Date of Award

Fall 12-2012

Degree Type


Degree Name


Degree Program

Financial Economics


Economics and Finance

Major Professor

Tarun Mukherjee

Second Advisor

Kabir Hassan

Third Advisor

Arja Turunen-Red

Fourth Advisor

Wei Wang

Fifth Advisor

Peihwang Wei


Abstract 1:

In this paper, we investigate the effects of internal corporate governance on the length it takes to remove a CEO after the initial sign of poor firm performance. We find that firms that have a better quality of internal corporate governance are quicker to remove poor-performing CEOs. This result persists after controlling for other factors that might influence the CEO removal decision.

Abstract 2:

Employing a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers selected from S&P 500 firms over the period 2004-2009, I investigate the impact prior firm performance on a CEO’s potential of being hired on an equivalent job in a similar company. I find that the better the performance of the previous firm, the quicker is CEO being hired. In other words, the better the previous firm performance, the better is the CEO’s potential to a land a similar job faster. The result prevails even in the presence of control variables, such as the CEO’s education, tenure, age and gender. The better performers in previous firms also seem to yield greater improvement in performance of their new employers.


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