Date of Award
5-2006
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
M.A.
Degree Program
History
Department
History
Major Professor
Bischof, Gunter
Second Advisor
Altman, Ida
Abstract
This paper examines the 1958-1959 Berlin crisis as a diplomatic experience, conducted by the U.S. and U.S.S.R as an alternative to war. Both nations had nuclear weapon capabilities that could transform a local conflict into general war. The potential for disaster, plus other limits, made a series of diplomatic encounters the only productive option. The diplomatic course also shielded American and Russian interests indirectly related to the conflict. Each nation and its leader had pragmatic reasons for practicing restraint. These included conservation of assets, political stability, and most importantly, poor chances for sustainable gains. Limited war doctrine was influential in establishing these policies.
Recommended Citation
Williamson, Richard D., "The Berlin Crisis of 1958/59: A Case of Pragmatic Restraint" (2006). University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations. 340.
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/340
Rights
The University of New Orleans and its agents retain the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible this dissertation or thesis in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. The author retains all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation.