on I'm not getting. I've got to provide for the roads and the police and everything else and I'm not getting any juice out of this squeeze? Of course there is going to be a conflict with that” (Deckert, 2015).

Paul Purpura, a journalist working for the New Orleans Times-Picayune covering the military desk for years, comments on his observed tension within the coalition:

“So there was a lot of friction between Jeff Arnold and City Hall. And I think Federal City was another piece of that too because you see Jeff Arnold was pushing to take over” (Purpura, 2015).

Bob Braithwaite, a retired Marine Colonel and former SES Executive Director of MARFORRES, describes the pejorative nature of local politicians in the context of the Federal City project:

“...everybody in New Orleans was content to let NOFA run with this ball until NOFA was approaching the goal line, and then all of sudden people woke up to the fact that “wow, there's a lot of money involved here,” “there's a lot of money involved with NOFA”...and when the politicians in New Orleans, as they always do, start smelling money they want to be involved” (Braithwaite, 2015).

Ron Bald echoes the sentiment:

“General Mize was always concerned that the politicians would screw it up...always concerned about that... he mentioned that when they went out for bids for the initial developer he had claimed he had people come to him and say they were not going to go to New Orleans because we didn't want to deal with politics, and the bribes, and the payoffs, and everything else. As the project began to evolve Mize I think got more and more concerned that the politicians were trying to get their piece of everything and he became much more defensive against the politicians (Bald, 2015).

Lastly, Admiral John Cotton, former Commander of the Naval Reserve Force (NAVRESFOR), offers an explanation of the local politics associated with the project:

“So they had some key individuals doing that stuff. So it really comes down to the people, their personalities, and what committees they're on and then what friends they make. And the definition of politics is compromise. And what deals they made with others to compromise on other issues to get funding. Okay. So could some strong politician from the past get a couple hundred million dollars -- I'm making this up -- appropriated to throw toward a federal city and then we would build it and they would

come, right? Well sometimes they would only come if they were directed” (Cotton, 2015).

Taken collectively, the overarching tone of the respondents when speaking of local politics was one of negativity and contempt. Local politics, and local politicians, represented the dominant subsystem associated with the Federal City project and with the coalition’s solvency.

Structural Subsystem (Quality of Life)

In contrast to the negativity attendant to the political perspective of New Orleans, all respondents universally appreciated the positive aspects of the New Orleans culture from a social perspective. Mr. Habel offers his personal view:

“I pretty much fell in love with the city at that time. On a personal level, I have a very personal connection in the city in the sense that I very much like the culture here and the – and that goes beyond just the food and music. That applies to the people and the historical nature of the city which I think is unrivaled anywhere in the country” (Habel, 2015).

Similarly, Ron Bald states:

“New Orleans has always seemed like a neighborhood...even if it is in downtown at the central business district that there is a friendly neighborhood feel to this” (Bald, 2015).

“It’s not like that anywhere else that I have been. Everywhere else it is just stay to yourself, don’t care about anybody, be independent, put your head down, walk away, and here it’s exactly the opposite. People come and ask if they can help you... people want you to be part of their community; they like it when you volunteer for stuff; they want you to be part of their kid’s lives, in part of their lives” (Bald, 2015).

LtGen Rich Mills reinforces this sentiment:

“I think others who come here and are stationed here – I count myself among them – they fall in love with the city...they fall in love with the way of life...they fall in love with the culture...they fall in love with the lifestyle...the “joie de vivre”, the joy of life, the “laissez les bons temps rouler”, all that kind of thing. And so I think it’s...its attractive” (Mills, 2015).

New Orleans Considered a Hardship Tour for the Military

Notwithstanding the general warmth exhibited above, there is another side to the story. For decades, the military stationed in New Orleans have shared mixed feeling about the tour of duty there. New Orleans' reputation as a cultural icon for good times and good food is difficult to mimic elsewhere within the nation. However, despite these characteristics which enable a top tourist destination city, lies significant Quality of Life (QOL) issues that have plagued military families for years. These QOL issues include the city's high crime rate, poor quality public schools, expensive car insurance rates, intemperate climate, and poor state of infrastructure. Many respondents described this pattern in regards to the military and New Orleans as a tour of duty. Habel offers:

“My opinion, it has been problematic for both services getting people to come be stationed here. And that is mostly tied to two issues: significant violent crime rate...the other is the school system...which is one of the lowest quality public school systems in the country” (Habel, 2015).

“We realize though that a really nice building in itself does not make a quality of life aspect of encouraging people to take orders and come down here. But it is a large part of it” (Habel, 2015).

“I think the original plan...was that you would have other federal organizations that wanted to live here. And that by the nature of having several organizations here, you would improve security; you would be able to influence the quality of the schools around here” (Habel, 2015).

General Mize, a staunch advocate for military families stationed in New Orleans, states:

“I thought the quality of life was so bad down here and we needed to do something for the folks that were assigned down here” (Mize, 2015).

Long-time New Orleans resident Purpura reaffirms this sentiment:

“The cost of living, apartments for your lower enlisted folks; schools, education, you know. All these things that were ailing that hurt the New Orleans area as a duty station. New Orleans is okay as long as you don't have kids” (Purpura, 2015).

“I live in the city and I put my kids through Catholic schools. I'm not going to send them to the public schools here” (Purpura, 2015).

In fact, for the Full Time Support (FTS) servicemen within the Marine Corps Active Reserve (AR) Program and the Navy's Training for Active Reserve (TAR) Program, service in New Orleans at one of the Reserve headquarters was (is) considered mandatory for career advancement. Bill Garrett states:

“So it wasn't seen as the most desirable place to be on active duty for somebody that's, you know, you would rather be at the Pentagon. You know, if you're going to be on a major staff, you know, the joke that I used to have is, well, if I'm stationed in New Orleans, there are going to be my brown heel marks drug all the way up I-10 (Garrett, 2015).

Admiral Cotton comments on the career implications related to New Orleans as a duty station:

“I'll just say this -- in the Naval Reserve, if you didn't, as an FTS, go to New Orleans, you didn't get promoted. And so at your peril, you stayed with the fleet in San Diego or Norfolk and did fleet business or did the centers or the regions or whatever else. If you didn't come to New Orleans, you weren't making O-6 maybe; certainly not flag” (Cotton, 2015).

“And I remember sitting on selection boards of guys that were, you know, top gun graduates; big ship drivers. And we can't make them admiral because they didn't have a New Orleans tour. And I'm saying, what a culture we've built as a result of this” (Cotton, 2015).

“And so I thought looking at the New Orleans area, if you take all those billets and put them in San Diego, Norfolk, D.C., Millington and align them with the Navy, you would get people to live there a little longer or be less afraid of moving there again so you might improve the quality of life for those sailors if we align it to the fleet concentration areas” (Cotton, 2015).

Financial Ability to Mitigate

The research revealed that the ability to either accept or mitigate QOL issues is primarily conditional upon possessing the financial means to do so:

- Choosing to live in safer neighborhoods in order to avoid crime areas, but is often much more costly.
- Choosing to enroll children in private schools to avoid poor-performing public schools, but is often very costly.

- Northshore communities are generally safer and have good public schools but are generally more costly and require an extended commute time (hour+).

Residents with financial means choose to live in neighborhoods on either the Southshore that offer security (e.g., Metairie, Uptown, Garden District, Lakefront, English Turn, etc.) or in communities on the Northshore (e.g., Slidell, Mandeville, Covington, Madisonville). Most Southshore residents with school-age children that can afford it often place their children in private schools (e.g., Holy Cross, Jesuit, Brother Martin, etc.). Most residents in this category on the Northshore utilize public schools within the St. Tammany Parish system, which has consistently ranked top in the State for education. Residents without financial means are forced to accept the risks associated with a degraded QOL in order to live within their individual means.

Transient personnel (e.g., the military), follow the same pattern. However, the military has the additional option of securing government-provided family housing (at the cost of their Housing Allowance) aboard NAS/JRB Belle Chasse and, on a limited basis, PPV housing aboard Federal City. The military choosing to live on the South shore, regardless of financial means, has the opportunity to place their children into the K-8 grade Belle Chasse Academy and the 9-12 grade NOMMA at Federal City. Military families with financial means, consisting mostly of the officers and senior enlisted personnel, share the same housing opportunities as traditional New Orleans area residents. However, military families without financial means, which consists mostly of the junior enlisted personnel, are similarly limited in their options alike New Orleans residents. However, the QOL issues described earlier are very prominent in the areas of the West Bank that surround both NAS/JRB Belle Chasse and Federal City in addition to many Orleans Parish communities on the East Bank.

GIS Map Discussion

To support the explanation offered above, several maps were created utilizing Geospatial Information System tools, specifically ESRI's ArcGIS software. The collected was a March 2016 pull of all Marines that were stationed with MARFORRES and its subordinate commands as of 2015. The 716 addresses used were plotted in four distinct categories to illustrate any residence patterns: Junior enlisted (E1-E4); Sergeants (E5s); Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs, E6-E9); and Commissioned Officers (W1-O6). Each plot utilized a heat map schema in order to show concentrations of residences throughout the region.

Beginning with the junior enlisted personnel (26%), the map reveals that the vast majority of the young Marines live aboard JRB/NAS Belle Chasse in either the family housing or in the bachelor barracks. Very little option exists for this low income group beyond the resources provided by the DOD installation and the limited infrastructure of Plaquemines Parish. The second map portrays the E5 Sergeants, accounting for about 21% of the population plotted. As can be inferred, this category begins to expand beyond the confines of the base support system and into the adjacent neighborhoods on the West Bank portions of Orleans Parish and even into select communities on the East Bank and into Slidell on the Northshore. The third category of servicemen, the SNCOs (33%), continues this residence expansion further away from the bases and into the heart of New Orleans, Metairie, and the Northshore communities. Lastly, the officers provide the greater expansion, heavily populating the nicer neighborhoods throughout Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Tammany Parishes. Their physical residential presence on the Northshore is notable, as is the high density aboard the single-family homes aboard Federal City, Old Algiers, English Turn and the many Uptown neighborhoods.

To reinforce the point made earlier concerning financial means and its relationship to housing location, the following information is presented relating to earned income of the military groups characterized. The average yearly income, which includes Basic Pay, Military Housing Allowance, and Basic Allowance for Subsistence, is as follows: For the E-4 Corporal with 4 years of service and a family, his annual income before taxes is \$48,300. An E-5 Sergeant with 8 years of service and a family earns about \$57,500 annually. A Gunnery Sergeant (E-7) with 16 years of service and a family earns over \$75,600, while a 22-year Master Gunnery Sergeant (E-9) makes over \$98,000 a year. The officer corps earns slightly more salary: a Captain (O-3) with dependents and 8 years of service earns \$93,336 annually; a Major with 14 years of service and a family, \$114,240; while a 22-year Colonel with dependents draws a solid \$150,000 per year.

There is a stark contrast in salary between the young enlisted family and the middle-aged Colonel's family. This dramatic difference in financial means enables significant lifestyle options and opportunities for those senior in rank and time in service. While these options to mitigate the quality of life issues described exist for some, however, they don't exist for nearly half of the military personnel stationed in New Orleans. While none of this information is considered groundbreaking, it describes a very important structural issue for the military, especially in the context of the Marine Corps' decision to remain in New Orleans and take stock in the Federal City prophesy to alleviate the QOL burden for its young Marines.

As illustrated in the preceding charts, the settlement patterns for the uniformed personnel have an explainable logic, as articulated in the narrative offered. However, it was also noted that all of the Marine General Officers and civilian Select Executive Service (SES) interviewed universally considered New Orleans a wonderful place to live, despite the quality of life issues plaguing the younger Marines and Sailors. This is most likely attributable to the fact that their

individual financial means allows them to embrace a social and economic lifestyle that avoids the unpleasantities endured by the young troops. As Marine LtGen Rich Mills states:

“But its a unique city...I can’t think of any other city that I’ve been stationed in...that has such a love and respect and inclusiveness for their Marines...and all the military” (Mills, 2015).

“I think it’s just coming down here, appreciating the lifestyle, and for once you’re really integrated into the civilian world and the civilian culture; and so you stay when you retire...because, unlike say Camp Lejeune North Carolina, where its very insular and very Marine-ish, here you live in this city, you live in a very civic society, you live in a very cultured society, you live in one that appreciates a lot of fun...and so I think that is part of it” (Mills, 2015).

However, the sole Navy Admiral interviewed, John Cotton, had a slightly different opinion, although he personally never lived in New Orleans nor was he culturally assimilated as was his Marine brethren:

“Do I like New Orleans? Yeah. Would I go down there tomorrow and party with you guys? Sure. Would I want to move my family down there and live there? I wouldn't” (Cotton, 2015).




Figure 22. Heat Map Portraying E1-E4 Residences




Figure 22. Heat Map Portraying E-5 Residences




Figure 23. Heat Map Portraying E-6 through E-9 Residences




Figure 24. Heat Map Portraying Officer Residences

Summary

Having now a better understanding of the prevailing New Orleans subsystems to include their origins, the interviews revealed certain aspects that appeared to govern the coalition dynamic at different times during the varied phases, especially during the mobilization and fragmentation phases. Specifically, ideologies associated with local politics within the uniqueness of the New Orleans culture had the most influence on behavior. This includes the generally accepted patterns of political graft and patronage (just outside the shadow of outright corruption); the unique architecture and application of New Orleans law in opposition to generally accepted legal practices throughout the rest of the nation; and the unwritten procedures for conducting business in New Orleans. Conversely, the interviews also revealed that the social subsystem is remarkably well lauded by all respondents, owing to the historically friendly, sincere, and welcoming indigenous populace.

It was also observed that permanent residents of the region, whether born locally or naturalized, perceive New Orleans very differently from transient residents, such as uniformed personnel ordered to local military commands for duty. Those that chose New Orleans as their home on a more enduring basis adopted a much more optimistic attitude towards the pejorative structural and cultural aspects described above, focusing instead on the common positive social attributes that the area provides. In other words, folks that choose to sink roots locally find ways to embrace the positive aspects (social), while either mitigating or ignoring the negative aspects (politics, QOL, corruption, etc.). Of note, the principle actors from the local region involved with the coalition were primarily permanent residents. The pro-Federal City coalition, championed by NOFA, attempted to mitigate the QOL issues for the transient military servicemen through the visionary Federal City concept, which purported to enable the creation of

a wholesome work-live-play environment from the transformed downtrodden Algiers community. However, the pervasive subsystems that drove constructive behavior during the early phases of the coalition were also the same pervasive subsystems that drove destructive behavior in the latter phases.

The following statement by Colonel Deckert summarizes the discussion related to the New Orleans governing subsystems:

“So I would say to your question, [NOLA culture is] different than the rest of the United States, but a lot more like the rest of the world” (Deckert, 2015).

This theme describes the cultural foundation for a coalition brought together with a common goal, but with each component possessing differing ideologies and motivations. The next subchapter, entitled Demonstrated Behavior, will be explored in detail in the forthcoming pages.

CHAPTER 5B

DEMONSTRATED BEHAVIOR

Introduction

This chapter will explore the established patterns of demonstrated behavior of the principle actors, as captured through the multitude of comprehensive interviews and other related qualitative data. Stemming from the findings discovered during the preceding chapter related to the New Orleans governing subsystems, it was observed that certain behavior and characterization appeared rooted in certain ideologies and beliefs related to the unique culture of New Orleans. Specifically, local politicians exhibited behavior commensurate with the cultural indicators associated with the traditional political climate described in the previous chapter. In reference to a holistic viewpoint of the Federal City debacle from a senior executive, “To me it was New Orleans politics to the “T”...to the “T”” (Braithwaite, 2015). Similarly, the developers likewise exhibited behavior seemingly appropriate for the business-oriented faction within the coalition: “So there was a continuous pressure from the developers to make money. They're capitalists. I understand that” (Davis, 2015). And as for NOFA, the non-profit champion of the Federal City campaign, their idealistic ideology drove idealistic behavior, as the following comment describes: “But all the people on the nonprofit NOFA board always had great intentions. And they never looked at it from the standpoint of they were going to make any money off of it. They were just going to do what was right” (Ryan, 2015).

This chapter will delve deeper into actor behavior, to include qualifying their individual or group motivations and agendas (i.e., *what were they trying to do and why?*), their characterization by the accounts of others (i.e., *how were they perceived?*), and the consequences or effects on the project and/or the coalition’s solvency (i.e., *what impact did their actions*

have?). An examination of the three larger factions will be examined first (e.g., NOFA, ADD, and HRI/ECC), followed by a discussion of the military elements in their respective roles. The latter part of the chapter will summarize the behavioral characterization and attempt to show what occurred over the course of the coalition's life cycle. However, a brief anthropological review of cultural relativism must be made to establish the context of the history and culture related findings from the previous chapter.

Cultural Relativism Discussion

Of the numerous contemporary anthropological theories related to the explanation of culture, one could argue that Franz Boas and his study of cultural relativism, or historical particularism, most aptly applies to the circumstances of this study. He postulated that cultures can only be understood with reference to their particular historical development. Boas believed that cultural customs had to be studied through three perspectives: environmental conditions, psychological factors, and (most importantly) historical connections. Consequently, cultural relativism holds that each culture and its cultural practices should be understood in context, that is, in terms of the institutions, ideas, values, and practices that comprise the whole of the culture. Further, the theory maintains that cultures and cultural practices should not be judged through the values and standards of another culture. Similarly, Alfred Kroeber also shared Boas' beliefs and believed that culture is learned, shared, patterned, and meaningful. Culture is a pattern that transcends and controls individuals and plays a powerful determining role in individual behavior (Moore, 2012; Harris, 1999).

Consequently, in understanding the demonstrated behavior of the different actors and groups in this paper, appreciation for the historical significance of the New Orleans culture as revealed in its governing subsystems must be made, specifically as it applies to the influence of

the local military presence for centuries. Subsequently, these seeming “clashes” of values or beliefs should not be judged in absolute terms, but rather considered a natural product of the individual cultural background of each actor. In other words, New Orleans politicians view the world differently than U.S. Marine Generals, who view the world differently than business-savvy developers. Conflict should not only have been expected, it should be seen as inevitable.

Actor Characterization and Behavior

NOFA as idealistic

To begin, it would be appropriate to examine NOFA first, owing to the fact that this organization lies at the both the heart of the Federal City initiative as well as the core of the coalition forged to bring it to fruition. NOFA’s overarching behavior can best be categorized as nothing short of idealistic, with all collected evidence establishing this fact beyond little doubt. From the beginning during the pre-formation phase days of the Mayor’s Military Advisory Committee through the post-fragmentation phase days of NOFA’s fall from power, the behavior demonstrated by NOFA has been true to their cause – the retention of the U.S. Marine Corps in New Orleans through the visionary Federal City project.

Motivation/Agenda

Major General Mize, the principle architect and proponent of NOFA, describes the initial efforts to form the organization and why:

“Then I set up the New Orleans Federal Alliance, you know, N-O-F-A. And so I got people to, you know, on a volunteer basis to sit on the board. And the idea was to give us people that actually had credibility and experience in the military and then development and banking and that kind of stuff. So I handpicked people that I knew from past and current things that had -- so we would have a group that would actually know something about development and who had no skin in the game other than trying to -- because they had the interest of New Orleans there so that nobody would be trying to get any money out of it or pushing it some way or another, et cetera” (Mize, 2015).

Comments from others that were close to the project's initial design describe NOFA's original scope for the Federal City plan:

"I think NOFA's role was to serve as the operations manager for federal city, to be the recruiter, to do the marketing, to run the daily tasks, to be the heartbeat of federal city. They would run it, they'd get the people here, they'd figure out who should be here, they'd run the master plan which they developed... the original master plan was developed by folks NOFA hired, and he would be the King or Czar or...Overlord ...overlord of Federal City. That was going to be NOFA's role as a non-profit...entity" (Bald, 2015).

"They were the driving force from the earliest days to make this happen, the NOFA staff. General Mize was very astute at getting the right people on his board to give him the horsepower to make these things happen" (Garrett, 2015).

"But I'm convinced NOFA, that committee, they thought they would forevermore run Federal City" (Braithwaite, 2015).

It has been established through the interviews that NOFA, from the project's inception, was under the impression that they would be the organization that would control the complete destiny of the project beyond completion.

Characterization

Significant comments related to the characterization of NOFA's behavior was collected through the interviews; the majority of which was positive and reinforcing of their stated intent.

According to former MARFORRES Executive Director Bob Braithwaite:

"By the time I got there NOFA and the BRAC process had started and they were already kinda set up and running...and General Mize was clearly the lead sled dog on that operation, with [Councilperson] Jackie [Clarkson] in the background providing a lot of support" (Braithwaite, 2015).

Councilperson Palmer offers commentary:

"And so you have a lot of people with government backgrounds on the NOFA board and then you also had some pretty big players from, like, corporations. That's kind of like, you know, they want to get things done. And sometimes people view the public process as messy, which it is. It's so messy. But you kind of have to do it, you know" (Palmer, 2015).

“Because you've got quality people in NOFA...I trust them. They already have track records” (Palmer, 2015).

Times-Picayune journalist Paul Purpura reinforces the point:

“You get NOFA, you get a nonprofit with people with some expertise in doing things; People who have a track record of building things and making projects happen were involved in it” (Purpura, 2015).

However, a critique of NOFA was also revealed during the research that suggested that, in spite of their overall idealistic ideology, the organization may have been ill-equipped for the challenges to be faced during the execution of the Federal City project. This theme will present itself further once conflict with ADD and HRI/ECC arises years later. As Marine LtGen Jack Bergmann offers:

“As I look at the people who were on it, not a bad person in the bunch. Just because they are good people doesn't mean they are the right people to be in that group” (Bergman, 2015).

Consequences

During the subsequent prosecution of the Federal City plan, the interviews revealed varied and insightful critique related to NOFA's behavior. The main theme observed was that their idealistic characterization and associated behavior eventually failed to dominate the coalition's dynamic once resources were provided to ADD, forever changing the power distribution within the group. Without the essential skills nor the authorities to compete against battle-hardened politicians and developers, NOFA became quite vulnerable. Retired Navy Captain Bill Garrett states:

“Their perspective was this is our project. We are responsible for this. This is our vision. We're the ones that had the vision. HRI, we've selected you as our developer. HRI/ECC we've select you as our developer. Duany, we've hired you to be the designer” (Garrett, 2015).

Bob Braithwaite offers his view:

“I think NOFA definitely thought they had the charter to do that...that they would forevermore be the people running Federal City. That turned out not to be true” (Braithwaite, 2015).

LtGen Bergmann provides ample reinforcing commentary:

“So this is gamesmanship going back to why I said idealistic. Idealistic folks don't employ a lot of gamesmanship. And life is all about gamesmanship. It is. So if you are going to get into the game, if you really -- don't put an idealist in charge” (Bergman, 2015).

“But an entity like NOFA will form for all the right reasons. And because of why it forms, it is vulnerable” (Bergman, 2015).

“And in NOFA's case, idealism falls by the wayside first. That's the way it is. And the NOFA did not have the stomach or the -- it did not have the right personalities onboard to make it the fortress that it needed to be to balance the competing interests of HRI and ADD and all the other things” (Bergman, 2015).

“The grit to coalition, the personalities, the group -- it didn't have the players. Think of any team. It didn't have the players it needed to withstand and to be successful against the competition which those other two would have to be considered the competition” (Bergman, 2015).

Colonel Bubba Deckert offers his opinion:

“But the cats that were at the top of that thing weren't day-to-day guys. They weren't people who knew how to work that day-to-day stuff. They were all just pie in the sky kind of thing. And when it got down to the literal implementation, they didn't know how to do it and it all fell apart. Law suits went flying every which way. And then they end up being on the outs. And then end up being on the outs because they kind of got past the part where they were really value added” (Deckert, 2015).

And lastly, from within NOFA, Bill Ryan describes the end:

“Anyway, so I went down in flames and I was out. And Mize was out. We fired Mize” (Ryan, 2015).

“The money all went away. And we had an audit. We had an auditing firm to make sure all the money was accounted for. And then they created -- the ADD created a board after the dissolution of pretty much the Federal City board, they created a board called -- Joint Development Committee” (Ryan, 2015).

Dave Mize as NOFA's protagonist

Motivation/Agenda

The following narratives describe General Mize's initial motivation and agenda, in addition to collected personal characterizations. The research revealed no pejorative information whatsoever, beyond a sense of naïveté. General Mize first provides an explanation regarding his personal motivation:

"I was...trying to improve the quality of life for military here in the New Orleans area, which upon me coming and doing my kind of command evaluation, it was pretty obviously not the quality of life for Marines and families and sailors -- it was not what we wanted it to be. So I got involved in the community there fairly actively trying to make some significant improvements in those areas" (Mize, 2015).

Purpura and Mike Tilghman (from HQMC), offer their respective comments relating to Mize:

"Part of what was happening back then and with the help of General Mize was to look at ways of shoring up our military installations here. Federal City came out of that effort" (Purpura, 2015).

"I think the big thing for the general, I think, was taking care of the Marines. I really think that was a big thing. And I think an associated interest was taking care of his adopted city, New Orleans" (Tilghman, 2015).

Characterization

Of note, all respondents described a very high level of respect for General Mize, both of his character and through his demonstrated actions in pursuit of the Federal City vision. Varied commentary from the respondents echo this characterization:

"He was optimistic to a fault. And I admire him. I admired him then; I still do" (Garrett, 2015).

"He was a master. He would do some fast talking. He was good at it" (Maguire, 2015).

"General Mize's having been on the mayor's military advisory committee, he had ins into the city which allowed him access to different things that others probably didn't have" (Bald, 2015).

“So he is a guy that is a visionary kind of a guy. I think in his heart he thought this is going to be a very good deal for MARFORRES. And I think today, it is. They have, I would say, probably the best headquarters within the United States Marine Corps” (Tilghman, 2015).

“I know he gets slammed sometimes, but I think there is a certain altruistic nature to the vision that he has for New Orleans. He thought Federal City would be a smart idea” (Tilghman, 2015).

“There were people that...were openly...[trying to] get Mize out of the way...there were folks that came to the conclusion that NOFA had served its useful purpose. So it was really a tough, tough dynamic” (Preston, 2015).

“Dave has a very pure Marine Corps ethos. But what you find out and what Dave thought, we were all doing this for the greater good...And I think he purely, purely believed that he could lead his master developer; that he could lead -- and he just wasn't savvy enough” (Dempsey, 2015).

Although very little criticism was observed of his character, his business acumen was critiqued by a few in the context of the project. According to Colonel Dempsey:

“Well they say that general officers make the worst CEOs in the country...Because they just don't know how to play that game” (Dempsey, 2015).

Further commentary by LtGen Bergman related to General Officers reinforces this theme:

“I didn't find very many generals and admirals who I thought really had any sense of how the business world really works” (Bergman, 2015).

Lastly, Bill Ryan of NOFA states:

“But he [Mize] never really had the background in terms of understanding the construction and so on and so forth. But he was in charge of day in and day out, hands on, which is something that he was not very familiar with” (Ryan, 2015).

“He retired here. He never really got into the political world. He never was a power player. He was in the socio-economic but not political. In fact, he was on the outside of the political” (Ryan, 2015).

Effects/Consequences

However, his personal characteristics, experience, and determination were the perfect combination of traits to have during the first two phases of the coalition. The results were universally recognized by all respondents:

“Well he was able to convince the Louisiana delegation who actually had the horsepower or the commission to say, hey, this is a great idea” (Garrett, 2015).

“He pulled it off. He was the puppet master in getting this” (Garrett, 2015).

“Dave Mize was the heavy lifter... he knew the buttons to push, and he got the allies he needed, and I think he was key to making all this happen. I’m convinced there would be no Federal City without Dave Mize...” (Braithwaite, 2015).

“He was a great man that did great things. But I think his perspective is different than many other people’s perspectives. And to this day I think he would say that the politicians screwed it up” (Bald, 2015).

However, towards the end of the coalition, it was clear that the same components that enabled his success in the beginning were the same that caused his demise. According to Paul Purpura:

“So to see how he was pushed aside by these public politicians, it's shameful. And to the detriment of the whole project. It's exactly what he didn't want to see happen to the project. The politicians took over. The politicians are blaming everybody else for why this thing is dragged on” (Purpura, 2015).

ADD as cunning

As positive as the characterization of NOFA was, the majority of the comments describing ADD were just the opposite. In fact, most of the respondents associated ADD with the classic New Orleans political machine, with all of the negative traits that that reputation conveys. What is most interesting is the fact that ADD was barely involved with the coalition’s efforts for the first two phases, and didn’t truly engage until they were inadvertently brought into the equation during the final stages of the Navy lease negotiations. Once the State of Louisiana determined that ADD would be the signatory of the Navy lease for Federal City (as a consequence of SECNAV refusing to allow NOFA to sign), everything changed – especially ADD’s behavior. “The fuse was lit when ADD signed the lease” (Boettner, 2015).

Motivation/Agenda

Varied commentary collected from the respondents:

“And they were just interested in making money off of it. So you have all these different divergent interests and nobody, with the exception of NOFA I'll say, nobody had just the Federal City's interest at heart” (Ryan, 2015).

“[Originally], ADD wanted nothing to do with the development or management of Federal City. First of all, they saw some risk in the project here. And second of all, it was a tremendous amount of work and they didn't have the staff and the people with the expertise to do it” (Mize, 2015).

“They had public interest [ADD] because you are going to get a pot of money. They don't want to spend the whole pot of money on the Marine Corps facility because they got some other initiatives they want to -- So they started weaning it off. That's where the food fight comes into play” (Maguire, 2015).

“It's all about the money” (Maguire, 2015).

“ADD wanted to control it. And they just thought there was a pile of gold. And it turned out to be a pile of straw...” (Ryan, 2015).

“Now they are politicians though and they're thinking, you know, minimize what goes into Federal City and kind of give off a little bit here, a little bit here, a little bit here around the community and then that makes them look good and easy to get reelected” (Mize, 2015).

Characterization

Similarly, most comments from various respondents related to the characterization of ADD as an organization were not positive:

“And I'm not a real-estate developer, but we had that kind of expertise on that board. Do you think they have any of that expertise on the ADD? Not any” (Dempsey).

“There was just no confidence. These people [ADD] have no expertise” (Purpura, 2015).

“...we never dealt with ADD...until it looked like “holy cow, there's a lot of money here” (Braithwaite, 2015).

“ADD is one of those entities that will always be reforming itself to be able to dip into the public coffer and gain control” (Bergman, 2015).

Consequences

“But from the moment ADD started to take over, until they took over, and since then, it seems to me everything stopped. All the grand plans for shopping centers and all that kind of stuff...nothing has really happened since ADD got more involved and then became the lead” (Braithwaite, 2015).

“If ADD got involved sooner we’d have been in danger of being in a half-completed building, people swirling over the checks from the State....thank goodness NOFA got us past that point...before the food fights started” (Braithwaite, 2015).

“Once they smelled that money... and I'm not going to name any politician's names here...but right away that's when they got involved and wanted to take over, and in very brutal fashion, in my mind, they took over...and that was the beginning of the end” (Braithwaite, 2015).

Jeff Arnold as ADD's protagonist (and NOFA's antagonist)

And just as David Mize was viewed as the idealist (albeit naïve), Jeff Arnold was viewed as the stereotypical New Orleans politician. In fact, most respondents associated Arnold as the principle antagonist to NOFA's efforts, and the main reason the project stalled and the coalition fell apart.

Motivation/Agenda

According to retired Marine Colonel Terry Ebbert, NOFA member:

“It's because certain people [Arnold] want to retain power and they don't want to give that power to a developer. They didn't want to give the power to NOFA” (Ebbert, 2015).

Characterization

Bill Ryan comments on Arnold:

“And Jeff Arnold was the self-perpetuating chairman of the ADD because he's a big blustery son of a bitch. He's not that bad of a guy. Anyway, you had to understand him” (Ryan, 2015).

Effects/Consequences

Dave Mize describes the consequences of Arnold's influence:

“...now you suddenly have one of these great Louisiana patronage opportunities just put right in front of them. So now then Jeff Arnold and the ADD crew says, ‘ah, this is our chance to get back in it and take over’. So they then went on this very calculated long-

term campaign to get NOFA out of money and not meet their obligations to us to pay us our money here, et cetera, and to get them back in control of the project...and they eventually succeeded” (Mize).

“...and with the leverage that Jeff Arnold had, eventually we used up all our state money first just like they asked us to and then we were telling him in letters and, you know, all this -- we've got copies of the public record. Okay ADD, time for you to -- pony up. And so Jeff said, ‘no, we're not going to give you any money’. And again, the idea was he would run us out of business because he would dry us up. We would have no money to do it, et cetera. And then ADD could take over. So that's what he did” (Mize, 2015).

Councilperson Palmer supports this characterization:

“And the pool took so long because I think, again, Jeff Arnold was using it as some kind of political hostage to release funds. I'm serious. It's just crazy. Crazy, crazy, crazy. It's sad” (Palmer, 2015).

Colonel Dempsey describes the consequences as it relates to General Mize:

“So when they [Jeff Arnold and ADD] cut him [David Mize] up into little pieces and then just -- I mean, they had to sell their home. But nonetheless, he couldn't find enough work around here to support it. So they had to sell their house and now they are living in a little condo right off of St. Charles Avenue” (Dempsey, 2015).

Lastly, Purpura reinforce the theme:

“And people like Jeff Arnold push people like General Mize out, which was a shame too” (Purpura, 2015).

HRI/ECC as opportunistic

If NOFA was labeled idealistic and ADD as cunning, HRI/ECC was characterized as the greedy capitalist developer. Notwithstanding the traditional role of the developer – to develop land for a profit – many associated HRI/ECC in a negative sense. Most recognize that they were the “private” entity of the classic public-private-partnership, and that the Federal City project was a profit-oriented venture. However, during the execution of the project, many respondents felt that they exploited the vagueness of the lease documents and took advantage of the growing rift between NOFA and ADD to default on their financial obligations. While this latter point will be discussed in much greater detail in a follow-on chapter, their exhibited behavior can be examined through the following captured characterization, all pejorative:

Motivation/Agenda

“The developer, pushing as a developer would, to get the best deal to make the maximum profit” (Deckert, 2015).

“HRI wanted everything. HRI wanted Quarters A. HRI wanted to manage Quarters A. HRI wanted everything...HRI they're leaning in in the straps. They want it now. They want it before we leave.” (Garrett, 2015).

“This area, I would suggest you went up in value because of the fact that it really didn't suffer any flood damage. So they look at a place like this and what do developers do? They talk negatively about it until they figure the price is at rock bottom. Once they got it to where it's at rock bottom, then they do their deal and then they start talking positively about it” (Bergman, 2015).

“They want to make money. They want to develop stuff. They want to move on fast because they are losing money. Right now, they don't have any” (Maguire, 2015).

Characterization

“HRI was branded as the ‘greedy developers’” (Boettner, 2015).

“But the HRI leadership were the bulldogs. They kept pounding us, pounding us, pounding us” (Garrett, 2015).

“It's business and those guys are good at it” (Bergman, 2015).

“And HRI/ECC, Prez is a slimy little weasel. And he's got a crowd of some of the smartest, looniest in terms of the things they'll say and do for him. He's really good at spending other people's money” (Dempsey, 2015).

“HRI is a company that doesn't have a heart or a soul. They just want to make money however they can do it. And if they can find a way to renege or not do something that, you know -- they're willing to do that” (Mize, 2015).

Effects/Consequences

“Everything the public sector wanted done was on HRI's back...” (Boettner, 2015).

“And so we ultimately went with Prez Kabacoff because he claimed that he knew more about the GO-Zone tax credits, you know, the post-Katrina tax credits, and new-market tax credits. He promised us that he was going to be our guy, you know, to get through this. And so that is why we went with Prez. And he turned out to be nothing but trouble every inch of the way. He was horrible” (Dempsey, 2015).

“If you're a good developer, want to do it with somebody else's money. You get your money out quickly so then everything else that comes is just gravy. And somehow you want to keep this project alive long enough that people forget what happened in the initial stages so if it does go south, you can redevelop it a few decades later and nobody remembers that you developed it 40 or 50 years ago” (Bergman, 2015).

“So HRI also has the philosophy that they're never going to invest any of their money. They will only invest somebody else's money. And so they got a commission for being the developer off the 150 million dollars that came to them. So it was probably 12 million dollars or something for being the developer to oversee Woodward, which Woodward didn't need any overseeing” (Mize, 2015).

“It was very frustrating for me to watch HRI. It was very, very frustrating to have developers coming into my office I can't tell you how many times, especially these guys, and not once would they talk about Federal City. All they wanted to talk about were the developments they were doing on the Eastbank” (Palmer, 2015).

State and City Government as indifferent

While initially very involved during the formation and mobilization phases during the BRAC Commission testimony, the State and City government did little to assuage the growing rift between NOFA and ADD during the latter years of the sustainment phase and during the fragmentation stage. Mayoral or Gubernatorial intervention could have easily mitigated the growing dysfunction, but opted not to involve themselves for unknown reasons. The following excerpts from the interviews reveal this pattern.

Motivation/Agenda

“I don't think the State wanted to play...I really don't. The state...obviously saw potential economic benefit...that was good, they didn't want to see everybody leave... because that would be bad for New Orleans...but I really don't think the State cared” (Bald, 2015).

“I had gotten to know all the political figures here in my efforts to promote the military and improve the quality of life. And I got asked to go see the mayor and he asked me if I would take on the chairman of the military advisory committee. And he said what I really want you to do in that job is I want you to save the bases because at this point -- now this is late 2003 probably. Everybody knows the BRAC is coming. It's just a matter of when. I was reluctant to do that because I knew once you got attached to the flypaper it would be hard to ever get off” (Mize, 2015).

Characterization

“Congressman Vitter was very enthusiastic and supportive. Senator Mary Landrieu was slow at the beginning and then she came on pretty good. The governor was pretty good” (Davis, 2015).

“We would invite the mayor to the ball every year, the Mayor would never show up. Whether the mayor was deeply involved in what was going on with the military, I could never tell you. But I do know that the mayor and on down was obviously involved in keeping the military in New Orleans” (Braithwaite, 2015).

“But I definitely think the [city] administration doesn't give a shit about Algiers. The administration probably should have gotten involved a lot more. But that administration is very tight, you know. So he [the mayor] only lets four or five people do everything and they just can't get it all done” (Palmer, 2015).

Effects/Consequences

“November/December of 2007. So you have strong political interests because both the Louisiana senators, Senator Landrieu and Senator Vitter, are strong supporters of this as you would figure. At this time, you had a governor changeover from Blanco to the new governor, Jindal. And so there wasn't as much pressure from the governor's office...but the real political pressure was being brought to bear by the senators” (Davis, 2015).

“And nobody had any structure or the state or the city other than getting updates and stuff like that, they weren't interested and they didn't want to be involved in it any more than that. Okay, you've got it. You go do it and tell us what you need and whatnot” (Mize, 2015).

“Now we brought this up to the governor and the mayor and the business counsel and everybody about what the guy was doing and, essentially, nobody was willing to step in. And they all had their own agendas that they wanted to get through the state legislature funding process and they didn't want Arnold and crew to buck anyone -- other priorities that they had” (Mize, 2015).

“So when this thing really started getting bad, we said, okay, well we've got to get the mayor involved. Well the mayor didn't -- he wasn't as interested in getting involved as we thought he was or would be” (Dempsey, 2015).

“But when the governor or the mayor or nobody would support us, we eventually lost with this cooperative endeavor agreement” (Mize, 2015).

“And the lack of leadership at the City level as it continued to battle back and forth with the State never ever -- now this could have been a strategy at the governmental level or at the elective level to just let it play out. Not do anything. You know, let's see who wins.

I think that gives the city and state leadership too much credit for thought and strategy” (Bergman, 2015).

The Navy versus Marine Ideology Dialectic

Before an examination of the behavior of the military is offered, a discussion of the differing ideologies between the Navy and Marine Corps must be made. While both services are sister components of the same Department of the Navy, each has a very unique culture and very different ideologies and ethos. One could also argue that, in fact, all branches of the service have their own unique institutional culture and heritage that separates one from the other. Anyone who has served in the U.S. military can personally attest to this claim – it is an inherent point of pride




Figure 25. The Navy/Marine Ideology Dialectic

for most veterans and equally a part of their developed personal character. It is important that this point is understood, in that the military ideology and culture plays a very important role in

this coalition's interaction, internally and externally, in addition to the way the Federal City project was received by the Navy and the Marine Corps.

As the above chart illustrates, the Navy and Marine Corps institutionally views the world differently. Neither aspect should be judged right or wrong, but considered simply different – a consequence of centuries of existence and application, during wartime and (very limited) times of peace. Boiled down to a simple dialectic, the Navy views land as a temporary place that they must exist in until they can get back to the sea (which is the domain in which they fight). Conversely, the Marines view the sea as a temporary place that they must exist in until they can get back to land (which is the domain in which they fight). This dialectic, when applied to the New Orleans Federal City proposal, offers a plausible explanation beyond the stated as to why the Navy chose to leave, while the Marines chose to stay. Marines tend to become very attached to territory they occupy or have fought for, whether that land be a base in the U.S. or a Forward operating Base (FOB) in some Middle Eastern territory. Relatedly, there is an ideological reason why the Marines are tasked with guarding the nation's 125 embassies throughout the world and not another uniformed served such as the U.S. Army. This concept, abstract as it may sound, should be considered foundational while absorbing the details of the forthcoming sections pertaining to Navy and Marine Corps demonstrated behavior.

The Navy as calculating

Motivation/Agenda

Significant data was collected through the interviews that describe the Navy's position in regards to New Orleans in general, and the Federal City project in particular. The Navy was relatively open in their desire to leave the area. According to retired Marines Bergmann, Quinton, Braithwaite, and Maguire:

“There was a strong move at some of the highest levels to consolidate. And the Navy was fully supportive because unlike New Orleans, places like San Diego, Jacksonville, Norfolk are core Navy ports, core Navy installations...” (Bergman, 2015).

“...but even before Katrina, the Navy was still trying to pull ComNavResFor to Norfolk to align with, you know, Fleet Forces Command” (Quinton, 2015).

“Why the Navy was so excited about getting out of New Orleans...we all know that have lived in New Orleans that New Orleans has its issues... housing, schools, you name it... it's not an easy area to get people to come to... attract them... but I think a lot of that drove the Navy's thinking that “hey, let's get somewhere easier to live and easier to function” (Braithwaite, 2015).

“That decision to leave New Orleans was already made up in the Navy's mind. It was just a question of when and how fast could they take advantage of -- BRAC and Katrina as you named provided them two excellent opportunities” (Bergman, 2015).

“They were looking for the door. Even the recruiters were looking for the door after Katrina because of the uncertainty of what was going to happen” (Maguire, 2015).

“Wash their hands [of the NSA]. [The Navy] could because it was millions of dollars of demo or revitalization and that is huge...they did a fee simple transfer and they got rid of all their problems” (Maguire, 2015).

Characterization

Despite their openness relating to their desire to leave New Orleans, most characterization of the Navy remained negative. Colonel Dempsey states:

“So we make it through the 2005 BRAC rounds very successful. Everybody is happy but the United States Navy. The Navy just -- they fought us every inch of the way on everything” (Dempsey, 2015).

General Bergmann reinforces this claim:

“They moved their headquarters down here but they never really moved their senior admiral down here. Their senior admiral always stayed in D.C. So they always had one foot in the door and one foot out of the door” (Bergman, 2015).

“Well, the Navy had already made the decision to move out. But the way they did it -- but again, just like when they came here in the first place, they came but they really didn't move everything here. They always, again, had one foot onboard that vessel getting ready to sail away” (Bergman, 2015).

“I will tell it like it is, I don't see the Navy as ever fully committed to New Orleans” (Bergman, 2015).

Consequences

Furthermore, General Bergman comments on the consequences of the Navy's position:

“I've studied this a lot, so I don't say this lightly, they just quit replacing people here. Some wanted PCS. They didn't PCS anybody in. You could see those offices in 601...Just slowly, slowly disappear” (Bergman, 2015).

Greg Preston, the Navy's BRAC Project Manager, comments on the Navy's position:

“...the Department of the Navy was not going to put money up to make it happen. Our marching orders were pretty clear. We're going to do what's best for the federal government... if the state of Louisiana had not come to the table with 150 million dollars, this deal [Federal City] would not have happened” (Preston, 2015).

“We had the DASN at the time, which was Howard Snow, you know, we were giving him bi-weekly updates and calling him directly after every meeting and things like that because he was being hounded from the SecNav himself. So there were a lot of politics internal to Navy there to the point where we actually had Secretary Winter meet with Governor Jindal on two separate occasions to lay down, this is as far as we're going and lay down the law...” (Preston, 2015).

“We had the pleasure of -- Secretary Winter personally being involved in a couple of issues that we had to go directly to his office. That was -- there was only one other project that I actually had to brief SecNav on that I have ever been in that office where you actually personally brief SecNav. And that was kind of interesting” (Preston, 2015).

Bob Braithwaite provides an opinion related to Katrina's influence on the Navy's decision to leave New Orleans:

“I think Katrina was just the final nail in the coffin...once that happened, any real objection from up north kind of went away” (Braithwaite, 2015).

Retire Marine LtCol Ed Maguire (and Deputy AC/S Facilities, MARFORRES) offers:

“So I saw that the Navy was always going to leave. And they do that a lot. They leave us holding the bag. This was a Navy base and we were tenants to a Navy base and they didn't really share a lot before they pulled the trigger” (Maguire, 2015).

“When they left, we lost all touch with NavResFor which shares some of our reserve centers. It made the ability to provide for the Marines at the Navy sites a little harder to

do because they were remote and out of the picture. But then that has kind of gone by the wayside and we are having challenges now” (Maguire, 2015).

Kristen Palmer describes the consequences of the Navy’s decision to abandon the NSA:

“I brought independent contractors through to give us at least ideas of demolition of some of these buildings [on the NSA] because I really felt that you just needed to show people some kind of progress to get people to buy in. And these buildings still have furniture in them. I mean, the federal government just left. It's horrible” (Palmer, 2015).

HQMC as altruistic/agnostic

Of the respondents that spoke of Headquarters Marine Corps in Washington D.C., the general theme observed was that they describe them as far removed from the cultural and political dynamics of the local New Orleans politics that dominated the Federal City dynamic. Their position was one of following orders (from DON), being committed to New Orleans post-Katrina, and taking care of the Marines on the ground there. The latter drove much of the behavior from HQMC actors during the Navy lease negotiations and associated Federal City MARFORRES Headquarters design. Regarding the Marine decision to stay in New Orleans according to LtGen Bergman:

“[The Marines staying in New Orleans...] It's a political strategy. It's not a warfighting strategy” (Bergman, 2015).

General Mize seconds this opinion:

So on the [Headquarters] Marine Corps side, again, I think the Marine Corps was okay to stay there [in New Orleans], but they weren’t necessarily fighting for it” (Mize, 2015).

Retired Marine Colonel Shannon Shy, HQMC Counsel’s Office, provides a perspective from Washington D.C.:

“The Assistant Commandant was our primary client on this one that we worked with closely. He was like, ‘make sure the Marines are thought about here’, and then, yes, sir. ‘And if I said it once, I’ve said it 100 million times there, I’m looking out for the Marines’” (Shy, 2015).

“I will never forget that day we were sitting in that theater in that big building down in New Orleans and they showed us the presentation and all the bells and whistles. And Ralph and Paul are like, well, it’s legal. And I go – I knew that I only had one shot at it – I said, I don’t like it. And I just started trying to think of different things I didn’t like about it. And when I called back to D.C. to my leadership, they went high and to the right. And I knew that I had put a good stake in the ground. So it all worked out after that” (Shy, 2015).

Mike Tilghman from HQMC complements the theme:

“And it got to the point where the commandant himself, big guy, General Conway at the time... went to see the Secretary of the Navy to make the strong case that we don’t want to do Federal City. We want to go to Belle Chasse. And apparently the SecNav told the commandant basically to shut up and sit down. You’re going to Federal City. And either before that or prior – either prior to that or sometime after this supposed meeting, Vitter and Landrieu, especially Landrieu I think, had called the SecNav and the commandant over and basically run the riot act. He said if you want to ever see a military construction project for the Marine Corps, you will support Federal City. So there was a lot of politics” (Tilghman, 2015).

The Marines as loyal

The majority of respondents, albeit many of which were retired senior Marine officers, commonly reflected the sentiment of the loyalty that the Marines demonstrated, through their actions, to the City of New Orleans and their citizens. Prior to Katrina, the Marines in New Orleans were generally indifferent to the decision to relocate to Belle Chasse, relocate to Federal City, or move out of State to other location such as Norfolk or Kansas City. However, after Katrina hit, the Marines behavior was observed to capture their unique ideology expressed earlier regarding their loyalty to the area. Multiple Marine respondents provide their personal comments:

“The Marines can move anywhere. They are expeditionary. But you know, there was -- at that point in time, I mean, we had a commitment to New Orleans. I mean, there was a bond, you know. There was a linkage that, you know, could not be broken” (Quinton, 2015).

“But up until the final grand compromise was worked out, we tried to be as neutral as we could... once a decision was made then, yeah, we were all over it” (Braithwaite, 2015).

“The only people that stayed [after Katrina] were the Marines. They were the only ones in the BRAC process. So there was a variety of different ideas being batted around within that thing that some of them just weren't acceptable” (Davis, 2015).

“I mean, at that point in time [post-Katrina], you know, if it wasn't for General Bergman's commitment to New Orleans...And he was totally committed to New Orleans. If he would have said, ‘it's easier for us right now to stay in Kansas City’...I think he probably could have pushed it to keep MarForRes headquarters in Kansas City” (Quinton, 2015).

“I think the fact that we stayed and the fact that even after Katrina, even though the lure of the new building obviously was pretty significant, but I think that also reflects somewhat the Marines...why people admire us, why we really got a shot in the arm from the locals, because they looked at us and said you guys hung in there, you guys stayed, when other people left” (Mills, 2015).

JDC as ineffectual

As mentioned, the Joint Development Committee was formed as a solution to the impasse between NOFA, ADD, and HRI/ECC, along with the new Cooperative Endeavor Agreement that spelled out the details of the new world order. However, while looking good on paper (as most comprehensive agreements do), in practice the JDC really hasn't accomplished much beyond reshaping the severed relationships within the public-private partnership. The JDC has proven just as dysfunctional as the previous coalition, owing to the fact that most of the same individual players (good and bad) still have a seat at the table. The local politicians are still driving the agenda, and NOFA has been completely disempowered. Councilperson Palmer comments on the formation of the JDC:

“I mean, the amount of crap that we had to go through to form this JDC and shit I had to slide in to make sure, like, Jeff couldn't chair both the JDC and the ADD. I mean, I had to finagle all these kind of under the table stuff because -- and then they were trying to do the same thing” (Palmer, 2015).

Gregg Habel provides his initial optimistic view of the JDC during its earlier formative stage:

“The JDC seemed to be the only way to get the project back in its direction. It shouldn't have been necessary to begin with and I think a lot of people would argue that the JDC is an extension of ADD more so than it is an inclusive partner with NOFA” (Habel, 2015).

Bill Garrett and Colonel Dempsey comment on the JDC's dysfunction:

"The Joint Development Committee...was not very functional either because of the players that were involved in that in the early days. They did not get along at all...there was a lot of infighting in those early days of that committee" (Garrett, 2015).

"They make every effort to work around us and not through us in terms of our membership on the JDC" (Dempsey).

Marine Colonel Bill Davis offers a consequence of the JDC's formation:

"During the process of creating the JDC, the JDC's creation essentially got rid of General Mize. Once they created that, the next step was to eliminate General Mize" (Davis, 2015).

Lawyers as self-serving.

Of note, it is worth mentioning the sea of attorneys that participated in the Federal City project over its duration. While nothing nefarious was noted during the interviews, a general sense of exploitation was felt, as dozens upon dozens of lawyers were hired to represent their client's interests in the lengthy negotiations to come. All factions – NOFA, ADD, HRI/ECC, the DON, HQMC, and MARFORRES – required legal representation. While the attorneys representing the U.S. Government (i.e., the military) were salaried federal civil servants, all others were retained from private firms. The thousands of billable hours that accrued, paid for with public funds by the way, were primarily spent negotiating and fighting for the best possible position for their individual client. Notwithstanding the quality work they turned out individually, the characterization overall was observed to be self-serving and wasteful. Several respondents offer their varied opinions regarding attorneys associated with the project:

"So you had three separate groups of attorneys on the other side of the table from the government each with their own, you know, attorney/client privilege requirements that they had to meet in protecting their own client and advocating for their client" (Shy, 2015).

"You would hear the lawyers -- I mean, the NOFA team had a lot of lawyers. Between NOFA, HRI, Woodward, and all the other guys, there was a lot of lawyers sitting around the table and we've got two. I've got Shannon Shy, Ralph Lombardo, and the occasional

other guy that would bow his head in to kind of give us some background. And they're government employees so they are paid salaried employees. The other guys through the negotiations, there was a lot of feeling sometimes that they were racking up hours. I mean, we would have the most inane discussions about small sentences or words throughout this thing. There were a lot of times that our lawyers felt that these guys were just trying to continue the negotiations to rack up billable hours. If you ever got to look at what it cost, there is a huge -- lawyer fees is probably the number one expense after the construction" (Davis, 2015).

"Adams and Reese have made a fortune off this project, a fortune" (Dempsey, 2015).

"The lawyers made out like bandits. It was ridiculous. I mean we paid hundreds of thousands of dollars. And Lee Reid is still sitting on that board and he's still billing, you know. I'm not beating on Lee Reid because he's just doing what lawyers do" (Dempsey, 2015).

"Kutak Rock is trying to push a position. They are trying to establish precedence. If they can get this approved, they establish precedence which helps their business do more stuff like this...But as a lawyer, I have an agenda to try and drum up more business...So if I can get this to work, oh man, we're going to make a lot more money doing more deals like this across the country" (Davis, 2015).

Actor interaction by phase

The following chart illustrates the level of intensity of involvement for each faction by phase. It is intended to provide a holistic view of the interactions amongst the actors and to serve as a reference for the complexity of activities that transpired during the Federal City project. Of interest is the pattern that emerges with regards to NOFA's entanglement with ADD during the sustainment phase. In regards to the chart legend, high intensity is reflected by the color red, moderate is reflected by the color orange, slightly moderate by yellow, and minimal by gray.

Federal City Actor Involvement and Impact

Actor	Formation	Mobilization	Sustainment	Fragmentation
NOFA	BRAC Prep; Federal City concept design	BRAC Testimony	Navy lease negotiation; Fed City design	Law Suit CEA
ADD	Minimal	Minimal	Navy Lease signatory	Fee Simply Transfer
MFR	Mayor's Advisory Committee	ISO NOFA Effort	Navy lease negotiation; HQ design; Relocate	Mitigating QOL issues
NRF	Mayor's Advisory Committee	Anti-Federal City; BRAC execution as proposed	Execute BRAC; Leaving NOLA	
NSA	Mayor's Advisory Committee	Prep BRAC execution plans	Prep for and execution of NSA closure	
HQMC	Minimal	Discussions with NOFA	Navy lease negotiation; HQ design	Minimal
DON/SECNAV	Minimal	Prep BRAC execution plans	Navy lease negotiation; NDAA Determination	Fee Simply Transfer
BRAC PMO	Minimal	Federal City discussion	Navy lease negotiation	Fee Simple Transfer
HRI/ECC			Fed City Design and Build Phase I	Law Suit
State of LA	Preliminary discussions with NOFA	BRAC Testimony	Minimal	Minimal
City of New Orleans	Preliminary discussions with NOFA	BRAC Testimony	Minimal	Minimal

Figure 26. Federal City Actor Involvement/Impact

Conclusion

In conclusion, the 21 hours or so of taped audio interview captured varied characterizations related to the behavior of the key actors both within and external to the coalition. To summarize the preceding chapter for the principle actors:

NOFA, with Dave Mize as the principle protagonist, was the sole driving force that galvanized the local New Orleans community, the State legislature, and key elements with the Department of the Navy, to convince the BRAC Commission to modify their plan to close the NSA New Orleans, paving the way for the Federal City project. Throughout the entire lifecycle of the coalition, their behavior is best characterized as being purely idealistic. However, with the unpredicted change of fortune that the SECNAV imparted through his decision to not allow NOFA to be the lease signatory, forever changed the dynamic of the coalition. Consequently, NOFA's loss of power and authority rendered them completely vulnerable to attack.

ADD, with Jeff Arnold as the principle protagonist, had very little engagement with the Federal City project nor the BRAC defense against closing the NSA. In fact, their participation didn't begin until mid-2007 during the final stages of the Navy lease negotiations when it became apparent that they would inherit control of both the land and financial resources to prosecute the Federal City project. Their subsequent behavior characterized throughout the interviews reflects one of ignorance and self-interest, as they were ill-equipped, intellectually or ideologically, to carry out the lofty vision of the Federal City concept. With their accession to power, their agenda was to push NOFA out of the equation, claiming redundancy and mismanagement of their developer as primary reasons for their elimination.

HRI/ECC, as the selected developer for the project, had nothing to do with the Federal City project until they were brought in to help with completing and prosecuting the Master Plan that NOFA had initiated. However, due to the vagueness in the legal documents associated with the navy lease and other related agreements, their demonstrated behavior was one of exploitation and greed, as captured in the interviews. Their legal battles with NOFA furthered the latter's vulnerability with ADD, setting them up for an inevitable showdown from which they would not

survive. LtGen Bergman best summarizes the relationship between NOFA, ADD, and HRI: “I’m going to give you three adjectives...NOFA, idealistic...ADD, slick...HRI, greedy. Okay. When you put those three together, that is what you’ve got. And if you let any one of them control it, the outcome is going to be bad. So how does -- how is a balance struck to let none of those three entities get absolute control? In the end, slick and greedy basically, as you would expect, made the idealists either get pissed off or disinterested or in some cases just give up, throw up their hands and said I’m done” (Bergman, 2015).

The Navy’s behavior was seen as logical, albeit hurtful locally from a community sense. They were not deceptive in any way with regards to their intentions to depart New Orleans, for both strategic and QOL reasons. The timing of their departure, however, on the heels of Katrina’s devastation to the region, will forever leave a bad taste in the mouths of most New Orleanians. After over a century of occupation and involvement with the affairs of the local community, the Navy departed during a time when the city needed them the most. The interviews reflect this characterization.

The Marine’s behavior echoed their reputation as the selfless, loyal organization that their institutional culture perpetuates. While somewhat agnostic during the BRAC negotiations related to MARFORRES staying in New Orleans or being realigned to Belle Chasse, the Marines got behind the Federal City plan once the decision was made and their marching orders issued. Throughout the lease negotiations, the construction of their new Headquarters, their move across the river, and suffering through the delays and failed delivery of the Federal City prophesy, the Marines maintained their commitment to the community of Algiers and the City of New Orleans. National military strategy and geography brought the Marines to New Orleans centuries ago,

politics kept them here for decades, and cultural integration (and Katrina) has cemented their presence here for decades to come. General Rich Mills concludes:

“So I think there are a lot of factors that play as to why the Marines stayed...to include like I said a brand new building, and our long tradition with New Orleans, dating back to the War of 1812...we’ve always had a presence...so I think that all played into it. But I think we benefitted at least the perception of locals that, hey, everybody left but the Marines stayed...you know...God Bless the Marines” (Mills, 2015).




Figure 27. Demonstrated Behavior Model

Collectively, it appears that each actor or group behaved as exactly as they should have, based on their individual cultural ideology and perspective. In other words, taking into account the background of each actor, there should have been no surprises, once the SECNAV and the Governor changed the rules of the game. This will be discussed in much more detailed in the

Legal Negotiations chapter ahead. Demonstrated behavior was a direct consequence of individual ideology and associated cultural influence.

CHAPTER 5C

NARRATIVE SHIFT

Introduction

As mentioned earlier, different narratives drove the intensity, direction, and pace of the Federal City dynamic over the many years of its existence. Beginning with the earliest threats of



Figure 28. Relationship between narratives, behavior, and subsystems

yet another BRAC round to threaten the NSA New Orleans, through the formal announcement that the NSA was on DOD's recommended list for closure, through Katrina's devastating blow to the region and subsequent rebuilding effort, various ideological meso-level narratives were present, subtly influencing behavior and activity. Each will be identified and examined as the interviews revealed their nature and effects.

BRAC Prep

Several of the respondents had significant experience with the DOD BRAC process, with direct experience dealing with the numerous previous BRAC rounds as they impacted various Navy and Marine Corps interests throughout the nation. Speaking to the complexity of the BRAC process, Greg Preston comments:

“I mean, the BRAC world is an unholy alliance in the federal government...and our deals are complex and difficult” (Preston, 2015).

Consequently, the narrative normally attributable to the looming BRAC threat for the local base facing closure was one of futile inevitability. As Bob Braithwaite states:

“I can't tell you how many times I've dealt with local communities... 'oh you can't do that,' 'please don't leave us,' and seen it in other places fighting tooth and nail to keep their units there or other organizations or whatever it was... but I never saw anybody win. Once the BRAC made a decision, it was just 'too bad'” (Braithwaite, 2015).

However, an interesting observation was raised concerning the change in the BRAC narrative after the tragic blow to this nation's security on 9/11:

“The pre-9/11 stuff from the earlier BRAC rounds, a lot of it was, okay, somewhat, we're glad that the military is leaving. We don't really need them anymore. Let's move on and make money rather than -- there wasn't that patriotism if you will” (Preston, 2015).

Within New Orleans, as news of the BRAC 2005 round reached the civic and military leadership, reactions were initially mixed relating to the threat to the military bases in the region, especially the NSA. According to varied respondents:

“And there was no doubt that one was coming. At that time, we just didn't really know when. So I got their attention and they definitely didn't want to lose the bases. So that registered with them” (Mize, 2015).

“Prior to 2005, the writing was on the wall. I don't remember the exact date, but it could go back to as early as 2004, perhaps even earlier than that when people suspected -- they knew that another BRAC round was coming. And there was some clamoring, hey, we have to get ready. We have to shore up our defenses. And even go back further than

that, people were always -- there was at one point people realized that there is an economic benefit to having a substantial military -- any community with a military presence is going to want to save that military presence. And this place was no different” (Purpura, 2015).

“Everybody suspected that Naval Support Activity was going to be on it. It was essentially an administrative base. There's no real training mission...there was no military mission here” (Purpura, 2015).

“No jets, no tanks, no ships, no nothing. Just an expensive base that straddled two sides of the river and needed a shuttle to get across...And there was a lot of cost associated with that” (Purpura, 2015).

“It was not at all disingenuous when in May 2005, Naval Support Activity was recommended for closure in the '05 BRAC. It wasn't disingenuous on the part of the city or the state to say, hey wait, Navy, you were receptive to this idea of Federal City. Now you're going to close it? Wait. We've already made some efforts. And that was an argument that they carried to the BRAC commission” (Purpura, 2015).

“So in the 2005 one, the Marine Corps definitely looked at other options, but they couldn't find a cheaper one than staying here in New Orleans. So they weren't overly excited about that, but they also weren't falling on their sword about trying to find another option because they couldn't make a case for going any place else. The Marine Corps got a much better deal” (Mize, 2015).

“So when all of this stuff started with BRAC, I think it was kind of the senior officer relationship in town that had a lot of impact on the Marine Corps wanting to stay in New Orleans” (Braithwaite, 2015).

However, the semi-concerned message that was carried during the early phase of the BRAC 2005 fact-finding months was quickly replaced with outright concern once the Department of Defense formally announced that the NSA New Orleans would be summarily closed. The theme quickly changed from one of half-hearted preparation to the classic “Save the Base” narrative.

Save the Base

As soon as word had gotten out that the NSA was indeed named on the DOD's closure list, City leadership quickly turned to General Mize and NOFA for help in attempting to assuage the BRAC Commission into sparing the West Bank of the NSA. In General Mize's words:

“...it was obvious that nothing had been done to do anything for BRAC or save the bases or anything...I mean, there were a few ideas thrown out, but nothing was done, zip. So we had no organization; no real ideas or anything...I talked to the mayor some more and then I talked to the governor” (Mize, 2015).

Corroboration from a key actor close to the situation, Captain Bill Garrett, offers:

General Mize, you know, was really the father for lack of a better term of leading the charge to try to find a way to revitalize this -- the West Bank facility. As that played out, that turned into a save-the-base once it came out that it was on the hit list” (Garrett, 2015).

Furthermore, General Mize comment’s to the City and State leadership on his actions to proceed with the defense:

“The only way I think we can do this is you've got to really make some significant commitments that you're going to fund and support things. So I'm not going to take on the job unless you're saying you're going to put some money and some effort in. You're going to give me the latitude to put an organization together here to do it because otherwise we're all wasting our time. So both the governor and the mayor said, hey, we're scared. We don't want to lose it on our watch. You've got it. We'll back you. And in fact both of them ended up doing that” (Mize, 2015).

“I said, okay, we're going to do this, but I'm going to do it only if two things; if you allow me to make a nonprofit organization that will run the effort that is totally outside the political process because it will hamper us and screw us up and it will ruin our credibility if the Department of Defense sees a local government running or doing this because they just won't have belief or credibility...So it's got to be a nonprofit that is outside of the local political process and you've got to make a commitment that you are going to give me some money for the plan I'm going to present to you” (Mize, 2015).

However, from the perspective of Washington, D.C., the Save the Base strategy normally fails to achieve any results. According to the Navy’s BRAC Project Manager:

“For the most part, all the save-the-base -- I would say 9 out of 10 of those efforts fail. For the most part, if you wind up on the list, you generally stay on the list and the save-our-base doesn't work” (Preston, 2015).

For two months or so General Mize and NOFA had rallied the coalition, to include the Louisiana State legislature, to persuade the BRAC Commission to save the West Bank portion of the NSA.

Various expressions were captured during the interviews that describe differing points of view of this narrative, even some with negative connotations:

“Easy to get people here to come up with a fuck-the-feds policy. And that's pretty much what it was. It was, you know, the feds are out to screw us again. So everybody came together to stop the feds from screwing us. How dare they take our base? We've had a base here since we were here. How dare they come and do that? So yeah, everybody comes together purist of hearts. Then reality sets in” (Deckert, 2015).

“You had General Mize..., this was his place...you had Jackie Clarkson...who grew up here... this was her place...and a lot of the other folks that had been here...this was their place... they had almost ownership...Here it was more ‘we need to have the military because we’re supposed to have the military.’ It was also ‘we’re supposed to be here’ as opposed to a logical reason why you wanted to be here” (Bald, 2015).

“People bonded and then banded together of like minds who felt for different reasons that this base should be saved in some type of format. When it couldn't be saved as a base, then the idea of a Federal City was conjured up” (Bergman, 2015).

“It could have never have happened at the local level. It never could have happened just at the state level and it never could have happened at the federal level. It had to have been a combined effort of everybody working together in order for it to be saved. That's my opinion” (Palmer, 2015).

The Save the Base narrative was eventually coupled with the vision for Federal City, the latter offering the prospective future for the former Algiers portion of the NSA. The original idealistic Federal City vision was a picture that everyone could imagine and rally behind.

Federal City Vision

If the Save the Base theme was the initial conventional argument to save the NSA, then the Federal City vision was the future for the City should the BRAC rebuttal become successful.

General Mize describes the early tenets:

“So then I came up with the Federal City plan because we needed to have some plan that, you know, when you compared our plan with DoD plan, it was going to save DoD more money and be better. Again, with my background in BRAC and knowing how this works, that's the only way you're going to be really credible of making the case” (Mize, 2015).

“And the idea was the state would provide the money to build the new facility, the new headquarters facility. And we would have a concept where you could kind of live, work, and play and you're all in the same area and be energy efficient and have all the quality of life amenities” (Mize, 2015).

However, elements of Headquarters Marine Corps were not necessarily fully aware of NOFA's Federal City plan nor in support of it initially, as the following suggests. According to Mike Tilghman at HQMC I&L:

“We started to get wind of this idea of Federal City and we didn't like it. None of us really liked that idea at the time” (Tilghman, 2015).

“So we don't feel like, at least at the I&L level, we had been brought into what was taking place up on the hill at the BRAC commission or wherever the hell they physically sat. I found out later, oh, General Mize went and talked to the commission. Because what surprised us was we thought it was supposed to be apolitical. So when a two-star shows up with Congressman Jefferson, Senator Vitter, Senator Landrieu sitting there right next to him, that doesn't look apolitical to us and that was one of our big complaints” (Tilghman, 2015).

“Anyhow, I believe that I was not alone by any stretch, but I think myself and a couple others made a pretty strong case that Federal City is a stupid idea for the Marine Corps to agree to. There's too many unknowns in it. Too much risk. We put our Marines at risk” (Tilghman, 2015).

But the optimism of the Federal City vision was overwhelming in the early days, as articulated by numerous respondents:

“The way I saw Federal City in that sense was, you know, a quasi-civilian, federal military -- military, civilian federal entities collocated with all your civilian support functions outside the base line supported by the local economy, not base housing, not the chow line, not a dining -- public works, all those military functions you would see on a military base. The local economy would support that stuff. And that's what I recall seeing as what the Federal City concept was about, that you would have your groceries, your restaurants, your housing -- apartments, some sort of living just off base or away from your civilian federal job whatever it would be; whatever they could get here. And it would be -- and I'm thinking back on here and I may be taking some leaps here, but it was like a symbiotic relationship” (Purpura, 2015).

“I think what they parlayed the federal city thing into was ‘if you put this investment and keep...keep the military here in New Orleans and we'll bring other people in...we'll steal them from other places, not within state but from outside...this will show that through economies of scale, we can bring other organizations in from out-of-state and tell them

that they can achieve greater things if they're in New Orleans. Because all the stuff is already set up for them..." (Bald, 2015).

"The Marine Force Reserve headquarters became the linchpin of the entire plan and it had to be in New Orleans because no one is gonna relocate from out-of-state to go to Belle Chasse" (Bald, 2015).

"The folks who were behind keeping these buildings here and keeping a military presence, they didn't know what the presence was going to be, but they knew they wanted to do it. They were creating a marketing plan to sell both the federal agencies -- largely the federal agencies who would bless this and send resources, and they were also developing -- and again, these are my words, marketing plan, to enlist the aid of any influencer; business heads, government, you know, whomever that they could get to sing the praises of the value that having the Federal City here would bring to New Orleans" (Bergman, 2015).

"I mean, the bottom line is that the rising tide and all the boats are going to be lifted with respect to, you know, the vision, you know, of the Federal City. Okay" (Quinton, 2015).

"And it was a noble vision. I mean, noble endeavor. I get that" (Quinton, 2015).

"He had a vision of more GSA type government tenants. He saw Army reserve, he saw Army, he saw multi-service agencies..." (Garrett, 2015).

"And it was expected all the military tenants in New Orleans would move to the new Federal City, which made sense. There would be new buildings, everybody in one place, and there would be a synergy there too" (Cotton, 2015).

"There were 43 GSA leases out in town. And the idea being that in a post 9/11 world that those guys would eventually need to move in -- some of them would need to move into a secure facility to comply with post 9/11 antiterrorism force protection. So then we would all be shared within this little compound getting back to the Federal City idea they had originally" (Davis, 2015).

However, pessimism of the Federal City Vision was also captured:

"So it is extremely difficult to get somebody to come in and buy into Dave's overoptimistic vision. Overoptimistic is probably an overstatement. Extremely optimistic vision of how this was going to -- Play out" (Garrett, 2015).

And also cynicism:

"And that was kind of Mize's approach on -- and it was a phase where it was needed, bringing everyone together to say that we need to save this entity and how you work it and who you bring in. And the guys that they ended up bringing in came up with the Federal City idea. Okay, fine. We'll call it that. We can't call it a base. Call it Federal

City. All right, great. And who are we going to get to come in and do that? We're going to get Coast Guard, go ahead and take a piece. Excellent. Wonderful. Marine Corps has already been dragged across the briar bush and up the cactus plant three times after the Navy snuck out of town and pissed off every elected official. So they commit to a piece of it. What about the rest of it? We're going to do some commercial redevelopment and some other stuff and we're going to bring these other -- excellent. Wonderful..." (Deckert, 2015).

Taken together, the Save the Base narrative along with its Federal City Vision, successfully enabled the coalition to influence the BRAC Commission's reversal of the DOD recommendation to close the NSA in New Orleans. As expressed through several accounts, that reversal was considered extremely rare. However, very little time was allowed for celebration.

Hurricane Katrina

The ink on the BRAC Commission's final report was not even dry when Mother Nature's wrath would upend the project, the City of New Orleans, and the entire region through its devastating assertion that she still ruled the planet. As several key members of the Louisiana delegation attest:

"We got those [BRAC Commission] decisions on like a Tuesday. Friday night, everyone, including David Vitter, Mary Landrieu, all the people, the adjutant general, all the people who should have been watching that damn hurricane, we were all sitting in a private room at Antoine's celebrating our collective contributions to this project. And then Sunday, boom, everything went to hell" (Dempsey, 2015).

However, Katrina also forced a shift in the overall narrative of the project. Save the Base was quickly replaced with national sympathy for New Orleans:

"I think New Orleans -- the Katrina factor in New Orleans made it very unique. And as much as I think a lot of folks, particularly on the Navy/Marine Corps side that were not from New Orleans felt a real connection to try and make sure that this thing worked out and that it was kind of the right thing to do" (Preston, 2015).

"Katrina scared the wits out of everybody, so I think that really pushed everyone together..."okay, even if this isn't a great idea, we need to do it...we need to have something..." Everybody at that point was like "oh my God, what do we do next." So Katrina became a galvanizing force for these guys to come together, to at least try and bring this plan in, and make the best of the plan, because it was a plan".

“...everyone wanted to help New Orleans, because they saw the pictures of the Superdome, they thought the entire city of New Orleans was 10 feet underwater for months, which it wasn’t, it was just an utter disaster. Americans like to help people who are in disasters. NOFA seized on that...they took advantage of the goodwill that was being brought out...I think they took advantage of the perceptions that President Bush’s administration had screwed New Orleans, and the Administration was trying to make amends... so this gave NOFA the ‘you want to make amends, you can amend us...’, which okay, that’s a good way to help... and I think as people, as the hundreds of thousands of people came down here to help – church groups and everything else, and they generally genuinely liked the people. Now this goes back to the whole cultural thing we had...in the neighborhood...” (Bald, 2015).

And Katrina’s impact to the Federal City project was captured in various forms:

“Katrina gave them an economic advantage of I think resources poured here that otherwise would not have. And that sped up the timeline. It delayed it initially because there weren’t people here to do the construction, et cetera. But it also brought additional resources that then maybe took them off their ultimate timeline of what they were trying to achieve” (Habel, 2015).

“Because it [Katrina] killed all the plans that we were currently working on. And then those options that we had developed -- just to develop options on what buildings we could occupy was negated by Katrina because three-quarters of them were damaged beyond...” (Maguire, 2015).

“Of course Katrina was a New Orleans defining event in so many ways – the commitment was still there to do this project” (Garrett, 2015).

“There was an overwhelming consensus within the community that we’re going to be resilient. We’re going to rebuild. We’re going to – this is not going to be a death blow for New Orleans. And it wasn’t going to be a death blow for this project. So that was kind of the attitude was, you know, we’re going to be resilient” (Garrett, 2015).

It appears that Katrina’s impact to the Federal City project, aside from its galvanizing effect of resiliency for the City, was time and money.

“New Orleans was in shock and moving very slowly. But the biggest way it hurt us was it pushed up constructions costs. And when we came back and we had to recalculate it, it cost us 50 million dollars more to do the same thing” (Mize, 2015).

“So we didn’t lose any scope because of Katrina. We just lost some time. We lost in the big picture about a year, so we had to do things in two years instead of three years. So that made things a lot more [pressurized]...” (Mize, 2015).

“I think that all Katrina did to the Federal City project was it slowed things down. Maybe reordered a few priorities on the part of everything” (Bergman, 2015).

“Well it obviously slowed Federal City down. It probably accelerated some of the BRAC because, honestly, the whole country felt sorry for New Orleans and the Gulf Coast” (Cotton, 2015).

In summary, as the dramatic effects of Hurricane Katrina eventually settled down, the narrative of Save the Base slowly transitioned to a Rebuild New Orleans one, with the Federal City Vision remaining intact as the conduit to prosecute the latter theme.

“Then after Katrina it became “we’ve got to do something, we have to have some kind of an economic driver within New Orleans or New Orleans may very well cease to exist” and this became one of those keys I think in the philosophy of both the politicians and the nonprofit that having a strong military base here would (1), make people feel safer, (2), bring in at least \$100 million a year in federal money, sustained, that you know will always be there, salaries, contract support, buying stuff... and it wasn’t Louisiana money, it’s federal” (Bald, 2015).

“The branding changed. That’s probably the cleanest way to say that” (Garrett, 2015).

Rebuild New Orleans

Following the initial shock of Katrina as the recovery efforts began, the scale of devastation and the required reconstruction illuminated an interesting parallel with 9/11 and the national sense of patriotism:

“We’ve talked before about Katrina and 9/11...and some of the parallels there. I do believe that this being a very, very, large construction project, the Federal City, was a focal point... something that people could look at and see what we’re rebuilding, we’re coming back, not unlike the freedom Tower” (Bald, 2015).

“Why in the world would you build another skyscraper on the exact same spot were two of them collapsed? Why would you build this whole brand-new Marine Forces Reserve headquarters in the location that was just devastated by a hurricane? It’s because you want rebuild... you own it you want to rebuild it...you want say ‘we’re better than this...better than nature, better than attackers...whatever it might be’” (Bald, 2015).

“So if you throw the patriotism in with the overall Katrina effect, I think that played a large role at least in the passion and the personal touch that I think a lot of us that worked the project had” (Preston, 2015).

Furthermore, the federal government in DC recognized the need to support the New Orleans Federal City project as a means to enable the recovery effort. One of the respondents for Headquarters Marine Corps comments:

“The pivot, and it didn’t require much of a pivot but it was very smart on their part, was look, now more than ever New Orleans needs to have Federal City so we can start the rebuilding process. And that became sort of the theme or subtheme. New Orleans has been devastated and -- we owe it to them as a nation” (Tilghman, 2015).

However, even though General Mize and NOFA were successful in reversing the BRAC Commission’s recommendation, skepticism concerning the Federal City project’s solvency remained popular in certain circles of the DOD. Recognition of Katrina’s effect on that skepticism was articulated through the DON BRAC Office:

“If Katrina wasn't there, I would have put the odds more likely than not that it would have closed. So I do think there was the -- the Rebuild New Orleans factor was a critical piece to ultimately having that building built” (Preston, 2015).

Within the Rebuild New Orleans narrative, the sympathy and support from the nation and the federal government was also revealed during the interviews:

“I believe you had the governor also saying, look, we've got to rebuild this great American city and stuff like this. I mean, I know at one point the SecNav basically was summoned down to Louisiana to meet with Governor Jindal and he did go down and meet with Governor Jindal” (Tilghman, 2015).

“And they thought this would be, they being Louisiana and the entities that were trying to make this happen, for them, this was the shot at revitalization economically of that area; of New Orleans as a whole saying this is, you know, we have to make this happen because it's going to bring all of this business, all of these jobs here. And so everyone had their foot on the gas. And we understood that, right. I mean, we understood it was going to be necessary or at least helpful to revitalization” (Shy, 2015).

“Once Katrina happened, this was another ‘oh my goodness, we’ve got to do something for New Orleans’” (Braithwaite, 2015).

Rebuilding New Orleans...

“So from the Federal City project, it needed to find its place in the priorities of a city and state rebuilding itself after Mother Nature had taken a strong vote” (Bergman, 2015).

“But Federal City...It was folded into this, ‘let's rebuild New Orleans’” (Purpura, 2015).

The Rebuild New Orleans theme remained in play throughout the bulk of the coalition's sustainment phase, slowly waning from the public spotlight as the City of New Orleans recovered over the years, returning to normalcy. As national attention displaced to other world events, the Federal (and State) government's attention to the Federal City project diminished significantly, enabling the local political actors (e.g., ADD) to influence the coalition's internal dynamics and, consequentially, the project's direction.

Navy Leaving

It is important to describe a related narrative that surfaced quite commonly during the interviews, and that is the impact of the Navy's leaving New Orleans. For many years prior to the 2005 BRAC, the U.S. Navy had been developing a national strategy to reorganize their Reserve forces to better align with the overarching National Military Strategy and to mitigate the service's dwindling resources due to budget cuts. Admiral Cotton, Commander of the Naval Reserve Force, describes the Navy's vision:

“The Navy in Washington, D.C., where the Chief of Navy Reserve office is, was looking to align functionalities with the goal of reducing staffs and becoming more effective” (Cotton, 2015).

“So Reserve Forces Command needed to be in Norfolk to align with us. BRAC 2005 was our vehicle. We moved out of the warehouse; moved the functionalities; used the BRAC vehicle to pay for this; and then we got a new building built in Norfolk, which was the Reserve Forces Command” (Cotton, 2015).

A local Navy respondent characterizes the Admiral's efforts:

“And he [Cotton] had a singular vision -- and you'll hear it from him -- he had a singular vision of active component Navy responsibility and ownership for the Navy reserve and complete integration. So what his vision was is he saw Navy Reserve Forces Command tied directly to Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk” (Garett, 2015).

Furthermore, Admiral Cotton further describes his actions towards achieving the Navy's vision for the future force:

"So we did everything with lots of thought beforehand. This was a strategic alignment of dwindling Navy resources to better position the Navy reserve for the future" (Cotton, 2015).

"So there was a lot of due diligence, do the right thing to strategically and tactically align the outputs" (Cotton, 2015).

Notwithstanding the Navy's explanation described above, senior Marines close to the project offer additional insight and perspective. According to General Rich Mills:

"I think from the active duty perspective, the Navy was anxious to leave the gulf coast because it was just no longer as important..." (Mills, 2015).

"I think the Navy was moving...was going out to the East Coast and West Coast and were consolidating. And I think that this base, probably from a Navy perspective, had outlived its usefulness. There was no longer a Navy fleet in the Caribbean...all those kinds of reasons. I think the Navy was kind of looking for a reason to get out...and two very convenient reasons came around...the BRAC and two was Katrina" (Mills, 2015).

And also a slightly pejorative comment characterizing the Navy's timing, as expressed by Bob Braithwaite:

"Katrina, I think, was the final straw for the Navy...just that they didn't want to deal with that again, and I think that was the final [arm motion up] 'we're outta here'. But I think they saw Katrina and the impact on the headquarters and all and saw that as a golden opportunity to get out of town" (Braithwaite, 2015).

The local reaction to the Navy leaving on the heels of Katrina was not surprising:

"But I've run into some people in New Orleans who didn't make the move who are still angry today that we left and their government job is no longer there" (Cotton, 2015).

"New Orleans was crushed when the Navy, in my mind, pulled a Baltimore Colts and kinda slipped out of town. I truly think they were crushed. I think they were surprised and I think they were a family and were hurt by that." (Braithwaite, 2015).

"They didn't even want to come back after Katrina hit...the DoN and the Navy itself did not even want to spend a penny renovating or even fixing to a level where we could come back and actually start operating again" (Quinton, 2015).

“...my perception always was that New Orleans was a Navy town. The Navy had been there forever...they loved the Navy... they were nice to us - the Marine Corps - because we're part of the Navy” (Braithwaite, 2015).

“Oh, they still think they're a Navy town. There ain't no Navy anywhere” (Dempsey, 2015).

“Like I said, I think they were in total shock that the Navy was leaving town, and I remember myself thinking, “holy cow,” it kind of caught us off guard too that the Navy was totally pulling out” (Braithwaite, 2015).

Some additional personal commentary on the subject further reinforces the theme:

“The fact that the Navy left...I think that it softened it a little by the fact that we [the Marines] stayed. I think there would have been more animosity towards the United States Navy had we left as well” (Habel, 2015).

“But again, they had a commander who was -- he was an asshole. Okay. Admiral Cotton. His scheme was to get out of New Orleans. Okay. His scheme was -- he had the grand vision. Okay. And his vision was to remake the naval reserve into a bunch of Kelly girls. Okay. You know, to divest itself of its infrastructure, divest itself of all of its installations. And he was the one who pulled the trigger on, you know, let's make us a collection of individual sailors that could go anywhere at any time. And, you know, he was the one that coined the phrase, the Navy's reserve” (Quinton, 2015).

“From what I understand, there was a conversation between Admiral Cotton and General Bergman. And Admiral Cotton said, ‘you know, I'm cutting my losses, dude. I'm leaving’. And General Bergman said ‘we're staying. Goodbye. See you. We don't need you anymore’” (Quinton, 2015).

Effects of the narrative shift

The most recognized impact of the shift of narratives from the conventional Save the Base story to the dramatic Rebuild New Orleans due to Katrina was the level of effort and visibility of the populace. Prior to Katrina, the overall sympathy for New Orleans' plight of potentially losing its century-old Navy base was luke warm at best. However, with the global coverage of Katrina's devastating blow to the region, sympathy for those affected was nothing short of absolute. Not only did the hurricane response come from all elements of the nation, international aid and sympathy also followed with both significant financial and human

assistance. The Rebuild New Orleans narrative remained in its position of influence for several years during the City's recovery, enabling a steady flow of federal resources into the region. The fact that the Federal City project was included in this narrative allowed its Phase I execution to proceed, as the evidence supports. However, it appears that over the years following Katrina, national attention towards ongoing New Orleans recovery projects slowly waned, to the point that after 10 years most efforts returned to solely local and regional. This observation concerning narrative shift may very well have had an impact on the fracturing of the coalition's solvency due to the varied actor behaviors addressed earlier.

Epilogue: Riverside at Historic Algiers

Towards the end of the fragmentation phase of the coalition when the JDC was established and NOFA was essentially rendered impotent, a conscious recognition was made that the title of the Federal City project was poisonous. Rather than objectively trying to understand the true nature of the project's failure, the JDC and ADD embarked on a new pathway to resurrect the project by rebranding the name. Consequently, along with a (somewhat) renewed Master Plan along with a new potential developer, the "New Orleans Riverside at Historic Algiers" project surfaced as a pseudo-replacement to the defunct Federal City campaign. As of the writing of this paper, the project remains in a perpetual state of inaction. To the point of a narrative's impact on a project, clearly one with national attention bodes well in driving patterns of behavior and acquiring external resources. "Federal City" had federal attention; "New Orleans Riverside at Historic Algiers" has local New Orleans attention only. Perhaps the Rebuild New Orleans theme was powerful enough at the height of the coalition's power to have enabled the project to succeed before catastrophic legal decisions were made at the State and Federal level

that derided the project's ownership. This latter point will be addressed in the forthcoming chapter.

CHAPTER 5D

LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS, CONFLICT, AND RESOLUTION

“The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly”

The title of the chapter ascribed above jokingly in reference to one of Clint Eastwood’s famous films summarizes the overall context of the information presented here. Having previously described the history, culture, subsystems, and associated behavior of the actors involved with the Federal City project, this chapter will present and highlight the qualitative data collected related to the actual legal and financial activities that led to the project’s initial success, but eventual downfall. A brief review of the timeline of critical legal events affecting the project and coalition:

Initial DOD BRAC Report	May 13, 2005
BRAC Commission Testimony	July 22, 2005
BRAC Approved by POTUS	Sept 15, 2005
NOFA as State Agent MOU	2005
NOFA Business & Enhanced Use Lease Plan	Feb 14, 2008
Navy Lease Negotiations	2007 - 2008
Developer Selection	Oct 2007
Louisiana HB 56	Mar 24, 2008
State Audit Report of ADD	Apr 23, 2008
CEA: ADD, NOFA, and LED	Sep 29, 2008
Navy Lease and Sublease Signature	Sept 30, 2008
Master Plan Published	Aug 12, 2010
Parking Garage Development Agreement	Aug 31, 2010
NDAA directing the Fee Simple Transfer	Jan 7, 2011
Tri-Party Parking Garage Management Agreement	Jan 31, 2011
Parking Garage Use Agreement	July 14, 2011
Law suits: NOFA vs. HRI/ECC	Nov 23, 2011
CEA: ADD and NOFA; JDC Birth	Dec 1, 2012
Secure Compound accepted by DON	Jul 30, 2013
Lease and Sublease terminated	Mar 18, 2014

BRAC Commission Testimony – “The Good”

“The Good” element of the chapter subtitle reflects the overall attitude, conduct, and success of the coalition during the formation and mobilization phases of the life cycle in the early days of the project. This early, pre-Katrina era witnessed General Dave Mize personally embark upon a mission to galvanize all elements of the coalition, which included City and State leadership, the State Congressional delegation, in addition to numerous other public and private civic lobbies. In response to the initial DOD BRAC Report naming the closure of NSA New Orleans, General Mize and NOFA coordinated the comprehensive counter-proposal to the BRAC Commission, as exhibited in the subsequent BRAC Commission Regional Hearing Testimony on July 22, 2005 in New Orleans. Highlights from the testimony:

Governor Kathleen Blanco:

“We have contributed more of our sons and daughters to the current war efforts than any other state”

“We also have a legacy of making financial commitments to the military here in Louisiana...the legislature and I have guaranteed funding for the Federal City project.”

“Louisiana stands by ready to continue our legacy of supporting the national defense.”

Mary L. Landrieu, U.S. Senator, Louisiana:

“The leadership of Louisiana has been completely united behind our military communities...the military is intertwined in the fabric of Louisiana”

“Louisiana has a long tradition supporting our military. This support comes in three forms: Louisianans have always answered the call to serve; Louisiana is host to a number of military installations; we have supplied our armed forces with the tools of war for several generations.”

David Vitter, U.S. Senator, Louisiana:

“The DOD BRAC Report used a dramatic expectation of savings for NSA...our analysis of the same report will concretely illustrate those savings to be grossly over-inflated. In addition to this miscalculation on savings, the DOD BRAC announcement does not take into consideration the City Of New Orleans’ ‘Federal City’ proposal.”

William Jefferson, U.S. House of Representatives, 2nd District, Louisiana:

“The proposed Federal City project presents a unique opportunity for the Department of Defense to take advantage of state-of-the-art facilities that would replace current facilities at Algiers, at no federal cost. Louisiana stands ready to develop the facilities at Federal City and allow the Department of Defense to utilize its numerous benefits for well-below-market costs.”

“With our continued effort, we feel that the Navy and Marine Corps would have a bright and successful future in New Orleans, and maintain their beneficial association with the neighborhoods and people of New Orleans.”

C. Ray Nagin, Mayor, City of New Orleans:

“Please consider that the Greater New Orleans community and the State of Louisiana have created a compelling alternative to base closure with our Federal City plan...It creates a new model for national security, and it makes good economic sense for the federal government and the City of New Orleans.”

“Not all great ideas come from Washington. We ask that you help the big bureaucracy in Washington apply some good common sense and adapt a program that is better for the country, better for the DoD, and better for Louisiana.”

General Mize summarizes the BRAC Commission testimony quite succinctly, culminating several months of hard lobbying on NOFA’s part towards marketing the Federal City alternative to the DOD’s proposal for the outright closure of the NSA:

“So we made our pitch and we got great feedback on it. Some of the BRAC commissioners told me it was the best one they had seen and it was obvious our case saved DoD a lot more than the -- but the Navy didn't want to do it even after we won the deal. So they wrote up the law in the BRAC on how it would go. And so they went back to what was in the original DoD BRAC thing and they lined out the Navy. It had the Navy going and then they penciled in, okay, the Marines stay and go to Federal City” (Mize, 2015).

As has been well-established, the overwhelming success of the coalition’s reclama effort was short-lived, as Katrina’s blow to the region just days after the victory quickly buried the celebration into obscurity as all eyes turned to the recovery effort. However, to the point of this Chapter, the successful effort by NOFA and the Louisiana delegation to reverse the BRAC decision should be regarded as tantamount to the coalition’s political power and should serve as

proof of what can be accomplished by advocacy coalitions when all members are completely in synch with a common goal. But, as the reader will see, early success is no guarantee of subsequent triumphs, particularly if the coalition fragments. The next several sections will explain the dynamic of the Navy lease negotiations, to include several unforeseen actions that completely derided the coalition's solvency.

Developer Selection

Following the enormous recovery effort of the region, NOFA slowly resumed the Federal City project's execution, having validated the coalition's enduring support first. A critical element for the project to proceed was the selection of the master developer to partner with. During the late 2006 timeframe, NOFA developed the appropriate Request for Proposal for the Federal City project and proceeded to recruit potential developers. General Mize describes the actions that took place with regards to the solicitation:

“So I had 15 major developers come in, you know, fly in. Most of them spent a day with me looking at the site and me pitching what our concept was of Federal City, et cetera. So we generated a lot of interest and we had 150 million dollars seed money which we thought would be pretty attractive. And then we had the final conference and we had like 177 people there and we had 37 different companies there. So I mean, we had a great interest. And so after the final bid conference, they had like six weeks to turn in your bid or something like that. So we were pretty excited with all the interest and questions and we answered all kinds of questions and stuff. And when the bids came, we only got two bids” (Mize, 2015).

Not surprisingly, the shock of only receiving two actual bids severely disappointed the NOFA members. General Mize further explains:

“So we got two bids. So that kind of crushed us. And I went back and I called about three of the people that had been really interested and been down here a lot and said, what happened? Why didn't you bid? And they said almost the same verbatim thing. ‘When it got down to us actually -- when we did the preliminary work and you're going to do the bid on, our senior leadership said I just can't believe that if we get involved in this, the local politicians down there won't screw it all up. They will want to get their money out of this and it would just be too much of a hassle. And so in the final analysis, even though the opportunity is tempting, I believe down there in Louisiana they'll just figure

out somehow to get their -- local guys get their hands in it so it's just not worth it'. So that's almost verbatim to what they told me” (Mize, 2015).

Unintended consequences of the negative perception of Louisiana politics appear to have influenced the decision for many vendors not to engage in the project. As NOFA Board Member Bill Ryan offers:

“It was Louisiana and people just didn't -- you were using state money and they just didn't necessarily trust the process. And it was very complicated to say the least. But we ended up with two viable bids. And the one we selected, Bob Farnsworth almost left the board on that because he couldn't get along with HRI at all. And we should have” (Ryan, 2015).

NOFA recognized the risk of selecting HRI/ECC, but proceeded with the project nonetheless vice risk attempting to repeat the solicitation. The deadline to begin the project was quickly approaching. General Mize states:

“...we really ended up with one choice. So that's how HRI got the job. And we knew it was going to be a challenge, but it was either pick them or not have a project” (Mize, 2015).

It appears that the foreboding concerns about the developer exhibited by numerous respondents earlier proved true several years later, as will be discussed towards the end of the chapter.

The Navy Enhanced Use Lease (EUL) Negotiation – “The Bad”

The revised BRAC language that was passed into law specifically stated “If the State of Louisiana obtains funding and commences construction of the Federal City project proposed for the Naval Support Activity West Bank property on or before September 30, 2008, then relocate Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve to the Naval Support Activity West Bank property” (BRAC, 2005). With that hard milestone date set by law, it was critical that the entire Federal City project business plan be developed, to include a negotiated and signed Enhanced Use Lease (EUL) agreement between the Department of the Navy and the State of Louisiana.

In 2007, NOFA, along with its coalition select partners in Louisiana, began developing their initial proposal for the project, entitled *NOFA Business & Enhanced Use Lease Plan*, and submitted it to the BRAC Program Office Southeast, Department of the Navy on February 14, 2008. Concurrently, NOFA, acting as the appointed agent for the State of Louisiana, also entered into detailed negotiations with the Navy for the lease of the NSA West Bank property (Mize, 2015). These negotiations, beginning in 2007 through the Spring of 2008, became exceptionally complex and polarizing. On the State side, you had NOFA leading the charge, along with their developer, HRI/ECC. Additionally, they had their counsel, Adams and Reese, present during all negotiations. NOFA's and HRI's position in the negotiation was to attempt to minimize the amount of space and funding for the MARFORRES requirement of the Federal City project, thereby allowing more capital for the commercial development of the project.

On the Federal government side, the DON had formed a more formal negotiating team consisting of the BRAC real-estate contracting officer, Greg Preston; the BRAC Southeast project manager, James Anderson; a Navy attorney, Ralph Lombardo; an attorney from the Headquarters Marine Corps Counsel's Office, Shannon Shy; and Colonel Bill Davis from MARFORRES in New Orleans. Contrary to the State's strategy, the Navy's intent was to ensure that the Marine Corps' full requirements were met for the new MARFORRES Headquarters compound within Federal City. Consequently, this dialectic in opposing viewpoints led to a natural conflict – many months were spent analyzing proposals and counter-proposals, with little progress actually being made. Attorneys for each side entrenched themselves as the negotiations drew on. Colonel Davis offers a perspective from the Navy point of view:

“So again, we went through a series of negotiations that just didn't cut it because financially -- it was not financially suitable or very effective for the Department of the Navy or the Marine Corps what was being proposed by NOFA and their development arm, HRI/ECC” (Davis, 2015).

“And we really are hammering down the deal. I mean, we went back and forth, back and forth. NOFA and HRI was pushing to constrain the secure facility where you had to have a badge to get into the smallest footprint possible so that the rest of the property could be developed. So that was their objective... to put us into the smallest footprint” (Davis, 2015).

Other observers to the lease negotiation process reinforce the dynamic. Mike Tilghman offers:

“And some pretty rough negotiations back and forth. I mean, there was no shortage of punches thrown back and forth on the state's side and by the government's side” (Tilghman, 2015).

Bill Garrett reinforces this point:

“The lease negotiations were just so painful because there was so much posturing between HRI and their staff, their attorneys, the BRAC program office, the real-estate lawyers, Greg Preston who was actually the signatory of the -- was going to be the signatory of the lease for the United States government as the real-estate attorney...there were times when none of us thought that even that was going to happen” (Garrett, 2015).

Even the developer agreed with this standpoint. As Eddie Boettner states:

“The Navy was trying to hold a hard line [during the lease negotiations]. The negotiations were originally plagued with conflicts with traditional military demand. Hoops to jump through...exception after exception” (Boettner, 2015).

However, as the negotiations wore on, more and more pressure was applied to the teams as the deadline approached. This pressurization forced intervention at the highest levels of government, culminating with the Secretary of the Navy personally discussing the matter with the Governor of Louisiana. As was revealed during the interviews by several respondent, this senior level dialogue resulted in specific guidance back to the negotiating teams “to make it happen.” As one of the attorneys for the DON, Shannon Shy, states:

“The governor of Louisiana had basically said, ‘look, Glenn, give them what they want.’ So they came back and they not only gave us what they had previously put on the table, but they added more space too” (Shy, 2015).

Eddie Boettner from HRI/ECC corroborates:

Consequently, in order for a solution to be reached, compromises to the terms of the lease had to be made by both sides, oftentimes with intentional vagueness written into the language in order to allow for acceptance by both sides. However, vagueness leads to interpretation. This latter point enabling factional posturing several years later. As one of the negotiators confided: “Sometimes you want vagueness to get to an agreement...then later it haunts you” (Boettner, 2015).

The last critical event during this tense period of legal maneuvering ended up being a fatal action for the coalition and the project, albeit unrealized at the time. Up until this point in time, all parties fully recognized that NOFA was the authorized agent for the State of Louisiana for all actions related to the Federal City project, to include the Navy EUL. However, at the last minute, the DON’s Counsel’s Office weighed in and ruled that the DON would not agree to allow NOFA, a non-profit entity, to serve as the lessee. As an observer explains:

“NOFA fully expected to be the signatory of the lease. They fully expected to be the signatory of the lease. And it wasn't really until the 11th hour when the Secretary of the Navy made a trip to Baton Rouge to where there was some questions about, you know, you can't really sign this agreement under 501c. It really needs to be a state entity with the ability to levy taxes and do TIF. So that's how ADD ended up as the signatory of the lease” (Garrett, 2015).

And from NOFA’s perspective, Colonel Dempsey states:

“Well the Navy didn't really want to deal with NOFA. Why? Because we weren't recognized by the state legislator. So they wanted somebody above us kind of almost as a pass through that the state legislator recognized. That somebody would be the Algiers Development District. Okay” (Dempsey, 2015).

General Mize summarizes the challenge they faced from his perspective:

“We had a couple meetings with myself, Senator Vitter, and Senator Landrieu on one side, the Secretary of the Navy -- and one meeting the Chief of Staff of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps and whatnot, you know, come to Jesus as tough a meeting as you can have. So we were at loggerheads because neither side would bend. And we had done this -- we got it through past 50 lawyers, you know. This one guy at the last -- at Secretary of the Navy's level said that – ‘misdeal’. So we were desperate to find some way because, again, the timeline was about out on this” (Mize, 2015).

General Mize further describes the resolution and reveals his concerns about local politics:

“And so what we came up with was, okay, how about you do the lease with ADD because they are a quasi-state agency and then ADD will do a total pass-through to NOFA...But the idea then was ADD didn't have to do anything except for sign the lease and we did then the sublease for all the rights and responsibility for payouts through ADD to NOFA so that we could -- thought then that we would -- we hated that to happen because we had worked so hard to get the political guys out and the Department of the Navy were the ones who put the local political guys back in the deal” (Mize, 2015).

Even the developer recognized the fateful decision by the Navy:

“The major fly in the ointment was ADD. The lease to NOFA needed a public entity...ADD. The fuse was lit when ADD signed the lease” (Boettner, 2015).

At this point, we now have a complex EUL with the Department of the Navy and the State of Louisiana, with ADD, comprised of mostly local New Orleans politicians, now serving as the primary lessee and signatory for the \$150 million Federal City deal. However, the fact that all parties were able to close the deal before the deadline and symbolically break ground on Sept 30, 2008 was a feat in and of itself. Regardless of the legal mechanics behind the scenes, the project was officially underway and all coalition partners were amicably rowing in the same direction. Woodward Design/Build, the selected builder, proceeded in quick order with the construction of the Phase I requirements, which focused primarily the MARFORRES Headquarters secure compound.

Fee Simple Transfer

Following the stressful tribulations related to the Navy lease negotiations, the DON subsequently determined that it was in their best interests to hand over a significant portion of the leased land outright to the State of Louisiana via a fee simple transfer. All of the property less the secure compound, the parcels encompassing the PPV Housing, and Quarters “A” (the historic LeBeuf Plantation) was included in this transfer, authorized in law with the passing of the FY11 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on January 7, 2011. This action would cede all property rights over to the State, effective in 2013. ADD’s power would summarily increase

from that of lessor to one of outright landowner. Assorted commentary from the respondents to this event:

“So '13 is when ADD became the landowner...but there were some exclusions to that; obviously, the Marine Corps compound. The Coast Guard headquarters predated the Marine Corps Support Facility. Quarters A was excluded and also the PPV housing was excluded from the fee. Everything else was theirs. So that was as much of a defining moment in terms of changing the direction of what would be the development of the project” (Garrett, 2015).

“ADD was now in control because they owned the land” (Garrett, 2015).

“And then I think that what went haywire was that fee simple transfer that then gave the endgame to the ADD. Because at that point they had all the power” (Palmer, 2015).

If the lease was considered the “lighting of the fuse” with regards to the catalyst for ADD’s power ascension, the fee simple transfer was the explosion, at least from a legal perspective. The local politicians of ADD were now in complete control of both financial resources and land title as they related to the Federal City project.

NOFA versus ADD

As the dynamics of the coalition slowly evolved, it became increasingly apparent that the ideologies driving each faction slowly crept into the exhibited behavior of the varied actors (as described in the early chapters). Specifically, the friction between NOFA and ADD grew more tenuous over time, as described by Kristen Palmer:

“There was a lot of distrust on the ADD side of the NOFA side, especially with General Mize. They just totally did not like him” (Palmer, 2015).

The primary catalyst for the friction was over money, with ADD now in charge of all outlays associated with the project, to include NOFA’s operating expenses. NOFA board member Dell Dempsey describes the situation early on:

“So the State comes to us and they said, if you are going to be the -- we got Mize on board as the director of the project. We were not going to pay him I think 225 a year was what his salary was plus his whatever travel expenses. And the state says we need an

operational budget for five years because that's what BRAC paper is, five years in the project. So we needed an operational budget for five years. So we got together and we talked about it and came up with a five year budget and we went back and said we need five million dollars” (Dempsey, 2015).

The subsequent informal agreement between ADD and NOFA over the funding plan for NOFA’s operating expenses was a sourcing combination of the State’s mega-fund and the local TIF account, both controlled by ADD. Dempsey offers:

“So the state came back and they said you've got that TIF down there. We don't think we ought to have to put up the whole five million dollars. Tell you what, we'll put up two-thirds and you guys down there use the TIF for the other third” (Dempsey, 2015).

“Well the TIF is controlled by ADD still. That's the only reason for the ADD to exist is to control that TIF money. So we go back to the ADD still thinking we have a bunch of supporters there and say, this is the way we're going to do this. Is that good with you? Yeah, it's good with them except they said, look, we've used so much of this money getting through this BRAC process, there are some other projects we would like to get to. Do this, use the state money up front and then we'll come in on the tail end with the last few operational years. We were like, good to go. No problem. The only problem is Adams and Reese never put any of that in any legal documentation. So it was almost like a gentleman's agreement” (Dempsey, 2015).

“So we now are kind of running out of operational money from the state and we write a letter to the ADD saying, hey, it's time for you guys to set the plate. Here we need our two million dollars in the bank, you know, so we don't lose any momentum here. The ADD comes back and says no. And we are like, what do you mean no?” (Dempsey, 2015).

Eddie Boettner from HRI/ECC offers his comment regarding ADD and money:

“I think it was just a matter of power struggle between Jeff Arnold being the political animal that he is. He needed to control the money from ADD. The ADD gets all their money from a TIF” (Ryan, 2015).

As ADD consolidated its power base, it was necessary for them to expand their staff through the hiring of consultants and a larger legal team. Since they were the sole authority for the control of the TIF funding and the project mega-fund, this was within their legal right. Consequently, ADD’s tactics appeared to shift accordingly as they saw their role changing. NOFA’s apparent

usefulness [to them] was duplicative. From the Marines perspective of the growing impasse between NOFA and ADD, Colonel Bill Davis comments:

“But essentially, ADD is saying, well, NOFA is pretty darn expensive. They've got these hired consultants and General Mize and a big staff” (Davis, 2015).

“ADD starts complaining about the costs and they don't want to pay any extra money out of their -- now ADD has the purse strings because the money from the 150 million has to come through ADD down the chain. They are part of the approval process. So they were leaning on General Mize and his group to cut costs and do whatever...He [Mize] lets go of the consulting team and some of the staff to reduce his costs. He's still fighting with the HRI guys. What's funny is it's around this time that not long after he lets go of the consulting team is when they [ADD] hire them” (Davis, 2015).

Other comments related to the topic of redundancy were revealed:

“So much money was wasted. So many duplicative services between ADD and NOFA. You know, you had separate accounting, separate construction management, separate staff. It was the amount of money that was wasted” (Palmer, 2015).

“They were using the word redundancy; said redundant spending. ADD and NOFA both were spending money on consultants who were both spending money on – lawyers” (Purpura, 2015).

The theme of ADD “starving NOFA to death” financially was quite prevalent in the captured interviews:

“And now it's just like one punch right after another, right after another. And they finally effectively starved us to death is what they did” (Dempsey, 2015).

“I think they wanted to starve NOFA with money and then just wait them out. And that in and of itself cost so much money. And nobody really cared about the end-game. I think NOFA always did” (Palmer, 2015).

“But the fact that we [NOFA] never got a written agreement that put that money into place in that last two years of operational funding, that's really what opened the door for them [ADD] to do this (Dempsey, 2015).

Interestingly, this internal coalition funding fray was observed from outside agencies. As revealed from the primary journalist covering the military desk for the Times-Picayune states:

“So after the fee simple thing was approved and so forth, ADD started reneging. They started reneging; they started pulling back from their handshake agreement...” (Purpura, 2015).

“NOFA was starving. It was a shame. It was, to me, humiliating. I felt humiliated for General Mize to have to go up to that board, to the ADD, the politicians, and saying, hey, we need money. And the politicians are holding it back and they might give him a little money here or there or something. And I remember Tom Arnold making a motion, look, we just have to get this over with. We are getting hammered. The press is saying we were starving them out” (Purpura, 2015).

“So I wanted to call the kettle black. My use of the word renege in the context of ADD reneging on that handshake funding agreement, I had the paperwork. But at any rate, the point is that using the word renege to describe to what ADD did to NOFA and starving it into submission, that's what was happening” (Purpura, 2015).

And from the developer's perspective:

“NOFA and ADD were throwing grenades at each other...with HRI caught in the middle” (Boettner, 2015).

Deputy Counsel for MARFORRES, Ron Bald, summarizes it best with his recounting of the coalition's dynamic at this point in time:

“ADD funded NOFA for operating expenses and an audit in 2008 could not account for \$1.7 million that had been given to NOFA. The auditors could not find it...still. I think the argument is what we were spending on Federal City, what were we spending it on? Yeah it's... it's hard because I think at that point the distrust started, politicians are going ‘this is taxpayer money going to a nonprofit, I have my constituents to look after and if I can't tell them that we know where all the money is going I'm going to get unelected.’ So that started to create that whole mistrust, as was the money. It all came down to the money, and as that distrust grew you started getting into the lawsuits, into the us-versus-them, to the whole ‘we don't need you’” (Bald, 2015).

In the Fall of 2011, following the Marines' successful move across the River during June and July into their new MARFORRES Headquarters compound, the coalition's worsening relationship was approaching collapse. As ADD and NOFA continued their struggle over money and operating expenses, NOFA's relationship with their developer HRI/ECC was also quickly deteriorating, following a year of disagreements related to interpretation of responsibilities defined in the Navy lease in addition to other previously agreed upon legal documents. The

vagueness intentionally written into the Lease earlier as a compromise to allow for signature would end up haunting NOFA at this point in time. The disagreement over the payment of utility bills for Federal City beyond the Marine compound would be the specific catalyst that would propel NOFA and HRI/ECC to war. As Colonel Bill Davis confirms that point:

“The initial issues were between HRI and NOFA. Somewhere in their negotiations, whether written or verbal, there was some gray space. Considering the number of lawyers that were involved in this, I am amazed that there was some gray space... there’s a gap in there that created the source of a lot of the animosity that started with who got paid what. It really came to a head over the utility bills” (Davis, 2015).

Fortunately for all parties, the unravelling relationships amongst the coalition did not impede the successful completion of the MARFORRES move across the river within the prescribed BRAC timeline. The Marines’ met their obligation to transition to Federal City seamlessly and the Navy similarly closed both sides (East Bank and West Bank) of the NSA as directed by federal law. However, as the Marines were “settling in” to their new environment on the West Bank, the vision of the Federal City live-work-play prophesy slowly faded as the development of the commercial aspect of the project completely stalled due to the fractured ADD/NOFA/HRI relationships. The promise of restaurants, shops, boutiques, and other traditional community-support venues failed to materialize for the 1000+ members of MARFORRES. The isolation of Federal City in the economically-barren section of Algiers soured expectations of many servicemen and their families.

Another Source of Friction: The Master Plan

As a related side note, the topic of the Master Plan surfaced numerous times during the interviews that serves to illustrate the friction amongst the coalition partners. As has been demonstrated already, General Mize’s vision regarding the Federal City project was somewhat singular, in that it appears to be one man’s view of a possible future state. The physical Master

Plan was developed in earnest by Duany Plater-Zybek & Company, a successful architectural firm out of Florida that specializes in new urbanist development. The Master Plan was considered unrealistic by many, as illustrated by several of the respondents below:

“I had that personal sense with the Duany plan and that the Duany plan was what General Mize's vision was. So it was kind of -- it wasn't quite a self-licking ice-cream cone, but it was a -- self-fulfilling prophecy” (Garrett, 2015).

“I knew the only way that Federal City was going to be successful is if we integrate into the greater community. That was the only way. That 500 thousand dollar master plan was a piece of shit. And you can quote me. Piece of shit. And we paid 500 thousand. That came up before me, right. So they hire the damn guy that was the architect from seaside who was going to do -- it was horrible” (Palmer, 2015).

“But the master plan was only done by one entity, not shared with the other entities...there was no buy-in...It was NOFA that did it, they published it, and ADD got pissed off” (Bald, 2015).

“We spent a lot of money on a master plan for that Federal City. And Arnold had gone to Dave on maybe two occasions wanting to put, like, churches in there and other things that weren't included in the master plan and Dave said, fuck you. So now Jeff was looking for more of a way to get rid of Dave. That's where it started unravelling” (Dempsey, 2015).

Further critique of the master plan in the context of the retail portion of the commercial parking garage business endeavor:

“How are you going to get a business to go into your bright, shiny parking garage if there is nobody there aside from the Marines. That's just not going to happen. Whatever. I'm an idiot. Maybe I just don't know what I'm talking about. So that was frustrating. I was a community activist. I do not come from politics” (Palmer, 2015).

The developer commented on the mega-fund distribution, critiquing the decision to fully fund the Marine compound at the expense of the commercial development side. Of note, the developer did not invest any of its private resources into the project, unlike traditional public-private partnerships involving land development.

“The bulk of the money going to the Marines upset the Master Plan. HRI committed remaining resources to mitigating the project. There was not enough subsidy to develop the private retail side...” (Boettner, 2015).

Taken together, it appears that the Master Plan was not well socialized by NOFA and was another source of tension amongst the partners as the project evolved.

NOFA versus HRI: The Law Suits – “The Ugly”

In late November of 2011, NOFA filed a law suit with the Orleans Parish Clerk of Courts against HRI/ECC for breach of contract (?), specifically citing their responsibilities for paying various operating expenses associated with the contract. While the focus of the law suit was on the aforementioned utility bills, the suit covered several other grievances. Shortly thereafter, HRI/ECC counter-sued. The lawsuits were litigated for well over a year in the court system, costing both parties significant amounts of (public) funding in attorney fees. NOFA board member Bill Ryan comments:

“And of course we had lawyers. And the lawyers, they didn’t care what we did because they were billing us by the hour and we weren’t getting a discount on it either. But it was very contentious. We spent a great deal of time – I don’t know what year it was – we spent a great deal of time in the courthouse fighting with them” (Ryan, 2015).

Other collected comments related to the NOFA – HRI/ECC law suits:

“The next defining point almost as much as Katrina was the NOFA/HRI lawsuit. Alien Versus Predator was out at that time, so I did a slide. “No matter who wins, we lose.” That was the tagline in that. So that was kind of the Navy’s view of that. He goes, man, this is bloody” (Garrett, 2015).

But the consequences of NOFA’s legal battle in the court system had other effects, especially towards supporting ADD’s agenda:

“So what that did was that took HRI basically out of the picture. Dave was working behind the scenes trying to maintain control as the thing imploded” (Garrett, 2015).

“So that was the defining moment for the decline of NOFA and put them on the ropes. Because now they are -- the developer they hired is now suing them. So that was debilitating for them” (Garrett, 2015).

“And now we’ve got -- and now there are a couple of lawsuits that start flying back and forth because we don’t have the operational funds now to pay the light bill or anything

else. So these lawsuits become really, really important to the whole story” (Dempsey, 2015).

“But they eventually settled the lawsuits. They bought out HRI. They closed the deal. HRI walked away with the money and the hotel, so they are still running that. But that's what kind of brought that to a close...So there really isn't much left of NOFA” (Davis, 2015).

“That law suit became more ammunition, more fodder, for ADD to use to say, hey, they're fucked up; they can't get their shit together; we've got to step in; we've got redundant expenses and so forth” (Purpura, 2015).

The lawsuits were eventually settled through the creation of the Joint Development Committee, governed by a new Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) signed by both NOFA and ADD.

Resolution: The Joint Development Committee

As mentioned, the embattled protagonists were directed to settle the dispute through the creation of a CEA, administered under the newly established JDC. The JDC consisted of a board of directors, with three members each from ADD and NOFA in addition to an appointed representative from the City of New Orleans and an elected Chairman. The JDC was given full authority to manage the Federal City project. MARFORRES Deputy Counsel Ron Bald describes the action:

“But there were different ideas and there was no process for Algiers Development District and New Orleans Federal Alliance to come to come up with an agreed-upon answer, so it wasn't until October 2012 that they came up with the second cooperative endeavor agreement that created a Joint Development Committee where you had a certain number of votes for each side with additional support from the business community and appointed by the mayor... and now it kinda makes sense, and you have all the players in the same place coming to the same meetings voting on the same things and coming to some type of resolution...you all get your say at the table...there has to be one answer...everyone is not gonna win all of the time, but you would hope that the process would lead to the best answers, and the best use of the money, the best use of property, and I think that's what's happening” (Bald, 2015).

However, it became apparent that many of the same incumbents that served on the NOFA and ADD boards during the years of dysfunction now served on the JDC. Critique of the JDC was captured during the interviews, as expressed by Colonel Davis:

“They should be merging. That becomes this nexus for creating this Joint Development Council that they push on. That went on for about another year. And the JDC thing was the idea that, okay, a couple people from NOFA, a couple from ADD. We'll do a joint board and they'll be the ones that run the project and work together. The NOFA board was getting pretty disinterested because it's just they are not getting anywhere. They've got all these hassles and they're not getting anywhere. So I could tell that they were kind of frustrated” (Davis, 2015).

“The JDC thing really, you know, at the end of the day when you look at the documentation, ADD is large and in charge. And the JDC really doesn't have any authority because whatever the JDC does has to be approved by ADD because they have the money” (Davis, 2015).

However, when City Councilperson Kristen Palmer replaced Jackie Clarkson on the JDC, the tone of the Committee began to recover somewhat:

“Once they got the JDC established with Kristin Palmer and some other people, that really became the impetus to settle everything that was going on” (Davis, 2015).

Councilperson Palmer offers her observation regarding the JDC:

“It had already unraveled at that point when I came on. And so I was trying to get us to a point of bringing it all together to move forward” (Palmer, 2015).

“...it was a mess. Everybody is a piece of the puzzle. Right. My piece is a little different than most because I already came in when it was just imploding. And I was very frustrated with it because nobody was putting the mission above themselves. And there was already so many personalities. It's like it boiled down to the Mize's, the Pres Kabacoff's, the Jeff Arnold's. Very strong personalities” (Palmer, 2015).

She further offers in the context of the original coalition:

“It had to be destroyed in order to be reborn” (Palmer, 2015).

Unfortunately, despite the JDC's efforts to attempt to jump start the Federal City project, all development remained stalled. Subsequent efforts to rebrand the defunct and poisonous project name “Federal City” into the new “Riverside at Historic Algiers” has also failed to produce any

progress. The CEA and the JDC did accomplish a few things though: it enabled the buy-out of HRI/ECC as the project developer; it terminated the sub-lease with NOFA, removing the latter from all business dealings with the project except for the Parking Garage; and established somewhat clearer ownership of the project's future.

Summary

Taken collectively, the complex task of negotiating the Navy lease proved exceptionally daunting, owing to the nature of the challenge to find compromise from two very distinct perspectives: that of the federal government representing the macro-level versus that of local community meso-level. Further, defaulting to ADD to serve as the signatory and recipient of both land and resources set in motion a series of (seemingly) catastrophic legal events that led to the coalition's ultimate demise.

Central to the subsequent legal impasse between NOFA and HRI/ECC, and the friction between NOFA and ADD, was the inconsistency and vagueness of the original Navy lease.

General Jack Bergman offers some commentary related to this issue that summarizes the dysfunction neatly. Regarding interpretation of unclear legal agreements, LtGen Bergman offers:

“In any process where you are trying to develop, if you will, an agreement, there is always arguing about the words. Insert this, delete that, add this. Yes, no, maybe. Let's go back. What does this really mean in the negotiations? And that's just part of the process of business. Where it differed here, there was no clear entity in charge. If you asked NOFA who was in charge, they would say they were. If you asked ADD who was in charge, they would say they were. If you asked HRI who was in charge, they would say, I don't know” (Bergman, 2015).

Events were set in motion by unforeseen catalysts that deteriorated the fragile relationships of the coalition, culminating with complete disintegration of the coalition and a cessation to the Federal City project. From this perspective, the project was considered a failure in that it was unsuccessful in achieving the commercial development, despite the early Marine compound

Phase I success. The last finding captured in the qualitative research which includes views of success and failure, along with lessons learned will be explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5E

VIEWS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE

Introduction

This chapter will explore the information captured during the interviews as they relate to the differing views of success or failure of the coalition and the Federal City project as a whole. It will also report common themes and critiques revealed through the research that lend themselves to a better understanding of the overall consensus of the study respondents as it relates to the lessons learned through this unique case study.

Owing to the nature of the project's intent to serve the interests of the Marine Corps through the planned relocation of the MARFORRES Headquarters across the River to the Federal City complex, the views of the Marines locally will be described first. Interestingly, all respondents with a Marine service background universally considered the Federal City project an abject failure, despite the successful effort to construct a premier state-of-the-art modern facility for the largest Command in the Marine Corps. The visionary promises of General Mize and NOFA failed to achieve their lofty goals of the commercial development and housing aspects of subsequent phases, caused mainly by the circumstances of fate described in previous Chapters.

The Marine perspective:

The overall consensus from the Marine respondents appears to denote a feeling of overwhelming frustration and disappointment, as reflected in the below comments. However, these comments must be absorbed while considering the points made earlier concerning the Marine ethos, character, and ideology. While Marines will normally endure any hardship or "bad deal" dealt without missing a beat, this was (is) an undercurrent of disillusionment to the fact that the Federal City prophesy failed to produce the advertised result. While the "troops" (i.e., the junior enlisted Marines) are not necessarily overtly suffering at the hands of the quasi-

substandard QOL of the West Bank, they are certainly not thriving either. The promises of the Federal City campaign promising a rebirth of Algiers...a live-work-play utopia whereby the Marine Staff Sergeant fictionally portrayed in the opening vignette could conceivably pick up her son after school (on foot), run him by the Baskin-Robins for a quick treat, and drop him off at the Fitness Center for a couple of hours of intramural basketball while she completed her workday within the MARFORRES basilica. That is not the case. In today's atmospherics, the young son would be able to walk across the street to the sole Subway sandwich shop, purchase three chocolate cookies for \$1.99, and eat them while he meandered to the Ochsner gym where he would do his homework until his Mom collected him at 1630 when she got off work (assuming of course they had a paid membership). While a relatively feasible scenario by inner-city scenarios, it is hardly utopic, or even close to what the movie trailer prescribed. It is through the eyes of the hundreds of junior Marines (and sailors) ordered to serve at MARFORRES in New Orleans that the Federal City campaign must be gauged, not through the eyes of the senior leadership (e.g., the modern day military "gentry") that can afford North Shore or Uptown lifestyles and associated QOL benefits (e.g., good schools, crime-free neighborhoods, etc.). Recognizing this dynamic, the Marine respondents offered the following commentary (recognizing that all Marine respondents are senior Marine officers with decades of experience and an intimate knowledge of New Orleans):

"There was a gap there between the, you know, the promise, the dream, and the outcome and the reality. You know, we wound up with a goddamn parking garage and this, these 29 acres inside this fence line" (Quinton, 2015).

"I don't think any development has been spurred in Algiers as a result of this headquarters the way it could have been. Contrary to what was advertised" (Habel, 2015).

"For the most part, I don't think the promise was delivered on" (Habel, 2015).

“At the end of the day, the parts of Federal City that function are this headquarters, you know, the Navy Federal Credit Union, which is completely tied to the headquarters here, you know, a Subway shop that is tied to the fact that people, you know, have to eat lunch somewhere, and the school. Nothing else has materialized” (Habel, 2015).

“There was supposed to have been multiple restaurants. There was supposed to have been hotels there...So from the perspective of the military that thought that there would be a community here that supported this headquarters where we could have large conferences come in here and we would -- they could stay at a hotel here, walk to this headquarters. They would not need rental cars. They would be able to have a choice of eating at various restaurants, none of that ever materialized” (Habel, 2015).

“So they put the hook in us, brought us over here, but then they didn't keep all the promises” (Maguire, 2015).

“You know, MARFORRES is the anchor tenant and hence the name Federal City. That should bring in other -- you know, should bring in the Navy, the Army, the Air Force. That was the vision. That's not what happened” (Tilghman, 2015).

“...the world class facility is not really a world class facility at the end of the day; that the Federal City project itself goes bankrupt, right, and now there's really nothing over there for the Marines” (Shy, 2015).

There was (is) a universal recognition that the new MARFORRES Headquarters building, at a staggering cost of over a \$100 million Louisiana tax dollars, is the de facto modern symbol of the U.S. military in a post-Katrina rebuilt-New Orleans world, but it is a hollow portrayal. Several respondents echo the point of the new facility's opulence:

“...the success of NOFA, it was not the establishment of Federal City per se. It was the building of this headquarters here which became the cornerstone of Federal City, but really, the only thing that remained on time, on target, you know, on budget” (Habel, 2015).

“That's the best headquarters building I've ever seen in my life. And I'm pretty sure anybody else that has been in it will tell you the same thing” (Tilghman, 2015).

In summary, the Marines appear quite grateful for the State's investment in such a modern convenience that is the MARCORSPTFAC 29-acre “best-place-to-work-ever” compound. However, to the individual, it appears that they would trade most of the trappings of grandeur for basic QOL relief such as safer, more affordable places to live, better public schools,

and, – if it’s not too much to ask - , a local gas station or convenience store whereby you don’t need an armed guard to pump gas or buy a gallon of milk after dark. In 2015, there were 146




Figure 30. 2015 Capital murders in New Orleans

murders in New Orleans, with many within one mile of Federal City (see chart above). Algiers has hardly demonstrated its ability to be the preferred host to this nation’s most treasured resource, its Marines.

The Community/City perspective:

Similar in tone to that of the Marines, the perspective of local community leaders also revealed disappointment regarding the failed promises of Federal City. Former City Councilperson Kristen Palmer comments:

“My opinion of Federal City is that it is not a success, you know. Basically, Phase I, if they couldn’t build a building for free with hundreds of millions of dollars, then what was the point? Anybody could have done that. I hate to say it. But, you know, what -- so all the ancillary projects and economic development and housing failed. So the only people that were beneficiaries were the Marines” (Palmer, 2015).

“it was a huge use of public funds and the benefits that were promised have yet to be seen. And we are at constant threat because the benefits have not been seen” (Palmer, 2015).

“Now, people in Algiers, they just think it's a joke” (Palmer, 2015).

Gregg Habel, retired Marine Colonel and current Executive Director for MARFORRES

(and Algiers Point resident) offers a complementary point of view:

“Algiers itself, I think there was a false expectation on the part of the community at large. I think they felt... that somehow...this Marine base was going to somehow police the area, that somehow, you know, crime would drop just because you had Marines stationed here like we would be out patrolling the streets or something. And so I think there was some disappointment on the part of the people that live here locally that it did not bring as great a drop in the crime rate. I don't know if it even brought any drop in the crime rate” (Habel, 2015).

Additional comments reinforce the sentiment:

“So I think the local community is a little bit frustrated with the lack of the progress...a lot of frustration with things not coming to fruition --” (Maguire, 2015).

“So it's sucking out of the community into the black hole. And the locals are getting Heisman'ed as far as their input” (Deckert, 2015).

“Nothing, nothing has happened” (Purpura, 2015).

“I'm very frustrated... I don't believe in one big sexy project flipping a neighborhood overnight. It just doesn't ever work” (Palmer, 2015).

And lastly, a senior representative from the local developer, HRI, provides a (very) candid commentary related to the project as a whole:

“This was not a viable business deal...this was the most fucked up public private partnership I've ever seen...” (Boettner, 2015).

Taken collectively, the data paints quite a clear picture regarding the views of success and failure from the meso-level. Disappointment and frustration are the most common descriptions of the Federal City project.

Federal perspective

However, what was revealed through the interviews was a singular exception to this overwhelming pattern of veritable project failure: the perspective of the DON BRAC Real Estate Office in Washington D.C.:

“I look at that building...it might be one of the nicest buildings in the entire department's inventory to be honest with you. It's a hell of a site” (Preston, 2015).

“From the Navy's perspective, my belief is that if I had to transfer that property, we would have done an economic development conveyance of some kind. It probably would not have been redeveloped -- not probably, definitely would not have been redeveloped in the manner it was redeveloped because there was no money there. At that point in time, we had just started the financial crisis, so we probably would have wanted to get out at all costs because it was costing us money to be there. So we probably would have cut the same type of deal that we cut on the East Bank and just tried to get out of it. So we came out way, way ahead” (Preston, 2015).

“It's a project I'm proud of. I'm very proud to be involved in that one” (Preston, 2015).



Figure 31. Hebert Defense Complex on Poland Avenue in 2015

To the DON's defense, the comments are most likely in the context of the alternative course of action relating to the original prescribed base closure of the complete NSA. His reference to the East Bank portion of the NSA (shown in the photo below) was the part

that was closed as directed by

BRAC, and handed over to the City of New Orleans via fee simple transfer as soon as the Marines moved out in the summer of 2011. The historic East Bank property (recall the

invaluable Port of Embarkation details illustrated in Chapter 7) remains completely shuttered, chained, inundated with graffiti, and overtaken by five years of Mother Nature's unyielding reclamation. The property remains completely undeveloped with little hope of recapitalization - a truly sad prologue to a once glorious past. To the DON point, at least the West Bank of the NSA was provided a fighting chance for survival, albeit unrealized through the mismanagement of the Federal City campaign by the powers that be.

Use of metaphors and analogies

Throughout the interviews, several common metaphors were used to describe various points related to the dynamics of the coalition and to the Federal City project. Of primary interest to this study are the following three metaphors, illustrated within their respective context. All metaphors are used to convey a particular viewpoint that the respondent attempts to share.

The fear of Federal City failure: "Fort Apache" view

In reference to the lone U.S. cavalry outpost in eastern Arizona during the late 1800s, the term "Fort Apache"

normally connotes a vision or sentiment of solitude and vulnerability in a hostile unforgiving environment.

As the cavalry posted to the original Fort had to endure repeated attacks from angry Apache natives without reinforcement, so too is the




Figure 32. Artwork portraying Ft. Apache in the West during the late 1800s

fear that the Marines aboard the failed Federal City will become a lone outpost in the surrounding crime-ridden neighborhoods of Algiers. The original story was captured first in the famous John Wayne and Henry Fonda feature film of the same title in 1948, and then again in the popular adaptation “Fort Apache: The Bronx” (1981) film starring Paul Newman, set in an embattled downtown New York City ghetto. The use of the metaphor to describe the Marines’ plight as it relates to the Federal City project was popular amongst respondents:

“In the end, if for whatever reason, the Federal City project fails and everything here just turns into Fort Apache as we talked about, I guarantee you ADD will be the first one to say, ‘it wasn't our fault’” (Bergman, 2015).

“We felt there was no chance Federal City was going to come to anywhere even near a fraction of fruition to what the vision was and that we would be a nice headquarters with all the bells and whistles, but it would be Fort Apache in the Bronx because we are already in a crappy neighborhood. And we thought urban blight would be what we're surrounded with. Which I believe today is basically what they are still surrounded with down there” (Tilghman, 2015).

“But the catalyst for the development of the Algiers never took hold, never really got hold. And so you have all around there -- if you drive all around there, it's just -- it's not something that you would expect the Marine Corps -- it's like Fort Apache” (Ryan, 2015).

“There were those who wanted the military to stay. They just liked that affiliation with the military. And then there were those folks who really believed that New Orleans could benefit from having, you know, campuses like this as opposed to let's say ghettos. I mean, strong word, but you know, the joke was our concern -- still was and still is -- you can't have places like this turn into a Fort Apache” (Bergman, 2015).

“...the military was very very concerned that as you know Gerry, that we become Fort Apache... that we would be the only thing on this piece of land...” (Bald, 2015).

“Part of what the Marine Corps was always afraid of out here was it looking like Fort Apache in the Bronx, which it's kind of doing that. And if they are having problems here with crime and all the rest of it, they'll pick up and go to Norfolk” (Dempsey, 2015).

Taken collectively, the comparison of the MARFORRES compound to “Ft Apache” is implied to be pejorative, and as fate would have it, has materialized as feared.

References to dogs (*Canis lupus familiaris*)

Next, a significant amount of reference to “man’s best friend” (an unqualified reference of course) was captured in the interviews which is worthy of mention. The more popular one is described first, and is used to portray the disillusionment or dismay of the reality of when a proponent actually catches its quarry when unprepared for the aftermath. In the context of NOFA’s initial success of swaying the BRAC Commission decision to approve the Federal City project:

“Now what? And that's the dog catching the bumper. Fuck, it's steel. So what do you do with it once you've got it? And with the amount of energy that went in to getting it, there was an equal lack of energy on what do we do now?” (Deckert, 2015).

“And the single biggest things in all honesty, I believe really the biggest things coming in and the oceans of lawyers and stuff was all designed mainly to get around the EPA aspects because every other deal like this around the country could be summed up as the dog caught the bumper. Once the locals got ahold of whatever, they found out they couldn't do anything with it because they lost the EPA type protections” (Deckert, 2015).

“They [ADD] are smart enough and savvy enough to know how to work the political system to derail something, but they are not smart enough to then run something once they get it. So it's like the dog catching - the bus” (Mize, 2015).

“...we were almost like the dog that caught the bus. The dog that caught the bus, you know, not the car. It's like, all right, now what do we do?” (Dempsey, 2015).

The suggestion from the use of this metaphor points towards the unpreparedness (or naiveté) of the broader coalition in having a well-thought out plan for execution of the Federal City project once the initial success of the BRAC reversal was achieved. As has been discovered thus far, numerous assumptions, false expectations, and frail relationships conspired to sabotage the success of the project in the long term. The next two quotes reference dogs in a “protective” capacity:

“The public sector was in a watchdog role...oversight on top of oversight. ADD was the watchdog over NOFA; NOFA was the watchdog over HRI” (Boettner, 2015).

“The way that that was put together was it said that they kind of were our watchdog” (Dempsey, 2015).

These last three statements also apply the dog metaphor in various descriptive ways to reinforce their points:

“But the HRI leadership were the bulldogs. They kept pounding us, pounding us, pounding us. So there was never any, is there a way you would be comfortable” (Garrett, 2015).

“By the time I got there NOFA and the BRAC process had started and they were already kinda set up and running...and General Mize was clearly the lead sled dog on that operation, with Jackie in the background providing a lot of support” (Braithwaite, 2015).

“If I was ADD or HRI, I would be applauding NOFA in the early stages. I would be ---- sitting back. I would be supporting them. Anything I can do to help you, absolutely. Let me know if I can make an introduction. And it's like hunting -- bird hunting. Use a dog. Pure and simple. Get a good dog” (Bergman, 2015).

The coalition as a marriage

Lastly, in the context of describing the coalition during the formation and mobilization phases, a multi-generational New Orleans resident and retired Marine Colonel that was close to the NOFA and ADD dynamic offers his colorful analogy:

“She’s hot, I’m horny. This is good” (Deckert, 2015).

“And then you realize at that point that love is not an erection. Love is holding someone’s hair while they vomit in the toilet. And what we ran into was shortly after consummation, your vomiting in the toilet annoys the shit out of me and I’m out of here. So the more mature group is one of, you know, love is taking care of you when you’re down, not when everything is rolling” (Deckert, 2015).

Notwithstanding the baccalaureate (or Marine) humor in the analogy, it is certainly thought provoking, if not downright brilliant intellectually, in the context of the complex dynamic of the coalition’s internal relationships – especially in trying to qualify the curious relationship between NOFA and ADD.

Lessons Learned

Respondents were specifically asked to comment on any lessons learned that they felt that the Federal City experience had enabled. Significant commentary was provided, and the findings reveal commonality across several patterns. One common theme described the need for clarity in regards to the overarching Federal City concept/vision, to include the prerequisites for realism and flexibility. The plan for any type of endeavor such as this should also be unified and made with a long-term focus, and have complete buy-in from all stakeholders. Some comments:

“Understand that things happen and you need to modify your plan based on what's happened. That's probably one of the big takeaways. I think that's probably the biggest ones of all. Things change” (Davis, 2015).

“I think the other takeaway was clarity in the process...I don't think as much clarity was outside the fence line which led to the lawsuits and the friction points. Things weren't as clearly defined” (Davis, 2015).

“You cannot take anything for granted...something is going to happen to screw with your plan. Business is not a pretty thing. Negotiations are not a pretty thing. They are ugly. But in the end, that is part of the process” (Bergman, 2015).

“You've got to have a plan and you have got to make sure that the partners own up to that and then put it in writing” (Maguire, 2015).

“I think the keys to success were a true desire by the people of this city and I think that goes back to the -- to how much they love the military to keep the Marine Corps here” (Habel, 2015).

“There has to be that one effort of commonality and you've got to put everybody together in the same place, give them ownership” (Bald, 2015).

Another common theme involved the interaction of people, specifically the need to understand relationships, roles, motives, and agendas of all stakeholders involved with a coalition and complex project such as this. Additionally, the need for an enduring “champion” to serve as the principle advocate for the project throughout its entire life cycle was suggested. Regarding leadership:

“The only thing that could have been done was truly to create some leadership, some goal to aspire to, somebody or whatever to be held accountable to because none of these entities felt accountable to anybody” (Bergman, 2015).

“Somewhere, people lost track of the ultimate objective as people struggled with their piece of the pie. What were they getting out of this? And people lost sight on the ultimate objective. So keeping people tethered to the ultimate objective, having a strong influence from the city leadership about not allowing people to get off track would have made this a much more successful project” (Habel, 2015).

“Entities that have succeeded, it's because their leaders were selfless. And it is not enough to have one selfless leader. You have to have a group of people who believe that their purpose for being together is greater than who they are as individuals or even who they are as a group of individuals” (Bergman, 2015).

“I think keys to success were identifying an early champion for this cause” (Habel, 2015).

“So the key is you have to find the right people with the right desire, strength, fortitude, to push an issue that they believe in” (Bald, 2015).

“Everybody has an equity, everybody has a piece of ownership, everybody is part of the solution, as well as part of the problem if something goes wrong. I'm a big believer in you have to have skin in the game in order to care... so if you're not at the table, you're not gonna care...” (Bald, 2015).

Regarding the need for City and State leadership throughout the entire process:

“We should have had the mayor's office involved from the get-go. And I don't know, they might tell you that he tried because he's the chairman of the mayor's military advisory committee” (Dempsey, 2015).

“We should have been better at getting more of the local people involved because when it came time to reach out politically, we didn't have the reach” (Dempsey, 2015).

“...instead of just letting the ADD being our pass through, we should have said to the Navy -- we should go get a special thing in the State legislature that recognizes us...let's get ourselves recognized as the entity that's going to do this. And then we wouldn't have had that association with the ADD at all” (Dempsey, 2015).

Understanding roles and motives...

I think first it was helpful to understand the roles of all the parties... I think you really had to understand the motives of the other parties” (Shy, 2015).

“It’s important to just keep reminding yourself of what those objectives are, what the parameters are, and what the motives of the other side are and what their fears are” (shy, 2015).

Lastly, the need for the backing of the community and the importance of community involvement:

“The dedication of the people involved...the strong feelings that there needed to be a military presence in New Orleans and that very important people with access to high-ranking politicians forced that issue. I think that's probably the number one thing; the drive of the people involved...” (Bald, 2015).

“I think there should have been more community engagement at every step of the way” (Palmer, 2015).

Taken together, the lessons learned that tumbled out of the interviews were quite logical, and appeared to address the concerns articulated in the exacting critiques described earlier.

Summary

The common themes and causal factors associated with the aforementioned views of success and failure that surfaced in the interviews can be summarized as follows: impact of local politics; change in scope of ADD’s role; the rigidity of the Master Plan; the deliberate vagueness within the Navy lease; lack of clarity regarding the long-term governance and management of Federal City; the complexities associated with the coalition’s relationships, and an overall lack of City and State leadership. These ideas, among others identified in previous chapters, will be expanded upon in greater detail within the Conclusions chapter.

CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

Overview

The analysis chapter consists of two main elements, each of which reveals insight into answering the two principle research questions. The chapter will first attempt to integrate the themes discussed in the findings chapters as they relate to the coalition life cycle and the Federal City project's post-mortem pathology. The second part will explore these same revelations but through the lenses of the modern theories that were offered for analysis during the earlier sections of this paper. Restating the research questions for the reader:

(1) What circumstances, conditions, or events led to the early success and subsequent failure of the Federal City project? What contributing factors led to the evolution of the coalition life cycle?

(a) What were the effects of Hurricane Katrina on the coalition and the project?

(b) What lessons can be learned from the NOFA/Federal City experience that can inform future military base closure efforts such as this?

(2) What contemporary theories (e.g., ACF, PET, NPF, GM, etc.) explain the dynamics of the coalition during the various phases of its life cycle and to what extent?

Summary Discussion of the Pathology of the Coalition's Life Cycle (By Phase)

Formation Phase (“*We love our military...*”)

To begin, the information presented in the earlier Findings chapters – taken collectively – reveal significant insight into this case study. First, the cultural history of New Orleans, to include centuries of military integration into the fabric of its society, played a large part in shaping the motivation for the City to fight to maintain a local military presence.

After surviving numerous previous BRAC fears, the looming 2005 BRAC threat of the NSA base closure prompted NOFA's birth. At the core of the NOFA movement was Marine

Major General David Mize, the recognized champion. His leadership skills coupled with his knowledge of the political dynamics of DOD and, to a lesser extent, of New Orleans allowed him to maneuver effectively at the federal level.

Both State and City leadership recognized the economic impact of the military's presence in NOLA and provided overt support to General Mize and NOFA. Through formal venues such as the Mayor's Military Advisory Council, many senior Marine leaders during the 1990s and early 2000s coordinated with City and State officials to seek relief to quality of life (QOL) issues for military personnel stationed in New Orleans. Poor public schools, expensive insurance, and high crime rates (to name just a few examples) have been continuously associated with New Orleans' reputation as an undesirable duty station. One of the early Federal City design principles was aimed to mitigate these QOL issues through the establishment of a positive live-work-play community ecosystem in Algiers.

New Orleans governing subsystems, the product of centuries of cultural influences, began to influence the coalition's behavior early on. Specifically, the effective use of politics to galvanize the growing power of the local coalition towards a Save-The-Base narrative was a clearly observable tenet that led to early coalition success.

Mobilization Phase (*"Damn the Feds..."*)

Actual publication of the DOD BRAC Recommendations in May of 2005 was the forcing function that mobilized the coalition into kinetic action. The loose network tightened quickly and brought significant political forces to bear on DON and DOD via the Louisiana legislators in Congress in seeking relief to the base closure. General Mize, the focal point for the effort, exploited his network of elite military and legislative contacts at the Pentagon and on the Hill to raise awareness of the New Orleans reclama effort.

Driven primarily by Mize, the Federal City proposal was developed as a viable alternate course of action to full NSA base closure. NOFA, along with its abundant public and private allies, developed the Federal City argument, the elite politicians sold it to the BRAC Commission during the local testimony, and the proposal was successfully accepted with three principle conditions: the State of Louisiana had to make good on its pledge of \$150M to fund the project, groundbreaking for the project had to occur prior September 30, 2008, and the NSA had to officially close by September 15, 2011.

At this point, it was observed that all local factions had subordinated their micro-level agendas for the broader meso-level goal of convincing the federal government to stave off the complete base closure by offering an alternative reutilization of the property through the Federal City proposal. The coalition was completely in synch; no evidence of fractures were detected whatsoever. All factions within the coalition saw the potential for the Federal City vision...albeit naively. The adversaries at this point were the Department of Defense and the BRAC Commission. After the successful campaign to change the BRAC language to enable the Federal City project to proceed, the entire region was sent into chaos on the heels of Hurricane Katrina, just days later. The Mobilization Phase marks the highlight of the coalition's political power, as evidenced by what a unified, organized, and well-led disparate group can accomplish when in complete synchronization.

Sustainment Phase (*"New Orleans is resilient..."*)

Following a brief respite due to Katrina, the coalition reunited and again resumed their campaign, but this time the adversary was the Department of the Navy, the landowner of the NSA property. Katrina's effect on the coalition and the Federal City project were quite varied. Positive effects included an overwhelming national sympathy towards the region, which included

overt federal political support and associated funding towards efforts associated with the rebuilding of New Orleans, physically and emotionally. Negative effects, beyond the obvious horrific loss of life and property, included delays in project resumption, dramatic increases in construction costs to include fierce competition over materiel resources, and limitations related to qualified developers willing to vie for the Federal City project. It is unclear whether or not the project would have fared any better had Katrina not occurred. Complicating the matter somewhat, the U.S. military was still heavily committed to prosecuting the ongoing war in Iraq and Afghanistan, while contending at home with the Administration's Budget Control Act, also referred to as sequestration. The senior level DON attention and support provided to the Federal City saga may very well have been categorized as "noise" had not Katrina thrust New Orleans onto center stage of world events.

However, the overarching narrative in support of the Federal City project did shift from *Save-the-Base* to *Rebuild New Orleans* as a direct result of Katrina. Each narrative was used in driving actor behavior towards political agendas, especially that of the coalition's. Of significant importance, the Navy's untimely departure from New Orleans was observed to be a very emotionally sensitive topic, apparently having a lasting impact on the city's legacy impression of the military. Although the Navy's argument to realign its century-old presence to other locations within the U.S. (Norfolk, VA and Millington, TN) was arguably legitimate due to the operational and strategic reasons noted earlier, the timing couldn't have been more damaging to both the Navy's reputation and to the raw injury just sustained by the citizens of New Orleans from Katrina's wrath. However, it is clear that the senior Marine leadership – fully integrated socially into the local New Orleans culture – displayed the classic Marine character that decries their motto, *Semper Fidelis*, by not abandoning their host city in their time of need. Evidence is

overwhelming that Marine culture weighed heavily on their decision to stay in New Orleans even though they had the opportunity (like the Navy) to resist the Federal City proposal post-Katrina and relocate to an alternate location in the U.S. such as Norfolk or Quantico, or accept the Belle Chase option. Conversely, Navy leadership apparently held no such loyalty or obligation to the city of New Orleans in the context of remaining in town or even delaying the BRAC process to relocate. This action speaks to the senior Naval leadership's intent to realign their forces in accordance with their strategic desires, despite the tragedy that just befell the region. Again, the qualitative research reveals a distinct difference in military service ideologies: Marine leadership felt emotionally obligated to stay and rebuild with their host city, while Navy leadership felt unemotionally obligated to fulfill their original intent to realign their forces strategically. I believe this is directly attributable to the fact that the Marine senior leadership had been fully integrated into the local New Orleans society while the Navy senior leadership had not. Specifically, Major Generals Livingston, Dave Mize, Wilkerson, Lieutenant Generals McCarthy, Jack Bergman, John Kelly, Steve Hummer, Rich Mills, and Rex McMillian had all physically lived in New Orleans over the past two decades, embracing the local culture and fully feeling that they were a part of the local society. Conversely, Admiral Cotton, while Commander of the Naval Reserve Force in New Orleans, lived and worked from Washington, D.C. Consequently, his non-integration locally allowed for a truly objective perspective and, to the detriment of New Orleans, allowed for a rather non-emotional reaffirmation on the part of the Navy to follow through with the BRAC exit strategy for the Navy Commands. Their hasty departure will be starkly remembered by segments of the New Orleans community, mostly within Algiers. For the West Bank citizens, the omnipresence of the faded Navy water tower is a harsh reminder to that legacy. However, regardless of the philosophical and ideological

elements associated with the Navy and Marine leadership's decisions, the fact remains that the Navy left and the Marines stayed.

In the subsequent years, the required Lease negotiations with the Navy along with the catastrophic outcome, was the single most relevant action that impacted both the project and the coalition's solvency. The lengthy and heated negotiations revealed the differing agendas and viewpoints of the varied factions: NOFA was driven to accommodate the Marine headquarters with suitable facilities, but with an eye towards saving as much capital as possible for the revenue-acquiring commercial development portion of the project. Conversely, the DON and HQMC attorneys were striving to bolster the Marine compound and facilities with as much as possible, owing mostly to fears of what would happen should the commercial development element of the project fail (which is exactly what happened). Add into this equation the lack of complete recognition that NOFA was the state agent for these negotiations led to further delays and clarity. With time running out on the approaching BRAC-imposed deadline, senior State and DON leadership were compelled to get involved to force the settlement between the negotiating parties. Consequently, the remaining lease impasses were intentionally left vague in order to allow for factional concession towards a compromised solution, resulting in issues later on.

Politics again reigned supreme during this phase, as actors postured their positions in accordance with their prescribed organization's interests. The highlight of this phase, and the ultimate root cause of the coalition's subsequent fragmentation, was the last-minute change by the Secretary of the Navy Counsel's office to not allow NOFA to sign the lease on behalf of the State. With no time to coordinate formal Louisiana legislation to properly anoint NOFA as their legal representative, the Governor defaulted to designating ADD as their signatory for the lease,

and as the recipient for all State funds for the Federal City project. For years, NOFA and the State were operating under the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between NOFA and LED, with the latter document stating that NOFA was the State's agent for all negotiations regarding Federal City. The SECNAV Counsel, the final decision authority for DON, apparently determined that this MOU was not of sufficient legislative authority so as to allow for a 75-year lease with a non-profit organization that could dissolve at any time.

Up until this point, ADD, led by Jeff Arnold, had been in a supporting role to NOFA, was not truly engaged in the details of the negotiations, but had provided political support where applicable at the local level. Even after the change in governance, the intent was still for ADD to function as a pass-through element, and not as a major decision-making player within the coalition. However, the associated power shift created by this Navy decision was the beginning of the end of the coalition, although the effects would not be realized for several years. Since this action completely changed the governance architecture of the project, the coalition quickly adjusted their plan by creating a sub-lease to NOFA to execute the project's Master Plan. Concurrently, NOFA was in the throes of developer selection and was forced, again by lack of time, to select HRI/ECC, the sole legitimate developer capable of fulfilling the role. HRI/ECC was subsequently integrated into their sub-lease contract with NOFA.

This phase is again wrought with political maneuvering, the outcome of which set the conditions for factional agenda pursuits, particularly with ADD's instant rise to power and NOFA's corresponding decline from power. With local politicians now in complete control of both the land and the funding for the project, disaster was inevitable. The subsequent fee simple transfer simply amplified ADD's consolidation of power, turning over complete land title of a large portion of the Federal City property to Jeff Arnold.

Once the construction of the major Phase I facilities were complete, the coalition's seams were exploited by ADD, and the covert – and then overt – actions to eradicate NOFA from the project began to take shape. As ADD accumulated its own development experts and attorneys using the Federal City project funding, the claim that NOFA was an unnecessary redundant activity and had outlived its usefulness in regards to the Federal City project became a common theme.

Fragmentation Phase (*"You reap what you sew..."*)

NOFA's problems with its developer also began to worsen during this time, again with individual political agendas surfacing. HRI/ECC's determination to squeeze all possible profit from the vague lease arrangements despite an absence of investment of their own funds led to law suits with NOFA. Additionally, this showdown between NOFA and HRI continued to bleed public funds in attorney's fees and court costs, meanwhile playing right into ADD's argument that NOFA couldn't even control their own developer.

While NOFA was embroiled with its legal battle with HRI, ADD increased their efforts to further emasculate NOFA by starving them of operating funds. Again, due to the vagueness of the lease and other informal arrangements/agreements with ADD and the State, NOFA was powerless to challenge or repel ADD's attacks. Owing to the nature of ADD's existence as a State entity, along with its composition primarily consisting of local politicians sitting on various State Committees and Boards, seeking relief through the State court system was not possible.

Again, local (and State) politics greatly fostered the coalition's fragmentation, creating an unfair advantage for ADD, an entity driven mostly by local politicians and local politics. General Mize's initial apprehension during the formation phase as expressed to the Mayor and Governor was fully realized, to his unfortunate dismay. Due to sustained political pressure to

settle the dispute, the law suits were summarily dismissed, the leases terminated, the developer bought out, a new CEA developed, and the JDC created. The CEA essentially removed NOFA from any direct control of the project, relegating their organization to a three-member contribution to the new JDC's board of directors.

General Mize was subsequently removed from NOFA's leadership position through a board vote. NOFA no longer had the operating funds to afford his salary, nor was he empowered to execute his previously assigned duties due to the CEA's provisions. The founding father of the Federal City project was essentially dismissed without so much as a "Thank You" from what was left of the coalition; the same coalition that would not have even received a returned phone call from the BRAC Commission a decade ago, let alone a formal audience for a reclama.

The JDC, along with its NOFA and ADD components, has remained stagnant despite early optimism for a resurgence in the rebranded Riverside at Historic Algiers effort. Furthermore, even with the unanimous selection of a new developer, Vista Louisiana, last year (2015), the project has failed to mature due to internal JDC squabbling, active and passive resistance, and unconventional requests for financial information from the developer. Should the proposed sale of the property not proceed and the Riverside deal become scuttled, the cycle will once again have repeated itself.

Contemporary Theory Analysis

In addressing the second question, each of the theories described earlier in the paper have been subjectively mapped across each of the coalition life cycle phases utilizing the below color gradient color scheme reflecting activity levels (Figure 9.1). As the reader can observe, the color green represents normal activity while dark red represents the highest possible activity level.

Normal activity is defined as status quo behavior; conversely, high activity is defined as abnormal behavior caused by any internal or external catalyst. In the methodology of describing each theory's activity by phase, the portrayed color profile will be supported by a narrative which will reinforce the illustration.




Figure 33. Activity Scale

Advocacy Coalition Framework

As described earlier during the literature review, the principle tenets of the ACF are:

- Actors engaging in politics to translate their beliefs into action
- Main focus is the subsystem
- Focus is on how the coalition interprets and responds to events as external or internal shock

Recall that the ACF focuses its study on identifying the shared ideologies of the belief subsystems and relationships of the actors involved or associated with the particular coalition, or network. The literature suggests that the ACF focuses on myriad of topics from the organizational structure and stability (or instability) of coalitions, their core actors, supporting belief systems, and overall dynamics of their formation, sustainment, and decay over the lifecycle of their existence. Within the framework of the ACF, a core focus of analysis is on policy evolution in the context of the belief systems. The ACF offers four distinct conceptual pathways to policy change: (1) external source; (2) internal events; (3) policy-oriented learning; and (4) negotiated agreement between previously warring parties. Of the four, the first pathway, external source, is very similar to a major “punctuation” in Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

(PET) in that it serves as a forcing function for a significant policy shift. The latter key factor is very much akin to the policy entrepreneurs designated with the Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA), exploiting the event-produced MSA “policy window”. These external events are also a central element and requirement of both the PET and MSA concepts and theories. These external events, such as natural or man-made disasters, increase the likelihood of major policy change but require several enabling factors such as the mobilization of advocacy coalitions, utilizing compelling narratives to garner overwhelming political support to attract attention. Based on the findings and analysis to date, it is clear to see the parallels between the ACF tenets and the formation of NOFA in response to multiple BRAC attacks culminating with the 2005 BRAC decision to close the NSA (a secondary external event). An important consideration within this synthesis of complementary theories is the direct impact Hurricane Katrina had on the coalition’s ability to garner significant public support, and, more importantly, its use in appealing to a whole new set of powerful actors (with resources) owing to the national attention received by the disaster. The New Orleans political subsystem was the primary vehicle by which the coalition translated their collective beliefs into action, motivated initially by the repeated external BRAC threats, and then again in response to Katrina, another external threat. As the chart below illustrates, the ACF theory played heavily during the mobilization and sustainment phases, waned during the transition to the fragmentation phase, and then began to reappear as the Joint Development Committee formed and rebranded the effort into the replacement *New Orleans Riverside at Historic Algiers* project. Additionally, ACF also claims that individuals are motivated by beliefs and prone to devil shift, a concept shared with NPF in which actors tend to “exaggerate malicious motives, behaviors, and influence of opponents” (Sabatier, Weible, 2014), which accounts for the NOFA, ADD, and HRI/ECC conflict. Further, contemporary

understanding by scholars of shared policy beliefs is an advocacy coalition’s “glue”. In the Federal City case study, the coalition had the shared belief of preventing full base closure initially, a motivation that certainly held to the “glue” standard. Unfortunately, time was the solvent that weakened the glue and allowed the actors to default to their fundamental core belief subsystems.




Figure 34. Advocacy Coalition Framework

Multiple Streams Analysis

As described earlier during the literature review, the principle tenets of the MSA are:

- Interactions between wide group of actors in a policy community to refine solution
- policy entrepreneurs searching for right time to propose solutions
- Focusing events shift attention to the problem

Recall from the literature review whereby the Multiple Streams Approach, or MSA, was described as a popular framework that explains or attempts to understand the dynamics of how government policies are created under ambiguous conditions. Through the identification and analysis of three core streams related to a particular paradigm – problem streams, policy streams, and politics streams – the creation of policy windows occur, enabling the opportunity for policy change on a system level through the manipulation of policy entrepreneurs. The aforementioned five structural elements constitute the interaction of the Multiple Streams Framework.

The problem stream constitutes various contemporary issues and/or conditions that policymakers and lobbyists want addressed. Examples span across the full spectrum of the political landscape, from environmental disaster recovery to inflation to budget crises. Focusing events such highly publicized events by the media (e.g., terrorist attacks, trade union strikes, etc.) serve to draw public attention to these problems. The policy stream includes the conglomeration of shared ideas, concepts, ideologies, or concerns throughout various organizational networks of proponents involved with the particular problem. This commonality bridges the disparate communities (e.g., academics, bureaucrats, politicians, technical specialists, etc.) and varies in depth and resolve depending upon the particular problem faced, both technically and temporally. The politics stream consists of three supporting elements - the national mood, individual lobbies, and individual government position transition/turnover. According to Nikolaos Zahariadis in his essay on MSA, “of the three elements in the political stream, the combination of the national mood and turnover in government exerts the most powerful effect on agenda” (Sabatier, 34). Furthermore, and as mentioned earlier, as these first three elements converge during focusing events, policy windows are created within the particular political stream. As an example, tragic events such as an offshore oil spill an oil rig explosion will immediately bring national attention to the petroleum exploration and development debate. Lastly, the policy entrepreneurs are poised to exploit the situation once a window is created, furthering their individual or group’s goals or objectives.

In the context of the Federal City project, the initial problem stream was the BRAC closure threat to the New Orleans NSA. The policy stream reflected the formation of NOFA and its coalition partners through their shared ideas related to the Federal City concept as a response to the threat. The politics stream, which reflects the national mood, individual lobbies, and

individual government position, greatly influenced the creation of the policy window once Katrina hit New Orleans. This policy window enabled the immediate opportunity for policy change on the system level through the manipulation of the project's principle policy entrepreneurs, General Mize (along with NOFA). Later, another pivotal policy window was created with the Navy's fateful decision to force ADD to act as the signatory for the lease. This enabled Jeff Arnold to serve as a policy entrepreneur, assuming control of the project and associated resources. The below chart (Figure 9.3) graphically depicts the MSA activity level across the coalition's life cycle, illustrating the principle policy windows created by Katrina and the lease governance change.




Figure 35. Multiple Streams Analysis

Narrative Policy Framework

As described earlier during the literature review, the principle tenets of the NPF are:

- Measures how narratives effect policymaking
- Setting, characters, plot, and moral
- Situated within the meso level of subsystems
- Context important
- Events treated as focusing events

Recall from the literature review in which it was offered that, within the overarching framework of the individual advocacy coalitions, focused narratives are developed to describe

the issue or problem seeking address. To further inform the relationship, Sabatier reveals “Advocacy coalitions engage in narrative strategies in an attempt to successfully influence the public’s and decision-makers’ policy preferences” (Sabatier, 2014).

Restating the NPF tenets, four policy narrative core elements are used to organize and define the particular context of the issue – the policy setting or “stage”, the characters or actors (e.g., heroes, villains, and/or victims), the plot of the story, and lastly, the “moral of the story”. Additional description of the NPF include its core assumptions: social construction (i.e., the “meaning” assigned by humans to the policy); bounded relativity (i.e., the boundaries of the particular belief system); a simultaneous operation at three levels (individual/micro, group/meso, and institutional/macro); and the *homo narrans* model of the individual (i.e., how individuals absorb and process information) (Sabatier, 2014). In the context of the Federal City project, these tenets are clearly illustrated: General Mize, NOFA, and the Marines as the heroes, Jeff Arnold, ADD, HRI, and the Navy as the villains; plots (and subplots) of the latter abandoning the city in its time of need and the former covertly (and then overtly) sabotaging NOFA’s efforts for political and financial gain; and all occurring across all three levels (micro-, meso-, and macro-) simultaneously. On a colorful side note, it has been suggested by many that the Federal City story, with all of its twists, turns, backstories, and conspiracies, be sold to television producers (perhaps HBO) and turned into a mini-series. Hollywood has got nothing on New Orleans when it comes to drama.

As the below chart depicts, the NPF plays a large role throughout the entire coalition life cycle, especially during the first two phases in which the Save the Base and then Rebuild New Orleans narratives are used extensively by the coalition as a rallying cry to garner political

support. However, the actual narratives have a lesser influence towards the latter years of the sustainment phase even though the plots, heroes, villains, and conflicts surface significantly.




Figure 36. Narrative Policy Framework

Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

As described earlier during the literature review, the principle tenets of the PET are:

- Subsystems are a source of stability, power, and policy continuity for long periods
- Instability and major change born from interactions between policy subsystems and macro-political system
- Unpredictable
- Major events as catalysts

Much like MSA, the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) is a popular and powerful policy system analytical tool. Recall that PET generally characterizes or explains system level policy as constantly evolving over time as societal ideological changes drive the political system to modify the status quo to keep pace. Throughout this continuous ebb-and-flow of minor policy change, major “punctuations” or significant external events occur, forcing a paradigm shift and associated changes to system policy on a national level. An historical example of punctuation would be the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, forcing the U.S. government’s change in its decade-old Western Pacific policy/strategy of Japanese containment into a declaration of war against the attackers. A recent example of punctuation is the infamous and tragic terrorist attack

on 9/11. While the national security strategy and U.S. citizen's rights have evolved in tandem, the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon enabled the national legislative response of the Patriot Act, changing system policy in such a dramatic fashion that would have never occurred without the punctuation. Moving forward to the present, the U.S. foreign policy as it relates to the Middle East has steadily evolved in concert with the emerging threat of ISIS. However, a significant change in national policy will not occur without a further dramatic punctuation, such as ISIS acquiring and detonating a dirty bomb on U.S. soil, killing thousands, as an extreme example.

In relation to the Federal City project, the punctuation was Hurricane Katrina. Its epic effects on New Orleans, and on the nation, are still felt today. As illustrated in detail within the Narrative Shift chapter earlier, Katrina's principle contribution to the project was the resultant national (and global) sympathy shown the people of New Orleans, along with an enormous flow of recovery aid, measured in resources, labor, and political support. Arguably, the punctuation enabled the project to proceed initially, but then, as the theory proffers, the political system returned to normalcy. The latter revealing the cracks in the coalition which ultimately led to its demise. The chart below (Figure 9.5) illustrates these points.




Figure 37. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

Growth Machine Theory

As described earlier during the literature review, the principle tenets of the GM Theory are:

- Coalitions of land-based elites, tied to the economic possibilities of place, drive urban politics in their quest to expand the local economy and accumulate wealth
- Places localities in chronic competition with one another; at their own risk

As discussed previously, in most modern capitalist societies, the commodification of land and associated improvements (e.g., buildings) have enabled urban areas to serve as a principle arena for property entrepreneurs, public entities, and other civic institutions to maximize investment return through coordinated developmental ventures. Generally accepted literature suggests that virtually all U.S. cities are dominated by a small, parochial elite comprised of public and private members having business and/or professional interests linked to the development and economic growth of their respective locales. Molotch (1988) suggests that these elites use their public authority and private power as a means to stimulate local economic development to enhance/further their individual business interests. Furthermore, this dynamic essentially transitions cities into fluid instruments, or growth machines, to enhance the personal wealth of elites through the accomplishment of associated growth goals and development projects. The growth machine thesis contends that these local elite “place entrepreneurs” form a virtual political coalition that lead collective efforts to further economic activity aimed to increase the “exchange value” of local urban real estate (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Kirkpatrick and Smith (2011) describe this coalition as a forged alliance between formerly disparate groups with conflicting perspectives, but with a common goal of a pro-growth ideology that associates urban growth with community prosperity. The resiliency of the growth machine is directly tied to the resiliency of the supporting coalition that exploits it.

This paper substantiates that the coalition that formed to pursue the Federal City vision was in fact a de facto growth machine by the very definition just offered. The prophesy called for the aphorism "a rising tide lifts all boats" pro-growth ideology aimed to enable a resurgence in the Algiers community prosperity, in addition to creating an ecosystem that would resolve, or at a minimum mitigate, the quality of life issues that have plagued the military personnel within New Orleans for decades. The initial successes of the coalition in this campaign was short-lived however, as the common goal of pro-growth dissipated in the face of factional agendas and associated behavior driven by individual political subsystems. However, as the life cycle of the coalition concluded with a dramatic end to the fragmentation phase, the die is re-cast with different circumstances under the JDC's oversight that may allow for the life cycle to begin again. This time, the growth machine construct will be a more conventional public-private partnership and not complicated by external punctuations, policy windows, or federal agency negotiations to contend with. The *New Orleans Riverside at Historic Algiers* will remain a local project, coordinated by local authorities, funded through traditional private developer resources, and in accordance with a Master Plan derived from well-informed market research.

Coalition Stage											
Formation		Mobilization	Sustainment					Fragmentation			
2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
		Project delays due to Katrina				Phase I Construction				Re-attempt to develop Federal City (Phase II)	

Figure 38. Growth Machine Theory

Summary of Theory Observations

Taken individually, no one theory explains the dynamic of the coalition's complete life cycle, its motivations, its relationships, nor its inherent characteristics. However, when applied collectively, each theory contributes to a better understanding of what occurred, why it occurred, and the root causes of the ultimate demise. This case study also serves as a contemporary example to better understand the principle concepts of each of the theories discussed in practical terms. Hurricane Katrina is as perfect an example of a punctuation as one could design; the demonstrated use of the New Orleans political subsystem and its positive and adverse effects is a wonderful example of a policy stream; Save the Base and Rebuild New Orleans are perfect examples of powerful narratives; and the two polarized protagonist-antagonist personalities of David Mize and Jeff Arnold serve as textbook examples of the hero and villain in the storied plot of the Federal City campaign.

Root Cause Analysis

As an additive perspective to better understand the relationships amongst the varied factors that contributed to the coalition's evolution through its life cycle, a popular and quite useful technique will be borrowed from the technical field of manufacturing quality control, specifically the use of the Ishikawa, or fishbone, diagram. Developed by the famous Japanese scholar and noted father of the field of quality control, this visual analytical framework has been widely used for decades within numerous industries to aid in better understanding cause-effect relationships. The following paragraph describes the methodology.

Traditionally, the primary result that the cause-effect contributors are designed to reveal through the analysis is depicted by the main trunk arrow in the diagram. Five main "bones" are

drawn from this main spine, each representing one of the “5M” categories – Man, Method, Machine, Measurement, and Material. While these categories are no absolute and can be modified as required in deference to supporting the principle result sought, they are a sufficient




Figure 39. Ishikawa Diagram

starting point to begin the analysis. In this case, four of the traditional 5Ms have been substituted with a similarly related “M” to better identify with the Federal City project’s scope. Specifically, the five “Ms” are Major Actors (Man), Master Plan (Method), Means (Machine), Money/Land (Material), and Measurement. From these, supporting “bones” are identified by asking the simple question “how did X contribute to the result.” As an example (referring to the diagram below), the root causes of “how did the Master Plan contribute to the Federal City project’s failure” are determined to be Flawed Assumptions, Poor Socialization, and Did Not Modernize. Each of these root causes can be further refined by delving deeper into each cause until the roots

are satisfactorily identified. Upon completion, the diagram provides a useful holistic portrayal of the root-cause architecture of the result. In this case, the illustrated root-causes easily corroborate the findings established through the coding analysis previously derived from the qualitative data collected from the research. Of interest, note that culture, politics, and behavior are a common root-cause within the diagram.

Summary

As highlighted by the individual theoretical explanations, the Federal City project and the coalition designed to bring it to fruition, was seemingly doomed for failure from the start. Had more conscious thought been given during the coalition's formation phase related to a long-term plan for the project, many of the identified pitfalls could possibly have been avoided. However, even with pure hindsight, no one could have predicted the reversal of fortune by the Navy's Counsel unwitting decision to empower ADD over NOFA. All factions within the coalition demonstrated behavior commensurate with their individual belief subsystem, based on local culture, born from decades of local history, and influenced by overarching narratives. Conclusions and recommendations will be covered in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

In summary, based on the findings and subsequent analysis, it appears that eventual coalition fragmentation and project failure was inevitable, based on several conditions and events that occurred over time. Numerous keys to early success were identified, as well as several doorways to eventual failure. Each is briefly summarized below:

Keys to Success

- 1). There was an identified and universally recognized coalition/project champion, General David Mize, who possessed a substantial network of federal, state, and local contacts (both political and social).
- 2). A common goal/agenda was established that enabled the champion to galvanize and mobilize all elements of the coalition to resist the BRAC threat and advocate the Federal City project.
- 3). The BRAC reclama and associated Federal City proposal was well coordinated at the local, state, and federal levels.
- 4). The champion and the coalition had the overt backing of both the Mayor of New Orleans and the Governor of Louisiana, but only initially.
- 5). Although unforeseen, Hurricane Katrina provided significant national sympathy, which enabled federal political and financial support to the project's solvency.

Doorways to Failure

- 1). Despite the Memorandum of Understanding between LED and NOFA for the latter to serve as the agent for the State in Federal City negotiations, NOFA was not officially recognized via State legislation in the eyes of the SECNAV Counsel.

- 2). Various Louisiana politicians (State and local) did not honor informal agreements made with General Mize and NOFA related to enduring political or financial support.
- 3). SECNAV Counsel's unwillingness to sign the EUL with NOFA was the pivotal event that led to the coalition power shift and NOFA's eventual demise.
- 4). The State's decision to authorize ADD to serve as lessee of the Navy EUL and "banker" of the project State megafund created the conditions for ADD's rise to omnipotence.
- 5). Several flawed assumptions with the original Master Plan contributed to problems during execution; The Master Plan was unsocialized, unrealistic, and did not modernize as the situation changed.
- 6). The influence of the New Orleans culture and political subsystem was grossly underestimated in the context of predictive behavior for the varied coalition actors representing different factions.
- 7). As time progressed, coalition actor behavior defaulted to core factional agendas and individual motivations, conflicting with the overarching goal of the coalition.
- 8). There was an observable lack of City/State leadership during the sustainment and fragmentation phases, which permitted ADD's wielding of political power without consequence.
- 9). The lack of a vetted and documented long-term governance plan for Federal City created seams in the coalition and the project, creating opportunities for ADD to exploit.

Who Benefitted

Throughout the research project, several discussions took place with respondents related to who benefitted from the Federal City project, knowing that the commercial development

aspect of the project failed to achieve the intended results. The following segment captures the general observations collected from the data related to the topic:

Beneficiary:	Opinion:
Algiers Community:	No. The proposed development failed to provide the economic growth and infusion of new jobs, retail shops, restaurants, housing, etc. within the local area.
City of New Orleans:	Yes. With the MARFORRES Headquarters remaining in Federal City, the economic impact served Orleans Parish vice Plaquemines as the original BRAC realignment directed the move the Belle Chasse.
NAS/JRB Belle Chasse:	Mixed. While Belle Chasse was eventually denied receipt of the MARFORRES Headquarters as originally directed in the BRAC 2005 proposal, the base did in fact gain responsibility for the provision of typical base support functionality for the MARFORRES Marines, Sailors, and their families (e.g., housing, PX, Commissary, Day Care, Fitness Center, etc.). This additive responsibility for infrastructure functionality for military personnel enables additional federal funding to flow to Belle Chasse for sustainment and operating costs. However, Belle Chasse serves as host to the satellite MARCORSPTFAC 15 miles away vice hosting on NAS/JRB property.
State of Louisiana:	Yes. The Marines remained in Louisiana, along with their \$100M annual economic impact.
Headquarters Marine Corps:	Yes. They were able to acquire a new \$150M headquarters for MARFORRES at little expense to them. Overhead for the sustainment of the Marine compound in Federal City does carry a significant cost in manpower structure and operating costs.
Marine Forces Reserve:	Mixed. While the Marines benefited from receiving a state-of-the-art new headquarters building, the failure to develop the commercial aspects of Federal City have kept the Marines isolated in Algiers. Also, the QOL issues remain unresolved for the younger servicemen and their families.
United States Navy:	Yes. They were able to off-load the NSA East Bank property to the City of New Orleans and a large portion of the NSA West Bank to the State

	of Louisiana. They also successfully realigned their Commands out of the region as planned. However, the Navy's reputation, at least locally, was severely tarnished by their untimely departure.
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Final Recommendation:

Related to future BRAC actions, DOD agencies should refrain from engaging in negotiations with State or City governments for land development projects involving EULs. The land associated with BRAC-directed closures should either be sold outright or gifted to the State government in accordance with federal policy/law. Should State governments choose to entice military departments into an ad hoc construct such as what Federal City proposed for their military unit(s), then the deal should not include land title of the property in question. In other words, the land associated with the BRAC closure should not be included in an alternative long-term lease arrangement just to maintain a federal claim to the property. Either keep it and sustain it, sell it, or fee simple transfer it to local public authority. This case study illustrates the dramatic complexity added to the Federal City concept including the EUL element in the proposal. Simply put, DOD needs to avoid local Save-the-Base too-good-to-be-true deals such as the one painfully experienced in the Federal City project. However, if a State does in fact attempt to host a military unit on recently acquired DOD property via BRAC, then the terms of that scenario would require crystal clear clarity in order to avoid the many pitfalls experienced by the many actors in New Orleans.

Recommendations for further study

Based upon information discovered during the research and analysis for this paper, the following issues emerged as potential topics for future study:

- 1). Forensic accounting audit to determine the actual disposition of all public funds associated with the Federal City project (e.g., the \$150M megafund, TIF funds, DOD funding, etc.).
- 2). Legal analysis relating to the use of public capital for investments into revenue-producing public-private activities (e.g., the Federal City parking garage facility).
- 3). An analysis of the Federal City project from a Public Private Partnership perspective.
- 4). An analysis of non-profit organizations coordinating land redevelopment in multi-level (federal, state, city) government projects.

Epilogue

In closing, the following two vignettes are offered to illustrate two potential scenarios for the future, the first one reflecting an optimistic outlook and the latter pessimistic. The reality will most likely fall somewhere in between, but only time tell. In any event, I would hope that the city and state leadership would strongly consider that the ongoing presence of the military in New Orleans, specifically the Marines, is a fragile existence. If the quality of life issues for the junior military personnel and their young families are not mitigated soon – or worsen – I fear that the Department of the Navy would not hesitate to relocate the remaining Marine commands out of state at the earliest opportunity. With another round of BRAC looming on the horizon, and the new Marine Corps Support Facility in Algiers portrayed as a modern day “Ft. Apache”, it is in the best interests of the local political leadership to figure out how to resolve the stalled redevelopment project sooner rather than later.

Closing Vignette A

The Sergeant Major glanced at her watch while she patiently waited in line for her morning coffee at the local Starbucks. 0540. “Plenty of time” she thought to herself, as her mind quickly ran through the morning’s scheduled commitments at work. As the Command Sergeant Major for the MARFORRES Headquarters in New Orleans, her responsibilities to both the 3-star

Commander and to the tens of thousands of enlisted Marines under her purview were tremendous, and she took her job quite seriously. As she slowly inched towards the counter to order her standard venti dark roast, she briefly glanced around the room, taking in her surroundings. Having just recently reported aboard the Marine Corps Support Facility, she was still in awe at the transformation that took place since her previous tour at MARFORRES over ten years ago. The dozens of shuttered and dilapidated buildings that once littered the former Federal City landscape had been replaced with rows of modern shops, boutiques, and restaurants, adorned with well-designed gardens throughout the town square. Becoming slightly disturbed by the large order placed by a patron at the front of the line, she distracted herself by striking up a conversation with a Marine Colonel standing just behind her in line. Knowing the man vaguely from previous travels somewhere unrealized, the chat quickly confirmed their acquaintance from a conference they both attended three years prior in Guam regarding the post-war reconstitution efforts following the bloody South China Sea conflict, the country's most recent skirmish with the belligerent Chinese government. After a brief exchange of catching up banter, the Colonel revealed that he was in town for the annual TEEP Budget Conference that was being hosted at the Riverside Marriott across the street. Apparently, she recalled from a recent discussion with the MARFORRES Counsel, the Historic Riverside at Historic Algiers development was a resounding success once the Governor finally weighed in back in 2017 and disbanded the entire JDC/ADD boards for incompetence. Once the State LED took over the project and dealt with the developer, Vista Louisiana, directly, the construction took off at a rapid pace. With Woodward Design/Build swinging the hammers, it was no surprise that the development hit all the Master Plan milestones ahead of schedule and under budget. This was all fantastic news for the Marines who had been forced to suffer through years of working at "Ft Apache" as the Marine Corps Support Facility had become nicknamed.

The patron that had stalled the line with his "Box o' Joe" and assorted pastry request had finally been processed, so the SgtMaj quickly grabbed her coffee and headed for the door. Just as she reached the curb, she realized that she had forgotten her CAC Card back home. "Damn it" she uttered, frustrated with herself for not properly checking before her hasty departure 20 minutes earlier. She walked briskly across the street, through the town square beneath the recently repainted 150 foot water tower, and across another street to her two-bedroom studio apartment located in the former NSA Building 10, directly across from the village auditorium. Despite her momentary misfortune regarding her ID card drama, she briefly smiled for just a moment as she entered her home on the second floor. The hardwood floors and 12-foot ceilings were classic New Orleans Victorian style; the developer had sold out the entire 20-unit complex in just under a month of advertisement five years earlier. Retrieving her wayward credentials from the granite countertop, she set out hurriedly through the door towards the side gate entrance to the Support Facility just four blocks away. As she retraced her steps from just a

short while earlier, she again took stock in the dramatic changes that had taken place since her last tour here. She recalled the feelings of contempt she had for whomever had let the Federal City project fail so miserably, forcing her fellow Marines to suffer in the Fort Apache



Figure 40. Artist's rendition of Federal City town square

environment that they had found themselves working in during the early days after the great migration across the river. But then her outlook quickly changed as her mind focused back to the present. Even the young Marines under her charge – unaware of the circumstances ten years earlier – were much more content with the amenities offered to them by the Riverside campus. Many young military families had taken advantage of the new housing opportunities nearby, along with the new public elementary school, Rouse's supermarket, and other essential mainstays of a modern community. The troops were much happier now that the quality of life issues that had plagued New Orleans for so many decades were beginning to dissipate. New Orleans was no longer the hardship tour that it used to be, at least from the standpoint of the junior enlisted Marines.

Closing Vignette B

The Deputy Sheriff drove his patrol car down Behrman Avenue heading towards the river, unwittingly glancing from left to right and back again continuously, a consequence of 15 years on the job working the 15th Ward of Orleans Parish. The dozens of shuttered building and abandoned lots of the former Navy base hadn't changed in years, he thought to himself, made worse with ADD's failed attempt to resurrect the redevelopment project with the Riverside at Historic Algiers plan. As the story had been retold over and over again, the local politicians couldn't get out of their own way and finally had run off the only developer willing to take on the project, Vista Louisiana. A couple of years after that fateful day in July of 2016 at the Joint Development Committee meeting, Vista leadership finally threw in the towel following the unwarranted emotional reprimand from Jackie Clarkson and an hour-long childish inquisition by a new committee member. Vista's investors had simply had enough of



Figure 41. Common sight aboard Federal City

the local political bureaucracy and land development incompetence, and had decided to cut their \$2 million dollar losses. Had the representatives “of the people” realized the disastrous effects that their indecision would cause years later, they would immediately have changed their attitude, if nothing more than to save their own individual reputations. However, unbeknownst to the JDC/ADD folks at the time, the 2020 BRAC wasn't even on the drawing board yet within the bowels of the Pentagon at that time. No one could have foreseen how, with the dramatic change in Administration, the subsequent hostilities in the South China Sea, and the need to restructure the Defense infrastructure strategically, that history would repeat itself with another round of BRAC rolling into the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. With the Department of the Navy needing to shift forces to the Western Pacific to contend with China's growing threat, several administrative shore commands had to be sacrificed to compensate for the capital investment needed to reinforce overseas outposts, such as on Guam. With a rather large bill to pay, the Marine Corps' contribution to the campaign was realigning its MARFORRES Headquarters to Quantico, Virginia, sending its Major Subordinate Commands to Joint Reserve Base at Fort Worth, Texas, and completely divesting itself of its Marine Corps Support Facility in New Orleans. With only a minimal capital investment in the facility by the Marines Corps (recall the State financed the facility), and the unresolved quality of life issues that had plagued the servicemen and their families for decades still weighing heavily, the choice was easy to make. So, from the indifferent eyes of the ever-watchful faded Navy water tower in

Algiers, the Marines finally departed New Orleans in 2021, after nearly 250 years of faithful service to the region.

Having lost the principle anchor to the hopes for an Algiers resurgence in economic growth, the area fell further into disarray. The beautiful MARFORRES Headquarters, considered at one point to be the most modern, opulent headquarters in DOD, was gifted back to the State with the stroke of a pen, along with the transfer of the remaining land upon which it sat. The Navy didn't even haggle over attempting to obtain a sale price, they simply gave it away. The State, after attempting to sell the property and the facility unsuccessfully, ceded it to the Parish to deal with. With no commercial takers either, the decision was made to transition the 400,000 square foot facility into a pseudo-municipal building. However, even with the leasing out of a significant portion of the building to Delgado Community College, several government agencies, and hosting the Orleans Parish West Bank Court system, the Parish was barely able to cover the operating expenses to sustain the facility in addition to the property of the former Federal City. The Marines' departure could have been avoided had the City and State leadership truly recognized the value of their presence. You would have thought that the New Orleans political machine would have learned its lesson from the Navy leaving town following Katrina. Apparently not. "Laissez les bon temps rouler," but without the Marines...

"No better friend, no worse enemy"
1st Marine Division Motto

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APPENDIX A
FEDERAL CITY CHRONOLOGY

[separate file]

APPENDIX B

PARTICIPANT LISTING

Respondent	Association	Remarks
Ron Bald	MARFORRES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired U.S. Coast Guard Commander• Deputy Counsel, MARFORRES
Jack Bergman	MARFORRES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired USMC Lieutenant General (3-star)• Commander MARFORRES 2005-2009• Board of Directors, NOMMA
Bob Braithwaite	MARFORRES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired USMC Colonel and SES• Executive Director 2005-2011
John Cotton	NAVRESFOR	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired U.S. Navy Vice Admiral (3-star)• Commander NAVRESFOR 2003-2007
Bill Davis	MARFORRES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired USMC Colonel• AC/S Facilities 2006-2010• Commandant, NOMMA 2011-2015
Paul Deckert	MARFORRES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired USMC Colonel• Multi-Generational New Orleans Native• Attorney
Dell Dempsey	NOFA, LA	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired USMC Colonel• Louisiana Economic Development (LED) Director• New Orleans Native (Algiers)
Terry Ebbert	NOMMA, City of New Orleans	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired USMC Colonel• City of New Orleans Disaster Recovery• Board of Directors, NOMMA
Bill Garrett	ADD; NSA New Orleans XO	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired U.S. Navy Captain• XO NSA New Orleans 2007-2011• ADD Executive Assistant 2015-2016
Gregg Habel	MARFORRES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired USMC Colonel• Executive Director 2012-2016• Algiers Resident
Ed Maguire	MARFORRES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired USMC Lt Colonel• Deputy AC/S Facilities 2007-2016
Richard Mills	MARFORRES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired USMC Lieutenant General• Commander MARFORRES 2014-2015
David Mize	NOFA	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retired USMC Major General• Commander MARFORRES 1998-1999• Chairman of the Board, NOFA 2005-2013
Kristen Palmer	ADD; City of New Orleans	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• New Orleans City Councilperson• Board Member, ADD/JDC• New Orleans Native (Algiers)

Greg Preston	DON	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DON BRAC Real Estate Project Manager SE
Paul Purpura	Journalist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New Orleans Times-Picayune Military Desk • Long-time New Orleans Resident
John Quinton	MARFORRES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retired USMC Lieutenant Colonel • Budget Officer, MARFORRES Comptroller • Multiple Tours with MARFORRES 1990s-present
Bill Ryan	NOFA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Board Member, NOFA • New Orleans Businessman
Shannon Shy	HQMC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retired USMC Colonel and Attorney • Counsel, HQMC • Navy Lease Real Estate Negotiator
Mike Tilghman	HQMC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retired USMC Major • Contractor for HQMC Installations & Logistics

APPENDIX C

CORE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

- *Please describe your personal and professional experiences with New Orleans.*
- *Describe your observations of the historical relationship between the citizens of New Orleans and the military. Are there any distinctions between the different services represented here locally?*
- *Despite BRAC, do you have any insight regarding why the Navy did not resist leaving the area but the Marines fought to stay? Did Katrina play a role?*
- *From your individual perspective, what were the defining characteristics that brought NOFA together as a coalition, understanding that each member and partner had different philosophies and/or ideologies based on their individual values and beliefs?*
- *As the NOFA (and its partners) group dynamics evolved over time, what factors had the most influence on its solvency? On its fragmentation?*
- *Understanding that NOFA and its partners consisted of varied influential actors from not only the public and private sector but from the military as well, how did the group interact over time with external agencies? Did any one group dominate the agenda?*
- *How did Katrina impact NOFA's group dynamic as a coalition over time? How did Katrina impact the Federal City project overall?*
- *Please summarize, if you can, the keys to success that led to the approval of the Federal City project? Are there any lessons learned that can be applied to communities facing similar situations?*

VITA

LtCol Gerald J. Ormerod (USMC, Retired) received his Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Massachusetts in 1987 prior to receiving his commission in the Marine Corps. During his 22 year career in uniform, he received a Master of Arts degree in Business from Webster University in 1994 followed by a Master of Science degree in Military Studies from Marine Corps University in 2001. During his subsequent doctoral studies at the University of New Orleans, he received his third Master's degree in 2016 in Urban Studies. Led by his dissertation committee (Dr. Bethany Stich, Dr. Pam Jenkins, and Dr. John Kiefer), he successfully completed all program requirements and will graduate from the UNO program in December of 2016.