Date of Award

5-2026

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

M.A.

Degree Program

History

Department

History

Major Professor

Allen R. Millett, PhD.

Second Advisor

Marc Landry, PhD.

Third Advisor

John Fitzmorris III, PhD.

Abstract

Theorists and advocates of air power argued that aircraft, not ground forces, would become the dominant platform for victory in war. They promoted the concept of strategic bombing, using aircraft to bypass ground forces and directly attack a nation's industrial capacity to wage war, hoping to ensure quick victory and avoid a repeat of the prolonged slaughter in the trenches of WWI. In 1947, led by advocates of strategic bombing, the United States Air Force (USAF) became an independent and equal branch of the U.S. military. The USAF developed the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to meet the requirements of the Cold War geopolitical landscape and deterrence theory, but the Korean War (1950-1953) required the USAF to modify its air power strategy for limited war. Using personal diaries, oral interviews, and official documents, General Otto P. Weyland emerges as the main proponent for tactical air power as an alternative to SAC.

Rights

The University of New Orleans and its agents retain the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible this dissertation or thesis in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. The author retains all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation.

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