ORCID ID

0009-0003-3937-881X

Date of Award

8-2026

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

M.S.

Degree Program

Cybersecurity and Operations

Department

Computer Science

Major Professor

Roussev, Vassil

Second Advisor

Wagner, James

Third Advisor

Newaz, Abdullah Al Redwan

Fourth Advisor

Summa, Christopher

Abstract

In physical access control, authentication is often viewed as a one-time event, where, once an authorized user crosses a protected boundary, downstream systems assume the user remains physically present. Tailgating and relay attacks violate this assumption. In this thesis we propose a continuous authentication layer based on two Bluetooth Low Energy spatial signals. Angle of Arrival direction finding follows the trail of a worn credential to determine when an operator exits a work zone. Bluetooth Channel Sounding measures a physical property of the radio path and verifies distance during stationary periods. Limiting Relay Attacks with Event-Driven Distance Verification. A stream of inertial sensing provides a stationarity and set-down liveness check that gates and corroborates the two BLE spatial signals. The system is designed as a non-disruptive extension to an existing tool-access radio-frequency identification model. It is evaluated in a community woodshop with a simulated tool node, motion-capture ground-truth, live radio measurements, and modeled attack scenarios. Results are reported for positioning behavior, distance verification behavior, attack-scenario denial and revocation, and prototype latency

Rights

The University of New Orleans and its agents retain the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible this dissertation or thesis in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. The author retains all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation.

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